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Abstract 
The construction industry has a longstanding reputation for offering dangerous work 
and has above average rates of occupational injuries and fatalities. Although 
fatalities have more than halved in the last 20 years, there continues to be more than 
one construction worker death on average per week. Earlier construction research 
has generated a wealth of data portraying a clear profile of accident types, but has 
failed to reveal what happened - the causal factors. In response to this lack of 
information the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) sponsored this research, the 
main component of which has been to undertake detailed examination of 
construction industry accidents. 
Lacking any precedent of earlier or related work, an important precursor to data 
collection was a review of the resources that might inform development of the 
methodology. The path of progress in accident research was explored through 
evaluation of accident causation models. The need to identify active and latent 
factors using a systems approach was identified. Desirable features of the systems 
approach were isolated and, against these criteria, construction accident models 
were evaluated. Construction accident models were found to be too technically 
orientated and focused upon human failings to fulfil the criteria for the systems 
approach. Nevertheless some gave good representation of failure potential through 
the project lifecycle, and these features were isolated for later inclusion during 
development of the data collection methods. To complement the theoretical 
development, perceptions of accident causation were gathered from groups of 
construction industry practitioners', by the use of focus groups. 
Ergonomics methods were used as a framework for development of the accident 
investigation methods. Key features from the construction accident models, 
findings from focus groups, and analyses from a number of key resources 
concerning construction industry accidents were built into these. Forty construction 
accidents were studied. These entailed site visits, interview with accident-involved 
personnel, their supervisors or managers, and (where possible) evaluation of the 
accident area conditions, equipment, task type and related instructions or 
procedures. Findings showed a catalogue of problems affecting all build phases, 
from conceptual design and scheduling of the project timeline, sub-contracting, 
work organisation and managerial issues, to factors at operational level and task 
execution. Given the construction industry accident history, task based failures 
concerning equipment, materials, PPE and task technique were expected. However, 
the extensive range of problems concerning the appointment, scheduling, 
organisation, instruction, training, role and co-ordination of personnel on site 
indicated that these aspects too were important contributing factors in accident 
causation. 
Construction and ergonomics specialists appraised site findings; these data were 
used to identify areas where more detailed exploration might further inform the 
exploratory process. This was undertaken for thirty of the accidents and included 
interviews with a range of personnel - designers, planners, managerial staff, industry 
suppliers, and manufacturers of tooling, equipment and machinery. The information 
from them supplemented and reinforced many of the findings from site data and 
also gave a perspective of the latent conditions under which they worked 
themselves. Designers, planners and managerial staff were affected by many 
communication and role identity problems. Manufacturers and suppliers also 
appeared isolated from the learning and information loop and received inconsistent 
feedback on the performance and failures of their products. 
Drawing the findings of the research together it is suggested that the main problems 
within the industry arise from (1) inadequate communication and consultation 
throughout the organisational and extra-organisational hierarchy; this includes 
ancillary service providers to the industry - the manufacturers and suppliers (2) the 
adoption of a rule based, highly proceduralised approach, with multiple and 
burdensome interventions to control both process and individuals. These lack socio- 
technical principles; there is inadequate attention to the needs and working methods 
at operational levels, where high decision latitude and autonomy is required to 
accommodate the perpetual flux and unique circumstances that typify much of the 
working day and (3) the reliance upon a hazard and risk assessment approach to 
identify latent conditions. Hazard identification and risk assessment may identify 
potential `active factors' in accident causation, but are poor or not appropriate for 
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the identification of factors that affect performance and which are contributory in 
accident causation. 
Appraisal of the accident investigation processes used in industry identified 
numerous problems with reporting and interpretation, and it was concluded that they 
are not efficient ways to explore latent conditions. Recommendations for 
improvements include the development of `performance assessments'; a 
supplementary system (to synchronise with the risk assessment process) for 
assessment of factors that affect performance and which are contributory in accident 
causations, the latent conditions. Benchmarking with industries that have moved 
away from the traditional organisational and safety management approaches is also 
advised. It will be an additional challenge to devise changes that are compatible 
with the unique construction management and contracting methods - any 
interventions will need careful management, leadership, participatory processes and 
cross-disciplinary development. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The construction industry has a longstanding reputation for offering dangerous 
employment, both in the UK and internationally (Health and Safety Executive 1978, 
Health and Safety Executive 1988, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001, Health and Safety 
Executive 2000). Whilst formerly the sector with the highest fatality rates, UK 
construction deaths currently (2000/01 data) fluctuate at - 32% of all worker fatalities 
(Health and Safety Commission 2001a). Fatality numbers have more than halved in 
the last 20 years, indicating tremendous improvements, yet death and major injury 
rates remain high (Health and Safety Commission 2001a). In the past five years there 
has been a mean fatality rate of 82 deaths per year - more than one construction 
worker death per week (2.2.11). 
Statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry indicate that the UK construction 
industry has manpower of approximately 1.5 million workers. This figure has 
increased steadily (approximately 10%) since 1996. Employees are predominantly 
male (only 12 - 13% of construction workers are female) and there is a high ratio of 
self-employed to employed workers (Department of Trade and Industry 2002). There 
is tremendous variety in the type of projects undertaken and a number of different 
styles for managing and financing a build project. Consequently there are perpetual 
fluctuations in demand for manpower, managed by casual or subcontracting of 
employment and specialist works (Whittington et al. 1992) and resulting in low 
employment security (Helander 1981). At site level, construction work is divided 
between many different trades. Longstanding problems associated with these 
employment types include physically straining and often monotonous work, weather 
exposure, lengthy commutes or spells working away from home and coping with poor 
site conditions (Koningsveld 1997). 
The varied organisational structure, work environment and profile of employment all 
pose unique challenges to the efficiency of management in the construction sector. 
Analyses of data from earlier government sponsored research into construction 
I Cross-reference style, used throughout the thesis, that refers to related or supplementary information 
in another section - in this case section 2.2.1 
fatalities (Health and Safety Executive 1978, Health and Safety Executive 1988), 
(2.5.1) and the RIDDOR reporting scheme (Health and Safety Executive 1999b), 
(2.2.1) has generated a wealth of evidence portraying accident causes, such as failings 
in safe systems of work, maintenance, material failures and poor supervision and 
training. However, these analyses, although rightly revealing a clear profile of 
accident types, patterns and trends from which to generate intervention, failed to 
reveal what happened; they do not indicate the causal factors. 
There has also been government sponsored research into the factors affecting 
construction safety management (Ministry of Labour 1967, Whittington et al. 1992), 
(3.6.5.2). Despite the time interval between each there were many recommendations 
in common (such as improvements in training, communication, work planning for 
example). The Whittington et al. (1992) Contract Research Report -`Research into 
management, organisational and human factors in the construction industry', 
identified headquarter, site and individual factors (1: 2: 1 ratio) in an analysis of 30 case 
studies of construction accidents. However, their analyses were impeded by access to 
accident data that was insufficient and incomplete; it was only through interviews with 
safety, site project management and client personnel that they were able to explore 
and advise upon factors affecting safety management. 
Since the 1992 report, new legislation, the Construction (Design and Management) 
Regulations 1994, has been introduced (Health and Safety Commission 2001b) 
(2.5.5), which accommodated many of the Whittington et al. (1992) 
recommendations. The key feature of this legislation is the placement of new duties 
upon clients, client agents, designers and contractors to account for, co-ordinate and 
effectively manage all stages of the construction process, from conception and design 
through to undertaking the work and making arrangements for subsequent 
maintenance and repair. Concurrently during the 1990s there have also been positive 
reports of safety improvements on construction sites by changing personnel behaviour 
(Robertson et al. 1999). More recently, in the past five years, there has been the 
implementation of extensive government initiatives for all round improvements in the 
construction industry (2.5.2 and 2.5.3). 
2 
In spite of these interventions, accident rates in the industry remained unacceptably 
high. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) invited proposals to investigate 
accident causation in the construction industry. 
1.1 Overview of the research strategy 
The current research developed from the HSE Mainstream Research Market 1998/9 
`Competition for Ideas' and commenced in October 1999. The research application 
and programme was devised by the Project Directors, Dr Roger Haslam (Department 
of Human Sciences), Dr Alistair Gibb (Department of Civil and Building Engineering) 
and Dr Diane Gyi (Department of Design and Technology) at Loughborough 
University. An important component of the HSE funding was to work in 
collaboration with a team from UMIST (Dr Roy Duff and Dr Akhmad Suraji, 
Department of Civil and Construction Engineering) who were already researching and 
had modelled construction accident causality by analysis of the HSE 'FOCUS' 
database reports (a database of HSE Inspector reports). 
The proposal was to undertake a three-year research programme, the main focus of 
which was the detailed investigation of 100 construction accidents. This thesis 
concerns the study of 40 construction accidents, of which 30 were subject to further 
detailed exploration of latent factors. Four researchers completed the remaining site 
based accident studies. The chapters for Phases One, Two and Three were prepared 
by the author and form the main body of this thesis. They were also used by the 
project directors who, supplementing these data with findings from the outstanding 
site based accident studies, prepared the contract research report. 
1.1.1 Rationale for research methodology 
This was the first large-scale study involving data collection of a range of construction 
accidents using an ergonomics approach; there is no precedent in use of such methods 
for construction accident investigation. All previous construction related work has 
entailed analysis of third party data (HSE inspector reports or provision of case study 
material) and is vulnerable to the nature of investigation, and style of documentation 
and analysis by those involved (3.9.5). For example, HSE inspectors consider the 
accidents primarily in the context of enforcement and potential for legal proceedings - 
as such the depth or direction of investigations may be unduly biased towards this 
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outcome. There is also a history of poor notification of reportable accidents (2.2.1). 
More simple problems, possibly caused by lack of time or insight, may also result in 
insufficient data (Whittington et al. 1992) and subsequent inadequacies in 
comprehensive analysis (Gyi et al. 1999). Inadequate baseline data does not serve 
well in the formation and implementation of policy. 
1.1.2 Aim and objectives of the research 
The aim of the research was to explore the nature of accident causation in the 
construction industry. 
The objectives of the research were to: 
" Review theories of accident causation and explore initiatives into construction 
accident modelling for use in the research methodology 
" Identify aspects that should be addressed in construction accident investigations 
" Undertake detailed investigation of a representative sample of 40 construction 
accidents 
" Provide guidance on better use of accident data 
" Provide guidance upon the outcomes of the research 
1.1.3 The research programme 
The research plan was developed as a three-phase process of data collection. An 
overview of the integration of research activity and input from industry is provided in 
Figure 1. The nature of the inputs and integration of information are described further 
in the chapters for each relevant phase. 
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Resources from the 
Construction 
Dato collection Resources derived from 
phases the research team industr 
Establishment and Literature review into 
develop industrial accident causation 
liaison theories, data collection 
and analysis 
Establish Steering 
Group 
Phase One 
Focus groups 
Collate industry Collate and develop 
accident investigation ergonomics analysis 
methods methods 
Collate project Ethical approval and 
sponsor information revision 
Establish strategy for Develop a sampling 
construction site strategy 
accident access 
Phase Two 
Site based accident 
studies 
appraisal 
Establish contacts for Collate and develop 
latent factor ergonomics analysis 
follow-up methods 
Phase Three 
Latent factor 
follow- 
Cross-disciplinary 
appraisal and closure 
Data analysis and report 
presentation 
Figure 1. Overview of the research programme 
1.1.4 The research team roles and contribution 
The research was undertaken by a total of nine people. The author, Sophie Hide, was a 
research student between November 1999 and October 2002. Sarah Atkinson (nee 
Hastings), Research Associate in the Health and Safety Ergonomics Unit, 
Loughborough University was appointed half time on the project for the first two 
years. Two researchers from the Department of Civil and Building Engineering, 
Loughborough University, assisted with data collection in the final year of the 
research. Roles are described in Table 1 below. 
Cross-disciplinary 
appraisal 
Collate and develop 
ergonomics analysis 
methods 
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Lead ad role Further contribution 
Development of the research plan Haslam, Gibb, Duff and Suraji 
G' 
Focus group method development, data Hide Atkinson (questionnaire) and 
collection and analysis Gibb 
Preliminary evaluation of construction Atkinson (and later revision) Hide 
industry accident investigation 
techniques 
Identification of sampling method for Gibb Haslam and Gyi 
range of build sector and build type 
representation 
Development of accident study site data Hide Atkinson, Haslam, Gibb and 
collection methods ' Gyi 
Site based accident study data collection Hide Atkinson, 2x Civil 
Engineering researchers and 
Gibb 
Site based accident study data analysis Hide Haslam, Gibb, Gyi, Duff 
Development of accident study latent Hide (& practice protocol) Gibb, 
factor follow-up methods Gyi, Haslam, Atkinson and 
Duff 
Latent factor data collection and data Hide (& validation of findings) 
analysis Haslam / Duff or Gibb / Gyi 
Table 1. The research team 
1.1.5 Industrial liaison 
An essential component of the research was the need for strong collaboration with 
industry. At the outset a Steering Group was established, with representatives from 
two major contractor groups (Tony Wheel, Safety Director, Carillion Plc; Mike Evans 
(later succeeded by David Cowan) Health and Safety Director, John Laing plc, and a 
representative of smaller construction groups, Suzannah Nichol, Director of Safety 
and Health, Construction Confederation). The group also included representatives 
from the project sponsor, (Trevor Allan, Principal Inspector, HSE (Project leader) and 
Bob Tunnicliffe (HSE Inspector, HSE), and Tom Mellish representing the TUC, in 
addition to the researchers from Loughborough University and UMIST. 
Industrial collaborators offered assistance in the publicity and establishment of field 
contacts. There were also numerous other publicity measures and `calls for 
assistance', through use of HSE press release and newsletters, through contacts of 
construction specialists on the research team, through conferences & workshops and 
through news sources of the construction industry (magazines and other news 
articles). 
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1.1.6 Project boundaries 
At the project outset, it was established that accidents already under investigation by 
HSE Inspectors would be not be included. There were a variety of reasons - to avoid 
duplication of effort, to avoid situations where interviewees were already under duress 
and fear of enforcement action, and to avoid generating information that might be 
subpoenaed as evidence. This precluded all fatal accidents and some major incidents. 
Just prior to commencement of accident data collection, the investigation 
requirements of HSE Inspectors (to increase their field work and analysis of major 
accidents) increased. This further reduced access to major accidents; nevertheless 
there were many other incidents with risk potential for more serious outcomes - 
management of the accident sample is discussed in Phase Two. 
To further distance the research from HSE investigation (to avoid any misconception 
and enhance distinction during field studies) it was suggested by the project Steering 
Group that data collection by the researchers should be called `accident studies'. This 
expression was used henceforth in this thesis. 
1.1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The research is presented over eight further chapters. The first two extend the 
introduction to the research and explore accident causation and modelling. The next 
five chapters describe the methodology, data collection and results for Phases One to 
Three. The final chapter identifies the outcomes and concludes the research. The 
content of each chapter is discussed below: 
Chapter Two gives a profile of construction accidents and injuries and introduces 
improvement measures that have been undertaken by the construction industry and 
Health and Safety Executive 
Chapter Three introduces the history of accident causation and the knowledge 
sources that have contributed to understanding. Construction accident models are 
appraised in the light of these findings 
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Chapter Four introduces Phase One of the research, the information search using 
focus groups among industry personnel to explore their perceptions of accident 
causation 
Chapter Five introduces the methodological approach and resources used to develop 
accident study techniques for Phase Two of the research 
Chapter Six provides a profile of the accident sample and participants during site data 
collection 
Chapter Seven reports the qualitative analysis used in analysis of findings from site 
data collection 
Chapter Eight introduces Phase Three of the research, the deeper exploration by 
follow-up of the accident latent conditions 
Chapter Nine offers a review of the findings, proposes recommendations and 
identifies areas where further enquiry is required. It also concludes the research 
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2 CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY - CURRENT STATUS 
This chapter provides a broad base of information about the construction industry. 
Firstly it expands upon information provided in Chapter One about the construction 
industry accident and injury profile, from both an international and UK perspective. 
Data sources, and the misperceptions that might arise through under-reporting are also 
described. Tremendous costs arise from the effects of accidents and, through 
understanding of these, the chapter concludes with an introduction of the range of 
improvement initiatives that affect, or have been generated by, the construction 
industry. 
2.1 International construction industry accident and injury profile 
Construction fatal and major injury rates continue to be key concerns in the UK, yet 
data comparisons reveal that the UK figures are in fact considerably lower than 
nearest comparable figures in the United States and are among the lowest when 
compared with other European Union countries (Health and Safety Executive 2000). 
Even accommodating the fidelity of differing reporting strategies across EU countries 
(government inspectorate data is used in the UK and is thought to be less 
comprehensive than social security system or insurance company data used elsewhere 
in the EU), the UK appears to experience a considerably lower rate (per 100,000 
construction workers) of fatal and over three day absences (Table 2, Health and Safety 
Executive 2000). 
1996 
In 2001 the United States construction industry, with -9 million workers, had the 
highest level of fatalities among all employment types. The mean number of fatalities 
in the years 1996 - 2000 was 1135/year, representing a fatality rate of 13.3 (per 
100,000 workers, (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001). Data of injury and absence are 
collected differently in the United States; however under-reporting is also felt to be a 
problem there, especially due to fear of loss of work and negative publicity 
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Table 2. Rates of fatal and over 3 day absences per 100,000 construction workers, 
(Zimmerman et al. 2001). Zimmerman et al. report that annual surveys exclude the 
self-employed or small businesses with less than ten employees, despite the fact that 
(in combination) these constitute 80% of construction establishments. 
The International Labour Organisation estimates that four percent of the world's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) disappears with the costs of absences resulting from 
work related ill-health, treatments and the provision of resulting disability benefits 
(International Labour Organization 2002). 
2.2 UK Construction industry accident and injury Profile 
Notwithstanding the impression gained of construction accidents and injuries in the 
international arena, the construction industry has one of the highest rates of fatal and 
major injuries among all industry types within the UK (Health and Safety Commission 
2001a). Around 7.3 million working days were lost through injury in 2000/01 and the 
majority of these (7.1million) were reportable (over 3 days) absences (Health and 
Safety Commission 2002b). Data that compare these by industry types and adverse 
outcomes are generated through two separate resources - (i) by employer reporting 
and (ii) from householder responses via national survey. 
2.2.1 Employer reporting via RIDDOR 
Employer reporting concerns obligatory notification according to specifications of the 
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR 
1995, Health and Safety Executive 1999b). Within these regulations, reporting is 
required under stipulated circumstances, such as work induced fatalities, major 
injuries (generally resulting in hospitalisation), injuries resulting in absences of three 
days or more, specified dangerous occurrences and work related ill-health. The 
Health and Safety Commission publish analyses of these data. Summary findings of 
the number of construction industry workers with reportable conditions (combining 
self-employed and employed personnel) are reproduced in Table 3. The marked 
changes in major injury and over 3 day absence figures from 1996 reflect a changed 
reporting structure and obsolescence of the preceding Regulations, the Notification of 
Accidents and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1980 (NADOR). 
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Worker 
fatalities 
Fatalities Irate 
Per 100.000 
workers) 
Major T 
injuries 
Oýer 3 
dad 
absence 
1992/93 
- 
96 5.9 2745 12719 
993/9 91 5.7 2574 11073 
1994/95 83 5.1 2627 11174 
1995/96 79 5.0 2477 14735 
1996/97 90 5.6 4054 966-6'- 
1997/98 80 4.6 4326 10265 
1998/99 65 3.8 4656 9576 
1999/00 
2000/ü1 
81 
105 
4.7 
5.9 
4749 
4708 
10504 
9796 
2001/02 79 4.2 4480 9587 
(p = provisional) (Health and Safety Commission 2001 a) 
(Health and Safety Commission 2002b) 
(Health and Safety Executive 2002d) 
Table 3. Injury profile of construction workers 1992 - 2002 - Numbers affected 
Data reveal a gradual decline in construction fatalities during the 1990s, However 
fatalities peaked in the year 2000/01 with 105 deaths reported -a 31 % increase from 
the preceding year. Data for 2001/02 indicate that construction worker fatal injury 
rates were lower than in most of the 90s. Of the 249 deaths (provisional) reported 
across all industries in the year 2001/02,79 (32%) of these affected construction 
industry workers (Health and Safety Executive 2002d). 
Construction fatalities rates vary by age group, with no clear pattern for each year. 
For example in the combined years 1999/00 - 2000/01,45% of fatalities affected the 
35 - 54 year age bands. In the reporting year 2000/02 (p), however, fatalities rates 
were higher still for the 20-24 and 55 plus age groups (Health and Safety Executive 
2002b). 
Injury types that caused construction fatalities are reproduced in Table 4, which 
compares latest available data with mean values for the preceding five years. Almost 
half of all construction fatalities are the result of falling from a height. Data reveal 
that construction fatalities from falls from a height have reduced in the past 5 years, 
whereas other injury types, such as being `struck', are mostly unchanged in this time 
period or fluctuate with no particular trend. Falls from a height predominately 
concern structures or equipment such as roofs, ladders or scaffolds. 
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Fatalities j Major injuries Oser 3 
. 
day absence 1 1996/2001 2001/02 1996/2001 2001/02 1996/200 2001/02 
mean mean mean 
Falls from height 53% 47% 36% 30% 13% 10% 
Struck by a moving vehicle 11% 14% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
Struck by a moving i falling 13% 15% 19% 18% 18% 16% 
object 
Trapped by something 7.2% 5% - - - - 
collapsing / overturning 
_ Slip and trip - same level - - 20% 26% 18% 22% 
Handling, lifting or carrying - - 9% 9% 35% 35% 
injury 
Other - 99% - 14% - 15% 
Source: (Health and Safety Executive 2002a) & 
(Health and Safety Executive 2002c) 
Table 4. Percentage of injury types to construction workers by kind of accident in 
1996 - 2001/02 (provisional) 
Data also reveal construction worker injury types resulting in major injuries and 
absences over three days. Falls from a height are also the most common injury source 
for major injuries but, as with over 3 day absences, injuries arising from slips and trips 
and being struck by a moving or falling object are much more prevalent. Injuries 
arising from slips and trips have had increased influence in incidences of major and 
over 3 day absences in the 2001/02 period. Over 3 day absences are most commonly 
caused by injuries arising from handling, lifting or carrying and this remains 
consistent with data from the preceding 5 years. 
2.2.2 Individuals reporting via the Labour Force Survey 
The second information source is the British household Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Within this, and at three yearly intervals, the HSE has included additional questions 
concerning workplace accidents and injuries, and any subsequent absence resulting 
from these (Health and Safety Commission 2002b). These data are compared with 
RIDDOR statistics to identify commonality or disparity in reporting, and to explore 
trends across industries. 
Comparison of RIDDOR and latest available LFS figures (2000/01) indicate that over 
recent years and across all employment areas, there has been a 1-2% decline in the 
level of reporting by employers. Even at a reporting rate of only 52% (1999/2000) the 
construction industry reporting rates compare favourably with general reporting rates 
across all employers types, whose estimated reporting of RIDDOR reportable injuries 
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was 44% (Health and Safety Commission 2002b). Nonetheless, data have revealed 
that construction workers major injury rates are currently the lowest since 1996 
(Health and Safety Commission 2002a). 
Information concerning `construction workers' has combined figures for employees 
and the self-employed. The self-employed constitute approximately 35% - 38% of 
construction workers, yet RIDDOR: LFS data comparisons show that the self- 
employed reported less than 5% of their injuries. The self-employed experience a 
higher injury rate than employees and this is attributed to higher risk occupations of 
self-employed personnel in the industry (Department of Trade and Industry 2002). 
2.3 Kev points from all resources 
Data analysis from both RIDDOR and LFS resources has identified summary trends 
of the construction industry and construction industry employees over the past two 
years: 
" Construction trades and unskilled jobs are reported to be among the top 20 
riskiest occupations. These 20 occupations represent'/, of all occupations 
and employment, but more than half of all reportable injuries in 
1999/2000. 
" The construction industry has above average rates of work related injury 
(as do transport, storage and communication, agriculture, manufacturing, 
public administration and extraction sectors). 
" Construction workers have the highest rate of working days lost among all 
employees, with 40% of those suffering work related injury being absent 
for over three days. 
" In 2000/02, the construction industry lost 1 196 500 working days and of 
these 1 169 400 (24.3days average absence) were due to reportable 
injuries (97.7%) 
" Construction workers with least time with their employers (or experience 
of being self-employed) have the highest rates of reportable iniuries 
(Health and Safety Commission 
(Health and Safety Executive 
2.4 Estimated costs of accidents 
Selected RIDDOR, Labour Force Survey and case study data have been the subjected 
to detailed analysis to identify costs arising from workplace accidents and work- 
related ill health (Health and Safety Executive 1997a, Health and Safety Executive 
1999a). Whilst sampling and data collection methods inhibit direct comparisons 
between different years, data for the two collection periods in 1990 and 1995/96 
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(Table 5) indicate the considerable and consistent costs to employers, to individuals 
and their families and to society as a whole - as a result of accidents, injuries and 
dangerous occurrences in the workplace. 
Costs to employers Costs to individuals / families 
199U 1995/96 1990 1995/96 
£4 - £9 £3.5 - £7.5 ! £5 £5 - £6 
billion ! year billion / year billion / ear billion . year 
Costs to the British eeonoi 
1990 1995/96 
£6 - £12 £9.9 - £14.1 
billion / year billion / year 
To individuals and their families these costs To society in eg ný these costs include: - 
include: - " Loss of economic output (national payments 
" Loss of or reduced income for support of the debilitated worker or their 
" Loss of capacity to pursue work of families) 
comparable remuneration " Resource costs (administrative, health 
" Additional expenditure for health care service and HSE investigative costs to tax 
uptake payers) 
" Losses in general welfare and quality of " Human costs (arising from pain, grief and 
life. suffering) 
To employers these costs include: - 
" The costs of accident investigation, provision of first-aid and support of the debilitated worker 
in post 
" Worker absence consequences (such as provision of cover or overtime and any losses 
affecting production output, quality and delays meeting contractual obligations) 
" General costs arising from administrative duties (such as organising sickness absence 
payments and arranging for cover or recruitment and provision of training for replacement 
staff) 
" Replacement of damaged goods, materials, plant and equipment; payment of increased 
premiums for liability insurance 
" Fines / penalties imposed by regulatory bodies or for legal proceedings 
" Loss of oodwill both within and outside the co an . 
(Davies and Teasdale 1994) 
(Health and Safety Executive 1999a) 
Table 5. Costs arising from accidents, injuries and ill health at work 
These findings apply to industry as a whole, yet an important contribution to these 
outcomes has been evidence arising from construction industry case study data. 
Accidents were sampled in a range of different UK industries (including, 
manufacturing, transport, petro-chemical, health care and construction) in a series of 
13 - 18 weeks case studies. For the construction case study, accidents occurring on a 
supermarket build were evaluated in the context of losses to the employer (Table 5). 
These data showed that accident costs in the construction sample (£700,000) 
constituted 8.5% of the tender price (value £8 million) and that uninsured costs were 
11 times greater than the insurance premium costs (Health and Safety Executive 
1997a). Unique to the construction case study was that an overwhelming proportion 
of the sample (3570+) were non-injury accidents. 
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2.5 Improvement measures affecting the construction industry 
The current methods of data analyses described above reveal the current trends and 
patterns of construction accident causation analyses. Analysis by integration of 
RIDDOR and self-reported data is only a recent development and, whilst the HSC 
have always presented findings of annual NADOR / RIDDOR reportable figures, 
earlier detailed governmental research initiatives have been instrumental in the 
evolution of understanding and generation of interventions. 
2.5.1 Previous government led research 
As precursors to the current research into accident causation in the construction 
industry, there have been a number of governmental research initiatives, incorporating 
both survey techniques and retrospective analyses of construction fatalities. Of note 
there are four reports. Two are epidemiological studies of fatality data (Health and 
Safety Executive 1978, Health and Safety Executive 1988). The other two are 
industry surveys, one of a sample of accident cases (Ministry of Labour 1967), the 
other relating to safety management in construction (Whittington et al. 1992), 
(3.6.5.2). 
The studies have been important data sources, for revelation and identification of 
trends and patterns and for proposals in support of the generation of improvements. In 
spite of the twenty-four year gap between the first and last studies, there are common 
themes to many of the accident profiles (the high fatality rates associated with falls, 
for example). The two epidemiological studies were 10 years apart and the second, 
1988 study, reported that there had been little change in basic causes of construction 
fatalities in the preceding 10 years - of the 739 deaths included they felt that 90% 
could have been prevented, 70% of these by positive management action. 
Nonetheless, recommendations for improvement have successively focused upon 
design and organisation of site, choice of materials, equipment and PPE, proper 
supervision and allocation of responsibilities, housekeeping, workforce training, the 
planning of a safe system of work and issues associated with individual behaviour and 
motivation. 
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More recent improvement initiatives draw upon these recommendations, but have also 
been based upon recommendations published by the `Construction Task Force' (led 
by Sir John Egan) in July 1998. 
2.5.2 Construction specific initiatives and targets for improvement 
The `Construction Task Force' was a government initiative, commissioned by John 
Prescott (Deputy Prime Minister), to assess the efficiency of the construction industry. 
Egan's report, `Rethinking Construction', identified widespread under achievement in 
terms of profits and investment in capital, research, development and training 
(Department of Trade and Industry 1998b). Targets and `drivers for change' were 
proposed, to improve construction productivity and profits, and to reduce defects and 
accidents. 
There were five `drivers for change' - these are described below and shown, with the 
targets for improvement, in Figure 2: 
" Committed leadership - management commitment to change 
"A focus on the customer - emphasis on fulfilling client /consumer needs 
" Integrated processes and teams - dissipate fragmented production / process 
operations 
.A quality driven agenda - avoid waste and uncontrolled costs 
. Commitment to people - improved facilities, respect and development 
opportunities 
Drivers for Chan; e 
i. t Y h(ý f i-i k 
lmprovhlg 6e Pro; ecf Process 
i'radj: t I Partnerin the 
Wcvtt. pmen; Supply nai, 7 
P'xo; ect Produ: tion o! 
tmpremer: atlo^ Compo nts 
Source: (Strategic Forum for Construction 2002) 
Figure 2. `Rethinking Construction' `drivers' and `targets for improvement' 
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Annual Targets 
for Improvement 
Organisations representing house building, private sector building and local 
government building (later amalgamated as Rethinking Construction Ltd), were 
subsequently charged with determining objectives and methods for implementation of 
the `targets for change'. Pan industry initiatives focused on the development of 
demonstration projects (used to publicise initiatives) and key performance indicators 
(used to measure outcomes) (see Table 6). Close collaboration with the Construction 
Best Practice Programme, (a Department of Trade and Industry initiative) promoted 
group effort and dissemination of examples of improved performance throughout 
industry. 
Initiatives Role Application 
Demonstration Forefront organisations demonstrate Off-site fabrication, 
project programme innovation and change that can be standardisation, use of new 
measured and evaluated. technology, respect for people 
initiatives, partnering and supply 
chain integration and other 
process improvements. 
Key performance Measures, directed towards Client satisfaction - product & 
indicators achievement of the `targets for services; defects - safety; cost 
improvement'. Against which all predictability in design & 
demonstration projects are measured construction; time predictability - 
and benchmarked. design & construction; 
profitability; productivity - cost, 
time. 
Table 6. Pan industry initiatives in `Rethinking Construction' 
The organisations also incorporated a number of working groups. These had a 
specific remit to explore and develop the initiatives whose contribution would impact 
upon the success of the demonstration projects. These addressed aspects such as 
`environmental sustainability' and `design quality indicators' and `respect for people'. 
The `respect for people' working party specifically incorporated accident reduction 
objectives: the performance measures of their initiatives are reproduced in Table 7. 
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Respect for People Steering Group 
Initiatives Development of toolkits, checklists and key performance indicators to 
improve performance on eo le type issues. 
Performance 
measures and 
criteria used in 
Employee satisfaction 1-10 rating (reflecting opinions of pay, job control, 
sense of achievement, respect from supervisors / 
co-workers) 
assessment Staff turnover Employee turnover as a% of full-time equivalent 
(FTE) 
Absence from work Sickness absence as a% of normal workin time 
Safety Reportable accident rates 
Working hours Hours per week, including overtime 
Travel time Home to work travel time 
Training and 
development 
Number of training days per employee per year. % 
of workforce qualified / certified 
Pay Gross earnings per FTE 
Investors in People Measured against existing standards for training 
and development of people 
Source: (Rethinking Construction 2000) 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2002) 
(Investors in People 2003) 
Table 7. "Respect for People" Steering Group initiatives 
`Rethinking Construction' was retained as the umbrella term to describe the initiatives 
adopted by the construction industry, construction clients and the government to 
improve performance. A body of industry representatives, the `Strategic Forum for 
Construction', was established in 2001 to lead and overview progress with the 
implementation of initiatives among the organisations and working groups. To 
accelerate change and secure continuous improvement three specific `drivers' have 
been the subject of renewed intervention and guidance, and are currently ongoing: 
" Client leadership - following a Clients Charter for change 
. Integrated teams and supply chains - improved relationship continuity of 
supply chain 
9 People issues - especially health and safety 
Appraisal of `Rethinking Construction' progress was last undertaken in 2002. There 
had been over 400 `demonstration projects' and, when compared with the Key 
Performance Indicators results show improvement in all areas, the most successful of 
which was safety, with a 100% improvement in accident rates - i. e.: Reportable 
accidents on demonstration projects were 50% lower than the construction industry 
mean (Strategic Forum for Construction 2002). These initiatives are ongoing and 
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findings from the current research will be incorporated to direct and guide future 
initiatives. 
2.5.3 General initiatives to improve health and safety 
In close allegiance to the `Rethinking Construction' initiatives is the `Revitalising 
Health and Safety' strategy that has been adopted by the Health and Safety 
Commission (Health and Safety Commission 2000). Essentially the `Revitalising 
Health and Safety' strategy had close allegiance with the `Rethinking Construction' 
initiatives (although for the attention of all industry types). Launched for consultation 
(again, by John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister and by Bill Callaghan, Chair of the 
Health and Safety Commission) in 1999, the aim was to review and identify new 
approaches that could inject new life into the health and safety initiatives; a 25 year 
review after the introduction of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
The responses generated a ten-point strategy of aspects to be targeted for 
improvement: 
" Promote better work environments 
" Promote a happy, healthy and productive workforce 
" Prioritise occupational health 
" Engage small firms in participating 
" Motivate employers to improve health and safety performance 
" Cultivate self-regulation 
" Establish worker: employer partnership on health and safety issues 
" Provide leadership through government procurement 
" Significantly improve education 
Technical design to improve health and safety 
(Health and Safety Commission 2000) 
A ten-year plan was made, setting targets for reductions in work related absences and 
ill health across UK workplaces by 2010. Individually, industries were invited to set 
their own targets for improvement and reduction in fatalities, injuries and ill health. 
The Construction Industry Advisory Committee (CONIAC), representing the HSE and 
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key industry stakeholders, undertook this (Working Well Together 2001). The 
national objectives and construction industry targets are reproduced in Table 8. 
All industry targets Construction industry taets 
To reduce the number of By 30% by 2010 20% by 2004/5 
working days lost from work and by 50% by 2009/10 
related injury and ill-health 
To reduce the incidence of By 10% by 2010 by 40% by 2004/5 
fatal and major injury and by 66% by 2009/10 
accidents 
To reduce the incidence of By 20% by 2010 by 20% by 2004/5 
work related ill health and by 50% by 2009/10 
To achieve half the targets by 2004 - 
Table 8. National and construction industry `Revitalising Health and Safety' targets 
2.5.4 General legislatory initiatives 
The construction industry, as with any other area of work, has to comply with the 
duties defined by the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974. As an enabling Act, many 
regulations have been created to provide suitable detail; the Regulations, in many 
cases, fulfil the requirements of European Union (EU) directives (Cronor 2002). EU 
initiatives arising from the Single European Act, 1986 introduced directives for 
enactment by member states. From these, and originating as the Framework 
Directive, came the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSW), 
1992 (revised 1999). This directive stipulated duties upon employers to take a 
systematic approach to the management of health and safety at work through the 
following measures: 
o Identify hazards and assess the risk of harm in work activities 
o Determine methods to prevent and/or control risk 
o Monitor control measures where necessary 
o Provide information and training to staff 
These measures form a common approach to risk reduction within other related health 
and safety directives (eg. manual handling of loads) and are also applicable in the 
construction industry. 
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2.5.5 Construction legislatory initiatives 
A later directive from the EU concerned the `Construction Sites Directive', "for the 
implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile 
construction sites" (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). This was 
implemented in the UK as two sets of regulations. For the most part implementation 
fell within the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations, 1994. Later 
regulations, the Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations, 1996 
implemented Annex N of the `Construction Sites Directive' and drew together and 
updated related but disparate industry guidance of a more technical nature. 
The Construction (Design and Management, 1994) or `CDM' Regulations follow the 
systematic approach to management of health and safety at work, with construction 
specific guidance. CDM applies only to projects lasting more than 30 days, or where 
more than 500 person days are expended (Health and Safety Commission 1995). The 
aims of CDM are: 
oA strategic approach to health and safety in project design, 
procurement, planning, preparation and execution 
o Effective management and co-ordination of health and safety 
throughout a project 
o Selection only of those with competence and resource 
o Improved management of construction work 
(Allan 2000, p. 91) 
CDM requires the preparation of documentation for the consolidation of health and 
safety information. These are the `Health and Safety Plan' and the `Health and Safety 
File': 
o The H&S plan is developed in two phases - initially in outline form 
during the pre-tender phase to alert interested contractors to key health 
and safety issues and the nature of the project. Later, during the 
construction phase, the plan is developed to include information about 
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procedures, emergency, work, welfare and communication 
arrangements. 
o The H&S File records information for use by those involved in any 
later construction, maintenance, renovation or cleaning work after 
completion. 
CDM explicitly, and for the first time, defined clients and designers roles in 
construction health and safety (Health and Safety Commission, 2001b). CDM also 
specified responsibilities of those involved in the construction lifecycle, including 
clients, designers, planning supervisors, principal contractors and contractors. A 
glossary of roles is provided in Table 9; their responsibilities are overviewed in Table 
10. 
Client An organisation or individual for whom a construction project is carried out. 
Includes developers and agents acting on behalf of clients. Clients may initiate a 
`one-off `build project or be serial clients with experience of many projects. 
Designer Prepares or arranges for the preparation of drawings and design detail for 
construction works, specifications of articles and substances and undertake 
analysis, calculations and related preparatory work. They include a range of 
architects, engineers, surveyors, and anyone who contributes to the development 
or revision of the design process 
Planning Ensures that those who carry out design work, particularly during the design 
Supervisors phase collaborate and pay attention to risk reduction. They ensure that all 
necessary health and safety documentation for the build is compiled 
Principal The main or managing contractor of the construction work. They must be 
Contractor competent and adequately resourced 
Contractors Those that undertake the construction work. They may be utility providers, 
specialist or general contractors or self-employed 
(Health and Safety Commission 2001b) 
Table 9. Glossary of roles of construction industry personnel described in CDM 
The CDM Regulations have been the subject of controversy since introduction. Initial 
investigation revealed that the planning supervisor role and burdensome paperwork 
were the main problems (The Consultancy Company Ltd, 1997). Following industry 
consultation (Health and Safety Commission, 2001b) the `Approved Code of Practice 
and Guidance' were revised (and recently re-issued, Health and Safety Commission, 
2001c), to clarify role requirements and rationale for the recommended actions. 
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The Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations, 1996 address practical 
measures to achieve healthy and safe construction sites. The content of the 
regulations overlap and complement material covered in other regulations, either 
specific to the construction industry or applicable to workplaces generally. These 
resources are compiled comprehensively as practical guidance to plan, organise, 
monitor and review health and safety for the construction phase (Health and Safety 
Executive 2001). Guidance distinguishes three aspects of construction site health and 
safety measures (Table 11). Guidelines are either of a technical nature or propose 
methods to facilitate a systematic approach to management of health and safety at 
work. 
Organising the site Risk control on site H&S management 
legislation 
Work conditions (site state, Practical instruction / Interacting legislation 
material requirements, sub- technical advice requirements (eg. MHSW, 
contracting) Health hazard control CDM) 
Work organisation (appointment, Use of PPE Procedural requirements (eg. 
supervision and training criteria) Risk assessments, Method 
Site layout and environment Statements) 
Provision of welfare facilities Provision of training 
Emergency arrangements Monitoring H&S 
(Health and Safety Executive 2001) 
Table 11. Summary of Health and Safety in Construction Guidance 
The HSE also have a range of free information sheets concerning construction health 
and safety. 
A supplementary feature, unique to the construction industry, is the use of a `method 
statement' (or safety method statement). The intention of a method statement is to 
draw together the risk assessment(s) and varied hazard information for a particular job 
(especially for complex or unusual works). It should also set out the work plan, 
process and control measures, and is used as an information source for employees 
(Health and Safety Executive 2001). 
2.5.6 Training initiatives 
Much of the workforce training within the industry operates under the auspices of the 
Construction Industry Training Board (CITB). The CITB works in partnership with 
industry and the government and is concerned with providing assistance in all areas of 
workforce recruitment, training and qualification (CITB 2003). 
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The industry has a highly mobile workforce and to ensure training provision (and 
avoid skills vacuum) the CITB are charged with collecting a levy from industry 
(where the annual wage bill exceeds £61k) and this is used for providing grants for 
qualifying and developing the workforce. Grants can be claimed for CITB training of 
30 minutes duration and above. Shorter training would typically include in-house 
training such as induction or toolbox talks (TBT's, which are short, on the job training 
session by a competent worker). There are also funds for general skills day courses (> 
6 hours) and for ongoing development, such as NVQ schemes or apprenticeship 
training for example (CITB 2003). 
The CITB also administer the Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS), a 
formal registration scheme of the training received by each worker and which may be 
used by sites to identify competent personnel. Each worker is provided with a 
registration card (credit card style) that records his or her achievements. A day's 
health and safety training is a minimum requirement and there are also distinct 
qualifying criteria for accreditation of each subsequent level of training (CSCS Ltd 
2001). 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW - ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
This chapter commences by introducing the resources available for occupational 
accident investigation and also provides different perspectives on the meaning of the 
term `accident'. Current understanding of accidents often indicates that there are 
multiple causes, yet this has not always been the case. The inter-disciplinary 
knowledge sources, and integration of their findings in the development of a systems 
approach are explored, and later used as a foundation upon which to evaluate 
construction accident models. The literature review also addresses the practicalities of 
accident investigation, for use both in evaluation of the construction accident models 
and to inform later methodological development in Phase Two. 
3.1 Accident data information sources 
There is a tradition of looking at non-occupational accidents such as those occurring 
in domestic settings or the transport sector. However, much of the data used in 
understanding occupational accident causation have been derived from accidents and 
human reliability assessment relating to high risk, high technology sectors (Kirwan 
1995). Whilst accident likelihood might be low, sectors such as petrochemical, travel 
(including space, aviation, shipping and rail), and nuclear are vulnerable to and have 
experienced catastrophic events. Investigation of such events has revealed multiple 
failings affecting design and equipment, systems operations and procedures (Wilson 
and Rajan 1995). In contrast to the wealth of information concerning high risk high 
technology sectors, Kirwan (1995) describes only early stages of comparable interest 
in other industries that have low technological complexity, yet higher risks resulting in 
a larger number of isolated fatalities. 
More recently there has been a concentration of accident research in medical settings 
(with different technology and outcome patterns again). Selective use and adaptation 
of the principals and approaches used in other industries has permitted investigation of 
causal factors in this unique environment (e. g. Taylor-Adams et al. 1999). 
It is necessary to be cautious in the application of previous industry wide findings and 
methods in the context of the unique environment of the construction industry. 
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However, whilst not all aspects may be relevant or transferable, a review of previous 
findings and materials has revealed generic issues (and shortcomings in earlier 
approaches) that have been appropriated for this research; these are discussed from 3.5 
onwards, and introduced by review of the historical perspectives of accident 
causation. 
3.2 Historical perspective upon understanding of the term 'accident' 
The HSE describe an accident as "any undesired circumstances which gives rise to ill 
health or injury, damage to property, plant, products or the environment, production 
losses or increased liabilities" (Health and Safety Executive 1997b, p. 76). The 
openness and flexibility within the term appears to offer inclusion of any `situation' 
that might induce some form of `adversity'. However, alternative definitions and 
viewpoints, from a historical perspective and, more recently, from accident 
researchers, reveal a certain amount of controversy surrounding use of the term 
`accident'. Understanding of these aspects enables insight into the different 
perceptions of what defines `accident' and possible connotations that have had to be 
acknowledged in the development of theories of accident causation. 
3.2.1 Medical usage 
Green (1997) describes some early references relating to the development of 
epidemiological data and adoption of the term `accident'. These relate to sixteenth 
and seventeenth century studies of City of London `Bills of Mortality' (precursors to 
the population census studies of today). In the process of development of 
classification systems, those data that did not readily fit within the chosen 
classifications were labelled `accident'. Terms such as `lacking regular patterns', 
`arbitrary' or `non-rational causes' described events that were outside the boundaries 
of classification and were associated with fate or Acts of God (Green 1997). 
Green notes late twentieth century enlightenment concerning risk factors and 
correlations between them in accident events, but provides examples that indicate a 
disciplinary divide. Where medical statistics are concerned, the term `accident' 
continues to be associated with unpredictable or chance occurrences. A recent 
Editorial from the British Medical Journal (BMJ) indicates that the argument has 
perpetuated to the current day and that the term `accident' is no longer welcomed in 
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their publication (Davis 2001). Davis notes the lead for this movement from North 
America; BMJ correspondence from UK contributors raised a number of objections to 
this missive, suggesting international differences in perceptions of meaning of the 
word accident as well. Henceforth (in medical fields) Davis proposed that the word 
be replaced by a record of intent (such as unintentional act, violence, suicide etc. ) and 
causal mechanism (such as vehicle crash, poisoning etc. ). 
Thus a record of the inducing factors appears to be the chosen way forward in the 
medical field, yet the dispute draws attention to the interests and perspectives of 
different disciplines. For those with a purely therapeutic role the consequence or 
outcome effect upon the individual is the primary interest (Thygerson 1977). In the 
medical field knowledge of causal factors will be derived through clinical 
examination, and by the quality of information provided by investigators. 
Alternatively, for those with an investigative role it is the antecedent events that are of 
primary concern (Thygerson 1977). 
3.2.2 Industrial usage 
In an industrial context, early associations with the term `accident' had clear 
connotations with the apportioning of blame (Sass 1987). Sass proposed that the 
`blame' type approach was especially prevalent prior to introduction of worker 
compensation schemes -a means to absolve an employer of financial responsibility in 
the event of an employee claim. As an example of the widespread acceptance of this 
attitude, Farmer (1932) quotes from a report by the H. M Chief Inspector of Factories 
in 1918. In describing the efficiency of machinery safety guarding, he reported that, 
.. where absent, this accounted 
for less than 35% of accidents; the 
remainder largely being attributed to `negligence', 'carelessness', `want of 
thought' and most of all a `lack of proper appreciation of danger' (Farmer 
1932, p. 3). 
Even at the time of publication in 1932, Farmer proposed that guard avoidance was 
due to bravado and disdain - and that coercion and `putting up with the discomfort of 
using a guard' was the solution. Early research into accidents was inter-linked with 
studies associated with the two World Wars. Through the Industrial Fatigue Research 
Board (later the Industrial Health Research Board, IHRB), (Greenwood and Woods 
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1919) and (Newbold 1927) findings from accident rate analyses introduced the 
concept of accident proneness and unequal liability (3.6.2.1), which had significant 
influence on research thinking into the 1930s (cited by Surry 1968). 
Surry (1968) notes a step change in approach to accident research since the 1940s 
(especially initiated by IHRB work during the Second World War), from reliance 
upon findings arising from descriptive accident statistics to exploratory research into 
human performance. 
.. Applied Psychologists asked specific questions about the efficiency of human production. By this time it was recognized that the multitude of 
factors contributing to accidents were not amenable to direct or simple 
control. More economically satisfactory for immediate results were the 
studies of human output ... study of performance influencing factors has flourished. (Surry 1968, p. 17). 
There had been considerable advancement in understanding of accident causality at 
least by the late 1950s, with the development of theories of `multiple causality' (3.5.2) 
and a `systems approach' to accident investigation (3.5.3). The Robens Report (Great 
Britain, Parliament 1972), acknowledged a range of contributors to failure occurring 
throughout an organisation; information that was pivotal in development of the Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act, 1974 (Great Britain Parliament 1974), the enabling Act 
to current health and safety legislation. 
3.3 Defining the meaning of 'accident causation' 
Literature review reveals that previous accident researchers have interpreted each 
term, `accident' and `cause' or `causation', differently. Whilst the use of these terms 
is adopted in the thesis, it is important nonetheless to be aware of the emphases 
attributed and the significance that grammatical choices have had in the development 
of understanding. 
3.3.1 Defining `accident' 
As in the medical field, there has been considerable debate about the semantics of the 
term `accident'. Researchers have used a number of alternative nouns, adjectives or 
described classes or characteristics that embody the accident event. 
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The nouns `accident', `incident' and `mishap' are attributed different meaning and 
interpretation, the choice of which appears to be the determined by the outcome of the 
event (such as injury, damage, production adversity). On the one hand an accident is 
described as a subset of incident. Reese (2001) states that an accident implies failure, 
damage or injury, whereas incident additionally implies adversity to production. On 
the other hand, an incident is a subset of accident (Perrow 1999) where consequences 
are minor and least disruptive. An alternative perspective has been to avoid use of 
either word and use the all-embracing term `mishap' instead (Ferry 1988); yet this 
noun has also been used to describe an accident without injury (Surry 1968). Surry 
(1968) also notes that judgment on whether an accident has occurred may vary among 
lay public, victims and those with specialist knowledge. 
There is also a temporal aspect that distinguishes accident and occupational ill health. 
Ill health, such as work-related musculo-skeletal disorders may have a sudden onset 
(and for administrative purposes be called an accident (Pheasant 1991)), or be 
insidious, resulting from exposure or sensitisation over long time periods. 
A variety of different adjectives have been adopted to describe accident criteria. 
Typically these express lack of foreseeability, intention and control - example terms 
include `unplanned' (Thygerson 1977, Reese 2001) and `uncontrolled' (Heinrich et al. 
1980), `unintended and `untoward' (Perrow 1999) and `unexpected' (Reese 2001). 
Judgemental terms are also used, such as `unsafe and avoidable' (Thygerson 1977) 
and `uncontrollable' (Reese 2001). 
An alternative viewpoint is that there is no one encompassing definition of an 
accident, more so an accumulation of defining features. Perrow (1999) describes an 
accident as `damage to a defined system that disrupts the ongoing or future output of 
that system' (p. 64). He distinguishes between component failure accidents (part, unit 
or sub-system failure) and system accidents (with multiple failures). 
3.3.2 Defining `cause' 
The term `cause' has also been disputed because of the inferences that can be made 
from the word. Selected sources proposed that the word `cause' should be 
discouraged because: 
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9 It encourages listing of insurmountable problems & inevitability, rather than 
encouraging search for solutions 
41 It has an air of finality, discourages deeper exploration and masks underlying 
complexity of range of influencing factors (Surry 1968, Kletz 1994) 
" It implies blame and may lead to defensiveness 
9 It encourages fatalism or generalisations without proper isolation of the issues 
(Iüetz 1994) 
Alternative terms such as `related', `contributory factors' (Surry 1968) or `factors 
increasing liability' (Woodcock 1989) have been mooted. From an alternative 
perspective, Kletz (1994) proposed that that instead of the unhelpful cause listing, 
accidents should be explored with underlying best practice in mind (such as "why did 
x not happen"), in order to develop an event chain of the accident precursor stages. 
Factors affecting decision making and the qualities of causal attributions in accident 
investigation are discussed further in 3.9.5. 
3.4 Information sources contributing to understanding 
The development of knowledge concerning accident causal factors has been generated 
from the contributions of a variety of different disciplines (Rasmussen 1990). Major 
contributors appear to be the sciences of psychological and behavioural issues, 
engineering innovation, organisational development and advances made in the use of 
epidemiological data. 
Table 12 outlines the developments in each knowledge source and how these have 
been employed as a common resource for current day accident causation modelling. 
From fragmented understanding through to appreciation of multi-factorial issues and 
finally systems approaches, there has been ever greater assimilation of the inter- 
disciplinary knowledge - this assimilation is represented by the fading and eventual 
loss of horizontal lines between each of the information sources. Development of the 
interdisciplinary knowledge and evolution of the accident causation model and 
systems approaches are discussed in the next two sections. 
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Development of understanding in accident causation 
1920's _-_ - ---º 1990's 
Public health EU 
Epidentio 
Data 
analysis tu 
and Increase in 
General 
initiatives 
public logical 
identify 
occupational complexity for 
re orti sources target areas reporting of analyses 
p ng standardis schemes schemes ation 
Fragmented understanding No 
Multi-factorial 
_1 
Systems 
events approach 
Behag mural 
Individual and Accident Unequal Risk Sensation Individual 
%ariability pelsunalitr proneness liability taking seeking 
Human error 
variability 
factors 
Technical Technical 
Engineering and and Hierarchy Man-machine User centred 
approaches environment environment of control interface design 
factors adaptation 
----------- ---------------- Work Jub and Speed and Job Socio- 
organisation Psychosocial pressure of design technical 
Factors affecting 
issues i factors work theories systems performance 
Table 12. Evolution of information used in the modelling of accident causation 
3.5 Approaches to modelling accident causation 
3.5.1 Fragmented approaches 
Understanding of causal factors early in the 20th Century was fragmented. 
Technology was relatively straightforward compared to the complex systems of today. 
Although there was a developing understanding of the varied contributions of human 
behaviour and technical / environment issues, the interdependency of these factors 
was not understood (Hale and Glendon 1987) 
3.5.2 Multi-factorial events 
The next development in understanding was that an accident is the outcome of 
gradually developing series of multiple contributory factors (Thygerson 1977). 
Heinrich and Granniss (1959) described a series of five factors that they called the 
`Domino Theory'. These factors `invariably occur in a fixed and logical order' and 
Heinrich and Granniss (1959) used the domino symbol for each of the five factors to 
represent interdependency - one domino fall initiated the downfall of later dominos. 
With the removal of a domino from the sequence the fall cycle would be broken. 
In the first `Domino' model the accident factors predominantly concerned the human 
failings that contributed to `unsafe acts'. Unsafe acts, compared with unsafe 
conditions were thought to account for accident causation in a ratio of 85: 15 (Heinrich 
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and Granniss 1959). The philosophy was that by isolation and extraction of 
undesirable human fallibilities (such as inherited undesirable personality traits and 
detrimental acquired behaviour), the precursor events in an accident sequence would 
be halted. 
The Domino Theory has been subjected to a number of revisions; these retain the 
domino graphic but substitute the sequence of human failings with a loss control 
approach, (Heinrich et al. 1980). Table 13 shows the initial model and later revisions 
from the 1970s. 
I)oniino One Domino Two Iloniino Domino Four Doniino 
Three Five 
Ancestry Fault of person Unsafe acts. Accident Injury (Heinrich 
/Social Mechanical / and 
environment Physical Granniss 
hazard 1959) 
Lack of control Basic causes - Immediate Accident by Injury, (Bird 
in management Personal cause - unsafe contact - with damage or 1974) 
- planning failings or poor acts and energy source loss 
- organising work factors conditions 
- leading 
Management Operational Tactical errors Accident - Injury or (Adams 
structure errors - - affecting incident damage 1976) 
- objectives manager and employee 
- organisation supervisor behaviour and 
- operations behaviour and working 
actions conditions 
Cited by (Heinrich et al. 1980) 
Table 13. Domino Theory approaches 
Development of the Domino Theory shows the progressive understanding of a link 
between antecedent events within the organisational process - the contribution of 
managerial functions (Bird 1974) and organisational strategies (Adams 1976). 
However, using the Domino Theory, the accident route continues to be seen as a 
process of interlinked sequential factors. Alterative theories, not using the domino 
graphic, but incorporating comparable sequential factors were also proposed, (e. g. 
Zabataki 1975, cited by Heinrich 1980) and continue to be used. Reese (2001, p. 
107), for example, attributes causal factors to three classes and these are reproduced in 
Figure 3: 
33 
Accident / incident 
Personal injury 
Property damage 
Equipment failure 
DIRECT Release of energy 
CAUSES and / or 
hazardous material 
INDIRECT Unsafe Unsafe 
CAUSES Acts conditions 
(SYMPTOMS) 
BASIC Policies and decisions 
CAUSES Personal factors 
Environmental factors 
(United States Department of Labor. Mine Safety and Health Administration 1990, cited by Reese 
2001) 
Figure 3. Accident cause levels 
9 Direct causes - Immediate events or conditions leading to an accident 
o- Energy (mechanical, electrical, chemical, thermal, radiation) 
o Hazardous materials (gas, poison, corrosive, explosive agent) 
" Indirect causes - Not causal in themselves, but increased accident probability 
o Unsafe acts (failure to work safely, horseplay, use of drugs / alcohol) 
o Unsafe conditions (exposure to inadequate environment) 
" Basic causes - Root causes that if corrected would prevent recurrence 
o Policies and decisions (inadequate health, safety and personnel 
arrangements) 
o Personal factors (inadequate behaviour & training, physical and mental 
capabilities, motivation and attitude) 
o Environmental factors (unsafe facility design / location and operating 
procedures) 
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These latter models incorporate many of the concepts of systems theory (Carter and 
Corlett 1983). However, the focus of this approach continues to promote isolation of 
negative aspects (inadequacies and unsafeness). It is not apparent that the approach 
explores the nature or quality of the faults, such as intermediate failure or even 
positive features of behaviour, organisation and design that mitigate adversity or the 
severity of the accident event. These issues are discussed further later, but an 
alternative approach to accident causation has developed from the exploration and 
modelling of human and general failures, and in the distinction of active and latent 
factors in accident causation (Reason 1990b). 
3.5.3 Systems approaches 
`System' describes inter-dependent entities, such as humans, machines and `other 
things' that interact in the pursuit of a common goal (Sanders and McCormick 1992). 
Entities of the system relate to each other in a hierarchical order. Errors become 
apparent at boundaries between each stage and any changes impact upon the function 
of the system as a whole (Stanton and Baber 1996). In order to adopt a systematic 
approach, it is necessary to consider the inter-relationship between the person, job and 
organisation (Health and Safety Executive 1997b). These aspects encompass a wide 
range of different features and are introduced in Table 16. 
With the systems approach, failure is deflected from concentration upon `unsafe acts' 
or accident `perpetrators'. More so, failure is seen to be a reflection of, or shaped by, 
the outcome of organisational strategy; its culture, management and decisions 
(Department of Health 2000). Failures are considered multi-causal in origin and 
initiating factors are generated through two routes: 
Active failures - Errors and violations are effected by front-line (Reason 1990a) or 
system (Mathews et al. 2000) operators, who directly initiate or create a hazardous or 
undesirable system state (Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994). 
Latent failures - When combined with local triggering factors (such as active or 
technical failures) failures lying dormant (as resident pathogens) within the system 
become apparent. These are created by organisational decisions (Reason 1990a), such 
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as any of the engineering, design or management policy levels (Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 1994) . 
3.5.3.1 Models of human and general failure 
By defining the basic elements of a productive system "Decision makers, line 
management, preconditions, productive activities and defences", Reason (1990a page 
478) proposed a `General framework for accident causation' showing possible human 
failure types that can occur through the system phases. Based upon this Wagenaar et 
al. (1990) revised the approach, `a general accident scenario' and suggested general 
failure types that could occur at each stage. These are reproduced in Figure 4. 
Although there is no reference to `domino's' these show similar sequential stages to 
the latter two Domino Theories described in Table 13. 
Latent failures Active failures Outcome 
- Fallible 
Line 
gement mana 
Psychological -f Unsafe f- Accident 
(Reason 
decisions deficiencies precursors acts 1990a) 
General 
Decisions 
Psychological Unsafe f Accident 
(Wagenaar 
et al. failure types precursors acts 1990 
Figure 4. Models of human and general failure 
In order to explain the meaning attributed to each of the sequential stages, a summary 
of descriptions from each resource is reproduced in Table 14. There are different 
emphases within the first three stages of each. However, in spite of this a range of 
human and general failure types have been indicated through the production system 
stages. 
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__ (, eneral framework for accident General accident causation scenario 
causation (Wagenaar el al. 1990) 
(Reason 1990h) 
Fallible decisions Decisions 
There can be resource conflict for safety As the feedback loop becomes greater with 
and production goals each of the following stages management 
Manifestation of safety and production decision-making is delayed 
success is dissimilar 
Line management deficiencies General failure types 
Competence will influence outcome of There are three failure types generated 
fallible decisions through human behaviour, physical 
Different deficiency types can have far environment and management practices 
reaching consequences 
Psychological precursors Psychological precursors 
Preconditions include tasks, environment Precursors distinguish skill, rule and 
and hazards knowledge based behaviour 
Multiple different combinations of 
conditions create `token' active failures 
Unsafe acts Unsafe acts 
An error or violation committed in the Varied error types constitute unsafe acts. 
presence of a potential hazard They have different intent and presentation 
Defences Defences 
Defences may be local barriers and/or Extra defences can never be foolproof 
operational and/or engineering controls 
Table 14. Descriptions of active and latent failure types 
A distinction adopted by Reason in his approach is that types of preconditions or 
psychological precursors have the potential for multiple connotations and creation of 
different event tokens. Reason advocated that in accident investigation the 
identification of event `tykes' offers the potential to control or disable many event 
`tokens' . This approach to accident 
investigation has been also been adopted 
elsewhere as `cause-orientated' rather than `event-orientated' (Shappell and 
Wiegmann 1997) and concept-dependent rather than concept-specific (Dekker 2002) 
accident investigation. 
3.5.3.2 The model of Organisational Accident Causation 
The stages of the 1990 models are simplified in a more recent variant - the model of 
Organisational Accident Causation, (Reason 1995, reproduced in Figure 5). There is a 
grammatical shift from use of abstract nouns, such as `fallacies, deficiencies and 
precursor (events)', towards description by more concrete nouns, such as 
`organisational, workplace and person/team' that are not defined by pre judgement or 
any form of emotional loading as a basis for data collection. Within this Reason 
(1995) also distinguishes two important factors: 
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9 The latent failure pathway can directly affect the efficiency of defences. This can 
occur independently of the sequential failures of the active failure pathway. 
" Interdependent organisations, such as manufacturers, suppliers, maintainers, 
customers, regulators, accident investigators etc. influence the pathway at many 
different points and in many different ways. 
Organisation Workplace 
Person/ Outcom 
team e 
Active Management Error and (Reason 
failure decisions and violation Errors and A id t 
1995) 
pathway organisational producing violations 
cc en 
processes i conditions 
I 
Latent failure pathway 
1 
(Reason 1995) 
Figure 5. A model of organisational accident causation 
Latent failures (also referred to as `latent conditions' to avoid deferred blame to senior 
managers (O'Hare 2000)) are ever present and provide the conditions under which an 
accident can occur. As such they may be considered contributory in nature but are not 
necessarily directly causal (Spurgeon and Young 1980). Reason (1990b), referred to 
these as organisational and workplace factors, Wagenaar et al. (1990) referred to many 
of these latent factors as `general failure types', but they have also been referred to as 
`Performance shaping factors (PSF)' or `Performance influencing factors (PIF)' 
(Redmill and Rajan, 1997). Preferences for the term vary; the Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (1994) also prefer the term PIF - affording it a more qualitative 
association than the quantitative connotation of PSF adopted by the nuclear industry. 
Rasmussen (1997) offers an alternative term, `Behaviour shaping mechanisms' that 
result from the `dynamic state' of interaction between the organisation and extra- 
organisational factors. The `dynamic state' (compared with traditional controlled 
production systems) involves perpetual flux, arising from fast technological change, 
rapid development of information and communication technology, and aggressive 
commercial tactics. It is the work system constraints, boundaries of acceptable 
performance and subjective criteria guiding adaptations to change, that define the 
`behaviour shaping mechanisms'. Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) later developed a 
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representation of this dynamic state using graphic representation - accident mapping 
(3.9.3.2). 
3.5.3.3 Summary of latent conditions 
Example latent conditions have been compiled in Table 15. Information from 
resources with plentiful examples was used; these each employed a variety of 
grouping of terms and offered examples that were of both type and token. In order to 
create some commonality, anchor headings have been collated from ergonomics texts 
of workplace assessment and contributing factors in accident causation, e. g. Grey et 
al. (1987), Sanders and McCormick (1992, page 667), Finnish Institute of 
Occupational Health (1989), Institute for Occupational Ergonomics (1998a), and are 
recorded in the left column. Data from the resources have then been allocated 
according to failure types and tokens events. The allocations are intended to offer 
distinction to disparate data rather than introduce a classification that was not 
necessarily intended in the source material. 
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Anchor headings Types Tokens 
Extra-organisational Government policy, regulatory 
issues decisions 
Organisational goals Strategic decisions Unspoken attitudes, unwritten 
Generic organisational rules, poor management of 
processes health and safety, poor 
Safety culture safety culture 
Work organisation Workload, social support, High workload, Time pressures, 
personnel availability, team skill / personnel shortages, 
management, communication low pay, poor 
channels, roles / communications and co- 
responsibilities ordination, social pressures, 
conflicts, poor teamwork 
Work scheduling Pace, duration, repetition, Monotony, fatigue, effects of 
frequency, hours and shift unsociable hours or poor 
working, breaks shift patterns 
Target / payment issues Rewards, benefits 
Workplace layout Movement and access Poor workplace design, 
opportunities inadequate or restricted 
space 
Equipment, tooling, Inadequate supplies, poor 
machinery human-machine interface, 
poor maintenance, hardware 
defects, poorly designed 
automation 
Task characteristics Workload and interaction with Stress effects, boredom, 
other tasks, criticality, disturbances, interruptions 
complexity, attention 
requirements 
Environment Lighting, temperature, noise, Bad housekeeping, unpleasant 
humidity, control of conditions, environmental 
conditions extremes 
Training Job role Insufficient or inadequate 
training and experience 
Supervision Poor supervisor-worker ratios, 
ineffective supervision, 
leadership shortcomings 
Procedures / instructions Accuracy, sufficiency, style, Unworkable or ambiguous 
applicability, detail, ease of procedures, missing or 
use, revision and access unclear materials 
Defences PPE Inadequate PPE, lack of safety 
systems and barriers, 
inadequate responses to 
Previous accidents 
Personal factors Capabilities, skills, experience, Low status, badly calibrated 
personality, health status, risk perception, low skill, 
attitudes, motivation, risk incompetence, health 
perception, attitudes to safety problems, home life 
problems, dependency 
problems 
(Redmill and Rajan 1997) 
(Reason 1997) 
(Health and Safety Executive 1999d) 
(Svedung and Rasmussen 2002) 
Table 15. Summary of contributory factors in accident causation 
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3.6 Contributions from inter-disciplinary knowledge sources 
Reflecting the longstanding study of human capabilities and fallibilities, the 
information that has contributed towards understanding of accident causation is 
dominated by psychological and behavioural resources. Engineering approaches and 
enhanced understanding of the impact of work organisation and organisational factors 
have also contributed knowledge, but historically they have been ranked more as 
`contributory factors', with less of immediacy to the accident event. 
All aspects from each of the inter-disciplinary sources are embraced within the 
principles of ergonomics. In order to accommodate wide and diverse information 
sources ergonomics principles are summarised below; these embrace the 
`contributory' factors. Where the information has also been directly associated with 
accident causation this is described in later sections. 
3.6.1 Summary of ergonomics principles 
"Ergonomics (or human factors) is the scientific discipline concerned 
with the understanding of the interactions among human and other 
elements of the system, and the profession that applies theory, 
principles, data and methods to design in order to optimise human 
well-being and overall system performance" 
(Marshall 2000) 
By understanding the principles of perception, interpretation, decision-making and 
operation of the `human-machine system' compatibility of user and process needs can 
be accommodated (Kroemer and Grandjean 1997). 
0' 
Figure 6. Interactions in ergonomics 
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Figure 6, (Grey et al. 1987) draws together interacting factors, showing not only 
immediate task: equipment: environment factors, but also the contribution of 
organisational and extra-organisational influences upon the person as part of the 
system. These interacting factors are summarised in Table 16. 
People Demographic characteristics, health status, physical, physiological, sensory, 
cognitive and psychosocial capabilities and previous experiences 
'Tasks Physical demands such as - dynamic and static workload, handling, fine, 
manipulative work, movements, posture, repetition and rest. Mental 
demands such as task complexity, problem solving, decision making, 
monitoring. 
Physical / mental demand mix 
Equipment and Physical fit incorporating anthropometry and biomechanics. Equipment: 
machines machine: tool and task / performance compatibility. Information 
presentation, response, operation and feedback of performance 
Personal 
workspace Comfort and performance arising from interaction with equipment, 
Wider workspace and layout 
workstation 
Physical Environmental conditions such as lighting, noise, climate, dust, radiation 
environment etc., and the impact upon task performance, comfort, health. 
Work Psychosocial factors - work scheduling (shift, pace), management style & 
organisation culture (communication, team working, use and introduction of new 
and job design technology), payment (incentives, value), workload (mental / physical 
demands, skill, control, ownership), interpersonal relations (peers, 
supervisory and management style, social support), employment concerns 
(job security, organisational stability, role clarity, development 
opportunities). 
(Cordiner et al. 1998) 
(National Occupational Research Agenda 1999) 
Table 16. Factors affecting interactions in ergonomics 
3.6.2 Psychological and behavioural factors 
The understanding of behavioural issues in accident causation developed from the 
early research that isolated human fallibilities or characteristics as accident causal 
factors (the blame type approach). Research progress saw development through to 
conjecture on the contributions of personality attributes in accident causation, through 
to a quest for understanding of factors that affect performance or the implications of 
human error in the system. 
3.6.2.1 Individual variability 
The early research of Greenwood and Woods (1919, cited by Lawton and Parker 
1998b), identified variability in individual's propensity for accidents. Their 
evaluation revealed that certain people, as a result of their personal characteristics, had 
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a higher affinity for accidents; this individual susceptibility was named `accident 
proneness'. Although the research was popular and spawned a number of related 
studies, the concept was attacked from the 1950s for lack of account of workplace 
hazards, exposure to risk (Lawton and Parker 1998b, Sass 1987) and for poor 
methodological design (Hale and Glendon 1987). Nonetheless, the term was by then 
integrated into the English language and had also been used as a tool by 
`management' to excuse them from removal or control of workplace hazards (Lawton 
and Parker 1998b, Sass 1987). 
A supplementary facet of accident proneness theory is that susceptibility fluctuates 
over time, and that where there are `accident repeaters' this occurs for limited periods 
in a person's lifetime. This `unequal-liability theory; was initially hypothesised 
within a few years of accident proneness theory (Newbold 1927, Farmer and 
Chambers 1926, cited by Lawton and Parker 1998b). Despite similar criticisms of 
early methodological techniques, acknowledgement of individual differences and 
accident association persists. This is especially supported by findings from 
epidemiological studies, both from individual studies and from longitudinal studies; 
example associations are shown in Table 23. 
Brown (1995) describes additional theories relating to personal characteristics or 
behaviour. He includes `pure chance theory' for all those exposed to the same 
objective risk and also introduces biased liability. whereby previous accident 
experience can limit or enhance their liability for subsequent accident involvement. As 
there is inadequate information concerning duration of effect and interacting factors, 
this theory is not used for data collection (Brown 1995). Nonetheless, in their review 
of research into attitudes and motivation Lawton and Parker (1998a) note a positive 
effect upon risk perception, associated with a history of previous accident association. 
3.6.2.2 Risk taking 
Aside from risk perception there are also divided feelings about the causes of risk 
taking behaviour. The foundation of the dispute concerns the proposal of `risk 
homeostasis theory' (proposed by Wilde, 1982). Individuals are deemed to have an 
innate level of acceptable risk and, under circumstances where hazards vary from 
`normal', alter their behaviour to retain constancy (McKenna, 1988). Dispute centres 
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on generalisation from the origins of the theory (mostly road traffic data) into an 
occupational setting and also on the possibility of alternative reasons for such 
behaviour (Lawton and Parker 1998a). The main dissenter of risk homeostasis theory, 
McKenna (1988), proposed that risk taking is an outcome of `sensation seeking' 
(Zuckerman and Neeb 1980). Sensation seeking describes a desire for thrills, 
adventure, disinhibition and susceptibility to boredom. High scorers favour 
stimulating behaviour and are more apt to put themselves in risky situations in real life 
- Zucherman also claims a biochemical link and basis for risk taking (Zuckerman and 
Neeb 1980). The existence of these arguments continues to be acknowledged yet their 
impact upon decision making skills remains an area requiring further research 
(Lawton and Parker 1998a). 
3.6.2.3 Traditional approach to human error 
The final and most influential aspect of individual influence upon accident causation 
is human error. Human error is described as `an inappropriate or undesirable human 
decision or behaviour that reduces, or has the potential for reducing, effectiveness, 
safety, or system performance', Sanders and McCormick (1992, p. 656). The concept 
of human error derived a firm foundation from "Heinrich's" (1959) longstanding (and 
frequently quoted) apportioning of "the 80: 20 ratio" of human to technical causes for 
accidents (Brehmer 1993). Heinrich's terminology included attributes such as 
`recklessness', `violent temper', `inconsiderateness', and `ignorance of safe practice' 
(Heinrich and Granniss 1959 and Heinrich et al. 1980). These terms show close 
association with the blame culture approach already popular and rife at the time of 
initial presentation of Heinrich's work in the 1930s (Woodcock 1989). 
The concept of blame is rife at all organisational levels. There is widespread 
attribution, among workers and management, of `carelessness' as a predominant cause 
of accident causation (Powell et al. 1971) and the construction industry is no 
exception (Leather 1987). Woodcock (1989) proposed that where `carefulness' (even 
at the expense of efficiency or expediency) can mitigate accident potential, then this is 
the most easily identifiable identifier of `accident cause'. Blame is frequently 
attributed to the operators involved in `the dynamic flow of events' (Rasmussen 1990, 
p. 453), yet the apportioning of blame to individuals has been criticised for a number 
of reasons. Fear of retribution may induce a reluctance to report minor accidents or 
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near misses, resulting in the loss of learning experience (Center for Chemical Process 
Safety 1994). In addition, operative blame justifies shallow accident investigations, 
permitting closure with little deeper exploration of contributory factors and 
exploration or responsibilities among those with a design, planning or organisational 
role (Wagenaar 1990). 
Blame can also be quite subtle; Woodcock (1989) noted that while there is insistence 
that blame is not used, this is inconsistent where there is breakdown of procedures and 
systems to the responsibilities of defined parties. Blame also implies delinquency, 
which in turn invites sanctions entirely inappropriate for non-deliberate events 
(Reason 1995). Wagenaar et al. (1990) criticised focus upon targeting of unsafe acts 
because `perpetrators' can be unaware of risks or their violations. Because people 
make `slips' not all unsafe acts can be prevented and because people misdiagnose and 
make mistakes. The experience of error is part of the knowledge development process 
and contributes to learning the boundaries of acceptable performance (Rasmussen 
1990). Finally, human capacities for resourcefulness and ingenuity whilst dealing 
with novel or emergency situations are also important mitigators of accident potential 
(Health and Safety Executive 1999d). 
3.6.2.4 Classification of human error 
Developments in cognitive psychology during the 1970s advanced understanding of 
human error by exploring the types of conditions where errors occur and the form that 
they take (Reason 1990b). A number of classification systems have been developed. 
Earlier classifications identified information processing failures that could occur in the 
course of receiving information, decision-making, goal selection and effecting action 
(e. g. Surry 1968 and later revised Hale and Glendon 1987). Essentially a `yes/ no' 
response to successive cues, the methods have been criticised for the supposition 
involved and inter-expert disagreement in classification (Sanders and McCormick 
1992). 
Later developments incorporated different levels of functioning and Reason (1990) 
drew these together by means of a comprehensive model, summarising `psychological 
varieties of unsafe acts'. Recently updated (Health and Safety Executive 1999c, 
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reproduced in Figure 7), the model distinguishes between errors and violations in the 
generation of human failings. 
Slips of action 
Skill based 
errors 
Lapse of Errors 
Lj 
7 
memory 
Rule-based 
mistakes 
Human Mistakes failures 
Knowledge 
based mistakes 
Routine 
jo-I Violations Situational 
Exceptional 
Health and Safety Executive 1999c, page 12 
Figure 7. Types of human failure 
The first branch of human failures distinguishes different error types. These combine 
the skill, rule, knowledge classifications devised by Rasmussen (1982,1983), (which 
already incorporated earlier research upon slips and mistakes (Norman 1981) and 
categorisations of discrete actions (Swain and Guttman 1983, cited by Sanders and 
McCormick 1992). The skill, rule, knowledge classification concerns levels of 
decision-making and the type of errors that can be made at each stage. These are 
described in Table 17, with typical representations of the error types and proposed 
management solutions. 
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Skill based Rule based Knowledge based 
behaviour behaviour behaviour 
Involves little Involves processing 
(Center for 
conscious of information and 
Involves conscious Chemical 
monitoring and the use of generation of 
Process 
ü 
generally comprise predetermined rules 
solutions to deal with Safety 
well practiced to direct action. unique situations 
1994) 
physical activities. 
Slips include failure 
to execute `to plan' The adoption of 
a given sequence of familiar patterns of Misdiagnosis or 
(Health 
steps in task behaviour may be miscalculation may and 
Safety 
activities. Lapses inappropriate when result 
Executive 
are activities or ask conditions vary 
1999d) 
stages that are 
forgotten. 
Errors are relatively Mistakes are more difficult to detect and may (Mathews 
easy to detect pass un-noticed et al. 2000) 
Design changes to There may be improvement with personnel 
(Skiappell 
enhance error selection or training to convert activities to 
Wleýnn 
tolerance skill based behaviour 1997) 
E 
Table 17. Behaviour types, error representation and solutions 
The second branch of human failure concerns the different types of violations that can 
occur. Routine violations are deliberate acts, but nonetheless many reflect normal and 
unofficial practice by a work group. Reason (1990b) cites two influential factors - (1). 
The natural human tendency to take the path of least effort, and (2) an indifferent 
environment, whereby safety procedures are rarely sanctioned. Alternatively, 
situational violations occur where there are conflicting demands (such as time 
pressure, staff equipment and material shortages or inclement weather conditions) or 
where circumstances indicate that normal rule based behaviour is unsafe. Calculated 
risk taking, in exceptional circumstances, describes actions taken as a problem solving 
approach (Health and Safety Executive 1999d). Violations may also have sabotage 
qualities, reflecting motivational problems in the workplace (Shappell and Wiegmann 
1997). Solution management for violations encompasses a range of approaches 
affecting training, risk assessment and work scheduling /organisational strategies 
(Shappell and Wiegmann 1997, Health and Safety Executive 1999c). 
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3.6.2.5 New approach to human error 
Methods for identification of human error have had long been criticised for their lack 
of accommodation of the work and environment (Surry 1968). A focus on human 
fallibilities (such as forgetfulness, carelessness etc. ) will be ineffective without proper 
address of the underlying circumstances common to many accidents (Department of 
Health 2000) and this is reinforced by the conditions that contribute towards error and 
violation. Incompatibilities or competing goals between people and the work system 
create conditions for human error (Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994). Dekker 
(2002) describes the `new view' whereby human error is a symptom rather than a 
cause of accidents. 
3.6.3 Engineering approaches 
Information derived from early industrial accident analyses (3.2.2) revealed that the 
hazards implicated in accident causation were often mechanical in nature. Accidents 
were perceived as a form of harmful or uncontrolled energy transfer (Haddon 1973, 
Johnson 1980) or deviation from the controlled system element (McDonald 1972, 
Kjellenl983, cited by Koorneef and Hale 1997). Measures to reduce accidents and 
injuries entailed the control or distancing of human exposure to these energy hazards, 
typically by the introduction of defences using barriers such as safe-guarding of 
machinery (Hoyos and Zimolong 1988) or protective equipment (Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 1994). 
3.6.3.1 Physical defences 
Defences have been improved in a number of ways. These include selection of 
materials that will retain their integrity and reliability under process or environmental 
exposures. Such resistance includes acceptable responses to stress, strain, wear and 
corrosion (Stranks 1996). In construction, Koningsveld 1997, notes trends and 
developments in parts pre-fabrication, new building materials and new finishing 
techniques. 
Knowledge of a wider hazard range (such as environmental, chemical, radiation and 
vibration sources) has increased with technological advancement. Using principles of 
`Hierarchy of Control', the barrier approach has been developed as a universal hazard 
management technique (Reese 2001). Typically, control is achieved by sequential 
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progress through the stages in Table 18. The final solutions often incorporate a 
combination of interventions. The approach mirrors Regulatory risk control measures 
(2.5.4): 
Iflerarchy of Control Increasing defences 
1. Elimination Cease activity or hazard source. Automate process 
2. Substitution Alternative and less hazardous products or equipment 
3. Isolation Screens, barrier, system containment or failsafe operation 
4. Engineering controls Environment (control of ventilation, noise, light, noise, vibration) 
Works ace and equipment (design of machinery and tools) 
5. Personal protective 
equipment (PPE) 
As a last resort. 
To enhance existing control measures 
Table 18. Hierarchy of control 
3.6.3.2 Behavioural defences 
Engineering approaches have also been used to control unsafe acts such as negligence, 
carelessness etc. by use of intervention strategies to encourage behavioural changes 
among workers. These include measures, such as direction (through procedures, 
training, instruction etc. ), leadership by example, the setting of goals and the use of 
both positive and negative feedback as incentives to improve behaviour (DeJoy 1986). 
3.6.3.3 Defence failures 
Engineering and behavioural approaches to control are criticised because the human 
within the system receives analogous treatment as hardware (Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 1994). Where user requirements have not been properly considered 
incompatibilities can result in losses to the organisation and individual. 
Bainbridge (1987) for example, describes these types of problems with the use of 
automation. Firstly, there is a tendency to automate only those functions amenable to 
automation, which leaves fragmented activities for the operator and loss of continuity 
in the task. Secondly, reduced interaction can also create conditions for degradation 
in skills and operator vigilance. More general problems are that ergonomics 
principles are not applied. This can be because of lack of knowledge of problems or 
because of lack of insight into the significance of shortcomings. Underestimations 
arise from a range of preconceptions (design for `average', workers can adapt, 
problems are minor, instruction or training will solve any problems) or because of lack 
of insight into the benefits of user centred design (Cordiner et al. 1998). 
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Whilst it is acknowledged that behavioural defences have their value, without due 
attention to task workload and interface requirements, the potential for repeated failure 
will remain (Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994). That employee motivation is 
guided by incentives that correspond to their social and physical needs (Hoyos and 
Zimolong 1988) is also criticised for the assumption that all behaviour is amenable to 
free choice (Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994) and that lack of motivation is a 
significant contributor to work accidents (Wagenaar et al. 1990). To protect the 
system from human unreliability, approaches such as dismissal or disciplinary action 
are adopted. Control is also increased by supplementary training and by the 
introduction of increasingly complex and lengthy procedures (Stanton and Baber 
1996, Dekker 2002), yet there are some common problems associated with training 
and procedures; these are summarised in Table 19. 
to I Lack of task analysis or revision in line with an evolving work process 
of task Lack of appropriate evaluation of effectiveness 
for 
Underlying reasons are not 
understood and alternative 
actions are executed instead 
Voluminous or inappropriate 
language and presentation style. 
Appropriation of regulatory 
materials as instructions 
(Reason 1997) 
(Sanders and McCormick 1992) 
(Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994) 
(Rasmussen 1997) 
Table 19. Common failings in training and procedures 
There are also criticisms that multiplicity of defences or `defence in depth' 
(Rasmussen 1997), may create a false sense of security and, in themselves, introduce 
alternative hazards. Extra defences may camouflage system failure resulting in more 
serious consequences at the point of system failure (Wagenaar 1990). Possible 
reasons for this are the introduction of solutions in a piecemeal fashion and without 
due consideration of system compatibility. `Segmentalism' characterising impervious 
organisational boundaries (Kanter 1984, cited by McDonald 1997) can contribute 
towards this. Stanton and Baber (1996) encapsulate the fallacies of many engineering 
approaches, in that: - 
o these are reactive post-accident measures 
Lack of training needs analysis & 
determination of refresher training 
needs 
Inappropriate theoretical: practical 
mix. Inappropriate learning 
environment. Reliance on lengthy 
& unverified on-the-iob training 
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o they do not explicitly address the employee: technology relationship 
o they may be appropriate immediately, but are not necessarily 
sustainable 
o they may overlook insidious activities that impact on performance, 
productivity and user compatibility 
(Stanton and Baber 1996, p. 215). 
3.6.4 Work organisation issues 
The behavioural defences - training, use of procedures, motivational campaigns etc., - 
are measures that traverse the domain of work organisation. The evaluations of 
effectiveness showed unfortunate effects where development and integration had not 
been appropriately applied or evaluated. 
Work organisation issues accommodate the factors remaining from Table 15 and 
Table 16 (that have not already been addressed): - work organisation, work 
scheduling, hours of work, work-rest schedules, shift work, target / payment issues, 
task characteristics (job design), skill and effort requirements, degree of worker 
control and supervision (interpersonal relationships). 
Many work organisational factors are not traditionally associated with accident 
causation yet the increase in understanding of `contributory factor types' reveals that 
these issues, traditionally viewed in the context of performance, productivity, quality 
etc., are relevant. However, even among the few incidences where there are direct 
accident associations the evidence is not always conclusive (Table 23, p. 61). 
3.6.4.1 Developments in work organisation 
Much development in work organisation has evolved through the understanding of 
psychosocial issues. Psychosocial issues incorporate those issues that are not physical 
in nature (Cordiner et al. 1998), but are a manifestation of the interaction between the 
individual(s) with their surroundings (National Occupational Research Agenda 1999). 
Intrinsic to the individual are personal attributes such as attitudes, motivation, 
personality etc. Personal attributes (for example) are shaped by learning and 
experience and in turn there is additional effect by factors both from within and 
outside the workplace (Cordiner et al. 1998). 
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A significant influence to much of the current knowledge of work organisation and 
job design theories is derived from work of the Quality of Working Life movement 
and socio-technical theorists (Bridger 1995). The traditional industrial approach had 
required adaptation by workers where there was a `technocentric' approach to 
productivity (perhaps according to the nature of workflow, scheduling or style of 
managing the work). Socio-technical systems focused upon joint optimisation - 
fulfilling technical requirements in parallel with the personal needs and social 
networks among those who undertake the work (Warr 1987, Eason, 1988). 
Progressive understanding of factors affecting motivation, social needs etc. were 
foundation knowledge in determination of desirable job characteristics and job design 
theories (Carayon and Lim 1999). 
An alternative perspective concerning psychosocial factors is their association with 
occupational stress (Smith 1981). Imbalance or mismatch of psychosocial factors can 
lead to stress - an adverse reaction to excessive pressures or other types of demand 
placed upon individuals. While traditionally associated with ill health effects, the role 
of stress upon failures in human performance has been (Carter and Corlett 1983) and 
is again an area of current interest (RoSPA 2002, Lawton and Parker 1998b). 
3.6.5 Organisational goals 
Organisational aspects were described by Reason (1990b), and addressed the conflicts 
in goal setting and resource allocation that can occur in the upper echelons of an 
organisation. There is a trend towards use of information technology for improved 
logistics (Koningsveld 1997), but whatever the planning and communication methods, 
there is different information denoting success. Productivity goals generally have an 
immediate and discernable effect, whereas in contrast safety related goals have 
traditionally been measured by their failure (accident and ill health figures) and lack 
of certainty that investment will yield the desired results (Reason 1990b). 
The realisation of safety and performance goals is, essentially, a desire to improve 
competitiveness (Reason 1997) and this underlies the Total Quality Management 
(TQM) approach (Buchanan 1998a). Just-in-time measures are often introduced as 
part of this drive for competitiveness. These measures are directed at fulfilling the 
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needs of the end user, using a `pull' rather than `push' demand system (Myazaki 1992, 
Jackson and Martin 1996). 
Success will also reflect the strategy and culture of an organisation. In allegiance with 
the socio-technical systems approach Perrow (1999) described organisational strategy 
from the perspective of `coupling' in an organisation. Tight `coupling' (invariant 
sequences, one method to achieve goal, little slack in supplies, equipment, personnel 
etc. ) described organisations with a high level of control. Alternatively, loose 
`coupling' described organisations with a more flexible strategy, able to accommodate 
fluctuations in work sequences, methods, and use of technology and resources. To 
achieve flexibility in an organisation, alternative methods of work organisation (e. g. 
group working) and job design (e. g. multi-skilling) provide comparable adaptability 
among personnel (Buchanan 1998b). 
Organisational goals are also influenced by extra-organisational factors, such as 
legislatory and local government requirements and the customer: client base. 
3.6.5.1 Defining safety culture 
It is the actions and decision at the top level that determine the culture of an 
organisation, and this is also applicable to safety. A number of descriptions of safety 
culture exist (McDonald 1997); the term appears to be used interchangeably with 
safety climate and health and safety culture / climate. As an example the HSE 
describe: 
`The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of 
behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organisation's health and safety management. 
Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by 
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventative 
measures. ' 
(ACSNI 1993, cited by Health and Safety Executive 1997b). 
In more general terms, evaluation of the resources used to identify safety culture 
components are beyond the scope of this literature review, but for completeness and 
later reference, the facets that make up and are essential in the achievement of a health 
and safety culture are recorded in Table 20. 
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The facets of an informed safety culture 
"A `reporting' culture - of errors and near misses + knowledge elicitation of steady state 
"A `just' culture - determining boundaries of acceptable behaviour 
"A `flexible' culture - decentralised decision making and a divergent skill base 
"A `learning' culture - ability to evaluate information and take positive action 
(Reason 1997) 
To achieve a positive health and safety culture HSE promote: 
" Control - top down commitment and allocation of responsibilities for health and safety 
" Co-operation - pooling knowledge and experience through participation at all levels 
" Communication - H&S information must flow into, within and out of the organisation 
" Competence - that employees are adequately skilled and experienced in their role 
(Health and Safety Executive 1997b 
Table 20. Safety culture summarised 
3.6.5.2 Safety management 
It is beyond the scope of this research to comprehensively describe the field of safety 
management, but interview data from the two governmental research initiatives into 
construction accident causation (Ministry of Labour 1967, Whittington et al. 1992) 
summarise many findings and subsequent recommendations. The 1967 report focused 
upon the importance of management commitment to safety, proper provision of safety 
advice (especially at the planning stage), requirements to wear protective equipment, 
the use of a safety committee to co-ordinate different contractor groups and the need 
for measures to accommodate `multiplicity' of contractors in a work area. 
There have been some changes in terminology or emphasis in the 25-year interval 
between each publication, yet many of the findings remained relevant and were 
repeated in the latter publication. Summarised, the findings of the 1992 report defined 
three areas of safety management improvements (Table 21): 
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Within indiridual companies 
Develop effective reporting systems & data bases to feedback on company performance and 
decision making 
Integrate safety goals with other company objectives 
Aim for comprehensive safety management systems: 
" Establish lines of responsibility and control " ensure safety competence of contractors " 
define pan-industry safety requirements " introduce systematic risk management " improve 
supervision " increase subcontractor and workforce participation "effectively sanction and 
enforce policy " develop a safety monitoring system for organisational, project and site 
management levels " encouraje large companies to train commonly employed sub-contractors 
Industry-led initiatives 
Develop a more effective training infrastructure 
Develop a comprehensive policy for training and supervision of site management ! first line 
supervision 
Improve information flow of accident and technical risk management data across industry 
Establish common safety requirements and certification (anal2gous to BS5750) 
Client-led initiatives 
A higher client profile to ensure adequate consideration of timelines, costing, safety and 
programming 
General operating climate 
Legislative changes to promote proactive safety management, client responsibilities and minimum 
safety management standards 
Insurance premium changes to reflect good management 
HSE changes to 
" provide guidance on safety management " introduce a more systematic approach to data 
collection and incident investigation " develop more practical safety guidance for SMEs 
(Whittington et al. 1992, pp 124-128). 
Table 21. Recommendations for safety management improvement from `Research 
into management, organisational and human factors in the construction industry' 
Whilst not specific to the construction industry, more recent and primary guidance for 
safety management is provided by the HSE (Health and Safety Executive, 1997b). 
3.7 Overview of main issues in accident modelling 
Evaluation of progressive development of the knowledge base concerning accident 
causation has enabled the isolation of key features in modelling the systems approach 
- these are reproduced in the 
first column of Table 22. Evaluation of findings using an 
ergonomics approach (incorporating findings from the contributory inter-disciplinary 
research) has highlighted the areas that should be explored in accident investigation 
(Table 15 & Table 16). Remedial measures have been attributed variable success and 
the investigation must evaluate the appropriateness of these for both users and the 
work process. Comments on failings in accident investigation are isolated as key 
points to be avoided. These issues are summarised in Table 22. 
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Systems approach Accident investigation Key points 
IDENTIFY Managerial, 
organisational and extra- 
organisational influences " Explore the range of AVOID over 
IDENTIFY latent conditions influences and conditions concentration on 
independent of the accident that impact human individual 
sequence performance fallibilities 
IDENTIFY types rather than " Explore compatibility of AVOID the many 
tokens barrier i control forms of `blame' 
IDENTIFY the influence of interventions for user & AVOID 
dynamic states upon process technocentrism 
subsequent performance 
and adaptations 
Table 22. Overview of the systems approach 
These criteria will be used in evaluation of construction accident models (3.11). 
However, much information concerning the nature of construction industry accidents 
is derived from epidemiological data, and thus it is necessary first to introduce this 
resource. 
3.7.1 Epidemiological data 
Epidemiology is concerned with the study of patterns and determinants of damage in 
populations (Shepherd et al. 2000). Section 3.2 described the historical factors 
influencing understanding of the term `accident'. Initially the classification `accident' 
served as an umbrella term to describe outlying or vicarious events, but data collection 
and improved analysis strategies later permitted the collection of more usable and 
productive information. Sources and collective findings of modem day UK national 
accident, injury and ill health data statistics have been described in the introduction. 
The development of a sophisticated reporting and analysis system has proved 
invaluable in isolating data patterns, distributions and associations (age, gender, work 
experience etc. ) in accident causation. 
An initiative to improve and create commonality of reporting among EU member 
states has recently been launched (European Commission 2000). An early trial of the 
new methodology shows the potential for improved understanding of accident 
causation through the introduction of recording of deviation (sourced by people, 
products, environment etc. ), but notes limitations, especially for more minor 
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accidents, as a result of inadequacies in design and completion of accident report 
forms (Hanna-Kaisa and Marko 2002). 
Criticisms levied against the source material and methodological approaches are not 
new. Pitfalls of dependency upon epidemiological data are summarised by Surry 
(1968); although development of the EU classification systems indicates considerable 
progress, weaknesses or bias in source materials are concerns still relevant to current 
practice. 
Reporting may be `claim' rather than accident related and be biased by data 
collectors. Findings are entirely reliant upon the quality and integrity of 
reporting 
The main purpose lies in the accounting of accidents by severity / frequency. 
Statistical analyses find accident associations, rather than `why' it happened. 
There may be a revelation of significant common elements rather than 
investigation of accident antecedents, encouraging the researcher to deduce 
assumptions rather than explore data 
(Surry 1968) 
3.7.1.1 Epidemiology and human error 
Epidemiological studies have revealed some associations with human error type and 
accident consequence, which gives some insight into the risk factor and consequence 
associations described above. For example studies of aviation accidents have revealed 
that fatalities had greatest association with goal selection or decisional factors (O'Hare 
et al. 1994). Similarly major aviation accidents have been associated with judgement 
errors, whereas minor accidents have been more associated with procedural accidents 
(Wiegman and Shappell 1997). 
Mathews et al. (2000) compared the results of Wiegmann and Shappell (1997), Feyer 
et al. (1997) (Australian occupational fatality data), and Salminen and Tallberg (1996) 
(National Finnish serious and fatal occupational accidents) to identify error 
distribution. They reported that, among the aviation data as a whole, violations had 
greater association with major accidents, accounting for 17% of the data, whereas 
among minor events mistakes accounted for 58% of accidents and slips and lapses the 
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remainder. The two national data sources revealed very similar patterns to each other: 
skill based mistakes had greatest association with fatalities (66% and 55% 
respectively) whereas rule and knowledge based mistakes each accounted for 10% - 
14% of the remaining fatality cases. 
3.7.1.2 Epidemiology and systems aspects 
Understanding of multi-factorial events and systems approaches to accident causation 
has enabled considerable improvements in the collection, categorisation and analysis 
of epidemiological data. Pioneers in developing an epidemiological tool for 
occupational accident research are Williamson and Feyer who, through analyses of a 
3-year period of Australian fatality rates (1020 fatalities) and associated coroner 
details, developed a behavioural epidemiology tool for use in accident causation 
research (Williamson and Feyer 1990). The model requires distinction of up to three 
precursor events to the accident and eight categories of contributory events 
" Precursor events (can be selected from any of the four categories) `environmental, 
equipment, medical and behavioural*'. 
* Behavioural events used two error classifications -error of omission or 
commission (Swain 1963) and behaviour based error by skill, rule or 
knowledge (Rasmussen 1982) 
Contributory events can be any from the categories `environmental, equipment, 
medical, work practice, supervision, training, task error and other' 
Whilst attribution of behavioural events appears to exclude `violation', Williamson 
and Feyer nonetheless found that 91.2% of the fatalities included precursor events of 
human error or `poor work practices' such as poor supervision and training. Upon 
later re-evaluation of the data Feyer et al. (1997) concluded that unsafe practice varied 
for different error types - skill base errors were associated with individual worker 
practices, PPE and safety equipment; rule based errors were associated with general 
equipment practices; and knowledge based errors with management practices. 
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3.7.1.3 Epidemiology and construction data 
In the UK, the Health and Safety Commission provide an annual report of 
epidemiological data; current findings relating to the construction industry were 
introduced earlier (2.2.1). Preceding this method, there were two large studies 
(independent of the annual HSC reports) each involving analyses of construction 
fatality statistics over a five-year period (fatalities are always reported and 
investigated, thus ensuring consistent case details). In one case, 100 construction 
accident case studies were analysed (Health and Safety Executive 1978) and in the 
other all 739 fatalities in the five-year data collection period were included (Health 
and Safety Executivel988). 
Each study generally reported by very similar criteria, the activity or task type 
proximal to the accident event. In each study `falls from height' accounted for 
approximately 50% of the fatalities and, including histories of sample accidents, there 
was much guidance relating to defining responsibilities, preventative action and 
improvements. Whilst these two sources have been important in isolation of 
hazardous incidences and activities from which a wealth of remedial measures has 
been proposed, current methods of analysis appear increasingly sophisticated. There 
is also a wealth of similar information from overseas, for example the National 
Institutes of Occupational Health in Denmark (e. g. Kines 2001), Finland (e. g. 
Niskanen 1986) and the USA (e. g. Hinze et al. 1988). 
3.7.2 Summary table of inter-disciplinary knowledge sources 
Previous literature reviews have revealed a variety of associations with accidents, 
either concerning individuals, or associated with work place and environment or with 
work organisational issues. Table 23 overviews some of the accident related findings. 
There are some conflicting reports, but they are listed here as examples of related 
research drawn upon for later site data methods development. Data have been 
obtained from a variety of individual publications and literature sources such as 
national HSE data, a comprehensive review of individual differences in an HSE 
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contract research report (Lawton and Parker, 1998) and a review of social theory and 
accidents (Dwyer and Raflrey 1991). 
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3.8 Transferring accident causation models into practice 
3.8.1.1 Criticisms of accident causation models 
A criticism levied at accident causation models is that they can induce a struggle to fit 
the data range into a specified framework and inhibit `free range thinking'(Kletz 
1994). It should not be assumed that the development of an accident causation model 
is concomitant with the production of an accident investigation technique (Benner 
1985). In a study of accident investigation procedures undertaken by seventeen US 
federal or industry representation bodies, Benner found that only two were able to 
specify use of a particular accident model. Most techniques used by the remainder 
were closely allied to accident causation models, but had combined model elements 
with in-house data collection techniques to create a practical `investigative 
methodology'. 
This suggests that, as an academic concept, accident study models do not 
automatically translate into efficient accident investigation methodologies. There 
may be a number of reasons for this (such as poor models, lack of knowledge at 
practitioner level or industry specific idiosyncrasies); the need to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice in accident investigation and analysis has been identified 
(O'Hare 2000). The practical aspects of accident investigation are reviewed in the 
following sections. 
Hoyos and Zimolong, (1988, p. 29) note that `the application of accident causation 
models in safety practice is a means to filter and control the organisation of data about 
accident risks and select appropriate measures to improve safety'. Given the 
historical perspective showing the progressive learning about the range of relevant 
factors in accident causation, `filter' and `control' suggest the risk of elimination of 
data with learning potential. Alternatively, the models may also give some structure 
and enhance the approaches used. A significant feature in identifying the range of 
latent factor conditions has been achieved by the incorporation of ergonomics / human 
factors assessments as part of the data collection process (Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 1994), yet this too has received a number of criticisms. 
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3.8.1.2 Criticisms of human factors /ergonomics approaches 
Whilst the advantages of human factors / ergonomics assessments are embraced (as a 
means to identify contributory factors), the exact meaning and application of human 
factors and ergonomics appears to be a source of conflict. The Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (1994), attribute human factors /ergonomics to the use of design 
principals, matching the physical environment to the workplace layout and interface. 
The Health and Safety Executive (1999c), adopt a similar stance, but attribute 
different meaning to each word - ergonomics pertaining to physical fit between 
people and the things that they use, and human factors as the impact on safety and 
health behaviour arising from the job, the individual and the organisation. However, 
the International Ergonomics Association, in their definition (1.5.1), adopt 
interchangeable use of the terms `human factors' and `ergonomics' and reinforce that 
the approach and discipline is concerned with human interaction with the system. 
Cross-reference to the headings collated from ergonomics texts in the first column in 
Table 15 and Table 16 may serve to debunk some preconceptions pertaining to a 
narrow view of ergonomics /human factors, but not necessarily its science. Human 
factors assessments are criticised methodologically - for leaping from `tokens' to 
`types' without adequate breakdown and evaluation of the event sequence (Dekker 
2002), or error identification (Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994), and for lack 
of consideration of latent conditions, such as regulatory weakness (Johnson 1999). 
From an alternative perspective, the quality of ergonomics in diagnostic approaches is 
also criticised. Kennedy and Kirwan (1997), in their evaluation of 15 safety culture 
assessment methodologies (including MORT and Tripod, 3.9.2.2), identified that 
ergonomics was generally dealt with only in a `piece meal fashion' and concluded 
that an inadequate ergonomics evaluation could give a very poor reflection of 
interactions between the system and user. 
3.9 Accident investigation 
The aim of accident investigation is expressed from two different perspectives. 
Firstly, the emphasis of accident investigation is described in terms of its eventual 
desirable outcome; the improved safety of the system (Barnett 1987), a typical 
outcome being `judicious intervention strategies' (Shappell and Wiegmann 1997). 
64 
The second perspective is that accident investigation, additionally, is a means to learn 
from past incidents in order to generate improvements (Redmill and Rajan 1997, 
Kontogiannis et al. 2000). 
Whilst the authors with the `desirable outcome' perspective may feel that learning 
from past incidents is implicit within their descriptions, the nature of learning is an 
important point as this concerns the types of accidents studied, the techniques used to 
gather information and the nature of evaluation and interpretation. 
3.9.1 Accident types and consequences 
A commonly accepted view is that major accidents are relatively rare events, 
representing the `tip of an iceberg', yet for every major or lost time accident there are 
greater number of events with minor consequences, and yet more with no visible 
injury or damage (Heinrich et al. 1980). There has been some opposition to this 
viewpoint; Saloniemi and Oksanen (1998), (in analysis of Finnish fatality data 1977- 
1991) report increased fatalities on construction sites as cubic metres under 
construction decline and as accident frequency declines and proposed that the chain 
from minor to major accidents was unclear. Nevertheless, while the variables in their 
sample also incorporated number of employees, working hours and unemployment 
rate, there was no information relating context of the construction projects studied 
(build type, timeliness, environmental conditions etc. ), which may have revealed 
important contributory information. 
The Health and Safety Executive (1997b), adopts the traditional approach of 
relationship between major / lost time, minor and non-injury events and report a ratio 
of approximately 1: 7: 189. They conclude that the accident consequence (ill health, 
injury, damage) is often a matter of chance; investigation of near-miss events is urged 
(Health and Safety Executive 1997b). The more frequently occurring events could 
otherwise be more serious and, although not all risks lead to serious consequences, 
such events represent control failure and thus learning potential. 
There are requirements to report major injury types, work related absences over 3 
days and certain types of occupational ill health and dangerous occurrences (Health 
and Safety Executive 1999b). However, investigation of more minor events may have 
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less association with guilt, anxiety and produce a more candid history (Redmill and 
Rajan 1997). Different techniques and analyses are used in investigation of major and 
minor incidents and these are each discussed. 
3.9.2 Major accident - assessment techniques 
The investigations of major accidents in high-tech high-risk industries have been a 
key source of learning and intervention in the understanding of accident causation. 
Specific legislation has been developed to specify organisational responsibilities. In 
the petrochemical industries, responsibilities are defined by the Control of Major 
Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH, formerly the Control of Industrial 
Major Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations 1984, ) (Health and Safety Executive 1999c). 
As major hazard installations (sites with dangerous substances above specified 
quantities) they are required to detail emergency plans and include presentation of a 
`safety case' (defining the safety of the installation, Reason 1997). These principles 
have also been adopted by other high risk industries and techniques used in 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) are 
employed (Kirwan 1995). The assessments and development of different techniques 
have also provided much of the knowledge base concerning human error 
identification, prediction and risk reduction measures. Some of the methods also 
serve or have been used in development of accident investigations techniques. 
3.9.2.1 Human error assessment techniques 
An abundance of human error identification methods exist (Stanton and Baber 1996). 
A general feature of these measures is that they typically require task analysis 
(Kirwan 1994), the consideration of known events around a task (Johnson 1999) and 
expert judgement to determine predicted error types (Stanton and Baber 1996). 
Criticisms levied at human error assessment techniques are for their lack of 
consideration of physiological or intrinsic factors of the individual, (Shappell and 
Wiegmann 1997), for their lack of representation of the external environment and for 
variable reliability in judgement / predictions (Stanton and Baber 1996). Human error 
assessment is also used outside the major incident prediction scenario (in evaluation 
of human-machine interface for example), but further description is beyond the remit 
of this thesis. Nevertheless, solutions to shortcomings in human error assessment can 
be found in the assessment of systems issues and factors influencing performance. 
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3.9.2.2 System assessment techniques 
Response to the limited focus on Human error has been in the development of 
methods that embrace the systems approach to accident causation and collect data on 
the range of latent factor `conditions'. Many event diagnostic approaches have been 
developed for application in particular industries; some are also used as HRA or as 
safety culture assessment tools. These methods incorporate a range of the systems 
issues relevant to the industry type; examples of some used in accident investigation 
include: - 
Nuclear Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) (Johnson, 1980) 
industry - Safety through Organisational Learning (SOL) (Fahlbruch and Wilpert 
1997) 
Petroleum / Tripod -BETA described by (Reason 1997) 
shipping 
Chemical Sequentially Timed Events Plotting procedure (STEP) (Hendrick and 
Benner 1987, cited by Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994 
Table 24. Example diagnostic approaches used in evaluation of systems failure 
There are common features to many of the approaches; the need for training in use of 
the techniques, the need for task analysis and the use of expert judgement in risk 
determination (for example Kirwan 1994, Hoyos and Zimolong 1988, Center for 
Chemical Process Safety 1994). Another feature is of their presentation for use by 
industry professionals; the methods have also been developed iteratively through their 
use in field trials (in some cases over many years, Center for Chemical Process Safety 
1994). 
3.9.3 Major incident - data representation 
3.9.3.1 Use of analytic trees 
Software packages have been created to facilitate the diagnostic process using many 
of the system assessment techniques (Tripod - BETA for example, Reason, 1997). 
These may also adopt the more traditional approach of data representation by the use 
of analytic trees. Analytic trees include `event trees', that identify error potential and 
possible operator recovery modes from a basic initiating event (Kirwan 1994), and 
`fault trees' which employ a top down approach in the identification of sub-ordinate 
causal events (Hoyos and Zimolong 1988). These types of analytic trees typically 
employ a range of flow lines and symbols to distinguish interdependencies in event 
sequences in accident causation. Essentially, the aim is to identify the `root causes', 
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the underlying factors or sequences in accident causation (Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 1994). 
The `tree' layout style is favoured for its visual representation (especially one that is 
well understood by engineers), for its potential to expose alternative events that might 
have happened (Johnson 1999) and to model error recovery and to identify barriers 
(or barrier failures) along the flow lines that would influence the end event 
(Kontogiannis et al. 2000). Analytic trees have been used for some time in many 
PSA/ HRA approaches. The subjective modelling used in predictive quantification 
techniques can also be enhanced through use of the analytic tree. The layout would 
guide expert judgement or ranking of importance in the process of comparing and 
verifying accident causation probability predictions pre and post event (Kirchsteiger 
1998). 
Shortcomings in the use of fault trees are that they record only a particular case, not 
system functionality (Rasmussen 1997). They do not model uncertainty or borderline 
human performance that can be both successful and unsuccessful, (Hoyos and 
Zimolong 1988), or compensatory (Rasmussen 1997). Neither do they necessarily 
provide temporal information in the event representation (Johnson 1996). They have 
also been used extensively in well-structured industrial process plants (with well 
defined tasks), rather than in less structured situations (such as workshops and 
construction) (Hoyos and Zimolong 1988). The quality of quantification will 
inevitably reflect the quality of the source qualitative information (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 1994), and this will be determined by the nature of data 
collection and analysis. 
3.9.3.2 Accident mapping 
Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) recently presented a hybrid representation, tracing 
the analytic tree through to decision makers at the extra-organisational level. Whilst 
the analytic tree follows the traditional fault tree sequence, the process progressively 
links with decision makers (identified as part of the risk management process) whose 
decisions, under normal conditions, have influenced outcome. 
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3.9.3.3 Tabular representation 
An alternative approach was adopted by Taylor-Adams et al. (1999), who presented 
the investigation of a medical accident by identification of triggering factors between 
active and latent failures. Taylor-Adams et al. (1999), proposed this technique as the 
medical circumstances included a number of forms of `correct' styles of treatment 
(making task analysis very difficult), situations where medical practitioners rarely 
work within the constraints of defined protocols and where there are no safety case 
requirements. They anticipated that the benefits of qualitative analyses would pave 
the way for more systematic assessments in the future. 
3.9.4 Minor accidents - assessment and analysis 
The root cause analysis system is concerned with detailed investigations of accidents 
with major consequences and is, by necessity, resource intensive (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety 1994). In contrast, investigations of more minor events 
generate different types and depths of data; traditionally these are more plentiful and 
compiled for epidemiological style analysis (revealing frequencies and incidences 
among the sample). Software packages can be purchased (or developed in-house) to 
assist with analyses and solution generation. The collection and analysis of data is 
bounded by the impact of those involved in the process of investigation, the methods 
used, their analysis, and solution generation (Barnett 1987). 
3.9.4.1 Accident investigation - documentation 
A range of forms, checklists and questionnaires are generally employed to record 
data. The advantages of these techniques are that they enable quantification of results 
and increase objectivity and standardisation (Hoyos and Zimolong 1988). They may 
also assist analysts from forgetting the range of factors (Fahibruch and Wilpert 1997) 
and also facilitate the respondents history through recognition rather than the need to 
recall contributory factors (Hoyos and Zimolong 1988). 
In contrast, there are also a number of disadvantages in the use of these techniques. 
The style of the materials may encourage only superficial investigation, such as 
focusing on what rather than why an event happened (Center for Chemical Process 
Safety 1994). Forms are generally modelled on the `unsafe act - unsafe condition' 
dichotomy (active factors, Sanders and McCormick 1992), which is not very useful 
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for the design of improvements (Rasmussen 1997). Accidents may also be 
incompletely reported (Hoyos and Zimolong 1988) or the materials too inflexible or 
constraining to capture the subtleties and nuances of events (Barnett 1987, Fahlbruch 
and Wilpert 1997). The distribution of items may also adversely affect data 
collection, as points at the beginning tend to be chosen more than those at the end 
(Sheahy 1979), or because the detail of a particular item might lead to over-estimation 
of the causal relevance. Alternatively, if a cause is not listed on the checklist, it is 
likely that it will be missed (Fischhoff et al. 1978) and undermine the quality of 
investigation. 
3.9.4.2 Accident investigation - observation and interview 
Observation and interview are also used as data collection methods, and often in 
combination with the data collection forms and questionnaires (Barnett 1987). For 
near-miss incidents, the use of `critical incident technique' (recollection of a 
dangerous situation or successful recovery to avoid an accident) can provide useful 
information from which to direct remedial action (Hoyos and Zimolong 1988). 
Where an accident has already occurred, interview should occur as soon as possible 
after the event for accurate recollection (Barnett 1987). The interviewer should also 
have, or have access to domain knowledge of the technical aspects of the system 
(Barnett 1987, Dekker 2002) and be mindful of inter-personal issues of interviewing 
technique. Such issues include avoiding judgemental comments, pressuring or 
rushing the witness in anyway, suggesting answers or avoiding questions by assuming 
prior knowledge of answers (US Department of Energy 1999). Whether or not 
confidentiality can be assured should be discussed and understood at the outset. 
3.9.4.3 Accident investigation - current practice 
The practice of accident investigation in the construction industry has been found to 
be poor (Gyi et al., 1999), but from a more general perspective many issues 
surrounding accident investigation have been summarised in a recent HSE contract 
research report: 
In a general industry interview study (a range of 100 companies) of the 
nature and quality of accident investigations (Human Reliability 
Associates 2001) found that depth of investigation ranged from an event 
record only (at the most basic level) through to use of photographs, 
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statements, reconstruction (at intermediate level) to time line or analytic 
tree modelling (at the most structured level). Values and attitudes of the 
person driving the investigation (see also 3.9.5) exerted considerable 
influence over the process, but a robust and structured investigation 
style served to mitigate adverse effects. 
The use of a structured approach to accident investigation tended to 
increase with company size. Most companies veered towards 
traditional (active factors) approaches to investigation and although 
they often did not distinguish between immediate and underlying 
causes, this didn't necessarily preclude the generation of system based 
remedial action. For remedial action companies undertaking basic level 
investigation were more likely to recommend training and raising of 
awareness, whereas those undertaking more intermediate level 
investigation changed equipment and procedures. Only 24% of the 
sample revised risk assessments and this was greatest in companies 
employing the most structured level of investigation. Results also 
indicated little training in accident investigation, and for those that had 
received training it was often incorporated within general `health and 
safety training' or was more related to accident recording. (Human 
Reliability Associates 2001). 
3.9.4.4 Problems associated with the collection of accident histories 
There is a natural tendency (at any level in the organisation) to avoid blame, 
accusations of wrongdoing or incompetence (Woodcock 1995, DeJoy 1994). 
Accident involved personnel may prefer to associate their accidents with bad luck 
(DeJoy 1994) or be selective in recollection of events, choosing to omit seemingly 
unrelated or unimportant actions or events (Barnett 1987). There may be social 
factors at play too; the accident history may be devised to protect a group member 
(Woodcock 1995), or reflect the nature of social interactions between supervisors and 
subordinates (DeJoy 1994). 
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3.9.5 Cause attribution and hindsight bias 
A range of different factors influences the perception of causation and the process of 
decision-making; bias and hindsight are the main areas of concern because of their 
potential for impact upon the depth and quality of investigation. 
3.9.5.1 Role differences in attributing cause 
Attribution to internal factors (intrinsic faults of the individual) is more likely the 
greater the administrative distance from the event (although supervisors with task 
experience are less intemalised (DeJoy 1994). This is especially so among those with 
supervisory or decision making roles, who are in themselves influenced by the safety 
culture and attitude towards methods and level of search, perceptions of root causes 
etc. (DeJoy 1994, Woodcock and Smiley 1998). Attribution of cause is also affected 
by the investigators professional training (Svenson et al. 1999), whether the 
investigators role is `adaptive' or `defensive' (Wong and Weiner 1981), and by fear of 
economic implications in proposing solutions (Woodcock 1995). Repeatability, inter- 
and intra-analyst judgement, may not always be consistent or as objective as it might 
be (Stanton and Baber, 1996); in trying to avoid bias in one area it may inadvertently 
be created it in another (Woodcock 1995). Holding stereotype views of interviewees 
will also affect the interviewer / respondent relationship and likely produce different 
results (Loosemore and Tan 2000). 
3.9.5.2 Event tunes in attributing cause 
The type of event, the history of accidents affecting the task, or the accident history of 
the worker can influence the attribution of cause; where the event is more severe 
internal attribution is more likely than with a minor event (Woodcock, 1995). 
Causation attribution also depends on the stability of the event - consistent and 
repeatable conditions are more likely to invite change than temporary states or 
conditions (Dejoy 1994). 
3.9.5.3 Bias and hindsight in accident investigation 
Bias in information search can result from preconceptions among those with 
responsibilities for accident investigation. The reporting process is a series of filters, 
each of which may progressively contribute to bias / unwarranted selectivity in the 
transmission of injury related information (Webb et al. 1989). 
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Bias is especially apparent where there is a blame style approach (Dekker 2002), 
although the reasons behind this may be quite subtle. Attention and action can focus 
on well-defined hazards - `decoy phenomena', while other problems are missed 
(Department of Health 2000, Rasmussen 1990). Some accidents are not 
acknowledged as abnormal, especially if they commonly occur and become integrated 
within the pattern (or `script') of work (Woodcock 1995); this is one of the reasons 
why minor or near-miss accidents are particularly vulnerable to being overlooked 
(DeJoy 1994). Accidents are also often seen as one-off rare events and the lack of 
remedial action will not necessarily impede operations until the next `rare' event 
(Woodcock 1995). 
Dekker (2002) reports that hindsight encourages the creation of a logical sequence of 
events from information that was complex (and possibly unknown at the time of event 
unfolding), fragmented and with a background in its own right. This can also enable 
the investigator to `cherry-pick' information from within the sequence to highlight 
particular themes (such as `hurrying'), that were not necessarily there in the linear 
sequence of the event. 
What might have been perceived as normal or safe operations, may only in hindsight 
be identified as incorrect; the progressive development of latent conditions can create 
accidents that would have been considered `impossible' at their creation (Wagenaar 
and Groeneweg 1987). Hindsight reveals what the ideal actions and sequence of 
events should have been, but does not identify why people did what they did and why 
they deviated from accepted or instructed practice. What are seen as choices in 
hindsight may not have appeared so at the time (Dekker 2002). 
3.9.5.4 Resolving cause attribution and hindsight bias 
Solutions to some of the problems concerning the integrity of interpretation will be 
met by cross-disciplinary teamwork in accident investigation (Svedung and 
Rasmussen 2002). Teams should include experienced operatives (Kontogiannis et al. 
2000) and experts with different professional training - whose joint analyses should 
provide insightful coverage of systems interactions (Svenson et al. 1999). Solutions 
to any linguistic problems, such as natural language v. s. a profession's vernacular, 
must also be resolved (Johnson 1996). 
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In order to interpolate the varied perspectives arising from the contributing data 
sources a process of triangulation may be used (benzin 1970, Dekker 2002). 
Comparing data from one source with that of another, and incorporating different 
combinations of methods to secure an in-depth understanding is a process called 
triangulation. The outcome may serve to reinforce or question findings. 
Triangulation is an alternative to validation (Denzin and Lincoln 1998) and an 
especially useful tool where circumstances are unique and not repeatable. 
3.10 Overview of main issues in accident investigation 
Evaluation of the literature has revealed a number of differences in the nature of 
investigation into major and minor accidents. Data acquired from investigation of 
fatalities appears to have been useful for the large-scale epidemiological studies, but 
near miss / minor incident investigation is less emotive and a valuable information 
source when there is the potential for more serious outcomes. 
The accident investigation techniques used, for both minor and major incidents, 
appear to have drawbacks. These included adverse influences from the style and 
content of the materials used and potential for adverse influences from those 
responsible for data collection and analysis. Techniques used in major accident 
investigation have been validated yet appear to be directed towards specific industry 
types and depend upon detailed knowledge of work practices and procedures and 
robust qualitative information. Use of multiple methods and cross-disciplinary input 
offer solutions to some of these problems. 
Data representation, especially for major accidents, typically involves the 
development of an analytic tree which (where required) facilitates the quantitative 
analyses of accident probability associated with safety case development. Analytic 
trees appear less appropriate for representation of more subtle situations, especially 
where there is less control or proceduralisation. Alternative styles of representation 
have been adopted, eg. free text tabular representation of active and latent factors 
where a number of correct actions are possible. Alternatively, accident mapping, a 
variant of the analytic tree method, identifies the dynamic events in accident causation 
and traces these back to `normal' extra-organisational conditions. 
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3.11 Construction industry accident models 
There are few models of accident causation in the construction industry and little 
evidence as yet (beyond the source publication), that indicates the value, 
appropriateness and subsequent usability by those outside the originator research 
group. Literature review of accident causation models revealed the progressive 
research that has lead to the current level of understanding. This was summarised in 
section 3.6 and a table to encapsulate the main issues in a systems approach to 
accident modelling was devised (Table 22). 
Evaluation of the intricacies of accident investigation has also revealed the many 
ways that data collection and analysis can impact conclusions made and subsequent 
remedial action. To represent both the systems approach and the data collection 
methods, the table was revised (Table 25). 
Systems approach Accident investigation Key points 
IDENTIFY Managerial, 
organisational and extra- 
organisational influences " Explore the range of AVOID over 
IDENTIFY latent conditions influences and conditions concentration on 
independent of the accident that impact human individual 
sequence performance fallibilities 
IDENTIFY types rather than " Explore compatibility of AVOID the many 
tokens barrier / control forms of `blame' 
IDENTIFY the influence of interventions for user & AVOID 
dynamic states upon process technocentrism 
subsequent performance and 
adaptations 
Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary 
analysis 
Table 25. Overview of the systems approach and data collection methods 
In order to explore whether the construction models might be used in the research, 
each was evaluated against the criteria devised for the systems approach and 
understanding of factors that impact data collection and analysis (data representation 
styles are unknown and are not included in this analysis). Five models were selected 
- one (3.11.1) 
derived from an HSE contract research report, two from peer reviewed 
journals (3.11.3 and 3.11.4) and the remaining two from conference proceedings. 
Strengths, intermediate value and weaknesses were identified for each model using 
the criteria of the systems approach. Whilst this evaluation served the knowledge 
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elicitation process, it did not necessarily reflect the original intention or intended 
detail of the models. All best efforts have been made in giving a fair representation 
on the basis of the information documented. 
3.11.1 Alternative model of accident causation 
The work of Whittington et al. (1992) in their research into management, 
organisational and human factors in the construction industry, provided a key 
information source for the identification of accident causal factors. Their research 
entailed detailed analysis of industry reports of thirty reportable accidents and (to 
compensate for inadequate detail) was supplemented by interviews with Safety 
Officers for the companies concerned. 
" Poor selection /control of subcontractors & workers 
" Inadeauate safety training of site managers / supervisors 
" Failure to consider safety in design of build, plant. PPE etc. 
Poor plant maintenance systems 
" Failure to learn from past incidents 
Lack of hazard reco ition 
" Failure to set up and communicate safe system of work (SSW) 
" Failure to set up SSW for permanent and temporary works 
" Provision of wrong equipment 
" Failure to act on earlier safety incident 
" Failure to supervise subcontractors and employees 
" Failure to ensure training / authority to undertake task 
Poor control of multiple / linked tasks 
" Other site management issue 
" Unsafe acts 
" (from exceptional pressures such as time delays etc., habitual violations and inadequate 
SSW) 
" Miscommunications between operatives 
" Using own initiative without skills / training 
" utner muivºuuai iaý ui 
Key - '-"'-"- = most commonly linked. = second most commonly linked 
Table 26. Example failures identified in accident data analysis 
Findings indicated that the construction industry placed overwhelming importance 
upon the perpetration of unsafe acts by individuals as accident causal factors. 
However the Whittington et al. (1992) data evaluation (using an adapted HRA / 
analytic tree human factors orientated approach) identified three groups of causal or 
contributing factors - Headquarter issues, Site Management issues and Individual 
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Factors. Considering each accident in turn they identified 3 -15 causes (or possible 
causes) per accident (212 in total), distributed in a ratio 1: 2: 1. Head quarter factors 
were found to influence site factors, which in turn influenced other site factors and 
individual factors. The types of issues incorporated under each heading are given in 
Table 26 and those factors more often linked to other factors are underlined. 
Based on these findings Whittington et al. (1992) suggested an `alternative model of 
accident causation' showing the propagation of an accident. The model contains four 
main stages (Figure 8). 
" Company policy level - inadequacies in policies for training, procurement 
methods etc. 
Project management level - inadequate planning or choice of construction 
methods 
" Site management level - poor communication, supervision and work segregation 
. Individual level - use of wrong equipment, violations 
Although not annotated they also proposed that there would also be client influences 
at the commissioning stage. 
Policy I/ 
Project Site /Vih. Vidual 
es 
Management Management vb. Accidents 
Failur Failures Failures Failures 
Large / novel / 
complex Projects 
Small / traditional 
Projects 
(Whittington et al. 1992) 
Figure 8. Alternative model of accident causation 
3.11.1.1 Model evaluation 
In comparison with the main issues identified in the review of systems issues, data 
collection and analysis the strengths and weaknesses of this approach are annotated: 
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Systems approach hei points Weakness 
IDENTIFY Managerial, 
organisational and 
extra-organisational Explore the range of 
influences influences and conditions  AVOID over 
IDENTIFY latent that impact human X/ concentration on  
conditions independent performance individual fallibilities 
of the accident 
x 
sequence AVOID the many 
IDENTIFY types rather 
x? 
forms of `blame'  
than tokens E l ibi i xp ore compat l ty of IDENTIFY the influence barrier / control 
AVOID x/ 
of dynamic states upon interventions for user & x technocentrism subsequent x process 
performance and 
adaptations 
I Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary analysis 
The strengths of this approach are in the isolation of latent factors through to 
organisational, managerial and (inferred) extra-organisational issues. There is not 
undue attention focused upon individual fallibilities and blame directed at individuals 
is for the most part avoided. 
There are aspects that have received intermediate or uncertain address too. Some 
psychosocial factors are identified although there seems to be little perspective of the 
accidents in the context of the work situation at the time of the accident (workload, 
work scheduling, personnel availabilities, the range of psychosocial issues, 
environmental conditions, for example). Analysis is not overwhelmingly 
technocentric, yet the accident is seen only as final act in sequential events of 
construction activities. Training, supervision and communication etc. are identified, 
but their emphasis appears construction activity related ('constructocentric') rather 
than orientated towards or reflecting personal and social needs of personnel. Findings 
are not listed by `type', but by phase of generation. This is helpful in deflecting 
blame from `active factors', but has not distinguished `types' - there are failures in 
common at site management and headquarter stages. 
The weaknesses in the approach are that latent conditions have not been identified 
independently of the analytic tree accident trajectory. These would have served in 
exploration of a more comprehensive range of contributory factors and might have 
reflected the interacting dynamic states within which the accident event evolved. 
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There are no histories from injured parties - accounts are from Safety Officers and 
incident records. As such this carries the potential for bias and offers no insight into 
compatibility of control interventions for the user and process, where they exist. 
3.11.1.2 Further work 
Whittington et al. (1992) used their data sample and results as a foundation upon 
which to search more widely and explore the factors affecting safety management and 
impact from the client on the construction process. They extended their interview 
survey to include views from Project and Site Managers and from subcontractors 
(These were reported earlier 3.6.5.2). 
3.11.2 The distractions theory of accident causation 
Hinze (1996) proposed `The distractions theory of accident causation'. The 
components of this entail the plotting of injury probability against the probability of 
achieving a particular work task, according to whether distractions arise from either 
physical or mental sources (Figure 9). 
The extent to which a worker is focused upon (distracted by) unsafe physical 
conditions is a determinant of whether they reduce their productivity to accommodate 
this. The cross reference between the two is used to argue that productivity and safe 
working are not jointly achievable if the worker is distracted by a hazard - if safe 
work conditions are chosen, then the worker will not be distracted and the work will 
be relatively safe and productive. 
Mental diversions are different issues or concerns that can occupy the mind, such as 
domestic, social or family problems - greater focus on mental distraction diverts 
attention from the work task and compromises productivity. Safety and productivity 
are not compromised by mental distraction provided they are not related to physical 
work hazards. Supervisors and managers must observe for these types of mental 
distraction, and remove the worker from site, or reassign, where safety might be 
compromised. 
The conclusion to the distraction theory is that productivity will be compromised if 
the worker is distracted, but if the distraction is a physical hazard, focusing upon it 
will improve safety. 
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High Poor work 
performance 
Probability of 
Injury 
Occurrence 
Low 
but not safe 
Safe but not Ideal work 
Low High 
Productivity 
(Efficiency of work accomplishment) 
". ". " .... " ........... Direction of arrow indicates greater focus on the mental distractions 
Direction of arrow indicates greater focus on physical hazards 
Figure 9. The Distractions Theory 
3.11.2.1 Model evaluation 
In comparison with the main issues identified in the review of systems issues, data 
collection and analysis the strengths and weaknesses of this approach are annotated: 
Systems approach Key points Weakness 
IDENTIFY Managerial, 
organisational and 
extra-organisational 
x Explore the range of 
influences influences and conditions 
xý 
AVOID over 
IDENTIFY latent that impact human concentration on x 
conditions independent performance individual fallibilities 
of the accident 
x 
sequence AVOID the many 
IDENTIFY types rather forms of `blame' x? 
than tokens 
x 
lore com atibilit of Ex p p y 
IDENTIFY the influence barrier / control 
AVOID 
of dynamic states upon interventions for user & 
x technocentrism x 
subsequent x process 
performance and 
adaptations 
i 
Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary analysis 
There are almost no strengths to this model. The impression is that work hazards are 
seen as harmful to performance and productivity and should be removed, but this is 
also contradicted by a suggestion that the hazard keeps the worker alert. 
The weaknesses are that the model is entirely focused upon unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions and none of the systems approaches are used. Hazards are identified, but 
these in no way represent the range of conditions that affect human performance. 
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Mental distraction is seen only from the perspective of `beyond work' psychosocial 
issues, (no mention of social climate etc. at work) and hence a reason to remove or 
reassign a worker. 
3.11.2.2 Further work 
None suggested. It was proposed that this model might help construction managers 
ensure that work activities are performed safely. 
3.11.3 Accident root causes tracing model (ARCTM) 
Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) developed the ARCTM in order to tailor existing 
accident causation models and human error theories to the needs of the construction 
industry. ARCTM was developed as a working model to assist an investigator in 
identification of the conditions at the time of an accident and in identification of 
antecedent human behaviour. Three case studies (including loss control narrative and 
investigator appraisal of accident causation) of highway construction accidents were 
used to demonstrate the approach. The main concept is that accidents occur due to 
one of three reasons; these are reported in Table 27 with examples extracted from the 
paper. An abridged reproduction of the model is presented in Figure 10. 
Failure to identify an unsafe condition (workplace layout / location, tools, equipment, 
materials) 
" Due to management in/actions (PPE provision, poorly maintained workplace and 
equipment / tools OR through initiating exposure to occupational hygiene/ health 
problems) 
" Due to (co)worker unsafe acts (social / management pressures, sabotage, fatigue, 
intoxication, disregarding housekeeping, horseplay and working without authority) 
" Non-human cause (systems, equipment / tools failure, Acts of God) 
" Natural part of initial site conditions (uneven terrain, concealed hazards) 
" Unsafe condition not identified (lack of knowledge /experience, misinformation, habitual 
violation, human factors violation) 
" Unsafe condition identified and work continues (as above and attitude / risk perception 
No - refer to unsafe condition 
" Yes - social ! management pressures, habitual violation, lack of knowledge experience 
Table 27. ARCTM failure types 
Corrective actions entail redress in the areas of `worker training', `worker attitudes' or 
`management procedures'. Those workers without sufficient training / knowledge 
should not be expected to identify unsafe work conditions. Resolution of attitude 
problems are necessary for trained workers who chose to work unsafe. Management 
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should remove unsafe conditions proactively and reinforce the importance of worker 
safety. 
Yes 
How did this 
occur? 
Management No, unsaf 
actions ! condition 
inactions not 
identified 
(Co) worker 
unsafe act 
event or 
natural part 
of initial site 
conditions 
Figure 10. ARCTM Model (abridged version) 
3.11.3.1 Model evaluation 
Yes, unsafe 
conditions 
identified and 
carried on 
In comparison with the main issues identified in the review of systems issues, data 
collection and analysis the strengths and weaknesses of this approach are annotated: 
S. ystents approach Key points 
V 
T Weakness 
IDENTIFY 'Managerial, - -- ii 
organisational and x' 
extra-organisational Explore the range of 
influences influences and conditions AVOID over 
IDENTIFY latent that impact human x concentration on x 
conditions independent performance individual fallibilities 
of the accident 
x 
sequence AVOID the many 
IDENTIFY types rather X? 
forms of `blame' x 
than tokens E l tibili f xp ore compa ty o IDENTIFY the influence barrier, ' control AVOID x? 
of dynamic states upon interventions for user & x? technocentrism 
subsequent x process 
performance and 
adaptations 
Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary analysis 
Was there an unsafe 
condition at outset or upon 
starting the activity? 
No 
Did the worker Did the 
identify the unsafe worker 
condition? commit an 
unsafe act? 
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There are few strengths to this model. As a model / investigative tool there are 
references to `management issues' which is good, but no method of exploring the 
nature of these. Reference to possible peer pressures, tool and equipment usability 
serve to dilute a technocentric approach, but these are insufficient prompts to explore 
the range of possible psychosocial and user-compatibility issues. 
The main weaknesses of this approach are that it predominately focus' upon unsafe 
acts, such as individual fallibilities and blame. This was also the approach used in 
collecting the source data. References to management issues are too few and there is 
no consideration of organisational / extra-organisational influences at all - let alone a 
consideration of latent factors independent of the accident event and their dynamic 
interaction. Focus upon different unsafe acts ensures that `token' events are isolated 
and this is likely to inhibit the generation of remedial actions that would have generic 
address. The range of influences and conditions that might create human failure are 
few and there seems to be little insight-into or direction for the investigator to identify 
human factors issues. The focus of the three areas of remedial action is 
predominately directed towards behaviour change or an undefined management 
intervention which, given the confines of the investigation process, is likely to be 
severely under informed. 
3.11.3.2 Further work 
Upon publication of the Abdelhamid paper, discussions were presented by Gibb et al. 
(2001), and Suraii and Duff (2001). These authors commented upon the narrow range 
of investigation and recorded the ongoing work of the Loughborough University and 
UMIST research groups. 
3.11.4 Constraint response model of accident causation 
Suraji et al. (2001), propose the constraints-response model of accident causation. 
Their model traces the construction project from participants at the project conception 
phase through to project and construction management, subcontractors and operatives 
(19 classes in total). It is the interdependencies of successive decision-making and 
action through the process (the constraints and responses) that generates the 
conditions under which an accident can occur. The model is reproduced in Figure 11. 
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Physical & Business Environment 
........................ ý 
Project Concept 
............................ . 
I Project Management H Client Project Design Constraints Responses Constraints -- "1 
Project Management I Designer Responses 
Responses 
Construction Management Constraints 
Construction Management Responses """"" 
Sub Contractor Constraints 
Sub Contractors Responses 
Operative 
Constraints 
Inappropriate Inappropriate 
Construction Control Construction 
Planning 
Inappropriate 11 Inappropriate H Inappropriate 
Construction Operative Action Site Condition 
Operation 
Undesired Events 
Ultimate Undesired Events 
I Undesired Outcomes 
Figure 11. The Constraint- Response Model of accident causation 
Examples of the issues attributed to each of the classes are repeated in Table 28 
below. 
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Distal f act ors 
Project conception constraints Client responses 
" Difficulties obtaining funding " Reduced project budget 
" New business strategy " Add new project criteria 
" Planning constraints " Change project objectives 
" Environmental legislation " Accelerate design or construction of 
rojest 
Proiect des n constraints Designer response 
" Modified technical requirement of the " Increase design complexity 
constructed facility " Sublet part of the design process 
" Accelerated design programme " Reduce design resources 
" Inadequate design budget " Reduce quality of components 
" Conflict of objectives or demands of other 
projects 
Project management constraints Project management response 
" Late delivery of design detail " Increased time pressure on design 
" Limited availability of suitable team 
contractors " Inadequate contractor pre- 
" Lack of appropriate project experience qualification 
" Inadequate budget for supervision of 
construction procedures 
" Inadequate attention to risk 
management 
Construction management constraint Construction management response 
" Short programme timescale " Adjust level of supervision 
" Design variations " Fail to supply safety equipment 
" Designs difficult to construct safely " Revise or accelerate construction 
" Labour skill shortage programme 
" Fail to investigate subcontractor 
methods 
Subcontractor constraints Subcontractor response 
" Cash flow problems " Slow down work 
" Pressure from other contractors for " Reallocate resources to another site 
resources " Recruit untrained operatives 
" Lack of relevant experience 
Proxima l fa ctors 
((()eiativt>., onsitaints 1na ropriate construction planning 
" Social or domestic pressure " Inadequate method statements 
" Physical disability " Inadequate structural design for 
" Lack of skill or familiarity with process temporary structures 
" Peer pressure to conform " Inadequate site layout plan 
" Inadequate site investigation 
lnaphropriate construction control lna+ tropriafe sire condition 
" Inadequate control of plant or equipment " Unsuitable existing topography 
operation " Unsuitable weather or climatic 
" Inadequate supervision of operative work conditions 
" Inadequate control or protection of " Inappropriate ground conditions 
weather effects " Unacceptably noisy or crowded 
" Inadequate control of the stability of surrounding site 
tem orary structures 
Ina pro riete construction opgration _ 
Inapjýro riate. 1m. t_atiýe action 
" Improper construction procedure " Carelessness 
" Improper plant or equipment operation " Failure to adopt standard procedures 
" Inadequate illumination or poor lighting " Improper or inadequate use of PPE 
" Untrained or inexperienced workforce " Failure to follow instructions 
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Accidei 
I Undesired event affectin 
Structure " Equipment 1 plant " Ground 
Service " Material or component " Facility 
Operatives or other personnel 
Undesired outcome 
Minor injury " Major injury " Fatality 
Minor damage " Major damage " Destruction 
it event 
" Fall 
" Struck 
" Scaffolding collapse 
" Excavator overturn 
Table 28. Example factors of the Constraint- Response Model 
Through analysis of 500 records of HSE Inspector construction accident 
investigations, the researchers validated the proximal factors in accident causation by 
frequency of citation. These results are reproduced in Table 29; the findings for 
`inappropriate construction operation' (cited in 88% of accidents) are listed 
separately. 
Proximal Accidents caused % 
factor by proximal factors 
Inappropriate 28.8 Breach of regulation / code of practice 54.6 
construction Access/egress defective / unsuitable 18.8 
Tannin Inadequate safety facilities 15.4 
Inappropriate 16.6 Improper construction procedure 15 
construction Defective equipment /vehicle 9.8 
control Inadequate safety warnings / precautions 6.8 
Inappropriate 88 Inadequate work platform / no guard rails 6.6 
construction Untrained / inexperienced workforce 6 
operation Improper plant / equipment operation 4.2 
Inappropriate 6 Improper instruction to operatives 3.6 
condition Inadequate working tools 
/ instruments 3.6 
29.8 Inadequate temporary structure 3.4 
Inappropriate Defective services 3.2 
operative action Unsuitable plant / equipment 2.6 
Inadequate communication / co-ordination 2.2 
* total exceeds 100% due to multiple factors for each event 
Table 29. Constraint- Response Model - proximal factors 
The authors assume that inspectors report the most influential factors in accidents that 
they investigate. While they do not comment on the percentage attributed to breach 
of regulation / code of practice, they remark that the low frequency of `inappropriate 
construction control' may be explained, in part, by the HSE Inspectors focus upon 
legal requirements rather than uncovering all the contributory factors. It was expected 
that Loughborough University / UMIST collaborative work on this research project 
might aid in redressing the balance. 
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3.11.4.1 Model evaluation 
In comparison with the main issues identified in the review of systems issues, data 
collection and analysis the strengths and weaknesses of this approach are annotated: 
Systems approach Key points Weakness 
IDENTIFY Managerial, 
organisational and 
extra-organisational Explore the range of 
influences influences and conditions AVOID over 
IDENTIFY latent that impact human x concentration on x? 
conditions independent performance individual fallibilities 
of the accident 
x 
sequence AVOID the many 
IDENTIFY types rather forms of `blame' x? 
than tokens x E l xp ore compatibility of IDENTIFY the influence barrier / control 
AVOID x 
of dynamic states upon interventions for user & x? 
technocentrism 
subsequent  
performance and 
process 
adaptations 
Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary analysis 
The strengths of this approach is that the full range of managerial, organisational and 
extra-organisational factors have been identified; the example constraints and 
responses suggest numerous ways in which failure can occur. The model has been 
developed by construction specialists; the depth of understanding and perspective of 
this unique working environment appears extensive. The nature of successive 
constraints and responses gives a clear impression of the dynamic nature of the 
process and the factors that affect performance and adaptations of each player. An 
important and novel feature of this model is that constraints and responses operate in 
each direction, showing interdependencies across all levels of the construction 
process. 
There is intermediate or uncertain value in decomposition by `constraints' and 
`responses'. Cognitive mechanisms or information processing systems are used in 
error classifications, yet the terms here are used to describe the dynamic nature of the 
decision making process - in what is essentially a `generic' management role. Indeed 
it could alternatively be argued that bifurcating information `in and out' (constraints 
and reposonses) at each phase (or by each decision maker) serves only to create a very 
dense model of what are, essentially, interacting players making management 
decisions sequentially in the flow of a build process. 
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However, the constraints - responses offer very good illustrative example `tokens' for 
each stage of the construction process, but classification by project player (or phase) 
has both positive and negative points. On the one hand it is deflecting blame from 
`active factors', but it also masks opportunities to distinguish the main event `types'. 
On this latter point for example, considering the pre-site classes `Project conception 
constraints, Client responses, Project design constraints and Designer response', 
`types' generated from the examples given might alternatively be described as: - 
" Funding (budget, procurement) 
" Planning (needs analysis, managing criteria conflicts) 
" Scheduling (time management) 
" Policy (legislatory, local government, business strategy) 
Design (technical requirements, complexity, quality issues). 
Generation of `types' in this manner could be pursued through the remaining 15 
classes, using the given `tokens' and generating further types as the work nature 
changes. Classification by `token' has perhaps made the model far more complicated 
than need be. Ironically some `types' are given in free text introducing each set of 
constraints or responses (for example the `construction management responses' are 
described as dealing with managerial, organizational, technical and operational 
aspects), yet the emphasis of these is on their introduction to the `tokens' examples. 
A weakness in the model is the classification by the use of abstract nouns (constraint/ 
response/ failure/ management) rather than concrete nouns that have no judgement 
associated with them. This is especially prevalent during the distal factor phases. The 
classes `project management', `construction management', `subcontractors' are also 
proper nouns, thus identification by process stage / player instead of event types 
(concrete noun), leaves the opportunity for the direction of blame at those named in 
the project lifecycle. It does not describe the condition that has failed. 
Re-classification by `types' would likely enable exploration of the key points listed in 
Table 28, but it is not easy to identify these issues using the current failure orientated 
approach. In terms of whether the approach is technocentric, the model is certainly 
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`constructocentric' - entirely orientated towards the construction process itself; it is 
not possible to explore the conditions that influence human performance. 
Proximal factors are dominated by the adjectives inappropriate, inadequate etc., These 
describe the sample, but offer no insight as to the quality of the lacking features. By 
representing the token events in terms of failure; the assumption is that problem 
resolution would be the antithesis -a black and white approach to correct or incorrect. 
For example, there may be an `improper construction procedure' (in the class 
inappropriate construction operation), yet if the procedure were `proper' would this 
necessarily be appropriate for the user and would it have prevented the accident? 
There is no sense of the positive features that may have been affected at the proximal 
level to abate or reduce accident severity - this may have been achieved by 
exploration of the types of human error (operative action) rather than the process 
interaction with which they were associated. The model does not identify latent 
conditions independent of the accident, thus the focus is entirely based upon failures 
that occur in the dynamic situations and phases that interact in the accident trajectory. 
3.11.4.2 Further work 
The researchers noted the potential for bias (affecting the classification frequencies) 
as an outcome of the nature of HSE inspector investigations. It was expected that 
collaborative work on this research project might serve in validation of the distal 
factors of the model. 
3.11.5 The modified loss causation model (MLCM) 
Using a modified `Loss causation model' (Bird and Germain 1990), Goh and Chua 
(2002) developed the Modified Loss Causation Model for classification of 140 
construction fatalities. This uses the domino sequential chain approach (p. 33), but 
replaces the first domino `lack of control' with SMS (safety management system) 
(Figure 12); `lack of control' is redirected to supervision and rule enforcement. 
Addressing SMS, as the final stage in each accident investigation, is intended to 
deflect blame from individuals / conditions towards organisational responsibilities. 
`Situational variables' iterate the need to consider each aspect within the specific 
context of the accident situation and type of work being undertaken. The accident 
event is divided into `breakdown event' (the loss of control of energy) and `incident' 
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(victim contact with source energy), to ensure greater precision in subsequent 
generation of preventative measures. 
Loss 
Unintended harm or damage 
Incident 
Breakdown event 
Accident sequence - undesired points of loss of control 
Situational 
variables Immediate factors 
Substandard acts & Substandard physical conditions 
Underlying factors 
Personal factors & job factors 
Safety Management System (SMS) failures 
Inadequate: (A) System (B) Standards (C) Compliance 
Figure 12. The Modified Loss Causation Model 
Types of incident / breakdown events 
" Fall of person " Struck by falling object " Caught in or between objects " 
Over-exertion / strenuous movements " Exposure to hazard " Collapse / fall of 
object " Loss of balance " Uncontrolled plant 
Types of sub-standard physical conditions 
" Substandard plant/ machinery/ equipment/ tools " Substandard construction 
material " Substandard structures / parts of structure " Substandard work 
environment 
Types of substandard act 
" Extraneous Acts " Improper equipment usage " Inappropriate response to 
emergency 
" Omission of basic safety measures " Spatial error " Improper work procedure 
'types of job factors 
" Factors relating to designers " Factors relating to operatives "Factors relating to 
roect management /corporate " Factors relativ to site mana ement 
-_ 
I'Spesqpersonal factors 
" Lack of knowledge / skill " Mental / psychological factors " Improper 
motivation. * Physical / physiological factors 
Types of SM]S failures 
_ " Safety policy " Safe work practices " Safety training " In-house rules & 
regulations 
" Evaluation, control and selection of subcontractors " Maintenance regime " 
Control of hazardous products " Occupational health programme " Safety 
inspection " group meetings 
Table 30. Main headings of MLCM taxonomy (abridged version) 
A construction taxonomy was developed for use with the model to enable statistical 
analysis for description of distribution within the sample. Examples are reproduced in 
Table 30. The authors note a greater range of human error classifications, but selected 
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those that were observable behaviours (more objective and direct) and which were 
within the resources and expertise of the construction industry. 
3.11.5.1 Model evaluation 
In comparison with the main issues identified in the review of systems issues, data 
collection and analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of this approach are annotated: 
Systems approach hei points Weakness 
IDENTIFY Managerial, 
organisational and ý 
extra-organisational Explore the range of 
influences influences and conditions AVOID over 
IDENTIFY latent that impact human x concentration on x? 
conditions independent performance individual fallibilities 
of the accident 
x 
sequence AVOID the many 
IDENTIFY types rather x? 
forms of `blame' x? 
than tokens lo e com atibilit E f xp r p yo 
IDENTIFY the influence barrier / control AVOID x 
of dynamic states upon interventions for user & x? 
technocentrism 
subsequent  
performance and 
process 
adaptations 
Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary analysis 
The strengths of this approach are that specification of `situational variables' is 
intended to ensure that each accident is seen in the context of its own dynamics. 
Developed by construction specialists, there are a number of examples providing 
insight into the failure types that might occur within the construction industry. 
There is intermediate or uncertain value in the final level of exploration (SMS). 
This may fulfil some of the managerial influences, but not necessarily the 
organisational or extra-organisational influences. SMS may tie into the accident 
trajectory and be very worthwhile areas to address but they do not necessarily address 
the full range of influences and conditions that impact human performance. A desire 
to avoid focus upon individual fallibilities / blame has been described; yet this is not 
apparent in the examples given for `substandard acts, job factors and personal 
factors'. Findings are not listed by `type', but by phase of generation. This is helpful 
in deflecting blame from `active factors', but has not isolated the `types' of failures 
(the selection, design, maintenance, and use of equipment, materials and tools for 
example) that are common across all phases. 
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Weaknesses of the model (reflecting the intermediate values described above) are 
that the range of influences and conditions that impact human performance are not 
identified. Barriers / control measures are mentioned, but there is only scant reference 
to their (sub) standardness and it is not clear how this might be evaluated. As such the 
approach is almost entirely technocentric (constructocentric) and latent conditions are 
not identified independent of the accident sequence. The limited selection of human 
error classifications (observable behaviours and within the construction industry 
expertise) has rendered the evaluation of `substandard acts' vulnerable to problems 
associated with causal attribution and hindsight bias. 
3.11.5.2 Further work 
The paper is part of ongoing work into construction accident causation. Currently 
there are no further publications. 
3.11.6 Summary of findings concerning construction accident models 
None of the models, alone, were suitable for the research yet many had positive points 
that could be drawn into the method development. Likewise a number of intermediate 
issues or aspects with weak value arose. Table 31 has been developed to synthesise 
the findings of all the models evaluated. 
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Strengths Intermediate Weaknesses 
Representation of 
There is good possible failures at any Latent conditions do not 
representation of 
--º 
project phase deflects 
-f appear to be identified project concept and blame from accident independent of the accident 
extra-organisational players, but definition by 
factors proper noun makes this event 
vulnerable to blame 
A requirement to address 
the 'safety management 
The `constructocentric' system' in the accident 
The dynamic states approaches ensure that 
sequence does not ensure 
and variables --º failures in the build that 
influences and 
contributing to each process are identified, but % conditions that 
impact 
accident sequence is not from the perspective 
human performance are 
clearly identified of us need addressed er s Psychosocial aspects and 
user-compatibilities are 
poorly addressed 
Token' events are 
categorised by process 
phase or person 
"responsible" for their 
generation - not by 'type' - 
Categorisation by 
Influences and conditions judgemental, abstract noun, 
There are excellent that impact human `token' events (failure or 
examples of performance are unsafeness of person, barrier 
construction specific randomly indicated, but or control) perpetuates 
` oken' events lack completeness, clarity blame style approaches to 
or categorisation accident investigation 
Attempts to evaluate 
observable 'human error' 
according to expertise 
already within the industry 
is vulnerable to bias and 
narrow attribution 
Table 31. Strengths and weaknesses of construction accident models 
The transfer of accident models into practice has been criticised (3.8.1.1). It was 
decided therefore to identify the strengths highlighted in both the systems approach 
and construction industry models as a reference point upon which to chose or develop 
the study investigation techniques (Table 32). These are drawn upon later for Phase 
Two of the research - Site based data collection. 
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Systems approach Aý: cident Construction model l: t' points 
inNesti ation Streu the 
IDENTIFY 
Managerial, 
organisational and EXPLORE 
extra- . EXPLORE the 
representation of 
organisational range of 
project concept and 
influences influences and 
extra-organisational 
IDENTIFY latent conditions that 
factors AVOID over 
conditions impact human concentration on 
independent of performance 
EXPLORE The individual 
the accident " EXPLORE 
dynamic states and fallibilities 
sequence compatibility 
variables contributing AVOID the many 
to each accident forms of 'blame' of barrier / IDENTIFY types 
control 
sequence AVOID 'constructo- 
rather than tokens `centrism 
IDENTIFY the interventions EXPLORE examples 
influence of for user & of construction 
dynamic states process specific 'token' 
upon subsequent events 
performance and 
adaptations 
I Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary analysis 
Table 32. Overview of systems approach integrated with construction model 
strengths 
3.12 Summary of the literature review 
The literature review was undertaken in three sections. The first two sections explored 
knowledge sources concerning accident causation and the practicalities of accident 
investigation; this information was then used to evaluate construction accident 
models. 
The review initially revealed the variety in historical and inter-disciplinarian 
understanding of the terms `accident' and `cause'. Early accident modelling showed 
that ideas about causation were fragmented; interested disciplines (e. g. psychologists, 
engineers) had identified failure types within their areas of expertise, but these were 
seen in isolation. However, as understanding increased, this changed and the concept 
of the multi-factorial event evolved. In parallel with these developments, advances in 
epidemiological analyses also revealed ever more comprehensive trends and patterns 
among the accident data sources. 
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The final representation of accident modelling was in the derivation of the systems 
approach. The mainstay here is that failure is often an outcome of the culture and 
management of an organisation. Accident initiating factors are either `active failures' 
(errors effected at the front line) or `latent failures' (effected by organisational and 
extra-organisational decisions). An important facet of latent failures is in their impact 
on defences independently of the active failure pathway, and in their contributory 
effect upon human performance, rather than directly causal in the accident sequence. 
In the systems approach the consideration of factors that meet both technical and 
human needs is paramount. 
Construction accident models were evaluated against the criteria of the systems 
approach and a range of strengths and weaknesses were identified. The strengths of 
the models were in the representation of the construction process (including many 
examples of failure types throughout the project lifecycle and identification of the 
dynamic nature of the work). However, common omissions included failure to 
identify latent conditions independently of the accident event, various guises of 
blaming individuals, and poor representation of factors that affect human 
performance. 
Appraisal of the construction accident models provided only intermittent or scant 
detail about data sources and it was possible only to make cursory observations about 
this in the evaluation process. Nevertheless, the review provided a firm foundation 
upon which develop the methodology and methods for data collection, interpretation 
and representation in the subsequent stages of the research. 
Accident models have been criticised for their lack of transferability into the 
development of accident investigation techniques. The review revealed a range of 
assessment and data representation techniques; each had particular idiosyncrasies, 
varying according to the accident type and accident severity. Criticisms were levied 
at techniques used for all event types. For the more comprehensive diagnostic 
assessment techniques, criticisms included shortcomings in the interpretation and 
integrity of ergonomics approaches. Even where simpler assessment methods (such 
as questionnaires, checklists or interviews) were used, problems with their style and 
content were apparent. The impact of personnel involved in accident investigation 
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was especially important; reflected in poor accident investigation skills and problems 
with investigator bias and attribution of cause. The need to adopt multiple methods 
and cross-disciplinary intervention was identified as desirable in combating such 
problems. 
3.13 Critique of the literature review 
As a representation of the multi-factorial event, the Domino Theory (Heinrich and 
Granniss, 1959) was an early model showing the sequential development of accident 
antecedent events (Table 12). However, different disciplinary approaches 
(psychological / behavioural and engineering), and greater understanding of systems 
theories, appeared to have heralded divergence from the `domino' baseline model. 
Review of the contributions from inter-disciplinary knowledge sources indicated that 
the engineering approaches promote the use of physical and behavioural defences to 
control hazards and harmful energy transfer (3.5.3). This is the ethos of the revised 
domino modelling approach (e. g., (Bird and Germain 1990, United States Department 
of Labor. Mine Safety and Health Administration 1990). An example of the latter 
(Figure 3) showed that (prior to harmful energy release) accident antecedent evens 
were indirect causes (unsafe acts and unsafe conditions) and basic causes (such 
shortcomings in policies, personal factors, work conditions etc. ). 
Whilst the `basic causes' have an affinity with systems issues in accident causation, 
the perpetuated reference to `unsafe acts and unsafe conditions' is an aspect that 
contrasts the full complement of developments made in the systems approaches and 
by psychological and behavioural sciences. Here, these terms are rejected for their 
leading terminology, their association with blame upon individuals and for their 
narrow representation of factors that affect human performance in accident causation. 
The isolation of active and latent factors in systems approaches is also distinct from 
the (domino derivative) sequential modelling approaches, in that latent conditions can 
influence defences independently of the accident trajectory. 
The weaknesses identified in the construction accident models suggest prominence of 
the engineering approaches and that knowledge from the psychological / behavioural 
approaches has not been fully accommodated. The construction models showed that 
96 
attempts have been made to address human behavioural aspects, suggesting that these 
aspects have either not been completely understood, or were incorrectly interpreted. 
The shortcomings may also reflect cultural differences between the two disciplines. 
Literature review showed that the engineering approaches were heavily criticised, but 
there was no comparable rejection of the psychological / behavioural approaches. 
Whilst further literature review might redress this imbalance, the information 
available at this stage does suggest that the psychological / behavioural disciplines 
have a tradition of being more critical in their approach, whereas the engineering 
disciplines are more receptive and less challenging of new interventions. Whilst there 
are merits in each approach, this may offer some explanation for the acceptance of 
poor interpretations of human behaviour and systems within the engineering 
approach. On the other hand, the development of models specifically for the 
construction industry is comparatively recent (compared with the longstanding 
generic accident modelling) and greater input over time might redress this imbalance. 
The review also revealed that the prominence and contribution of different disciplines 
appears to have progressed at different rates. Engineering approaches appeared to be 
the mainstay of early accident modelling. The emergent understandings of the range 
of factors that affect human performance and human error have since brought the 
psychological and behavioural approaches to the forefront. Human error appears to 
have evolved from its early task based connotations; the `new' approaches to human 
error champion address of underlying circumstances. This also indicates a change in 
the meaning of `human error', as the term now implies address of wider systems 
issues too. 
Nevertheless, examples of these `underlying circumstances' in the human error 
approaches, at times, appeared to offer little in the way of categorisation upon which 
to direct further enquiry. The understanding of systems issues in accident causation 
has previously been promoted through use of ergonomics methods (e. g. Carter and 
Corlett 1983). It was through assimilation of a range of ergonomics approaches that a 
classification was generated to group the examples of underlying circumstances. 
This classification was used as a framework for the systems approach to construction 
accident investigation. 
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4 PHASE ONE - INFORMATION SEARCH 
The phasic approach was introduced in (1.1.3) and the section for Phase One is 
reproduced in Figure 13. Phase One was concerned with establishing industrial 
contacts and generating the information that was necessary to proceed with the 
accident studies. The baseline literature review that was undertaken at the project 
outset revealed a lack of up-to-date and `unbiased' information concerning accident 
causality. The FOCUS data base material, collected by the HSE, was directed 
towards enforcement action (Suraji and Duff, 2000) and the Whittington et al. (1992) 
research, although an excellent resource, predated the CDM legislative interventions. 
In addition there was little apparent input from construction workers, outside of safety 
or management roles. 
Resources from the 
Construction 
Industry 
Data collection 
phases 
Resources derived front 
the research team 
Establishment and Literature review into 
develop industrial accident causation 
liaison theories, data collection 
and analysis 
Establish Steering 
Group 
Phase One 
Focus groups 
Figure 13. Phase One of the research 
4.1 Methodology 
Critical incident technique (3.9.4.2) has been used to explore near-miss events 
recovery actions, but the one to one approach was not feasible given the time scale, 
resources and site access available. An alternative and more realistic approach was to 
use focus groups as a method to access a wider range of people and their perceptions 
of accident causation. Focus groups are commonly used in market research, social 
science and human factors research (Bruseberg and McDonagh-Philip 2002). 
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4.1.1 The nature of focus groups 
A focus group is a style of group interview whereby the data obtained arises from the 
interaction and discourse generated from within the group (Morgan 1997). Topics are 
supplied by the researcher, who acts as `moderator' for the discussions. Criteria for 
selecting focus group participants vary and depend on the nature of the area of 
enquiry. Participants may be selected by random sample or, where specific areas 
need to be explored, participants may be recruited from carefully selected categories 
(defined as segmentation). 
The level of moderation is determined to some extent by the desire for session 
control; low-structured sessions may comprise general discussion around one or two 
discussion themes, whereas the discussion may be more structured (or become 
progressively more structured in a `funnel' style of approach) accommodating up to 
four or five discussion themes. Under these conditions the moderator undertakes a 
more dominant role, but in any case should facilitate discussion rather than interview. 
The nature of data analysis is a consideration when developing the focus group's style 
(Krueger 1998). Factors to be considered include the purpose of obtaining the data, 
what influence the findings might have, whether they will be supported by other data 
sources, and more fundamental issues of how much time and resources are available 
etc. Data may be transcribed verbatim, transcribed in an abridged form (salient points 
and relevant quotes only) or, where no tape has been used, may be analysed from 
written session notes, or even from memory. The style of analysis can be equally 
variable but usually incorporates encoding by topic or by some form of content 
analysis (typically frequency of iteration or semantics, Stewart and Shamdasani 
1990). 
Some caution in interpretation of focus group findings is required. For example, 
participants may generate a level of conformity and acquiescence within a group and 
this can result in the suppression or generation of extremity of opinion that might not 
necessarily be felt in private. Alternatively, the researcher, albeit unconsciously, may 
direct discussion into an area unimportant to participants, or indeed achieve this 
through data interpretation. However, whilst it is recognised that there are inherent 
weaknesses within the focus group technique, the dedicated discussion upon a 
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specified topic and access to the unique insights of group participants, offers a source 
of information and data that might otherwise be unavailable with more traditional 
approaches. 
4.1.2 Aims and objectives 
The aim of the focus groups was to consult a range of different employee groups in 
the construction sector, exploring where failure occurs and why accidents still happen. 
The objectives of the focus groups were to: 
(a) Learn more about perspectives or viewpoints held within different 
construction disciplines and groups 
(b) Supplement information available through existing published work. 
(c) Review information from foundation resources used at the project outset 
(Suraji et al. 2001, and Whittington et al. 1992) to enable refinement and 
enhancement of the study strategy and investigation protocol for the accident 
studies 
4.1.3 Development of the discussion material 
In order to meet the focus group aims and fulfil the first objective (a) it was necessary 
to identify and classify from the Whittington et al. and Suraji et al. research, possible 
areas of `failure occurrence'. Effort was then directed at establishing a way in which 
these could be presented succinctly to the focus group participants. 
4.1.3.1 Whittington et al. 1992 
Whittington et al. (1992) identified three main groups of causal or contributing factors 
in their accident investigations (3.11.1). The first being `Factors relating to the injured 
party or to his immediate work colleagues', the second `Factors related to site 
management' and the third is `Factors related to headquarter responsibilities'. The 
first two factors continue to be relevant features and are duplicated in the Suraji et al. 
research. However, the third factor, although including aspects such as problems with 
selection/control of subcontractors/workforce and failure to consider safety 
implications of building design, plant design or PPE, fails to thoroughly address the 
current complexities of project development, planning and financing. These are in 
part a consequence of the new legislation and also reflect the sphere of business 
development since the 1992 publication. 
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4.1.3.2 Suraji et al. 2001 
Suraji et al. described up to 19 different construction phases where failure might 
occur (3.11.4). They noted the distinction between proximal (active) and distal 
factors in accident causation, whereby proximal factors are those that have a direct 
impact upon an event occurrence and distal factors are the constraints and responses 
which occur outside an event area, predominately in the conceptual development of 
the project. Conceptual development includes, for example, the nature of the client, 
financial procurement, and design and planning; these include factors which have 
been subject to legislative change since the Whittington research. 
4.1.3.3 Isolating discussion areas 
In either case, the content was either insufficient or too detailed for the focus group 
discussions. An alternative framework was developed for the discussion topic areas, 
based on HSG65, Successful Health and Safety Management (Health and Safety 
Executive 1997b) and (in the context of human failings of accidents) HSG48, 
Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour (Health and Safety Executive 1999d). 
These isolate three distinct areas upon which much of Suraji and Whittington's 
causation factors or phases could be superimposed. These are (1) Management and 
organisational factors (to identify underlying causes), (2) Job and (3) Personal factors 
(to identify immediate causes). 
Looking at these data in combination, it was apparent that all `Factors related to 
injured party or to immediate work colleagues', `Factors related to site management' 
(Whittington et al. 1992) and `proximal factors' (Suraji et al. 2001) are included 
within the three HSE headings (1997). Some of the `distal factors' (Suraji et al. 2001) 
or `factors relating to headquarter responsibilities' (Whittington et al. 1992) are 
included in `Management and organisational factors' (HSE 1997) - thus outstanding 
issues concerning project, concept, design and procurement issues, needed to be 
addressed separately. 
This analysis resulted in the development of four discussion areas for the focus 
groups. After determining the most appropriate language style (3.9.5.4) with a 
construction specialist, aspects from the foundation resources were categorised for 
focus group discussion thus: - 
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Discussion Area One 
Discussion Area Two 
Discussion Area Three 
Discussion Area Four 
- Project concept, design and procurement 
- Work organisation and management 
- Task factors 
- Individual factors 
4.1.4 Choice of participants 
Groupings of potential participants were devised to offer comprehensive 
representation of the different employment strata / responsibilities within the industry. 
Assistance with accessing appropriate focus group members was provided by 
industrial collaborators from the research Steering Group. 
Six groups were scheduled (Table 33). A further `mixed discipline group' was also 
undertaken as a pilot study. Minimal changes were made subsequent to the pilot and 
the data from these participants have been included as an additional group. An earlier 
pilot focus group was undertaken with Loughborough University Civil Engineering 
undergraduates. The research style was considerably refined following the 
undertaking of this focus group and these data have been excluded from the analysis. 
Grou Ein lo nient Target participants 
One Client team Clients or client representative, Architect, Engineer (Structural 
/ Civil or Mechanical / Electrical), Financial Manager, Project 
Manager or Design Manager and a Planning Supervisor 
Two Senior managers From General and specialist contractor firms representing civil 
Three Site Managers engineering, major building or the residential sectors and from 
small and large projects 
Four Operatives large site Tradesmen or general operatives 
Five operatives small site 
six Safety professionals Industrial safety professionals and Construction Enforcement 
Officers 
Seven Mixed group pilot) A mixed discipline group (trades and professionals) 
Table 33. Focus group categories 
The composition of two groups varied from that intended, mostly due to the 
practicalities of recruiting participants. Group One comprised a mix of Planning 
Supervisors and Health and Safety Specialists; Group Three comprised a mix of those 
in general supervisory and managerial roles and those with health and safety 
responsibilities. All groups had between 5-7 participants. 
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The seven groups took place between February and June 2000. The `safety 
professional' group was undertaken at Loughborough University campus, whereas all 
others were undertaken at a convenient location nationally for the participants. 
4.1.5 Information for participants 
Participants were provided with a briefing sheet describing the nature of focus groups 
and brief details of the research. Participants were advised that all identifiable 
information would be confidential to the researchers and that analysis would prevent 
the attribution of findings to any one individual. At the outset of each focus group 
overhead transparencies were used to provide a short presentation of the research and 
focus group discussion areas. 
To clarify and distinguish the four discussion headings (4.1.3.3) examples were 
provided under each heading in order to enhance participant understanding and 
prompt discussion; examples were developed with the assistance of a construction 
specialist. Each of the four discussion areas (and examples in brackets) was presented 
on a flip chart sheet; the text is repeated below in Table 34 to Table 37. 
With each theme participants were asked to consider where failure occurs and why 
accidents still happen? 
" Client background (skills and experience of the client) 
" Selection of design team (Designers giving consideration to practicalities of construction? ) 
" Procurement of contractors (What role do price and safety play in selection? ) 
" Safety considerations (Safety in construction considered? ) 
" Allocation of resources (Financial - where the money is spent) 
" Legislation (Enhances or hinders? ) 
" Strategic design considerations (Choices of site, appropriate building design) 
Table 34. Project Concept, Design and Procurement 
" Project management and supervision (Style, degree of input and instruction from management and 
supervisors) 
" Managing change (Handling of any design modifications of work in progress) 
" Work scheduling (Time pressures, overlap of operative / trades) 
Resources (Availability of contractors, suitable skills of contractors) 
" Safety considerations (Risk of injury assessed, safety managed appropriately) 
" Site layout and logistics (Safe access routes, placement of essential services) 
Table 35. Work Organisation and Management 
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" Tools and equipment (Appropriate selection, maintenance) 
" Adequacy and use of procedures/method statements (Appropriate? ) 
" Is safety considered? 
" Training in task and health and safety skills (Appropriate? ) 
" Work load / time constraints (Time pressure upon individuals and/or groups) 
" Environmental conditions (Weather, out of hours work) 
" Design of task or working area (Layout of immediate area, is safety and access considered? ) 
Table 36. Task Factors 
" Experience and competence of all employees 
" Safety considerations (Safety behaviour, attitude to risk) 
" Personality influences 
" Health status and fitness for work 
" Conformity (Company ethos, pressure to comply) 
Table 37. Individual Factors 
4.1.6 Data collection tools 
Audio recordings were made of each focus group to permit subsequent transcription 
(and have since been destroyed). A questionnaire was administered at the end of each 
session (Appendix 1), and incorporated two elements. Firstly, in open question style, 
participants had the opportunity to reiterate aspects from the discussions which were 
important to them or which they were not comfortable to talk about publicly. 
Secondly, using five point rating scales, participants were asked to consider what 
might contribute to accidents. A number of possible factors were proposed (again 
drawing upon aspects under the four discussion headings) and participants were asked 
to provide a rated response. Possible answers ranged from agreement with either `not 
at all' to `to a very large degree'. All questionnaires were submitted anonymously. 
4.1.7 Procedure 
Each group was scheduled to last 1 V2 hours. A sample agenda is shown in Table 38. 
The time allocations were used flexibly as severance of discussion at an allocated 
time point would have been inappropriate. The four main headings were presented in 
reverse order for the two `operative' groups. This was done to ensure the discussion 
could develop from a starting topic with which all participants were familiar. 
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Time Topic Time allowance 
15.05 - Introduce / overview the nature of the project 10 
15.10 - Round table introductions (name and discipline) 5 
15.20 - Project concept, design and procurement 15 
15.35 - Work organisation and management 15 
15.50 - Task factors 15 
16.05 - Individual factors 15 
16.20 - Questionnaire 10 
16.30 - Finish 
Table 38. Sample focus group agenda 
At the beginning of the time allocation for each discussion area, a brief explanation of 
the intended meaning was provided by the researchers. Participants were encouraged 
to draw any related aspects into their discussions, even if these were supplementary to 
the points on the prompt sheets. Having introduced the discussion points, and once 
discussion had been generated among participants, the researchers took a passive role 
- interjecting only if conversation faltered, if meaning was lost or if the discussion 
strayed beyond the enquiry area. 
4.1.8 Analysis 
An abridged transcription was made from each audiotape. The transcriptions 
recorded the main points made as each participant spoke. This included a number of 
quotes where these were clear, and salient points. There were incidents where the 
tape was inaudible (due to interference, mumbling etc. ) and short tracts had to be 
omitted. Given that most of the surrounding speech / speakers were audible, this is 
considered to have had a negligible effect on the results. 
To facilitate interpretation of the transcriptions, intermediate analyses were 
undertaken which involved summarisation of all text into short bullet point 
statements. These were a subjective interpretation by the researcher of the main 
points of what the speaker was saying. This enabled significant points to be extracted 
and permitted later comparison and categorisation of information according to the 
discussion area headings and sub-headings. 
The analysis aimed to identify: - 
. The nature and range of the discussion data 
Differences between opinions of each group or among participants 
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9 Whether any of the prompts were omitted from conversation by participants 
0 If additional and unexpected aspects were introduced into the discussion 
4.2 Results - Focus group data 
Sections 4.2.1 - 4.2.4 present the main points from the focus group discussions. 
It is the nature of this style of group discussion that participants engage in 
relatively free speech with minimal intervention from the moderators. Whilst 
this was a desirable feature (to enable exploration of a wide range of opinions), it 
also meant that some points appeared somewhat ambiguous, vague or were 
described with varied or outdated terminology. 
In reproducing the essence of the conversations, no judgement is made on 
whether the material is right or wrong. It is possible that in some respects focus 
group participants may be factually incorrect or hold opinions with which others 
disagree. 
4.2.1 Project Concept, Design and Procurement 
4.2.1.1 Client background 
Responses from participants concerning client background were for the most part 
negative although there were some positive comments concerning particular client 
sectors. An example of this is that many positive comments were made with respect 
to the larger high-tech organisations such as the Petro-chemical, oil, nuclear and (to a 
certain extent) retail industries. Such organisations were reported to have a 
responsible attitude towards construction safety and to anticipate costing for this at the 
project concept stage. 
An overview of the data more generally indicated that clients are considered to vary in 
their commitment to health and safety. Many criticisms were directed at client 
ignorance in certain areas of the process, such as their legislative responsibilities 
under CDM, the contractor's responsibilities and the practical implications of any 
build or design changes they request. It was commented that the process of 
contracting out had diminished client skills and experience. 
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Clients (especially large and wealthy clients) were at times described as arrogant risk 
takers with little interest in the build process. The decisions of many were portrayed 
as frequently being determined by the lowest price tender, avoiding being accountable 
for a legislatory breach and maintaining a high public profile (e. g. environmental 
issues, or general public safety being a high priority, but not the welfare of 
construction workers). 
There were also reports of considerable time pressure from clients and a perpetual 
urge to trim construction times. To achieve this there is increasing pressure to 
undertake weekend / night work. Concurrently, clients are reported to be reluctant to 
provide the desired site area or access - again to avoid inconvenience to the general 
public. It was reported that one client had even repealed any time flexibility for poor 
weather conditions. 
The general opinion seemed to be that client pressures and inflexibility caused time 
and output pressure, and induced a compromise of safe working methods. Some 
clients are reportedly unaware of the potential cost benefits of safety innovations, and 
never request guidance on safety at the tender stage. An additional loss due to the 
client pressures is that opportunity for project improvement and design revisions are 
lost. 
4.2.1.2 Strategic design considerations 
Strategic design was subject to a number of different criticisms. Firstly, an increased 
desire for aesthetic qualities was generally seen to inhibit ease of building, which in 
itself induced safety hazards. Designers reportedly use outdated plans as a template 
from which to develop each `prototype', with this seen as ensuring continuity of the 
same accident types. A number of comments were made concerning the fallibility of 
design and the problems that are induced when having to work around incorrect 
drawings. Design changes are frequent and costly and incorrect drawings were 
described as having adverse implications for construction operatives later on in the 
process. It was suggested that some clients inappropriately see safety as a separate 
`bolt on' issue. 
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A new development, although described still as a rarity, is the use of pre-finished 
components. There were mixed views on this. It was understood that designers 
positively encourage off-site fabrication and that there are great benefits in this, 
especially to compensate for a lack of available skills on-site and to make a faster, 
more buildable and safer structure. It was also reported however, that pre-fabrication 
often does not account for continuously developing prototypes (referring to the 
development of all new structures). It was argued that manufacturers need pressure to 
revise products and, in an example concerning design revision of timber trusses, the 
manufacturers were reported to have ignored requests for design improvements. 
Clients were heavily criticised for not leading design innovation, either through the 
procurement process (it was claimed that Quantity Surveyors can ruin designers' 
innovation), or as a consequence of the range of problems described above. A 
number of comments indicated that Contractors have had to drive design innovations; 
it was reported that these needed further development (especially for every day tasks) 
yet costs for this have to be accommodated by the contractors rather than by the 
client. 
It was felt that time and financial pressures from the client impede appropriate 
opportunities for review or audit of designs yet, were this possible, it would permit 
deferral of responsibility back to the client for revision (instead of contractors having 
to accommodate this late in the process). Design audit is also inhibited by the absence 
of a convenient and stylised pro forma. It was suggested that the process is also 
hampered by inconsistencies in the tendering procedures and that on occasions the 
construction phase Health and Safety Plan (2.5.4) can be ready even before the pre- 
tender is put out. 
When discussing the range of different funding and management styles there was a 
general rejection of traditional methods where price and speed of construction 
directed the process. Likewise the style of `Construction Management' and 
fragmentation of different parts of the contract to different contractors was also 
viewed unfavourably as it was reported that control is lost and safety compromised. 
Alternative methods such as `Design and Build' and PFI (Private Finance Initiative) 
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were more popular as these foster a contractor: client alliance and encourage practical 
design review. 
4.2.1.3 Allocation of resources 
Participants felt that clients are reluctant to pay for outsourcing their responsibilities 
and in this context they are not acquiring the necessary information they need to fulfil 
their duties. It was reported that clients (and mostly their lawyers), make the money 
in construction, with price their priority in important decisions such as contractor 
appointment or apportioning appropriate arrangements for safety. Building cost 
benefit analyses are being used to address the safety case, yet despite this, time is lost 
during client: contractor price wrangling, and this can negate or induce additional 
problems to the process. 
A further suggestion from the focus groups was that cost incentives mean that 
longstanding `fixed' client: contractor relationships are diminishing and that there 
may be some pressure to attribute `competence' to the lowest tenderers. This loss of 
fixed client: contractor relationships means that the knowledge of client requirements 
(that contractors may have developed over previous projects) is lost, as is the 
continuity of established team working. Although clients are required to consider 
safety in tenders they receive, this was reportedly not necessarily the case; it was felt 
that inbuilt safety costing in a tender had led to both loss and acceptance of contracts. 
4.2.1.4 Selection of contractors 
It was reported that the selection process is generally a paper-based exercise and some 
documentation, used universally, is approximately fifteen years old. Participants felt 
that it was inappropriate that contractors should be judged purely on a questionnaire 
basis, as this in itself may only be a judgement of ability to complete a pre- 
qualification questionnaire, rather than an adequate assessment of competence. It was 
also noted that contractors are burdened with multiple tender applications and that, 
within this, each competency assessment requires more and more time. 
Another part of the tendering process is the submission of the Health and Safety Plan. 
There were comments that this is generated more to impress the client than to be used 
as a working tool, and contains meaningless generic statements about hazards. There 
were concerns that any tender including a price for safety indicates to the client that it 
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has been considered, but that the client may not appraise the actual content of this. 
The safety plan is developed by the contractor's Contracts Manager and there were 
reservations about the depth of safety knowledge held by this role. 
All contractors in the process, both principal contractors and sub-contractors, have to 
submit tenders. General thoughts among participants were that principal contractors 
are more safety aware than sub-contractors and that sub-contractors often have a poor 
safety culture and do not adequately price safety. It was reported that there is 
considerable competitor pressure for contract work, yet skilled trades are difficult to 
find (especially in London). 
4.2.1.5 Safety considerations 
Although it was reported that commercial incentives influence the drive to consider 
health and safety, it was also noted that such competition may positively influence the 
development of new initiatives. Safety has a price, but it can be the cheaper option. 
An example given of this was in the use of netting for roof work, which is reported to 
enable greater productivity and performance among workers no longer fearful of 
falling or restricted to certain weather conditions. 
On the other hand it was reported that a `top down' culture drives attitudes towards 
safety, yet clients are not necessarily offering this commitment and were reported to 
have ignored contractors' safety requests. It was said that while accident costs can be 
considerably greater than profit margin, it appears to be the fear of prosecution that 
acts as the main driver to influence safety considerations. The industry was described 
as having an adversarial culture, where blame and lack of acknowledgement of 
individual responsibility persisted. 
It was indicated that certain client team members, such as Quantity Surveyors, 
Designers or Structural Engineers do not have adequate training to appreciate their 
impact upon people. Likewise, it was recounted that in some cases Quantity 
Surveyors and Local Authority Planning Committees have openly rejected their 
contribution towards safety, yet these disciplines (by involvement in contractor 
selection or approving safer designs) were also seen as influential in their potential 
impact upon construction safety. 
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4.2.1.6 Client team 
The client team can comprise any number of professionals (depending on build-type 
and site size) and many comments were made about them. At times these were 
directed towards a specific discipline, whereas for others generalised comments were 
made. The terms Designer and Architect appeared to be have used interchangeably at 
times. As a formal distinction cannot be discerned, the reporting below reflects the 
general themes generated by participants under the description `Designer'. 
A number of comments were made about Designers acting in an `insular' manner, not 
communicating appropriately, consulting other disciplines nor forming part of a team 
with others on a project. As part of a `design team' it was reported that although the 
Designer is responsible for informing a client of their need to appoint a Planning 
Supervisor, many are in fact ignorant of the Planning Supervisor function. Likewise, 
it was reported that Designers do not give adequate consideration to contractor utility 
needs at the project outset or to how the contractor will tackle site, build and 
maintenance logistics - they are removed from site reality. It was claimed that 
Designers never supply hazard information and that this can negatively affect the 
Method Statement quality. It was reported that inevitably these misrepresentations 
cause client: contractor conflict and the `novation' of a Designer (client imposed 
rather than a chosen appointment) causes problems for principal contractors. 
Although it was acknowledged that designers can be good at designing out risk, it was 
reported that although they are starting to understand safety matters, they have little 
understanding of health related issues. It was thought that Designers do not 
necessarily associate their undertaking of their design as influencing accident 
causation. However, when they specifically try to incorporate safety features there 
can be overcompensation, and the induction of awkward working conditions for 
operatives. 
From a scheduling perspective, designers were seen as unprepared for work 
commencement and absent from sites - seemingly a designer can take between two 
and three weeks to revise a drawing thus delaying the start (or progress) for all 
concerned. There were reports of inadequate site investigation by designers and that 
their work had to be double-checked at contract outset. If it is possible to defer the 
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cost of designer oversight back to the client, then cheap alternatives may be sought by 
them to cover their misrepresentations; alternatively the contractor has to cover 
oversights in any misrepresented drawings and this has time and money implications. 
In summary a statement made by one participant was that `the term Architect is a 
euphemism for continuous experimentation'. 
It was also pointed out that design is not just about the design team and that this is a 
loosely used term and many people don't actually know that they are designers. 
Contractors often act as designers, but do not necessarily see themselves as such or 
appreciate their (legislative) responsibilities in this respect. It was reported that at 
times design inadequacies might be resolved through the Site Manager and that in- 
house design revisions might be preferred for their practicality. There were 
suggestions that designers might agree with design changes generated in this manner, 
if only they could be encouraged to come to the site to see for themselves. 
More generally, some participants considered that contractors were seen as being too 
`nice' or accommodating to clients - contractors never ask for extra time or help from 
clients and are instrumental in urging early completion in order to obtain competitive 
advantage for future work. Although it was seen that clients may capitalise on this, 
contractors too were portrayed as being able to take advantage of clients. 
Of the other representations in a client team, specific note was made regarding the 
role of the Planning Supervisor. There were reports that Planning Supervisors vary in 
performance and contribution to a project. Clients, Contractors, Designers and 
Architects were often considered ignorant of Planning Supervisors' functions and as 
such these professionals are under-resourced and under-used. The Planning 
Supervisor can inappropriately be appointed after a job has already gone to tender, or 
even after site work has started, and is thus to late to do anything useful. From an 
alternative negative perspective, it was suggested that some Planning Supervisors are 
appointed only to protect the client and in this capacity they do not enhance the 
project. 
There were other criticisms of the influence of the client team. It was suggested that 
the client team is led by accountants and that, knowing nothing about safety, they base 
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their decisions entirely upon the outcomes of key performance indicators - this was 
not deemed to reflect adequate and comprehensive information of the construction 
process and progress. 
4.2.1.7 Legislation 
The CDM Regulations were seen as poorly understood or incorrectly addressed by 
clients and designers. The legislatory requirements are treated as a paper exercise and 
create an additional role that clients have had to assume from what were traditionally 
viewed as contractor responsibilities. 
The loss of prescriptive legislation was rued by some (as this renders the client 
decisions more difficult), yet conversely, another participant inferred that the level of 
prescriptive legislation is inversely related to level of management. It was reported 
that changes would only occur when Senior Managers start to be prosecuted. The fear 
of prosecution was indicated as a driving force and that more authority and 
endorsement from the HSE would be welcome. 
4.2.2 Work Organisation and Management 
4.2.2.1 Project management and supervision 
Within this subsection, Method Statements (2.5.4) procedures and general planning 
issues were the main topics of discussion. There were a number of issues concerning 
the quality, development and use of Method Statements. It was felt that Method 
Statements, to a certain extent, reflect the variable quality of information provided by 
the client or designer. In the same way, the Method Statement quality is also 
vulnerable to deterioration when highly technical information is the subject matter. 
A number of discussions concerned the content of Method Statements. Firstly, it was 
thought that although Method Statements may provide a task breakdown (although 
the task analyses may be inadequately considered) they do not necessarily provide 
adequate procedural information. Method Statements are reportedly mistaken for risk 
assessments and were criticised for accommodating rather than addressing risk 
control. 
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It was said that there is often little variation in Method Statement content and they 
were portrayed as an `office' based exercise, prepared by someone at safety / 
management level. A shortcoming of this was that there is rarely consultation with 
the operatives doing the work and consequently inadequate appreciation of, or 
understanding of, the demands of their work and the relative discomfort that may arise 
from the recommended PPE. The process of developing the Method Statement was 
portrayed as a ritualistic paperwork exercise resulting in material that does not 
necessarily reflect practice. In addition, much of the material was reportedly generic 
and often boring, too long and not of an appropriate language style for the end user. 
As a consequence of these problems it was argued that operatives do not necessarily 
see, read or understand the method statements. The non-use or over-looking of 
procedures was described as habitual practice, but elsewhere was at times said to be 
due to operators looking for shortcuts or to make financial gain. Additionally it was 
acknowledged that non adherence to procedures may lead to dismissal and that where 
there is a lack of formal procedures, this creates an inability to maintain discipline. In 
spite of misgivings among the participants, it was thought however, that poor Method 
Statements are tolerated and accepted, and that use in their current state is perpetuated 
by all concerned. 
Participants also spoke abut the problems associated with planning, and noted that the 
parameters for work scheduling always change and may in fact be obsolete even 
within about three weeks of a project start. Various causes were suggested, such as 
lack of preparation by contractors / sub-contractors for an immediate start and the 
difficulties associated with dealing with fragmented `packages' of work. Changes to 
work in progress also contributed to planning problems and these might be 
modifications in areas such as design, scheduling, as a result of transport & delivery 
problems, or as a result of weather conditions. 
The consequences of planning problems were described as trade overlap (and loss of 
work sequence), work back log and the generation of time pressure - all of which 
were felt to contribute to risk circumstances. It was generally indicated that greater 
attention is now being given to planning, but that client commitment (to a longer 
programme for example) is required. 
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Allied to the problems with planning, some participants spoke about difficulties 
associated with maintenance activities, noting that maintenance operatives are not 
`site-wise' and that their increased vulnerability in one-off visits to the site is not 
accounted for in planning, safety or design. 
Supervisory aspects were drawn into the planning category whereby it was felt that, if 
dismissal is being considered (for poor performance perhaps), the possibility of 
inadequate planning is not regarded as a contributory factor. There were reports that 
fear for job security inhibits reporting of problems and that there are cases where the 
under-reporting of accidents is actually condoned by supervisory staff. 
4.2.2.2 Work scheduling 
Time pressure within work scheduling was mentioned frequently. Example causes 
cited for this are pressure from earlier contractors in the chain and pressure from Site 
Managers upon operatives. Additional causative factors mentioned are the pursuit of 
competitive advantage between different contractors seeking to ingratiate themselves 
to clients, or from a 'team-like' competition generated by managers of different 
contractor gangs working side by side on a site. 
The time pressure of work scheduling was described as having effects upon two 
interacting factors - work performance and the skill base of contractors. To 
accommodate the time pressure in work scheduling it was indicated that unskilled 
labour and poor subcontractors are sometimes appointed. During a contract there 
were reports of time pressure, perhaps as a result of having to incorporate unexpected 
work, which is then detrimental to work in progress. 
It was indicated, however, that nearing the end of a contract, performance and quality 
of work can suffer in particular - with participants citing negative effects such as 
short cuts, resulting from increased work intensity and trade overlap. There were 
concerns from operatives that they are not appropriately consulted concerning the 
scheduling of trade overlap. Although this was recognised as a Site Manager 
responsibility, the lack of appropriate consultation resulted in loss of work sequence 
and even the re-doing of work on occasions. 
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4.2.2.3 Resources 
A number of criticisms were made regarding the move from direct labour towards 
lengthy chains of sub-contractors. As Principal Contractors employ less of their own 
employees, this has inevitably led to a greater demand upon the use of sub-contractor 
fines. Although it was recognised that some contractors work to a very high standard, 
that this can be compromised (when poor subcontractors are appointed), especially 
due to price/ time pressure, or as a result of a lack of good planning by the Site Agent 
(Manager). It was noted that the appointment of sub-contractors is generally price led 
and thus competitors undercut; this creates pressure to drop standards to be 
competitive, or to appoint less qualified / young people or immigrant labour. Sub- 
contractors are reported to invariably have inadequate supplies of safety equipment 
and this can have negative implications for the PPE stock levels of Principal 
Contractors! 
The negative consequences of sub-contracting were described as working purely in a 
price motivated manner, to perform a task. This leads to the taking of short-cuts, 
inadequate or non-use of Method Statements and results in increased hazards to all on 
site. Sub-contractors, and especially those most distal in the chain from Principal 
Contractors, were seen as distanced from responsibility and ignorant of and not 
committed to the team work of the site. Sub-contractors reportedly make inadequate 
design revisions or may even walk out if site conditions are inadequate. Overseeing 
supervision of sub-contractors also appears to be a considerable problem. Firstly, this 
was described from the perspective of inadequate supervision from their own 
immediate employers, which had a negative affect upon safe working practice and 
performance. Secondly, the logistical problems experienced by Site Managers were 
also noted, especially in the difficulties they experience in co-ordinating and 
overseeing lengthy chains of sub-contractors. 
Additional negative comments on this theme, were that specialist contractors are very 
expensive and at times are bought in to undertake tasks which could be undertaken as 
effectively and more time efficiently by the Principal Contractor operatives (had their 
skills been recognised). The sub-contracting system reportedly promotes the 
overlooking of the range of skills and experience that may already be available among 
site personnel. The advantages of direct labour (over sub-contractor labour) were 
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described as project dedication, better teamwork, a better safety attitude and better 
overall housekeeping. Other than being retained in continued employment, however, 
these advantages were not necessarily perceived by the operatives themselves; 
feedback on good performance appeared to be provided solely through their continued 
employment. 
Skill availability was reported as a considerable problem for the industry. This affects 
recruitment and retention of competent Sub-contractors, Site Managers, Foremen, and 
Tradesmen -a problem worse in London. Problems in more rural areas were also 
cited, however, as it was indicated that in some areas a quota of local labour must be 
employed and this too does not necessarily provide the competent personnel required. 
The consequences of these skill shortages were that people (without site specific 
experience) are appointed in trade, supervisory and management positions. These 
personnel may not necessarily have worked their way through the system and were 
not thought to have the range of knowledge of the industry necessary to work 
efficiently and to support the project. 
At operative level, this means that at times new employees cannot be left unattended 
and that in the absence of even the most basic common-sense, considerable pressure is 
put upon gang leaders to undertake and supervise the work of the operatives. There 
were a number of criticisms that training certificates do not necessarily infer 
competence at operative level, yet are endorsed at management level. To fulfil the 
quota of required personnel, it was reported that agency staff are frequently used. The 
use of agency staff received a number of criticisms, predominantly due to their lack of 
commitment to the site and for not working according to work methods specified in 
their training. It was also reported that, due to difficulties in filling a quota, personnel 
with health problems are employed and create a risk to themselves and an additional 
burden to colleagues who have to `look-out' for them. 
The loss of a consistent complete team (both at management and site level) was rued, 
as work teams continuously disband and reform at each new site. With this is a loss 
of interaction, experience and common purpose among the group, which was felt in 
some cases to contribute to accidents. 
117 
4.2.2.4 Safety considerations 
A number of positive comments were made about the improvement in safety culture 
in the industry over recent years, and all participants appreciated this. It was noted, 
however, that the effectiveness of any initiative is dependant upon the interaction of 
superiors with subordinates. The success of such top down commitment was reported 
to depend heavily upon the attitude of the Project or Site Manager and of the foremen 
or team / gang leaders. Similarly, the personality of the Safety Manager / Advisor 
was seen as carrying considerable influence, with positive outcomes being dependent 
upon the status and respect commanded by an individual. 
Inhibitors to effective safety culture were that management on site is generally seen as 
reactive rather than pro-active. Time pressure plays a considerable part in work 
methods chosen and although it was reported that people may be committed to safety, 
they do not necessarily feel a concurrent pressure to comply with specified work 
procedures. It was reported that `trades' are over-ridingly concerned about time and 
do not appreciate concern given to their safety. It was also indicated that unsafe work 
could be scheduled for the weekend when safety personnel are absent and unable to 
intervene. There were reports that personnel at an intermediate management level 
have conflicting responsibilities, which included facilitating maximum earnings by 
the operatives and achieving acceptable or even accelerated performance of the work. 
As such, safety was at times portrayed as a competing priority at site level with lower 
level supervisory grades described as being prepared to take risk on behalf of their 
men, as it is they who are likely to be disciplined should an accident occur and 
regardless of who is hurt. Some worst case scenarios recounted included suppression 
of the reporting of risk circumstances as it was believed that, should an accident or 
injury occur, some protection would be afforded to the employer if the risk 
circumstances had previously been `unknown'! 
On a more individual level, it was indicated that the traditional `blame culture' shows 
signs of receding, but that there are still cases where individuals are blamed if 
procedures are violated. Procedural violations were seen as insidious and tolerated, 
and reflect a wider malaise on site. If dismissal results, this would only ensure that 
any problems are exported elsewhere. 
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Although safety arrangements reportedly receive more thorough consideration for the 
bigger jobs, negative comments were still made indicating that safety considerations 
can result in a loss of a contract (during the tendering process), can increase work load 
and that safety standards can be compromised by shortcuts. However, participants 
noted that accidents may be more common in one-off or small jobs and that the 
importance of near misses are undervalued. Concern was expressed that HSE are not 
providing enough guidance to the industry. 
Specific criticisms were made regarding the risk assessment and accident reporting 
processes. It was stressed that risk assessments can be confused with Method 
Statements and that, in any case, risk assessments are at times of little value. Faults in 
preparation were described as inadequate attention to hierarchy of control, inadequate 
consideration of maintenance issues and, at times, over-specification of risk 
circumstances (which can inhibit consideration of broader factors). Problems were 
also attributed to the use of generic risk assessments, which do not include operative 
consultation and which are of more use as a bargaining tool to impress clients. 
There were also criticisms of the accident reporting systems, in that some participants 
felt that they are prohibitive and that the recording of remedial action can appear very 
trivial. It was suggested that the loss of the accident book prohibits the review of 
previous accidents, a feature that had been valued previously. 
There were conflicting opinions about the ratio between Safety Advisors and 
operatives, and of the value of Safety Advisors at each site - it was suggested that 
people can actually behave less responsibly where there is an on-site Safety Advisor. 
The Safety Advisor role was generally reported positively and it was felt that support 
would be given to operatives should they have any safety concerns. It was noted that, 
to make a stand, a certain amount of self confidence is needed by operatives and that 
this is how some less experienced / familiar operatives can be influenced to work in 
an unsafe manner. Some conflict was described, namely in that Site Agents don't 
necessarily "think safety" and that there can be occasions where they do not always 
incorporate safety as part of their work. 
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A number of participants in the focus groups indicated that they perceived that the 
state of housekeeping on a site closely reflected the site safety culture and the attitude 
of the Project / Site Manager / Site Agent. Good housekeeping was seen to reflect the 
`state of affairs' for a number of site issues and this is impressive to a client. 
Conversely it was recounted that working in a poorly maintained site has a negative 
effect on safety attitude and can contribute towards accidents. One group indicated 
that any problems should be resolved by disciplinary action or monitoring and that 
management should instigate this. 
4.2.2.5 Site layout and transport 
There were conflicting reports about site layout plans. Although it was acknowledged 
that they can be well done, there were a number of comments indicating that the 
provision of "laid out area" has decreased and that this impedes work processes. 
Problems with access were reported more, in that there can be inadequate access to a 
task area and that, on occasions, haul roads have to be used to compensate or to 
accommodate all who need to use a particular area. In themselves, uncontrolled 
transport issues were seen as able to dilute good control measures which may be 
present elsewhere. There were reports of work load pressure upon Banksmen and 
concerns about lack of supervision or induction for lorry drivers. 
4.2.2.6 Job roles at work organisation level 
A number of comments were made about the influence of different `job roles' at 
organisational level that can impact upon safety. Where possible these are 
summarised here, although there has been some difficulty in compiling this due to the 
range of different job titles used and due to the number of references made in the 
focus group discussions to `management' (given that for each group this may in fact 
have described different disciplines). Reference to Site Managers includes comments 
attributed to Site Agents. 
Concerning Project Managers, it was reported that, while having a heavy workload, 
there may be shortcomings in their communication skills and level or appropriateness 
of experience. Project Managers were described on one occasion as insulated from 
enforcement action yet, on another occasion, were also described as being able to 
exert a powerful influence on safety performance. 
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When discussing Site Managers it was indicated that, as they are able to find 
employment outside the industry, competent Site Managers are hard to find. At best 
their responsibilities were described as including resolving design inadequacies, 
accommodating the consideration of trade overlap and of identifying and dealing with 
incompetent operatives. However, it was also suggested that Site Managers are not 
necessarily aware of safety standards and that they vary in their commitment to safety. 
This can be reflected in the level of instruction provided and in the amount of time 
pressure put upon tasks. It was also reported that Site Managers may or may not be 
prepared to delay work for safety equipment to arrive and that some can overlook or 
condone the taking of shortcuts. 
As well as Site Managers, it was also reported that there is insufficient availability of 
competent Foremen. In the past, Foremen were described as powerful and 
knowledgeable, but it was considered that this role is for the most part now obsolete. 
It was suggested that `Managers' may now replace foremen. Alternatively, operatives 
can nominally carry the `foreman' or `supervisor' title, but they do not necessarily 
have the skill base or role clarity of their predecessors. It was reported that pressure 
to fill a `foreman' role can result in under-qualified people being promoted and that 
the impact of this results in inadequate work `set-up', which in turn can lead to time 
pressure, the taking of short-cuts and inappropriate supervision. It was reported that 
about 20% of foremen just have a nominal role and that they do not provide the 
leadership required. 
Overall, comments pertaining to `managers' mostly reflected their positions regarding 
competence and their knowledge. Managers were perceived as lacking adequate 
construction knowledge and experience, which was seen to impact negatively upon 
accountability and construction health and safety. 
The final role mentioned was that of Trade Union representatives. There were few 
comments, but there was some indication of costs inhibiting the amount of time that 
could be committed to safety matters. On the other hand it was also reported that bad 
Union advice can lead to accidents, yet Trade Union representatives have no 
accountability in this respect. 
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4.2.3 Task factors 
4.2.3.1 Tools. equipment and materials 
The selection of correct tools, materials and equipment received a number of 
comments with these appearing to be influenced by availability and work scheduling 
factors. Although it was generally acknowledged that, where provided by the 
Principal Contractor, the tools are often good and new to each site, it was indicated, 
however, that their selection is too cost motivated and that they are not always freely 
available. This may be because equipment is shared too widely between gangs, 
because loaned equipment is removed immediately after use (but prior to task 
completion), or because work scheduling is lost and the right tools are unavailable at 
time of need. It was indicated that this might lead to the taking of short-cuts or to the 
use of inappropriate equipment, especially if there is time pressure on the task. Cost 
implications were seen by some as inhibiting to the selection of preferred equipment. 
Safety equipment was in some cases seen to impede work efficiency. Work 
efficiency was also compromised by late delivery of materials as this can also induce 
time pressure upon the work. 
It was described, however, that equipment is not always of a good quality and that 
there are problems with the selection of the correct capacity tooling and that there is 
not always provision of adequate maintenance (directed to lifting equipment). 
Overall, it was suggested that the health implications of using old and poorly 
maintained equipment is under-appreciated. There were some concerns about the 
unknown quality of equipment that is used by sub-contractors and of the use of multi- 
functional equipment. One example relevant to sub-contractor tool use was that to 
compensate for unknown site circumstances, they are known to bring their largest 
capacity equipment to site, and proceed with using this although the equipment may 
in fact be too large for the task. 
Along with tools, equipment and material, participants also discussed the personal 
protective equipment (PPE) that is used whilst performing tasks. Availability and use 
of PPE was reported to vary widely. The impression gained was that for larger 
companies there are plentiful supplies, but for smaller companies availability is 
limited and in some cases operatives are even expected to provide their own PPE. 
122 
It was acknowledged that non-use of correct PPE does occur and, although this is 
more likely to happen at the week-end, use was seen as an individual's responsibility. 
It was indicated that those advocating the use of PPE do not adequately appreciate the 
practicalities and negative influence upon performance from its wear. For example, a 
considerable loss of mobility through using PPE was described; helmets are said to be 
disliked as they impede vision and fall off unless secured by ear muffs, and goggles 
are greatly inferior to visors (as they induce sweating and work is frequently 
interrupted to clean them), but that in either case vision can be impaired by surface 
scratching. 
4.2.3.2 Task supervision and communication 
Inadequacies were reported with both supervision and communication across the 
different disciplines at task level, and these were seen as contributing towards 
accident potential. Participants described different experiences of supervision, with 
contradictory observations that there is both more and less supervision nowadays. It 
was generally indicated that there is more supervision on larger sites, but that where 
this is lacking, poor practice and performance can result. The lack of supervision of 
lorry drivers and sub-contractors was mentioned a number of times. Particular 
reference was made to small groups undertaking a high rate of small jobs, who are 
less likely to be formally managed as their supervisors may cover many different 
sites. As such, safety behaviour may only be concurrent to the time of the 
Supervisor's visit. Participants explained that if an adverse event occurs and 
dismissal follows this only exports the unresolved problems elsewhere. 
At site level, the efficiency of supervision was seen to deteriorate with a rise in the 
volume of sub-contractor labour, yet where supervision was regarded as good, sub- 
contractors would conform to standard. There were indications, however, that some 
task requests are inappropriate and that these relate to problems with communication. 
Communication was discussed as inadequate both with a same status team, and 
hierarchically through different grades. Within this there were indications that 
adequate consultation and liaison at trade level is lacking and that it is misleading to 
assume that absence of reporting of problems automatically indicates that all is well. 
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4.2.3.3 Task. techniques and safety factors 
Small jobs, isolated work or short term contracts were seen as those where little 
forethought is given, and with safety factors more likely to be considered on an ad hoc 
basis or at an individual level only. It was noted that setting up safely, waiting for 
arrival of and use of safety equipment can take longer than the job itself and that 
duration of exposure to a `risk' influences an individual's choice of safe working 
methods. 
More generally, working methods were described by some as outdated, but that there 
is resistance to or ignorance of `new developments'. Additionally improvisation or 
short-cuts in work methods are seen as contributory to the causes of accidents. The 
system for introducing and using risk assessments was seen as not working and (as 
described earlier concerning procedures and method statements) there is generalised 
ignorance at operative level. It was indicated by some, however, that operatives 
should look out for each other and that any wrong doing should be challenged and 
resolved at this level. On the other hand it was suggested that near misses are under 
reported, but there were feelings among some participants that even when `incidents' 
are reported, they may be discarded or `lost' higher up the hierarchy. 
4.2.3.4 Training in task and health and safety skills 
A number of different criticisms about training were mentioned and the first of these 
concerned induction. Comments on induction were that they can be overly long and 
repetitive of base-line information common to all sites (such as PPE). It was reported 
that they are inconsistently provided (lorry drivers especially were thought not to 
receive induction) and that they do not necessarily provide the `appropriate' site- 
specific information. It was indicated that people become blas6 about inductions and 
that in any case they are not evaluated and have no expected outcome. 
participants reported that induction and tool-box talks are confused and that tool-box 
talks can become obsolete. When discussing training in more general terms 
alternative problems were recounted, especially as it was indicated that training is 
often inappropriately seen as a response to all problems. The provision of training for 
young people was seen as inadequate (in terms of a lack of appropriate 
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apprenticeships), as was the use of multi-skill training. It was indicated that the 
consequences of the loss of apprenticeships would be felt considerably in 
approximately 15 years time. 
Generally, for training content, it was mentioned that not all understood the 
terminology used and that agency staff especially perceived training as a waste of 
time. It was indicated that there is a shortage of courses, that training is not provided 
consistently (no manual handling training for labourers for example) and that it is the 
larger sites that provide more training opportunities. 
The use of a trainer unknown to the trainees appeared to be criticised (and understood 
to be due to their lack of understanding / empathy of specific work problems). 
Additionally, the training content was also criticised (especially at task level), 
whereby it was considered by some that too much time is spent on office based theory 
(again much of which is repetitive common-core material) with insufficient time spent 
on practical field skills. 
The lack of practical field skills was thought especially important. In this respect 
problems were mentioned with one day training courses that provide a certificate of 
competence. The certificated person is apparently not evaluated for competence, yet 
is still expected to display a wide range of skills from a very early stage. In any case 
it was also reported that working without the correct certification is permitted, but that 
learning on the job in this manner may convey the wrong techniques. 
4.2.3.5 Work load and time constraints 
The scheduling of workload appeared to be influenced considerably by the revised 
work patterns and long hours culture that is now prevalent in the industry. Although 
it was recognised that long hours are well rewarded financially, this is invariably 
disruptive to domestic life and can routinely entail early morning starts. This, coupled 
with the additional culture of travelling large distances for work, was discussed as 
having a negative effect on decision-making and productivity, and that the resulting 
fatigue could compromise safety. 
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Focus group participants reported that there has been an increase in the introduction 
of weekend, night and block work by clients. It was suggested that Management staff 
at the week-end may be unfamiliar with workload and that there can be omission of 
PPE or tolerance of unsafe work practices (especially whilst the Safety Advisor is 
absent) during this time period. The effects of revised work scheduling were 
particularly reported in the undertaking of retail work, whereby changing shopping 
patterns have made Sunday one of the busiest days (a day which was previously 
considered a quiet time). This has lead to increased night work, which in itself was 
felt to cause a loss of alertness, carelessness and permit double shifting. 
Time pressure was repeatedly mentioned in relation to the undertaking of tasks. 
Various causes were noted and (in no particular order as many of these factors are 
mentioned elsewhere in the chapter) these include having to accommodate operative 
turnover, the availability of, and need to, inspect equipment, the use of (some) safety 
equipment, access to the site, poor work set-up prior to task commencement, waiting 
for sub-contractors to undertake fixed fee jobs, interruptions whilst working, the need 
to make bonus payments, inflexibility in work organisation, and the pressure to meet 
deadlines. The effect of time pressure was cited as comer cutting, the use of unsafe 
work practices and having to exert considerable extra effort to accommodate previous 
time losses. 
4.2.3.6 Financial considerations 
The implications of payment methods upon performance, quality and efficiency were 
mentioned on numerous occasions. It was indicated that pay is directly related to the 
work undertaken and that expectation of payment leads the choice of work methods. 
There are reportedly no longer any fixed wages for trades people, as all work is now 
target or bonus related. Financial expectations are high and exceeding the work target 
and increasing bonus related pay is considered essential for income and the prime 
incentive for operatives. Bonus pay may be safety-related, but it seemed that most 
often bonus pay is solely related to task performance. 
A range of adverse consequences of these payment methods were presented in the 
discussions and these include poor working practices, ignoring procedures, increased 
risk taking and unsafe improvisation, time pressure, and consequent inhibition of 
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constructive decision making. It was indicated that there may be a financial penalty if 
a job is difficult or slow to complete and that any mistakes have to be resolved within 
the company's or individual's own time. 
Participants variously reported that on the one hand pay is not related to qualifications 
or experience, but that on the other, pay may be increased after learning new skills 
(with some companies). It was commented that there is a reliance on young 
employees and that this is reflected in a low basic wage. 
4.2.3.7 Environmental conditions 
Poor environmental conditions were raised as a factor which can impede work for 
operatives. It was suggested that, where work has to continue in bad weather, this can 
induce risk-taking to finish tasks hastily. It was suggested that some operatives, such 
as pipe layers and scaffolders, may be more vulnerable in wind / rain conditions. The 
effects of heat fatigue also need to be considered (the need for special consideration 
during the religious fasting that occurs during Ramadan was noted). Isolated 
operatives were also described as being at greater risk if they have no means of 
calling for assistance should an adverse event occur. It was reported that bad weather 
affects morale and especially as some clients can stipulate that there will be no 
schedule revision in these circumstances. 
4.2.3.8 Design of task area 
While it was said within the focus groups that safety is considered in the task layout, 
there were also indications that there are some space restrictions (perhaps through the 
use of safety equipment, through inadequate scaffold set-up or other working `at 
height' problems) and that these can introduce awkwardness or reduce stability. 
4.2.3.9 Job roles at task level 
There was consensus that there are insufficient competent and experienced trades 
people in the industry and that this has consequences not only in loss of task skills but 
in safety awareness too. There was some indication that different trades perceive 
safety guidelines differently, and that scaffolders and steel erectors are more likely to 
over-ride safety rules. 
127 
Clarity of job role received varied comments and different participants saw this in 
both a positive and negative light. Firstly, for speed, jobs are reportedly more 
fragmented nowadays and this can inhibit use of the full range of operative skills. 
However, fragmentation was also seen in a favourable light as certainty and role 
clarity of just doing specific jobs was valued as well. Overload was noted too in the 
context of Banksmen, who simultaneously have to assist with additional duties while 
doing their task, which was felt to inhibit the efficiency of their role in the safe 
movement of transport. 
4.2.4 Individual factors 
4.2.4.1 Age. attributes and experience 
The discussions indicated that there is increased reliance on young and inexperienced 
employees on sites and there is particular concern about early responsibility and use 
of dangerous equipment by young workers. Young people were described as more 
safety conscious and seen as more likely to follow work instructions, but were 
reported to experience a high accident rate, especially within their first week of 
appointment. It was said that construction does not attract high calibre school leavers 
and formerly, prior to the last construction slump, there were older and more 
experienced workers, but they are now seen less commonly. 
It was argued that young and inexperienced workers are present across all grades. 
young people in authority were described as possibly having good organisational 
skills, but having low safety motivation - it was also described that those in authority, 
and inexperienced with safety management, can sometimes be perceived as not 
caring. At operative level, there was a certain amount of concern about the impact of 
inexperienced people on site, and especially about the lack of even the most basic 
common sense among newcomers. ' There were also references to lack of 
concentration and carelessness. It was reported that it is generally possible to 
establish whether a new person to site is `any good' within approximately one hour, 
but that because of manpower shortages those less able have to be tolerated - creating 
supervision and safety-related problems. 
The verification of `experience' seems especially difficult and it was discussed that 
there are problems with people with inadequate skills presenting themselves as a 
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skilled trades person. Concern was also voiced about the appointment of trades 
people from outside the industry and reservations about the transferability of their 
skills onto site. When discussed, the use of the CSCS card (2.5.6), to provide a record 
of qualification and experience, appeared to be welcomed at trade level. It was 
understood however, from remarks made, that experience and skill is not necessarily 
perceived as particularly valued and that there can be some feelings of marginalisation 
among long standing employees. This was experienced in lack of recognition in pay 
and in having to assume a housekeeping / `nannying' role to others bought onto site. 
Although experienced workers were described as having fewer accidents, experience 
was also seen to have a negative side. The range of problems associated with 
experience were noted as work fatigue, over-familiarity and over-confidence, 
complacency, omission of or low safety awareness, and difficulties in changing work 
techniques. 
It was variously described that site and work experience may either increase or 
diminish the likelihood of risk taking at work. It was said that a gang leader or charge 
hand may be more likely to get injured than new starter, but that this happens because 
they take risks on their behalf. Alternatively, the repeated successful undertaking of a 
risky activity was also thought to encourage perpetuation. Additionally, the 
commitment attributed to an employer through long service may also induce 
employees to take risks that they might otherwise avoid. By virtue of their short 
appointment time, maintenance staff and sub -contractors were described as tending 
to be more ignorant of site risks. Ultimately, inadequate knowledge and training were 
said to contribute towards risk misperception and apathy, and these were seen as 
accident causes. A number of comments were made by participants, which revealed 
the presence of a fatalistic approach to accidents - with luck and chance seen to have 
a considerable contributory role. 
4.2.4.2 Competency issues 
Where competency and the issues of certification were discussed by participants, a 
number indicated that that `competency' lacked clear definition. Moreover, 
competency needs to be relevant to site conditions / equipment used and cannot be 
inferred just by certification. There was concern among some that too much emphasis 
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is placed upon certification as, for `managers', this implies competence of workers 
and defers responsibility from themselves. In other cases, the misrepresentation of 
competence (deliberate or not) by people wishing to join the site was considered 
detrimental as this had supervision implications and also impedes ability of the gang 
to meet their bonus. There was concern too about spurious attribution of competence 
when convenient (i. e. when a particular task needed doing in a hurry) as it was 
indicated that proceeding without certification may result in lack of `cover'. 
4.2.4.3 Attitudes and conformi 
Attitudes among personnel were variously described. There were a number of reports 
of pressure to conform, such that jobs must be done at any cost and although there is 
nominal commitment to safety, complacency breeds complacency, and people do not 
feel a pressure to comply. There was indication too of peer pressure to maintain work 
pace, especially in the context of achieving the bonus. It was also indicated that a 
degree of self-confidence and authority is needed to reject pressure to conform, but 
that once stated it is accepted. On the other hand it was also mentioned that fear of 
the consequences can inhibit operatives from complaining and, as such, violations 
remain insidious and tolerated. 
4.2.4.4 Health status and fitness for work 
One concern highlighted by the focus groups was the next day effect upon individuals 
of high alcohol intake. This was discussed as being connected with life-style factors 
associated with the industry, such as site distance from home, long hours and early 
work starts. More broadly, varying views and differing perspectives of general health 
status were noted. It was indicated by some that a lot of men are (or through work 
hardening) become quite capable of doing the jobs they are requested to do and that 
ability to do a task is evidence enough that they are adequately fit. On the other hand, 
there were also concerns that there are considerable health problems among 
construction workers, and that operatives are at risk of work related injury and, if 
affected, may continue to work with inadequate health status despite this. It was 
reported that light work may be possible for injured employees, but that dismissal is 
sometimes the alternative. 
The general impression from participants was that ill health and health-related issues 
(especially slowly developing health issues) are under-appreciated in the industry and 
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that an increase in the extent of litigious action is anticipated in the future. In this 
context, the suspicion was raised that some work injured personnel might be securing 
appointment with larger companies in anticipation of making a future compensation 
claim. 
The skills shortage was described as leading to the appointment of people with health 
problems and there were concerns about inadequacies in verification of health status - 
especially for sub-contractors. It was reported that health screening is increasing, but 
that there are major difficulties with this, given the turnover and mobility of personnel 
in the industry. The terms health screening, medical screening and health surveillance 
appeared to be used interchangeably by some participants and it was apparent that the 
distinction is not appreciated. Where content of health screening was mentioned, this 
was described in terms of drug and alcohol testing, whereas a more comprehensive 
`health assessment' reportedly occurs only for confined space workers. 
4.2.4.5 Exclusion of discussion themes 
Few aspects of the discussion area prompts were left un-addressed. A notable 
exception was `site selection' as a `strategic design consideration' (Figure 14). This 
was discussed by only one group, but restricted to raising the point that wealthy 
clients would be willing to pay more to `make good' poor site choices, as `location' 
was an over-riding factor in their decision making. Likewise, there was little 
discussion relating to site layout issues. 
4.3 Questionnaire results 
As an element of the focus groups meetings, participants were asked to consider the 
contribution of different factors to construction industry accidents. This helped to 
isolate viewpoints by each different group. A five-point rating scale was used and the 
mean responses from each focus group are presented in Figure 14 - Figure 17. 
4.3.1 Project concept, design and procurement 
The graphical representation in Figure 14 shows that for the first three factors there is 
a visible continuity of responses among each group, although strength of feeling 
varies. For the first factor, `inexperienced client', those that considered that there was 
a greater contribution were those in a senior role, either as a Senior Manager, Safety, 
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Mixed group or Safety role. In contrast this factor was considered less important by 
the site-based personnel - Site Managers and operatives (large and small sites). 
These patterns of responses were similar when considering the contribution of 
`unsuitable contractors' and of `inadequate identification and assessment of risk', but 
for these factors the mean results from the responses of Site Managers indicated that 
they felt that the contribution of these factors was greater. Likewise for the operative 
group, strength of feeling concerning the contribution of these factors is increased. 
The pattern of responses changes with the final four factors. Responses from Senior 
Managers indicated that they had considered the previous three factors important `to a 
large degree', however `inappropriate allocation of finance', a function likely to be 
under their control, was judged as less significant by them. In contrast, out of all the 
factors in this section, this was rated most highly by the operative groups. 
`Choice of site' was rated least important by all respondents, and particularly by those 
working at site level - Site Managers and Operatives (large and small sites). This 
pattern was repeated for the final two factors `technical faults in building design' and 
non-compliance with legislation', although these rose in significance, again for the 
non site-based personnel. 
4.3.2 Work Organisation and Management 
Figure 15 shows that the response patterns among participant groups, although not 
necessarily strength of feeling, were very similar for the first three factors. Although 
`PPE deficiency' was considered the least important of these, results indicate that 
`inadequate planning' and `lack of safe systems' were seen as relevant to failure. 
Senior Manager, Safety, mixed and Site manager groups rated these factors as being 
of greater contribution than the operative groups. 
The pattern changes for `inadequate response to previous incidents' and, although the 
safety and mixed groups continued to see this as influencing `to a large degree', the 
senior managers, client team and site manager groups were less strong in their 
agreement. 'Poor supervision of operatives' was noted as contributing towards 
accidents between `to some degree' and `to a very large degree', but strength of 
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feeling was least among the mixed and two operative groups. For the next factor 
`lack of feedback on work performance', opinion was less strong, with operative 
groups continuing to rate this only `to some degree' as did the Site Manager client 
team groups. Lack of training was rated as contributing `to a large degree' by almost 
all participant groups, yet opinion was contrasting again when considering the 
influence of `poor health and safety culture' and the site based personnel attributed 
least contribution of this among the different groups. 
4.3.3 Task factors 
Again, a similar pattern of responses was obtained across groups, excluding the mixed 
groups, who varied in opinion (by indicating a lesser contribution for poor tools and 
equipment) (Figure 16). When considering `high workload of personnel', this factor 
was considered by all to at least influence accident causation `to some degree', yet the 
opinions of the two operative groups appeared to be very different for this factor. 
Strength of feeling was greatest among the large site operative and safety groups, yet 
least by the small site operative groups. Opinion was similar among all groups for the 
middle three factors, yet `missing or unclear instructions' appeared to illicit a much 
stronger response from the operative groups. 
4.3.4 Individual factors 
There was most variety in ratings among groups when considering individual factors 
(Figure 17), and there was a very similar pattern of responses from all groups. The 
least important factors appeared to be individual medical problems, and to a certain 
extent, the effects of monotony and boredom. In contrast, attitude to risk was 
considered to be important `to a large degree' by all participants, as was (although 
responses were somewhat less consistent) `failure to recognise danger or carelessness 
on the part of the employee'. All considered `Tiredness' important at least `to a slight 
degree'. High ratings were also given for `low skill and competence levels' and `the 
demands of the job are not familiar', with the operative groups providing some of the 
greatest strength of these responses. 
4.4 Discussion of questionnaire data 
The data (mean scores and standard deviation) for the rating scale responses are 
reproduced in Appendix 2. An overview of this indicates that variation of opinion 
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was higher among the mixed and site based groups (especially the operatives - large 
and small sites). 
All factors presented were recognised as contributory to accidents to some degree 
among the different focus group participants. This recognition might have been 
expected for task or individual aspects, but it is perhaps surprising that factors 
determined earlier in the project lifecycle were rated so strongly. Researchers often 
argue that issues such as these are neglected as causal factors in accidents. 
Differences in opinion between the groups are much greater when considering factors 
related to the first two discussion themes, `project concept, design and procurement' 
and `work organisation and management'. This was especially so concerning 
contractor suitability, client experience, health and safety culture, legislatory 
compliance and availability of safe systems. Senior Manager and Safety professionals 
have consistently attributed a larger contribution of these factors to accident causality, 
whereas site based personnel (especially operatives) rated the least contributions. 
This was a theme among many of the group responses. 
Whilst the questionnaire results have generated material that supports the focus group 
findings, it is felt that data from the rating scales should be interpreted with caution. 
The results may reflect the degree to which participants considered themselves to be 
associated with the subject area, the extent of their prior experience and their 
confidence in expressing an opinion upon such issues. It is also possible that the 
results have been influenced by norms among groups routinely used to completing 
such questionnaires. 
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4.5 Data validation 
An important element of the focus group methodology was data validation, to assess 
whether any important issues may have been neglected in the studies, and to test 
whether the information generated rings true to peers of the participants, and experts 
alike. The following data validation was undertaken 
4.5.1 Consultation about data analysis method and interpretation 
In preparation for the analyses each of the two focus group moderators independently 
drew up their own interpretation of data from one of the focus groups transcriptions. 
Whilst there were some differences in the style chosen there was agreement between 
each of their understandings of the main points from the focus group discussion. As a 
result of this, the moderators agreed that further analysis should be undertaken only 
after prior agreement of the main points generated by the groups, across the discussion 
themes. The participant prompts (Table 34 - Table 37) were used as a baseline to 
prepare the comprehensive list of main points (these were used as the sub-headings 
under which the results are presented in Section 4.2). Subsequently this author 
undertook the analysis and interpretation of the transcription data. All interpretations 
have been appraised (and revised where necessary) by the second moderator and by 
researchers and industrial specialists from the project Steering Group. Since 
completion, these data have been presented at the 2001 Ergonomics Society Annual 
Conference (see Appendix 5). 
4.5.2 Open forum validation sessions 
Selected findings were presented to industry personnel, to explore their opinions 
(either agreement or disagreement) and examine inconsistencies in views. Two 
separate workshops for data validation were undertaken. The first was held with 22 
delegates of the International Conference `Designing for safety and health in 
construction, 26th/27t` June 2000, London' (Appendix 4) and the second was held with 
21 delegates at a project seminar (for this research - Site and Personal Factors in 
Accident Causation in Construction and Civil Engineering) -17th July 2000, London. 
4.5.3 Materials 
Material for validation was generated from the first three discussion areas (project 
concept, design and procurement; work organisation and management, and task 
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factors). Material generated from `individual factors', although considered important, 
was excluded in order to concentrate the validation discussion into construction 
specific areas, rather than aspects which might equally apply in any employment area. 
From the `Project concept, design and procurement' discussion data, four categories 
were identified and these were presented for discussion at the first validation session. 
The categories were (a) Design (b) Innovation (c) Planning and (d) Communication. 
For the second validation session, two aspects were drawn from each of the `work 
organisation and management' and `task factor' discussion areas. The themes, (a) 
Method statements (b) Work scheduling (c) Supervision and training and (d) Payment 
issues, had each been subject to considerable debate in the focus groups. 
For each category, sample statements were generated by the researchers, from the 
focus group data, and were stylised to reflect what was understood during data 
analysis and to provoke a response from participants (these statements are repeated 
Appendix 3). As such, the statements provided were more provocative in style than 
any original statements, but this was deliberate. The rationale for this style was 
carefully described to participants to avoid misunderstanding and to encourage co- 
operation. 
4.5.4 Validation method 
At each validation session, participants divided into groups to discuss statements 
provided for one of the categories. At the first validation session, participants self- 
selected their category for discussion. At the second validation session participants 
were allocated to a discussion group, to ensure equal distribution of people (but with 
allocation on an ad hoc basis). 
All sample statements were presented to the validation groups as a whole prior to 
dividing into the category discussion groups, after which each category discussion 
group was given their statements to discuss. Groups were asked to discuss the 
statements for a 30 - 40 minute period, during which they were invited to respond to 
the following questions: 
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` 1. Do you agree with the statements? 
2. Provide a brief explanation for your responses (aim to list -5 key points) 
3. If you disagree with a statement, why do you think other groups within the 
industry hold this view? ' 
Participants were asked to prepare their responses on a flip-chart sheet and to give a 
brief presentation of their material to the other groups, after which the remaining 
seminar participants were also invited to comment. Responses from these 
presentations and comments from the sessions are reproduced in Appendix 3. 
4.5.5 Validation results 
Many of the responses generated by validation participants were similar to the 
responses provided by the original focus group participants. This was expected and 
reinforces the interpretation of material already obtained. New information came to 
light however and three continuous themes were apparent within this. 
Firstly, although validation participants indicated that there are shortfalls in 
performance of some clients or professional disciplines, they reported that it is 
inappropriate to generalise or lump together poor performance. A number of 
references were made to how difficult many jobs are (such as Planning, Designing, 
being a Site Manager or Foreman), that conflicting demands can make decision 
making difficult for personnel in these sectors, and that this should be appreciated 
during any criticism. 
The importance or relevance of communication within many of the discussion areas 
(and not just in the `communication' discussion of first validation session) was also 
highlighted. There was indication that lack of inter-disciplinary work and sharing of 
knowledge are considerable drawbacks in the effectiveness of auditing, risk 
assessment and the development of training and method statements. Related to this 
was the suggestion that there can be a `loss of face' in requesting assistance or 
acknowledging shortcomings and that this may inhibit communications too. 
Finally, validation participants described a range of important training inadequacies. 
Training inadequacies for apprenticeships were openly discussed, but there were also 
indications that training (and especially in health and safety issues) was lacking for 
other disciplines too. 
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4.6 Summary of the focus group studies 
Division of the focus group findings into the four discussion themes ensured that a 
broad range of information was obtained. At the `Project Concept, Design and 
Procurement' stage the influences seemed to stem from failings arising from the 
actions of clients and their representatives, such as designers and architects. Typical 
problems included ignorance of legislative responsibilities and safety innovations, 
perpetual cost cutting, the exertion of undue time pressures, poor design management 
and bureaucratic burdens during the early project phases. 
When discussing `Work Organisation and Management', the quality of method 
statements, procedures and general planning issues appeared to be significant 
concerns. There were also problems with work scheduling, whereby frequent revision 
of project time lines generated trade overlap (and loss of work sequence), work back 
log, the taking of short-cuts, and the generation of time pressure. Role and 
appointment issues were also described, especially in relation to sub-contracting and 
site supervision. 
Task factors concerned the provision, quality and usability of tools and equipment, 
materials and PPE. Participants were also concerned about failures in the provision of 
appropriate training and in only selective adoption of safe working practices. Work 
load and time pressures, revised work patterns and long hours culture were reported to 
be prevalent in the industry and there was concern about the affect upon performance 
from the resultant fatigue. There were also concerns about effects upon safety, 
performance and work quality arising from the widespread use of target and bonus 
related pay. 
Issues relating to individual workers mostly concerned age, experience, attitude and 
health related aspects. There were particular concerns about increased reliance on 
young employees on sites and their inexperience in dealing with dangerous situations. 
Even experienced workers were vulnerable, yet for different reasons such as work 
fatigue, over-familiarity and over-confidence or complacency. It was suggested that 
construction workers have many under-current health problems and there should be an 
expectation of increased litigious action in the future. 
142 
4.7 Critique of the focus group studies 
The range and depth of information provided a huge amount of information and was 
fundamental for later methods development (5.2.1.5). However, there were also a 
number of limitations with the focus groups studies. There were inconsistencies in the 
formation of two of the groups and, especially for client team, there was no 
representation from designers or other client team professionals. A consequence of 
this is that it affected the balance and role representation desired and is likely to have 
influenced the results. Likewise, the constitution of the Site Manager team was also 
subject to last minute changes and it is felt that, although the discussions were 
interesting, that the data collection from Site Managers may not be a good 
representation of the views held by Site Managers in the industry. It was anticipated 
that this problem would be redressed within the subsequent stages of the research. 
In more general terms, the focus group data reflected only the information participants 
were comfortable to divulge at the time of the groups. This being in front of the other 
focus group participants and also the two moderators. Participants from the Senior 
Manager, Site Manager and Operative (small site) groups all knew each other prior to 
their focus group, and for the others all participants knew at least one other attendee. 
Whilst conversation might be generated more easily among people they know, it may 
also mean that participants are less willing to challenge `group norm' or established 
thoughts on a topic. The nature of group dynamics is such that it is also possible for 
one member to dominate conversation and present a biased view that absorbs the 
discussion time allowance. Whilst the group moderators were alert to this, it should 
be noted that other participants might not challenge other's viewpoints and 
misrepresentation might not be apparent in the analysis. Additionally, it cannot be 
assumed that their feelings are representative of all in the industry, only that 
employees with a range of relevant experience and knowledge have generated these 
data. 
Differences in opinion were encountered, although these often seemed to be among 
participants rather than typical to any particular group. Some groups concentrated on 
particular areas (perhaps reflecting their own experiences), but overall a range of data 
were obtained. The research enquiry concerns the range of opinion rather than 
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spurious attribution by group, as such all data have been presented, for the most part, 
by discussion areas. 
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5 PHASE TWO - METHODOLOGY FOR ACCIDENT STUDIES 
Phase Two concerned site based accident studies. In order to proceed with these it 
was first necessary to develop the data collection methods, establish access to 
construction accidents, acquire ethical approval and develop a sampling strategy, (see 
Figure 18). The review of the literature presented in Chapter Three had identified 
desirable features of methods in accident modelling and the range of generic and 
construction specific issues that need to be considered (3.7 and 3.11.6). Table 23 also 
introduced a range of accident associations that warranted address in the exploratory 
methods. A range of accident investigation techniques were available, yet these were 
variably appropriate according to accident type, resources, training in technique and 
task decomposition etc. (3.9.1 and 3.9.4). Diverse methods of accident data 
representation were identified, yet these too differed according to the work situations 
studied and level of control exerted (3.10). 
Collate industry 
accident investigation 
methods 
Collate project 
sponsor information 
Establish strategy for 
construction site 
accident access 
Phase One 
Focus groups 
Collate and develop 
ergonomics analysis 
methods 
Ethical approval and 
revision 
op a sampling 
strategy 
Phase Two 
Site based accident 
studies 
Figure 18. Phase Two of the research 
In developing the sampling strategy, the research also had to operate within the 
constraints of the accident types actually available for inclusion. Given policy change 
within the HSE just prior to commencement of data collection (1.1.6), access to 
incidents of more serious consequence was very restricted. It was agreed with the 
Steering Group that near misses and accidents with risk potential for more serious 
outcome would accommodate this shortfall. As such, the approach was devised to 
address the range of near miss, minor and major accidents. 
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5.1 Aims and objectives 
The aim of the site based data collection was to gather information on the range of 
active factors and latent conditions through the study of accidents and identify the 
most effective way to present the data. In order to achieve this the objectives were to: 
(a) Appraise and adopt advantageous features from existing generic and 
construction industry accident investigation methods 
(b) Identify information from ergonomics and construction industry resources that 
might enrich data collection 
(c) Develop accident study techniques for data collection 
(d) Use of multiple data collection methods to facilitate evaluation and avoid 
problems of bias and causal attribution 
(e) Ensure that the methods and techniques did not compromise ethical practice 
(f) Ensure that the accident study sample was representative of the accident profile 
within the construction industry 
(g) Identify the most effective methods for data representation 
5.2 Appraisal of available data collection techniques 
Literature review had revealed the range of latent conditions that affect performance 
(3.5.3.3) and that these issues are the foundation of an ergonomics approach in 
evaluation of interacting factors in the workplace (3.6.1). These methods however are 
not generally adapted for the construction industry, neither are they necessarily useful 
in identification of accident active factors. There are existing accident investigation 
techniques (3.9.2.2), yet these require certain conditions and a number of 
shortcomings have been reported (3.8.1.2). To identify what methods might be useful, 
an evaluation of general accident investigation techniques and those used in the 
construction industry were appraised. 
Having isolated the framework of ergonomics assessment methods and desirable 
features from construction industry accident investigation methods, it was necessary 
then to integrate the construction specific information needs. A number of different 
resources were consulted and evaluated to see what information might usefully be 
extracted or be supportive in the development of construction specific methods 
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development. These included information supplied by the research partners and 
project sponsor and findings from the focus groups. 
5.2.1 Appraisal of existing accident investigation techniques 
A number of accident investigation resources (e. g. Canadian Centre for Occupational 
Health and Safety 1998, Health and Safety Executive 1997b, United States 
Department of Labor 2000, US Department of Energy 1999) and software packages 
(Norton Waugh Management Software 2000, EQE International 2000) were 
evaluated. Whilst these offered some helpful information, there were a number of 
shortcomings - mostly because these usually aimed at those with little background 
knowledge or because they were too proceduralised or constraining for use as an 
exploratory tool. These methods were not adopted. 
5.2.1.1 Appraisal of ergonomics assessment techniques 
Earlier development (for the focus group discussion themes) created an approach that 
accommodated the concept and development of the project, the work organisation and 
management, task design and individual factors (4.1.3.3). These were based upon 
ergonomics approaches and models of accident causation and provided an extensive 
network within which to explore perceptions of failure and accident causation. 
Having ascertained the range of aspects that needed to be considered, a variety of 
practical assessment tools were consulted as a guide for developing question style and 
content within the main factors of interest (Institute for Occupational Ergonomics 
1998a, Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 1989 and McAtamney and Corlett 
1992). These were employed as a framework upon which to integrate construction 
specific enquiry in methods development. 
5.2.1.2 Appraisal of construction industry accident investigation techniques 
Construction companies, who had volunteered assistance with the research, were 
asked to supply the materials that they use for accident investigation purposes. 
Fourteen out of the 26 construction companies approached volunteered the accident 
investigation tools used in their own workplaces. These were all in questionnaire 
format and in many cases were used concurrently with data analysis software 
packages (not seen). There was much commonality of enquiry among the 
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questionnaires. The range of factors included in these tools is summarised in Table 
39. 
Area of enquiry Example aspects addressed Frequency 
General details Date, address, location, nature of project 14 
Biographic details Name, age, address, employer, occupation, experience 14 
injury details Type, location, severity, treatment, absence 14 
About the accident Description and cause of the accident 14 
Unsafe acts or violations of expected practice 12 
Unsafe conditions such as organisational or 'ob factors 7 
Estimated recurrence probability 2 
Recorded provision of training, induction or toolbox talks 3 
Declaration / witnesses Details / statements for accident history and form completion 14 
Recommendations Recording of actions taken to prevent recurrence 13 
Reporting Whether notifiable under RIDDOR 1995 9 
Property / plant 
damage 
Source, condition and estimated damage costs 9 
Follow-u Later review of recommendations and progress 5 
Supporting 
documentation 
Accident area sketch / photo or supplementary explanation for 
immediate causes 
5 
Table 39. Content appraisal of construction industry accident investigation tools 
In this appraisal it is acknowledged that each of the accident investigation tools has 
been developed for use in work circumstances specific to the source company (which 
may have varied among contributors). Additionally. it is not known what background 
or accident investigation skills the reporter would be expected to possess, whether 
these tools may be used concurrently with additional documentation (which was not 
supplied) or whether these tools may be the precursor to a later and more detailed 
investigation method. Nonetheless, among the materials provided, the impression was 
that where subjective assessment is required during the accident investigation, 
attention to failures or violations by individuals received greater attention than those 
where indirect causes, such as unsafe conditions, may have been a contributory factor 
in the accident event. Unsafe conditions, where proposed, required address of such 
areas as the nature of the work and supervision, whether the correct tools and 
materials were employed and also more general comments concerning the work 
environment and conditions. 
Whilst the evaluation was a worthwhile exercise, these methods did not embrace the 
breadth of search criteria (latent conditions, factors affecting performance and the four 
assessment areas identified during focus group development (Project concept design 
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and procurement, work organisation and management, task and individual factors). 
The focus of industry methods was predominately upon identification of `unsafe', 
`failure' etc. which invites the investigator to commence search with a biased 
judgement (3.5.3.2). These failings are common to reports concerning generic 
accident investigation tools (3.9.4.4). Advantageous features of the industry 
techniques was in the recording of `active causal factors' and some of the base line 
data surrounding the task, site and build circumstances. 
5.2.1.3 Appraisal of information supplied by the research partners 
Analysis of the HSE focus database (Suraji and Duff 2000, but work in progress at the 
time of access) generated numerous examples of failure `tokens' (Table 28) which 
were drawn upon to ensure the depth and range of exploration - where failure might 
occur and where assessment was required. 
5.2.1.4 Appraisal of information supplied by the project sponsor 
Earlier work undertaken by the project sponsor generated a series of notes concerning 
`Intelligence needs' in accident investigation (HSE, Personal correspondence, 2000) 
and these provided a rich source of prompts for data collection and for indication of 
the areas where assessment was required. Whilst the complete list of notes is not 
reproduced here, the main themes were: 
Client - Construction and business history 
Site - Size, value, project timeliness and employee welfare and 
consultation arrangements 
Accidents - Incidences, causes and consequences 
Supplier - Data relating to provision of labour, services, plant and equipment 
Work activity - Task activity, work environment and nature of work groups 
Person - Biographic details, employment history, health history and work 
pattern on the day of the accident 
Employer - Size and trading history, health and safety arrangements 
planning - Employment history, nature of interaction with site and client, 
Supervisor specialist skills 
& Designers 
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5.2.1.5 Appraisal of focus group findings 
Findings from the focus group analysis were used to generate areas of enquiry, and 
were either complementary or supplementary to the resource materials described 
above. An essential outcome of the focus group analysis was that participants were 
encouraged to recount experiences of `failure' under Any circumstances; indirectly an 
opportunity to explore beyond boundaries of what is accepted `best practice'. 
An additional strength of the focus group findings was that the strategy for discussion 
points and analysis had already been developed from an ergonomics model of accident 
causation, with input from construction resources available at the time of 
development. This meant that data were already available across the range of enquiry 
areas in ergonomics assessment. The findings also contained considerable detail and 
practical examples of incidences where failure might occur. The richness of this 
information was essential in developing the questions themselves, within the 
ergonomics framework. For example, from an extract from the Phase One results 
".... specialist contractors are very expensive and at times are bought in to undertake 
tasks which could be undertaken as effectively and more time efficiently by the 
Principal Contractor operatives (had their skills been recognised)" 
..... was 
developed into the question `Were any of the Sub Contractor skills available 
among your own operatives? ' (Proforma 4- section 4.6.8). Development of the data 
collection techniques is discussed further in 5.3. 
5.2.2 Evaluation and integration of the resource range 
Evaluation of the range of materials described above showed that there were merits 
within each that could be drawn upon for the methods development. The accident 
investigation methods contributed from industry had the most straightforward style for 
baseline data collection concerning the accident event, yet materials supplied by the 
project sponsor and from the focus database analysis provided the most thorough 
resource upon which to identify general search needs concerning the site and build. 
The ergonomics analysis, as well as providing the framework for technique 
development, also provided the most comprehensive methods for the collection of 
data concerning the task and work situation. The focus group findings were the only 
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resource to accommodate the main areas of concern among construction practitioners 
and these supplied the core information for the question contents. 
Industrial Project sponsor Focus group Ergonomics analysis 
resources materials findings methods 
Baseline data to 
describe site and * ** * _ build 
Baseline data of the 
accident / incident ** ** _ 
Task activity and 
active factor ** ** ** ++ 
identification 
Techniques of 
comprehensive 
assessment of * * * *+ 
interacting factors 
in the work 
Key: ** = comprehensive information sources *- valuable contributory materials 
Table 40. Value of resources used in development of accident study materials 
An appraisal of the perceived merits of the different data collection methods is shown 
in Table 40. Whilst each aspect had unique strengths, use of these methods in 
combination ensured that a range of enquiry methods was adopted. Although there 
was a certain amount of overlap, it ensured that important issues (perhaps beyond the 
experience of the researchers or normal remit of any of those working in the resource 
areas) were not excluded. 
5.3 Development of site based data collection techniques 
Having established the relative merits of each of the chosen resources, the next stage 
of the work was to develop the techniques for use in data collection of accidents. This 
entailed reaffirmation of the enquiry needs (primarily from focus group findings, the 
largest data source), and determination of different data collection methods that would 
ensure thoroughness and permit triangulation (3.9.5.4). 
5.3.1 Reaffirmation of the enquiry needs 
The focus group findings had been reported upon according to the four original search 
terms - Project, concept, design and procurement; Work organisation and 
Management; Task factors and individual factors. Whilst the findings were a valuable 
resource, the information appeared scattered ('token events'), often repeated and it 
was not always easy to categorise into the original search terms. 
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I. ý, I'll, -1 -111- - 
There were broad-spectrum information requirements, but generation of data 
collection techniques directly from these results would have carried over duplication 
and added additional burden to an already demanding range of search criteria. The 
problem with the focus group search terms was that they had close allegiance with a 
project timeline, yet there were many recurring themes throughout (as noted in 
evaluation of the Suraji and Duff model, 3.11.4.1). Review of the focus group results 
with a more flexible approach permitted isolation and re-categorisation of these 
recurring themes and adoption of new search terms unique to the construction 
industry. 
Strategic design 
considerations 
Tools, materials 
and equipment 
I 
Site layout & transport 
Environmental conditions 
I 
Task supervision 
Task area design 
Legislation 
Work scheduling 
Task technique 
and safety 
Client team & 
background Competency 
issues 
Job roles at 
organisational and task 
level 
Design & Planning 
Task Scheduling & 
execution 
Management 
Role, skills, Information 
abilities and transfer 
attitudes 
Resource allocation 
Financial considerations 
Selection of contractors 
Workload and time 
constraints 
Age, attributes and experience 
Project management and 
supervision 
Safety consideration 
Training in task and 
health and safety skills 
Health status and fitness 
for work Communication of task information 
Attitudes mid conformity 
Figure 19. Developing search terms for the accident study methods 
By undertaking a secondary analysis of the findings (in exclusion of the original 
anchor headings), four new themes were derived - Design and Task execution; 
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Planning, Scheduling and Management; Information transfer and Role, skills, abilities 
and attitudes. These new headings are repeated in the inner quadrant of Figure 19. 
The sub-headings from the focus group analysis findings are closely positioned to the 
revised search term in the outer quadrant. Overlapping or proximity to a border 
between the search terms indicates enquiry in common among the new search terms. 
Although closely related to the original categories used in the focus group 
development and analysis, these new search terms gave a more succinct and 
representative overview of the findings in a construction specific context. Re- 
organisation generated some overlap or common enquiry, but this reinforced the 
research needs and avoided the fragmentation associated with the search terms used 
for the focus groups. More importantly, these had been derived from a multi- 
disciplinary source and it was thus anticipated that the search terms would likely be 
relevant in some manner to any individual in the industry. The next step was to 
determine which information to obtain from whom. 
5.4 Generating materials to fulfil information needs 
Much of the information requirements, not only about the accident but also about the 
complete background to the work and site itself, were aspects requiring specialist 
input from site personnel. Some of these information requirements were fixed data 
(giving a profile of the construction site and nature of the accident) yet subjective 
opinions relating to the accident and factors affecting performance were also required. 
An interview administered questionnaire format was chosen as the optimum method 
to collect these data; a series of different questionnaire ` proformas" were developed 
and these were used as both data recording forms and as a framework for semi- 
structured interviews. 
Whilst the value of the semi-structured interview was acknowledged, it was also felt 
that in isolation sole reliance on information provided by site personnel might 
ultimately reflect only the experiences or group norms among those included in 
discussion (3.9.5.4). To promote the use of multiple methods in data collection and to 
avoid bias, additional resources entailed supplementary data collection by the visiting 
researcher (5.4.3) and later review with construction and ergonomics specialists on the 
research team (8.1.2.1). 
153 
5.4.1 Recording accident details and descriptive site data 
Information needs were varied, as it was important to acquire a summary of the 
accident, the work situation and the nature of the build type and phase of construction. 
These data were to be used for summarising the range of accidents and sites included 
in the research and were also necessary for accident sampling strategy purposes (5.6). 
Data requirements were developed from the resources provided by the project 
sponsor, and a construction specialist on the research team provided further guidance 
on content and terminology. It was the intention that any personnel with the relevant 
knowledge might complete the form (among site personnel or the research team) and 
that this would not be part of the interviews `in confidence'. The accident notification 
form is reproduced as Proforma 1 in Appendix 6. 
5.4.2 Gathering subjective opinions from site personnel 
The main aim in the development of the study techniques for subjective data 
collection was to exploit the approach used in an ergonomics workplace assessment 
and use this as a framework upon which to integrate construction specific information 
needs. Objectives of this approach were that: 
" That the methods should be readily transferable across a range of accident and site 
situations. 
Different site management structures, build types and stages 
of build indicated that a broad spectrum of information 
would be obtained. This meant that the methods should be 
suitably open and adaptable to incorporate this 
" The methods should be appropriate to the role and responsibilities of the 
interviewee 
It was anticipated that job roles and responsibilities of 
interviewees would vary between accidents and sites. 
Beyond the fixed data information needs (Proforma 1) the 
methods then needed to gain information about the accident 
and to acquire information from the perspective of the 
interviewee in relation to the revised search criteria 
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" The enquiries should be non-confrontational and encourage the interviewee to 
discuss issues openly and without inhibition. 
It was anticipated that there might be some resistance to 
participation, given fears of blame and lack of any 
precedent of this type of research in the construction 
industry. The semi-structured interview content and style 
was developed so that issues readily identifiable and of 
greater familiarity to the interviewees were discussed first. 
" The semi-structured interview should be conductable within a 30-minute period. 
It was felt that this would provide sufficient time for a full 
discussion, but would not be unduly taxing or remove the 
interviewee from their work situation for too long a time 
period. Goodwill and continued good relations with 
industry were vital for success of the research. 
Three further Proformas were developed as data collection tools for the accident 
studies and are also reproduced in full in Appendix 6. Each was used as a basis for 
the confidential semi-structured interviews. Proformas 2 and 4 were for data 
collection about the work situation and the main elements of enquiry are summarised 
below in Table 41. 
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Proforma 21 roforma 
Accident involved Interviews Management / Supervision / Safety advisor 
Interviews 
" Comments on accident cause and remedial action 10 
" Task details 
- Skill, training and experience issues Opinions on task content and difficulties 
- Interruptions &! or task overload 
- Known risks (such as chemical, electrical 
hazards) 
Solitary or gang work 
Design and task " Managing design revisions 
related Management of redesign 
Problem solving issues 
" PPE 
" Provision, care and training 
Usability comments 
" Environment 
- Site conditions (such as light, noise, wet) 
Compensatory measures 
" Workspace Interaction 
- Space and movement issues 
- Housekeeping 
Comments on tools and equipment 
" Work scheduling 
- task work : rest issues - Managing delays and changes 
Availability of skilled workers 
" Work organisation 
- Interaction / overlap with other trades - Assessing competency 
- Personnel availability - liaison and communication 
Planning, - Presence of production targets - Planning teamwork 
Scheduling and - Consultation and communication issues - Dealing with productivity pressures 
management Interacting with sub-contractors 
- Provision of training 
Health and safety responsibilities 
" Work pace 
- Determinants of work rate - Motivation of employees 
Managing time pressure 
" Target / payment Issues 
- Method of payment - Opinions on conflict to safe working 
Use of incentives 
" Supervision / Management 
- Opinion on adequacy of supervision Retrospective opinion relating to Communication issues accident 
Welfare -- Break and facility comments 
" Procedures / method statements / risk 
assessments / training 
- Knowledge of documentation & content Preparation of documents 
- Perception and use of these Consultation and communication issues 
Information Dissemination of information 
transfer Review and evaluation of materials 
" Training provision 
- Nature of induction, 
" Provision of task training & tool box 
talks 
Table 41. Enquiry areas for site based data collection of the work situation 
" Proforma 2- collected data from those undertaking the work activity when the 
accident occurred. These `accident involved' interviewees included any injured 
party or co-worker. 
" Proforma 4- collected data from those with a supervisory, managerial or safety 
role. Whilst the questions are different from those in Proforma 2, they address the 
same search themes, but with questions relevant to their job roles. 
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A final proforma was also used for data collection, obtaining information concerning 
the final search term - Role, skills, abilities and attitudes. This, Proforma 3, was used 
universally for all interviewees, and obtained information concerning accommodation 
and travel arrangements; working hours, holiday and sick pay arrangements, accident 
history (accident victim only), employment and training history, health related issues 
(accident victim only), and individual perceptions of their work. Interviewees were 
asked to supplement any of the issues raised in the semi-structured interview with 
additional comment. They were also asked to complete a 5-point rating scale devised 
to measure work stress, social support and job satisfaction (Symonds et al. 1996). The 
scale end points were marked -1- completely disagree and 5- completely agree. 
Whilst a broad span of information was requested within Proforma 3, this was one 
area where it was felt inappropriate to collect the full set of information raised as 
concern issues by focus group participants. For example, items excluded were alcohol 
effects and risk taking behaviour; these items were considered sensitive issues and 
inappropriate for an already dense information search in the time available. 
5.4.3 Timing an accident study 
Previous research had indicated that immediacy in response for accident investigation 
was desirable (3.9.4.2), yet the possibility of such a response became increasingly 
unlikely with the dearth in notifications (5.7.1). Nonetheless, much of the information 
requirements of the semi-structured interviews were not time dependant. 
Additionally, all accidents were already subject to their own company accident 
investigation and it was possible to incorporate this record into the data collection 
process. As a pilot study, accident study 001 was undertaken 8 weeks after the 
accident event (5.4.5), yet the clarity and integrity of information indicated that 
flexibility in the timing of an accident study would be acceptable. Thus all accident 
studies were conducted within eight weeks from the event. 
5.4.4 Data collection by the visiting researcher 
Supplementary data collection included (where possible or appropriate) ergonomics 
analysis of tools, equipment or machinery, the work and/or accident event area and 
analysis of any supporting documentation (such as risk assessment or method 
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statement for the accident task). Data were collected by the visiting researcher, who 
had longstanding experience of interviewing (3.9.4.2), knowledge of occupational 
health and safety and of ergonomics assessment during fieldwork. 
5.4.5 Pilot study and iterative review of techniques 
The first accident study (accident 001) was undertaken as a pilot study. This was 
successful and generated much information that was thought to be useful for analysis. 
However, it was anticipated that an iterative review of study methods would be 
required at the early stages of data collection as the researchers became more familiar 
with the process in general; whilst it was felt that the methods were comprehensive, 
there were concerns that unexpected issues might arise during site visits and that the 
study methods should be adapted to collect this information. The questionnaires were 
reviewed after accidents 004 (April 2001), 012 (June 2001) and 036 (September 
2001). It had been the intention to continue iterative development, but as the data 
collection schedule had to be adapted (5.7) this became unfeasible. 
Aril 2001 June 2001 September 2001 
Profottiiw 1 Addition of questions to 
collect history of accident 
victims direct employer or - - 
appointer & place in SC chain 
1'rc, fýnna 2 Work organisation enquiry Additional enquiry Additional enquiry about the 
developed to enquire about about post accident interviewee's job description, 
consultation and access to the remedial action, PPE tool use and individual 
Safety Committee and use of procedures purchasing criteria 
prufornýa 3 Additional questions to Additional enquiry Additional enquiry about job 
enhance enquiry about about holiday and security and Trade Union 
employment and training sickness absence membership 
history 
_ Profi)rma Additional questions relating Additional enquiry about 
to management of team and - ensuring health and 
contractor workers. Inclusion employment status of new 
of Safety Advisor within employees and of purchasing 
interview process criteria in obtaining PPE 
Table 42. Nature of revisions to study data collection techniques 
None of the original enquiries were deleted, merely added to. Some information 
requests were moved between different questionnaires (if it was felt that the enquiry 
could be better addressed at a more appropriate stage of the semi-structured interview) 
and the grammar was revised to facilitate comprehension. In exception to this, where 
information requests were revised, this is recorded in Table 42. 
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5.5 Ethical issues and their impact upon data collection methods 
Although the accident studies were not scheduled to commence until August 2000 
(and in practice started five months later), an early and `preliminary' application was 
made to the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee in November 
1999. The researchers foresaw a number of unusual and significant possible problems 
and an early application and meeting with representatives of the Ethical Advisory 
Committee, in January 2000, provided an opportunity to explore these (Appendix 10). 
The potential problems hinged upon issues surrounding confidentiality and the 
recognition that there may be circumstances where the study method could not be 
manipulated to guarantee this. This would also have implications elsewhere and the 
main areas of concern are described below. 
" Gaining participant consent and their right to withdraw from the study 
" Compiling and storing data anonymously 
" Avoiding litigious / potential subpoena cases 
" Determining researcher action in discovering ongoing risk circumstances and 
participant refusal to notify a responsible person 
Supplementary advice was also sought from the project sponsor and the Steering 
Group. Consent forms identifying our separateness from HSE inspector work, 
addressing our commitment to confidentiality (but not over-riding our `legal 
obligations') were developed and a data storage system was devised to separate signed 
and anonymous data. It was the intention that interviewees should be unidentifiable in 
the evaluation and the final report. All materials were recorded by month, year and 
day of the week only, to avoid identification by date. 
In practice, the methods were not universally acceptable to participants and those 
advising them. Fundamental issues (and unanticipated by the research team) were the 
provision of a signature on the consent form and the potential of breached 
confidentiality if ongoing (and unreported) risk circumstances were identified. 
`Signaturism' carries a heavy weighting of responsibility and is discussed in 7.5.3.5. 
Safety Advisors in industry pointed out that employees do not have an option on 
whether to report risk circumstances (Great Britain Parliament 1974, S7(b) ) and detail 
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indicating circumstances where confidentiality might need to be breached was 
removed. Following further review with the Ethical Advisory Committee, a simpler 
style and use of the consent form was developed and separate data storage was not 
required (Appendix 10). Prior to interview, the participant provided verbal 
affirmation of understanding of the nature of the study and the researcher signed the 
`consent'. This was successfully instigated into practice from Accident 008 onwards. 
5.6 Development of a sampling strategy 
A sampling strategy was devised to ensure that accidents included would link to 
representation of existing construction accident and build type data, but that this 
should not restrict the desired exploratory approach. Whilst a range of different 
variables, describing the build details and incident details were collected (Proforma 
One -Appendix 6), it was decided that most of these data should describe rather than 
dictate the accident study sample. In spite of this, two aspects were outstanding and 
these were chosen as the foundation of the sampling strategy. 
5.6.1 Representation of UK construction industry types 
Firstly, and with advice from a construction specialist on the research team, it was felt 
that the accident sites should be broadly representative of the profile of UK 
construction. Four categories of construction build types were defined and the 
recommended sampling among each are given in Table 43. N=100 represents that 
spread of the entire sample and within that, N=40, are the relative proportions reported 
in this thesis. 
fTa 
........... 
Pc 
i Ra 
Lr_ 
rget distribution 
( onstrur 
Engineering Rail & Civil 
t'OnsinUctiun li ine iin 
lion types 
Major Residential 
I3tnldin 
00 7 14 43 6 
_ý_. _" 3 6 17 14 
Icent 7% 14% 43% 36% 
tics i 1 2 6 5 
Table 43. Construction profile sampling strategy 
5.6.2 Representation of UK construction accident types 
The second aspect of the sampling strategy was that the studies should cover a broad 
range of accidents and incidents - especially those types of events indicated in HSE 
statistics of fatalities, major injuries and absences of over three days (NB: this 
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preparatory period pre-dated the combined RIDDOR / SWI statistics now instigated 
by the HSE (2.2.2)). Data available at the time of development (Health and Safety 
Executive 2000) reported summary RIDDOR statistics of the three accident 
consequences for the four-year period 1997/97 - 1999/00 (provisional). Figures were 
summed for each category and causal factor within the four-year period, and the 
percentage representation within each is repeated in Table 44. 
RIDDOR 
fatalities 
4year % 
RIDDOR 
major 
injuries 4y 
% 
RIDDOR 
over 3 day 
injuries 
4% 
Falls from a height (all levels) 55 38 13.6 
Injured while handling, lifting or carrying 0.3 
_8 
34 
Slips, trips and falls on same level 0 _ 19 17 
Struck by moving (+ flying / falling) object 15 19 19 
Struck by moving vehicle 9 3 2 
Contact with electricity or electrical 
discharge 
8 2 1 
Trapped by something collapsing or 
overturning 
5 1 0.5 
Strike against something fixed or stationary 0.6 3 5 
Contact with/by moving machinery 2.5 3 3 
Other accident events types 4.4 4 4.9 
(Health and Safety Executive 2000) 
Table 44. Percentage representation of reportable injuries to construction industry 
workers for the time period 1996/7 - 1999/00 (provisional) 
The first four rows were an important resource for the sampling strategy as the causal 
factors accounted for 19% - 55% of incidences for each of the injury types (shaded 
area denotes greatest incidence by injury type). The pattern of distribution among 
these data were used in ensuring a representative range of accidents for the research. 
5.7 Constraints upon site based data collection 
5.7.1 Difficulties with accident notifications 
The early phase of the data collection period was encumbered by problems with the 
accident notification process. There appeared to be a habitual disregard in industry of 
accidents with non-calamitous consequences, resulting in difficulties persuading them 
to inform the research team of accidents with minimal outcome. There was also a 
change of scope (less major accidents and more minor / near-miss accidents) just 
before data collection started and, despite revised publicity, this may have contributed 
to the confusion. 
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5.7.2 Lack of balance in sector participation 
The research was hampered by reluctance to participate by those in both the 
Engineering Construction and Residential sectors. There were some offers of 
assistance from each sector at the project outset, yet these either failed to materialise 
or potential participants received legal advice guiding them to avoid participation. 
5.7.3 Barriers to data collection 
Upon receipt of accident information (often from participating company's monthly 
statistics (5.8.1) many many attempts were made to obtain access for accident studies. 
The greatest barrier to participation was that accident involved personnel or their 
managers had moved on (to other sites) since notification. At times it was not 
possible to access sites if they were particularly busy (especially nearing the end of a 
contract). It was only rarely that studies were not pursued, perhaps because 
participants were unwilling or because an unescorted interview was not permitted. A 
few interviews were conducted under time pressure and it was not possible to 
complete the full semi-structured interview. Time pressure was for the most part due 
to their work commitments, although there were a few instances where the visit was 
obstructed (beyond the time required to collect `active' factor data); in these instances 
little value was perceived, by the site facilitator, in later review of the work situation 
(the latent conditions). These cases were few, but the research was seen by some as 
just another "hare-brained student project"; this affected enthusiasm / commitment to 
the research and perceived credibility of the methods. 
5.8 The accident study procedure 
5.8.1 Notification of accidents to the research team 
Offers of assistance with the accident study data collections were confirmed as part of 
the process of developing industrial liaison. Two strategies were devised in order to 
alert the researchers to the possibility of an accident occurrence. The first, and 
preferred, strategy was for persons (designated by the liasing company) to phone the 
researchers with accident details as soon as possible after the accident event. This was 
not successful and as a contingency plan a second strategy was employed, whereby 
contributing companies provided their accident summary records, thus permitting the 
researchers to select accidents appropriate to their needs. This method introduced a 
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greater time element into the process, but those selected still fell within the agreed 
sampling strategy. 
I Accident not required Non-reportable 
I Industrial ý Sampling accident strategy Site liaison and contact ýº Accident visit 
reauired organisation 
L Reportable 
accident HSE 
permission 
Figure 20. Accident selection process 
Figure 20 shows the process adopted for selecting appropriate accidents for the 
research. When any reportable accident was selected, a representative of the HSE 
project management team reviewed the possibility of HSE Inspector action, before 
giving permission to proceed with the process of site liaison and visit organisation. 
5.8.2 Site liaison and visit organisation 
Each of the contributing companies provided a list of contacts (most commonly the 
Area Safety Advisors), with whom a first stage liaison was made to obtain the full 
details of the accident (for sampling strategy purposes) and site contact information. 
Arrangements for the site visit were made either via this contact person or directly 
from the researcher to the site contact. Discussion with the site contact included a 
description of the research, what the visit would entail and assurance that all findings 
would be reported anonymously. In turn, the discussion also ensured that the 
necessary research criteria existed; namely: 
That the HSE were not investigating the accident 
That the accident had occurred within the preceding two months 
That the accident victim and supervisor / manager were still on site and 
willing to participate in the research 
It was also important to reinforce that the work was independent from HSE accident 
investigations and that all interviews would be undertaken in confidence. Where 
possible a briefing sheet was sent in advance of the visit (for circulation to those who 
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would be involved) describing the research and reinforcing the voluntary and 
confidential nature of information provided at interview. 
5.8.3 Site based data collection 
The process for undertaking an accident study during a site visit is described in Table 
45 below. Despite revision of the three proformas, the additional search items added 
to rather than replaced information relating to the original data collection themes and 
results from all studies were included in the analysis. 
On site assessment method 
Additional researcher 
activities 
1. Upon arrival 
review accident Obtain / confirm baseline data including: ' Review and record 
details with site " accident event information accident details from 
contact person " contact details of personnel involved ö the company records 
Obtain consent and interview relevant 
2. Then review personnel, covering aspects such as: - 
Undertake task based 
accident details ergonomics assessment 
with accident " accident event information 
(observation, weight / 
involved 
" work profile aspects 
linear measurements as 
personnel " personal details 
w 
L appropriate etc. ) 
Obtain consent and interview relevant 3. Finally review personnel, covering aspects such as: - 
Evaluate risk 
accident details assessment and method 
with supervisor accident event information statements 
(removing 
manager / safety " work profile aspects 
copies off-site if 
advisor " personal details 
w" ö possible) 
Table 45. Practicalities of an accident study 
5.9 Analysis and representation 
It was difficult to identify the methods to be used for analysis - the accident range 
included near-miss events, minor and major accidents, and no one style appeared 
appropriate. Analytic trees (3.9.3.1), used for major accidents and appropriate for 
single events and where circumstances were fixed and controlled, were considered 
inappropriate given the volume of data and perpetual flux apparent within the 
industry. An alternative tabular style approach (3.9.3.3) has previously been used in 
the medical setting, where work situations are similarly dynamic and this was 
considered a more appropriate style for data representation. 
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With the much extended enquiry range (both active and latent conditions included) it 
was thought that findings would be greatly enriched and that the epidemiological style 
analysis traditionally used for minor accidents (3.9.4) may be appropriate. 
Nevertheless, it was appreciated too that any such style of analysis only reflects the 
information from which it is derived (3.7.1). In order to generate categories that 
define the outcomes of both the active and latent conditions, it was thus necessary first 
to undertake qualitative analysis of the data. 
Triangulation using multiple data sources (3.9.5.4) was a data collection objective at 
the outset and literature search surrounding these issues also introduced the concepts 
of qualitative research and naturalistic methods (Denzin and Lincoln 1998, Erlandson 
et al. 1993). Lincoln and Guba 1985, cited by Erlandson et al. 1993) reported that 
safeguards to ensure objectivity in research in effect serve as a barrier to prevent the 
researcher from exploring the most relevant aspects of the data. Qualitative research 
draws in information from many different sources in their natural settings (interview, 
case study, observation etc. ) and according to the context of the enquiry. There are no 
set methods for data collection or analysis; the essence is that they should generate 
important insights and knowledge (Nelson et al. 1992). These principals of qualitative 
analysis were adopted as suitable methods for exploration of the findings. 
Nevertheless, whilst this style of analysis precluded apparently 'objective' analysis 
through representation by volume or proportion of `hits' relative to the rest of the data, 
it meant that analysis by `insight and knowledge' lacked any structure. Many of the 
findings reiterated what were already longstanding problems in the construction sector 
(2.5.1 and 3.6.5.2). That the problems persist indicates some form of failure in the 
way that problems were previously identified or addressed. Traditionally, these issues 
would be addressed through safety management systems (SMS) and analysis using 
this approach was considered. 
Safety management systems (SMS) were thought inadequate in their address to the 
range of latent factors in construction accident model evaluation (3.11.5.1), but as an 
isolated example this was not necessarily representative. Whittington et al. (1992) 
identified many improvements that could be made in construction safety management 
(3.6.5.2), yet these were grouped according to measures that could be taken within 
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companies, by clients and by extra-organisational sources. In summarising the 
construction accident models (Table 31), token events (although positive features on 
this occasion) categorised by project phase were seen as weaknesses, as they did not 
identify `type' events (and thus offered no structure upon which to categorise 
findings). 
A more promising approach was that of Hale et al. (1997) who in an extensive review 
of SMS and their audits, reported "arbitrary lists of topics clustered under convenient 
headings which vary from one instrument to another" (p. 122). Redressing this, they 
created a SMS framework and identified three levels to define decision-making and 
management activity within each phase of the life cycle: 
. System structure- Principals and functions of SMS 
o adaptation to fit the culture of the organisation, activated when normal 
functioning fails 
" Planning organising and procedures - devising and formalising abstract principals 
into actions to be taken at execution 
o generation of safety manuals, setting out responsibilities, defining 
procedures, defining reporting lines, problem recognition [design 
reviews & accident statistics], solution choices [cost-benefit analyses], 
monitoring [auditing], contingency planning [first-aid] 
" Execution - actions of those involved directly 
o recognition and control of hazards, hierarchy of control measures, 
correcting deviations from procedures 
Hale et al. (1997) reported that these were loosely based on the `skills, rules, 
knowledge' model of decision making (3.6.2.4) and, in the same measure, were 
proposed as `abstractions' and not directly linked with organisational hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, although this approach offered a `framework', the primary motive 
appeared to focus on hazard control and it did not appear to embrace the desired 
range of latent conditions (the importance of this shortcoming is discussed 
further in 9.2.1.18). As a result the SMS framework was not adopted for results 
categorisation. 
166 
An alternative measure was devised, cross-referencing the pre-focus group 
categories against the categories generated from their analysis. This provided 
the framework that was needed for categorisation of the results and is discussed 
further in 7.2. 
In summary, therefore, analysis has created two styles of results: 
1. A profile of the research sample, cross referencing data to the sampling 
strategy criteria and enquiry areas for site based data collection of the work 
situation (Table 41) 
2. Representation and exploration of the results using qualitative methods of 
analysis and interpretation (7.1) 
5.10 Summary of the methodological development 
The methodological development incorporated the preparatory processes, from 
generation of the data collection techniques through to determining methods to collect, 
analyse and represent findings. 
The preparatory process commenced by appraisal of a range of resources that might 
be used in building the data collection techniques. Ergonomics assessment methods 
provided the framework upon which information from construction specific resources 
(from the research partners, the project sponsor, through evaluation of construction 
industry accident investigation methods and from focus group findings) was 
integrated. These information needs were later distributed between a series of 
proformas; these were developed as data collection tools for use during site based 
semi-structured interview with accident involved personnel and those with a 
supervisory, managerial or safety role. 
A sampling strategy was developed, so that accidents included in the research would 
be representative of the range of construction industry build types and of typical 
accident precursors. The accident study procedure addressed the way that accidents 
were notified to the research team, how site liaison was managed and the data 
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collection process during a site visit. There were also a number of preconditions, 
which were either fixed from the project outset, or were determined on the basis of the 
pilot study. These included exclusion of accidents subject to HSE investigation and 
the inclusion only of accidents that had occurred within the preceding two months. 
The methodological development continued during the early phases of data collection. 
This included supplementing the data collection range defined in the proformas and 
the generation of alternative methods to deal with difficulties that were being 
experienced with accident notifications and participation. 
The final part of the methodological process entailed determining methods for data 
analysis and representation. A range of possible methods had been identified during 
literature review, but few offered comparable circumstances to those typified in the 
research. Alternative methods were devised and these are presented in the following 
two chapters. 
A critique of the methodology is presented in the final chapter of the thesis (9.1). 
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6 PHASE TWO - PROFILE OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE 
Forty accident studies were undertaken on 24 different construction sites. The 
findings are reported according to the sampling strategy criteria (5.6) and also include 
supplementary details relating to the sites, build and accident conditions (Appendix 6). 
6.1 Data representation 
6.1.1 Description of industry types included in the sample 
A comparison of the findings in relation to the sampling strategy is shown in Table 46. 
Whilst there is close representation of the suggested distribution, the research was 
hampered by two factors, namely reluctance to participate by those in both the 
Engineering Construction and Residential sectors (5.7.2). 
Engineering 
C'onstnictiun (F(') 
Rail and Civil 
En ineeriný 
Major Building Residential 
total ratio total ratio total ratio total ratio 
Tar et 3 1 6 2 17 6 14 11 
Result 1 - 6 2 22 7 11 4 
Table 46. Distribution of the accidents studied 
6.1.2 Description of the sample build and organisational data 
Of those who did participate there was extensive variation in the nature of build and 
organisational details of sites, ranging from short contract work to major building 
projects being carried out over a number of years. All but 4 of the sites were 
brownfield sites. 
Sites varied considerably in size, accommodating between 3-650 personnel (mean 168 
people) and with build schedules of variable duration between 1- 625 weeks (mean 
231 weeks). Twenty-eight were running to time, one was ahead, yet 8 were behind 
schedule. Five of the sites were undertaking all phases of their work simultaneously, 
whereas 3 were in the `start' phase (see Proforma 1, Appendix 6), 10 in the `middle' 
phase, 9 between `middle' and `end' phases, 6 in the `end' phase and 2 in the `after' 
phase . 
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Five different principal contractors were represented, of which two each 
accommodated at least 15 of the accidents studied. The contract types were 
predominately `Construction Management' (n=17), `Design and Build' (n=7) and 
JCT2 (n=7), with the remainder comprising a small number of unclassified or bespoke 
contracts. It was not possible to gain adequate detail relating to project value and 
company employee numbers, and this information is not reported. 
6.1.2.1 Description of accident types included in the sample 
Eleven of the 40 accidents were reportable under RIDDOR. Of these three were 
dangerous occurrences, seven resulted in absences of over 3 days and one was a major 
accident. The sample accidents are reported according to the HSE categorisation in 
Table 47 (revised to combine slips, trips and all falls data together)3. By excluding a 
distinction between level change in these data, some similarities in distribution exist to 
the percentage representation of national data (Table 44) - namely the predominance 
of accidents caused by slips, trips and falls (combining all level data), injury while 
handling, lifting or carrying and being struck by a moving (including a flying or 
falling) object. Given the problems experienced in gaining access to accidents for 
inclusion in the research (5.7) such similarities in distribution are considered 
fortuitous. 
Accidents reported Total 
Sli s, tri sand falls all levels) 017,023 036,037,051,053,062,064 8 
Injured while handling, lifting or 
ca 
(005,007,024) 
, 
033,034,038,039,050 8 
Struck by moving (+ flying r falling) 
obiect 
001,004,009,019,035, 
061,063 
7 
Strike against something fixed or 
statio 
006,018,021,022,025 5 
Dangerous occurrences 003,010,011,020 4 
Contact withýb movin hinery 002,012,013 3 
Trapped by something collapsing or 
overturning 
060,065 2 
Other accident events types 008,040 2 
Contact with electricity or electrical 
discharge 
052 1 
Difficult to ascertain correct category 
Table 47. Distribution of accident types 
2 JCT = Joint Contracts Tribunal; a representative body of professional institutions and other industry 
bodies, charged with developing appropriate contracts for various types of construction procurement 
Duff, A. R. (2001). 
3 The numbers refer to each accident studied. These are summarised in Table 52 
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6.1.2.2 Description of baseline incident conditions 
A range of data was also obtained through Proforma 1 to summarise the conditions at 
the time of the accidents, including temporal representation of the data, summary of 
accident tasks or activities, the use of any tooling or equipment, the environmental 
conditions reported and level at which the accident occurred. 
The temporal details, including month, weekday and accident time are summarised in 
Table 48. Data were obtained during all seasons and all study accidents had occurred 
only between the hours of 08.00 and 17.00. 
Month Sum Day of the 
week 
Sum 
J 2 Monda 5 an y 
Feb 1 Tuesday 9 
Mar 2 Wednesday 11 8 
Apr 2 Thursday 6 
Ma 4 Friday 5 
6 
5 Saturday 3 4- 
Jul Jul 7 Sunda 1 
2 
Au 4 
0 
Sep 3 8ti19 9til 10 61 11 til 12til 13äl 14ti1 15til l6til 
Oct 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Nov 3 Time of da 
Dec 6 
y 
Table 48. Temporal details of accident sample 
Additional summary details compare the incidences of tools, equipment and materials/ 
structure that were involved in the accidents, with the nature of the task or activity 
being undertaken. These findings are reproduced in Table 49. 
Tools Plant /equipment Materials Site / structure 
Setting-Hp 034 
Task action 002,003,007, 
013,039,065 
008,011,038,060 005,009,010,033, 
035,040,063 
020,024,052, 
061 
Clear-up r 
maintenance 
004,012,021 
Movement / 
transit 
050 006,017,019,022, 
036,037,051,062 
001,025 018,023,053, 
064 
Table 49. Description of task and activities within the accident sample 
Fifteen of the accidents occurred indoors and of the remainder that occurred outdoors, 
adverse weather conditions (i. e. damp, wet or windy) were reported in seven of the 
accidents. Twenty seven of the accidents occurred at basement or ground level, with 
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the remainder occurring at higher levels - of these 3 accidents involved some form of 
level change. 
6.2 Profile of participants included in the research 
Forty semi-structured interviews were undertaken with accident involved witnesses 
(mean age 37, range 18-62, SD = 11.88). These included 38 who were directly 
involved in the accidents and two co-worker interviews; one accident was a dangerous 
occurrence with no immediate witness. A further forty-one semi-structured interviews 
were undertaken with supervisors, managers or safety personnel (mean age 43, range 
23 - 62, SD = 10.56). Of these, 28 interviewees were directly responsible for 
supervision or management of the accident involved person - two were supervisors / 
managers for two of the accidents and another a supervisor for three of the accidents. 
There was no supervisor / manager available for interview for two of the accidents and 
of the seven safety advisor interviews, two were provided instead of the immediate 
supervisor / manager for the accident involved person. 
Table 50 shows the job titles of those included in the semi-structured interviews. To 
indicate the range of different responsibilities among participants, further 
categorisation has been undertaken. This shows distinction according to managerial / 
supervisory responsibilities, either generally across site, or according to a specific 
section, location or task type. Operatives are distinguished according to whether they 
are general labourers or have undertaken a formal trade training. 
Whilst accident involved interviewees (underlined) were mainly represented by 
operative grades, a small number of those in supervisory manager roles were also 
accident involved. 
The client or principal contractor employee was `actively' involved in 7 of the 
accidents, whereas sub-contractor employees were implicated in 25 and sub-sub 
contractors and agency staff were implicated in 7 accidents. Details concerning the 
nature of employment were often difficult to ascertain (7.6) and only cautious 
distinction between sub-contractor chains should be made. 
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6.3 Profile of accidents included in the research 
Data summarising the main findings of the accidents are reproduced in Table 52; more 
comprehensive accident details are reported in Appendix 9 of the thesis. The information 
reproduced in the tables incorporates the main aspects reported by interviewees, or 
observations that were thought relevant to the accident by the researcher. The forty 
accident studies were assigned a number in sequence, but their assigned numbers are not 
chronological here. Other researchers also undertook accident studies during the data 
collection period, but these are not included in this thesis. 
Data are reported according to the categorisation criteria developed following focus group 
analyses (5.3.1). Table 51 shows the tabular style used to present the information. 
Depending on the accident circumstances and nature of the data obtained, the table has 
been amended for each accident, according to the relevance of information to report. 
Accident number 
ACTIVE FAILURES 
SITE factors 
T sk details 
PPE 
Environment 
Work scheduling 
Work or anisation 
Work pace 
Target /a nt 
_ Su ervision 
Method statement and risk 
assessment 
Skills and trainin 
Personal details 
Organisational factors 
Table 51. Criteria used to categorise data collected during accident studies 
Three divisions are used to categorise the accident data: 
Active failures describe errors that occurred at or induced the accident event 
Site factors describe aspects of the work situation considered relevant to the accident. 
These are aspects most analogous with proximal factors (Suraji et al. 2001), Site 
management issues and some headquarter issues (Whittington et al. 1992) or job 
factors (Health and Safety Executive 1997b) 
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" Organisational factors describe developmental, strategic or cultural aspects 
considered insidious to the accident event. These aspects are most analogous with 
distal factors (Suraji et al. 2001), some headquarter issues (Whittington et al. 1992) 
and organisational factors (Health and Safety Executive 1997b). 
For succinctness a number of abbreviations are commonly used - these are described in 
the key below: 
KEY 
AI Accident involved person 
CAT Cable avoidance tool 
H&S Health and safety 
IP Injured person 
MH Manual handling 
MHOR Manual Handling Operations Regulations 
MS Method Statement 
PC Principal contractor 
PPE Personal protective equipment 
RA Risk assessment 
SC Sub-contractor 
TBT Toolbox talk 
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6.4 Overview of accident specific results 
An overview of the findings reported in Table 52 shows that there are a number of 
features that were common across the accidents studied. These are considered for 
each of the areas of analysis. 
6.4.1 Active failures 
The summary of active failure attribution is shown in Table 53. Whilst it was not 
possible to distinguish the area of active failures in five of the cases (possible 
attribution shown in brackets), the remainder reveal that the highest rate of incidences 
were likely to have occurred through some form of slip of action (32%), such as an 
unplanned or unintended action. Routine violations were afforded the second highest 
prevalence (20%) and reflected the many incidences of responses to time pressure, 
lack of clarity in correct working methods and dismissal of some safety rules (3.6.2.4). 
The range of violations (together comprising 32% of the sample) also included 
`situational' and `exceptional' incidents and these were thought to reflect the 
frequency of `unique' work situations where improvisation in novel problem solving 
situations was required or where procedural compliance was seen as an inhibitor or 
barrier to effective task execution (Table 19). Mistakes in following rules or 
undertaking knowledge-based reasoning were also recorded. 
ACTIVE 
FAILURES 
Skill -based errors " 
Slips of action 001,002, (005), 006, ((*7), (013), 017o 018,021,022, 
033,034,051,053,062,065 
Mistakes " Rule based mistakes (138-050 
" Knowledge based 
003.0W . 036.060, (061), 4rý4 
mistakes 
Violations " Routine violation 004, (003). (007). 009, (013), 019,020, (0"_? ). 024,035, 
" Situational violation 
037, (061), 063 
011,025,039 
" Exceptional violation 008,012,040 
() - possible cause. tsrcy text - Lpstrcam causa! taster 
Table 53. Active failures within the accident study sample 
6.4.2 Site factors 
Analysis of site factors revealed a broad range of information across the accidents and 
within the four areas of enquiry. These data are outlined in Table 54. Overview of 
the findings revealed that, at the `Design and Task Execution' stage, there were 
numerous issues concerning poor interface with the products, equipment and materials 
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used on site. Complementing this there were also issues relating to poor work design 
- perhaps through adoption of undesirable work techniques or the poor condition of 
facilities. 
Issues relating to the `Planning, Scheduling and Management' of the work featured 
strongly in the analyses and exposed a catalogue of problems relating to the 
management of manpower and the build schedule. Working hours were long and 
additionally compromised by inadequate breaks or time off for many interviewees. 
Working under some form of time pressure appeared routine, yet was taken for 
granted by many. Time pressure appeared to evolve from the need to accommodate 
fluctuations in workload, the need to vacate a work area for access by other trades 
people and as a result of some form of work acceleration incentive. Problems relating 
to manpower recruitment were also evident. 
Communication and the nature of supervision were also identified as relevant aspects 
in accident causation, with especial problems concerning the nature of any supervisory 
intervention for experienced personnel. The data indicated that there was a high 
reliance upon core skills and little to distinguish role boundaries or formality in skills 
development. Information transfer, also in the form of risk assessment and method 
statement documentation, revealed a high level of bureaucracy, yet little real address 
to the tasks or events that were present in accident occurrence. 
In describing the circumstances of their work conditions, individuals revealed a range 
of issues likely to contribute towards the low moral and apathy of personnel 
undertaking site work. 
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Site factors 
Task details " Materials problems " 001,002,009,010,060, 
" Tool / equipment design problems " 
002,003,004,005,006,007,008, 
010,017,019,021,022,036,037, 
ti "P i t 
050,051,052,060 
002 010 035 oor ns ons ruc , " , 
" Poor technique / task design " 002,005,007,009,012,018,020, 
024,033,060,061,063,064 
" Poor activity area and housekeeping 
" 003,007,011,012,013,017,018, 
020,022,024,025,036,037,039, 
040.051,053,060,062,064 
" Storage problems " 034,053 
PPE " Task: PPE incompatibility 001,002,003.033,036,040,061, 
" PPE related problems 
063 
" 033 034 035 036065 
Environment " Weather extremes " 001,007,008,018,050,052,062 
" Poor lighting " 
002.020,037,050,051,063,064 
Work scheduling " Long working hours " 001,002,004.011,012.018,021, 
" Inadequate breaks / time off 
025,033,036,040,061,062 
" 010,012,040,050,052 
Work organisation " Fluctuating workload " 002,019,020,037,061 
" Trade overlap " 
004,005,024,033.051,053 
" Poor consultation /communication 
005,012,020,022,050,063 " 
" Manpower shortages " 022,039 
" Fitness for work issues " 037,038 
W rk pace " Time pressures upon pace " 001,002,007,008,009,013,018, 040 061 025 039 053 021 033 , , , , , , , 
" Gang incompatibility 
063 
" 005 
Target payment " Undertaking priced work " 004,063 
" Bonus / Job & finish " 
004.012,052 
" No sickness absence pay 
022 
ý, ýnervision " Supervision of experienced personnel " 002,004,007,009,013,034,051, 
" Numbers that supervisors oversee 
053,060 
" 036, 
Method statement " None / N/A " 006,007,008,009,013,017,018, 
and risk assessment 
019.020,022,023,025,036,037, 
G " Inappropriate detail 
038,061 
" 001,002,003 005,021,011,024, 
033,034,035,036,039,040,050, 
" Operatives unaware 052,063 
as " 
011,024,033,034,035,063,065 
- S Skills and trainine " Reliance on core skills " 001,002,011,018,061 
10- " Inadequate / Lack of training " 
003,005,012,019,020,065 
'" " On the job training dependency 
" 063.024,033,034,033,040,052, 
gersonal details " Work/ facilities dissatisfaction " 001,002,010,024,025,037,038, 
039,051,060,062,064 
" Communication / Language problems 
" 019,022,051 
ar " Underlying ill-health " 022,023,051,064 
atalistic approach to accidents / F 
injury " 033,033,037 
Table 54. Site factors within the accident study sample 
6.4.3 Organisational factors 
Analysis of organisational factors in the accident summaries revealed a number of 
incidences where latent conditions were readily identifiable at the site data collection 
phase. These findings are overviewed in Table 55. 
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The findings revealed one-off incidences where there had been a resultant negative 
impact and likely contribution to the accident event. These concerned the impact of 
design revisions to the work in progress and poor communications with external 
service providers. Additionally, there was only one clear incident where tight work 
scheduling was likely to have impacted upon the work and accident. 
In spite of these sporadic attributions there were much more common accounts, less 
directed, but more indicative of cultural problems on site. These accounts especially 
concerned poor communications and relations between Principal and Sub-contractor 
groups and gave a strong indication of loss of ownership and responsibilities with 
lengthy contractor chains. A second, but equally important factor was the 
inappropriate response to earlier related problems and lost opportunity for problem 
resolution. The issues appeared related to lack of insight or possibly problems with 
informed decision-making by those in authority. 
Organisational " Friction between PC: SC relations / perception " 001,005,010,011, 
factors 022,036,050,061, 
062 
" Loss of ownership with long contractor chains " 005,034,040 
" Purchasing: procurement issues " 002,006,003, 
" Inappropriate response to earlier problems " 003,004,009,017, 
018,019,051 
" Time pressure in work scheduling accepted " 021 
" Communication problems with external service " 020,052 
providers 
" Impact from design revisions / client Dressures " 025 
Table 55. Organisational factors within the accident study sample 
6.5 Critique of data representation and the accident specific analysis 
The profile of data representation showed that although the range of accident types 
tallied well with those identified in the sampling strategy, it was not possible to study 
the number of accidents at residential and engineering construction sites as 
anticipated. A number of non-reportable accidents were included, yet these often had 
the potential for more serious outcomes (3.9.1). Accidents occurred not only during 
task activities, but also during clearing up, maintenance, movement and transit. There 
were peaks in accident timings and these appeared to coincide with the pre-lunch 
phase and mid to late afternoon. 
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The profile of the accident study results has revealed detailed information relating to 
conditions that are contributory in accident causation. Analysis of active failures 
revealed a high level of slips and violations. Many of these show clear association 
with failings revealed within the site data analysis - such as task related problems or 
failures with organisation of the build and site personnel. The site data collection also 
generated early findings relevant to failures at an organisational level (problems with 
site culture or in project development for example). The data are explored in greater 
depth in Phase Three of the research. 
Whilst this style of analysis was comprehensive and succinct (compared with the 
qualitative analysis) there were a number of shortcomings in this approach: 
. Introduction of researcher bias 
Isolation of data thought to be specifically `related' to the accident event proved 
difficult. In creating boundaries of what should or should not be included the 
researcher may have introduced bias into what is theoretically an 'objective' method 
of data representation and interpretation (5.9). Whilst the categories were chosen in 
good faith and for their known association with impact upon human performance, 
exclusion of the full range of supplementary or circumstantial information might have 
served only to reiterate or reinforce preconceptions of the range of factors to be 
considered in accident causation. 
. ! Confined representation of latent conditions 
Exclusion of the full complement of data (perhaps on the boundaries of `association' 
with the accident) (see Appendix 9) , curtailed the exploratory approach and resulted 
in the loss of enriched understanding of the climate on site or within the organisation - 
essentially the latent conditions. 
0 Restrictions caused 
by categorisation 
The categories site and organisational factors were felt to be reasonable 
representations of the categories in the source research materials (Suraji et al. 2001, 
Whittington et al. 1992 and Health and Safety Executive 1997b). In practice however, 
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it was difficult to identify the point of initiation of findings or the junction between 
organisational and site event (3.8.1.1). 
" Irregular access to data 
Some detail or information sources were easier to access than others, yet this is not 
apparent in this style of representation. There was limited access to the accident event 
area (for researcher assessment) and people in more senior positions with latent factor 
knowledge. Additionally, up to two months following the incident, interviewees 
could not always distinguish actual accident related circumstances from other 
conditions at the time. 
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7 PHASE TWO - QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter introduces the methods and rationale for the qualitative analysis. The 
generation of a style for data presentation is described and, adopting triangulation 
techniques, findings from all resources are presented. 
7.1 Issues to be considered in results categorisation 
Revision of the focus group search terms into the new construction specific search 
criteria provided an efficient anchor upon which to re-categorise the enquiry needs 
(see Figure 19). Duplication and fragmentation was reduced and development of data 
collection techniques was facilitated. Nevertheless, a cost in using this more succinct 
approach was that the time-line element inherent to the original search terms (Project, 
concept, design and procurement; Work organisation and Management; Task factors 
and individual factors) appeared masked. Whilst it was more straightforward to 
distinguish the types of failures that had occurred, the time of failure generation was 
not immediately apparent. In order to identify causal factors in construction accidents, 
it was important to try to distinguish not only the nature of the failures that had led the 
`adverse event', but also to try to isolate the project phases where failure may have 
been generated. These two forms of distinction were vital for isolating areas of 
concern and for directing further work into latent factor follow-up (Phase Three). 
7.2 Solution to categorisation of project data 
To illustrate the application of this technique, Table 56 overviews how the findings 
were categorised. Findings have been generated as a result of the information 
supplied during the semi-structured interviews and by researcher observation during 
the site work. The technique used to extract findings from the accident study reports 
is described in Appendix 9. 
Both the focus group and construction specific sets of search criteria are shown below 
and cross-reference between each permits categorisation according to the nature of the 
failure and perceived phase of failure generation. Flexibility in use of this approach 
was essential. Failures, on occasion, appeared to have been generated in more than 
one phase; this may have been genuine or possibly a conclusion resulting from lack of 
researcher knowledge or incomplete information. In spite of the shortcomings in this 
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technique, the advantages of this style of representation lie in the reintroduction of a 
time element lost in the development of construction specific search terms. 
Phase 
of generation 
Failure category " 
Design & task 
execution 
- Site plan 
- Design details 
- Materials 
- Equipment 
- Tools 
- PPE 
Planning 
Scheduling & 
Management 
- Project 
timeline 
- Appointment 
of personnel 
- Scheduling the 
work 
- Provision of 
work area 
Failures concerning 
Project Concept 
Design & 
Procurement (PCDP 
Development of 
building plan, the 
design development and 
site layout 
Definition and 
organisation of 
necessary construction 
skills 
Determining and 
communicating criteria 
for build and personnel 
requirements 
Failures concerning 
Work organisation & 
Management 
Transfer and 
management of build 
requirements 
Management and co- 
ordination of site 
personnel 
Failures concerning 
Task execution 
Provision of necessary 
hardware or material 
effects for the work 
Provision of conditions 
for site occupation and 
task activities 
Information 
transfer 
- With off-site 
personnel 
- Method 
statements 
- Risk 
assessments 
- On site 
Instruction 
Individual factors 
_ Roles 
- Skills 
. Abilities 
- Attitudes 
Developing and 
communicating means 
i) assess and define safe 
practice 
Measures to 
connnunicate 
instruction and 
guidance on safe 
practice 
Identification of role, factors influencing development and maintenance of 
skills, individual capabilities and performance, and attitudes towards work 
and safe performance. 
Table 56. Categorisation of site data findings 
7.2.1 Rationale for the reporting of findings 
A distinction between immediate causal events (active factors) and findings of a more 
circumstantial nature (including latent factors) are not made. The reasons for this are 
three fold: 
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" Firstly, the aim of undertaking the accident studies was to adopt an exploratory 
systems approach to identify causal factors in accidents. Whilst the accidents 
selected for study were seen as broadly representative of construction accident 
types, it was essential to ensure that findings would reveal the generic nature of 
the contributory failings (latent conditions) in construction sector accidents. The 
forty accident studies were essentially a `vehicle' with which to explore the causal 
failings and risk factors, rather than to serve as an end in themselves. 
Key ® Accident information 0 Circumstantial information 
Figure 21. The benefits of combining `accident' and circumstantial information 
0 Secondly, focus upon the adverse event in isolation would have limited the data 
source upon which to interpret the nature of failures. In some cases interviewees 
found accident focused discussions quite emotive (which may have resulted in 
censoring the information they were prepared to provide), yet were happy to 
discuss more general issues about their work. By pooling the data across all 
accidents it was possible to enrich isolated findings `directly' related to the 
accident, by incorporating information provided without restraint or emotional 
duress (Figure 21). 
Thirdly, it was rarely a clear-cut exercise to distinguish accident active causal 
factors from the general factors affecting performance (6.5). By trying to enforce 
such boundaries, there was a danger of replicating the existing approach (and 
perceived failings) used within the industry for accident investigation. 
This general nature of the data interpretation is redressed somewhat in the process of 
identifying areas where deeper exploration of accident latent factors would be 
appropriate - this process was introduced earlier (5.4) and is addressed again in Phase 
Three. 
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7.2.2 Arrangement of interviewee responses 
It had been anticipated that responses would be generated per interview role. 
However, the reality was that interviewees were from a range of backgrounds - in age, 
skill and experience, and this was not possible. In a number of cases the injured party 
held a supervisory / managerial role; additionally the supervisory / managerial 
interviewees spanned personnel with a great range of responsibilities - from ganger 
man through to senior site management staff. Whilst this has excluded presentation of 
findings by job role, it has provided a number of interesting perspectives. Where there 
is clear contrast between information provided by interviewees, or distinction between 
interviewee and researcher accounts this is reported in the relevant sections. 
7.2.3 Cross-referencing data analysis with accident studies 
Data are reported according to the themes and issues that became apparent from 
analysis of the accident study data. Information was for the most part raised by 
interviewees during the semi-structured interview process, but this information was 
also supplemented by opportunistic discussions and researcher observations during 
site visits. Captions of the types of comments made during semi-structured interviews 
are included to illustrate the source of some of the interpretations. 
Where possible, the findings in sections 7.3 - 7.6 are cross -referenced to the number 
of the accident study from whence it was derived. 
A count of the referenced accident studies alone does not indicate relative importance, 
merely a clear attribution of information to a particular accident study. Comparative 
information may also have been available in other studies, but was not obtained, 
perhaps because of lack of knowledge by the interviewee or researcher, because the 
interviewee chose not to discuss certain issues (or was a poor historian) or because 
access was restricted. 
7.3 Results according to Design and Task Execution factors 
Design and Task Execution encompassed aspects vital to the physical process of the 
build. At the Project Concept Design & Procurement (PCDP) phase, this incorporated 
factors that are relevant to the build scheduling, the design of the build, the layout of 
the site itself and aspects related to procurement. At the level of work organisation 
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and management, this concerned the provision and management of supplies and the 
liaison of information concerning the task and PCDP phases. Finally, at a task-based 
level this concerned the tools, equipment and materials necessary to progress the 
work, tasks and work techniques, and the PPE designated for site work. 
7.3.1 Design and Task Execution : PCDP phase failures 
... I Prompt 9 nnwa 1 
Failure generation 
-f Design & 
Procurement 
Design & execution 
7.3.1.1 Build scheduling 
Interviewees reported that a considerable amount of build scheduling problems arose 
from numerous revisions or extensions to the project timeline (009,025). Possible 
reasons for this were repeated client or architect requests for design revisions - with 
especial problems when there was opposition among those responsible for design 
choices, and with the numerous architect instructions (both formal and informal) 
subsequently generated. 
... 
We've had over a thousand Architect instructions on this site because 
of disagreements within the outside design team. A good design should 
normally have no more than 300. The changes were for a range of reasons 
.... the area was not properly 
designed in the first place; the design didn't 
work or they had changed their mind from the original specification.... 
This had implications for the management of the site, including scheduling of all 
resources (such as supplies for task execution, labour provision and sub-contractor 
service providers). 
7.3.1.2 Detail and design of the structure 
Little of the data collected during site accident studies showed immediate problems 
with the design and build of the structure (although this issue is reviewed later by 
construction specialists, 8.1.2.1). However, aspects related to failures in the design of 
the structure were more concerned with uncertainty or lack of any clear specification 
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of responsibilities; this was especially apparent in the design of structures for 
temporary works. 
In accidents 010 and 051, for example, there was no specification for boarding (both 
quality and dimensions) to cover holes in the ground. In a similar situation, the extent 
to which scaffolding should be designed (even to the point of determining whether 
scaffold clip covers should be used) appeared to be an arbitrary arrangement lacking 
any clear specification or boundaries of responsibilities (017,022). 
A second and related failing was the lack of fine detail of design, which ultimately had 
implications for the safety, complexity and duration of the task (002,004,018,035). 
In accident 004, for example it was suggested by an interviewee that the steel prop 
that fell onto an operative should have been secured to the ground at the base plate, 
yet it was unclear to the researcher whether this should be conveyed in the design 
drawings, in task procedures (such as method statements) or be inherent to the skills 
of the operative responsible for erecting the structure. 
Alternative examples indicated that there is also a certain level of acceptance or 
`blindness' to longstanding design problems. On accident 018, for example, 
protruding nails were accepted as an unfortunate consequence of removing shuttering 
yet the potential for injury from these was severe. Alternatively, in accident 035 it 
was indicated that two alternatives were available for joining ducting -TEC screws or 
pot rivets. It was reported by some interviewees that there might be considerable time 
savings in choosing one of these methods in preference to the other. However, 
random comments were also made about equipment cost and TEC gun safety, yet it 
was not clear to the researcher that the possible drawbacks had been explored in any 
depth and the possible advantages of alternative working methods remained 
unexploited 
7.3.1.3 Detail and design of the site layout 
It was reported that there are problems with the provision of adequate space in the site 
layout (002,007,011,017,025,053,062). In one case it was felt that the space 
allocation was hindered by commencement of the build prior to the completion of 
demolition - resulting in a number of later reorganisations of site layout to 
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accommodate the changing plan of the build. General reports indicated that 
inadequate space affected the allocation of ground room for workshop placement, for 
footpaths, for storage (especially in winter when work is rained off), for parking 
provision and also adequate space in transport routes. It was reported that the impact 
of this was in constricted space for vehicle manoeuvrability and access to drop off 
points - ultimately affecting the ease of receiving deliveries and subsequent need for 
double handling of the deliveries. 
Interviewees also reported problems concerning the provision of incomplete drawings 
from external services such as the electricity board -a common problem with live 
lines often unmarked and hazardous during ground work (052). Problems in transport 
between different levels was described, indicating such things as narrow routes for 
lorry access or lack of lifting equipment to hoist smaller items between levels (011, 
050). 
7.3.2 Design and Task Execution : WO &M phase failures 
Failure generation 
Phase Work 
Organisation & 
Management 
Design & execution 
7.3.2.1 Procurement of hardware 
Interviewees reported the adverse effects of managing with insufficient quantities or 
having to work with incorrect materials or equipment because of cost restrictions 
(004,017,038,062). In one case it was felt that there was a considerable increase in 
manual materials handling due to inadequate cranage time allowances - managed 
informally with cash payment for assistance from other suitably equipped contractors 
on site. 
7.3.2.2 Manaingýthe provision of task resources 
Shortages in the supply of materials and equipment to site were reported and for the 
most part these comments were provided by interviewees in a supervisory / 
managerial or safety role. The supply inadequacies included missing, late or incorrect 
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deliveries and also the delivery of materials where pre-fabrication had not been 
undertaken, but was expected (022,036,040). Interviewees reported trying to work 
around or re-jig work to accommodate this, but inevitably time was lost in standing 
around if re-organisation was not possible (040). 
7.3.3 Design and Task Execution : Task phase failures 
Phase 
Failure generation 
Task 
Design & execution 
7.3.3.1 Tool qualities 
An assortment of tools was described in the accident studies, ranging from simple 
hand tools through to more sophisticated or powered tooling. 
Shortcomings in function or performance were reported by interviewees (002,052) 
yet observation indicated a much greater range of problems relating to the tool design. 
A number of the tools appeared basic with few features to enhance performance or 
interaction. Typical failings included poor texture and grip characteristics of the 
handhold areas, pressure points at the face of skin contact and, for powered tools, 
frequent use of single finger trigger operation (001,007,035,065). Some tools also 
appeared quite weighty, especially for the circumstances of their use - for example the 
petrol saw and torque multipliers used in accidents 020 and 039 each weighed 11.5kg 
and 8.9kg. Tools had also been personalised (by the addition of padding / tape on 
handles) and, especially where bladed tools were used, a high rate of unprotected 
handling of the cutting edge was required of the user in order to change blades (007) 
or to remove obstructions (002). The variable function affecting dependability of 
performance was also noted with the use of the CAT scanner (052). 
Interviewees described behaviour whereby they had to make do or work around tool 
related issues. This included non-cordoning off of a work area when using (non- 
flexed) battery powered tools (013). Trying to save time also seemed to be an issue in 
tool use for three of the accidents (020,033,050). 
208 
... A Curb lifter 
is available but by the time you go and get it it's easier to use 
two people at each end ... 
... The saw was quite a 
heavy and bulky tool for cutting the pipes, but a 
handsaw would have taken forever ... 
Interesting comments were made about criteria for tool purchasing. The self- 
employed often provided their own tools, although it was also reported that self- 
purchase was sometimes a matter of choice due to the poor quality and condition of 
those supplied (013). In describing criteria that lead their purchase choice 
interviewees most commonly described a `middle of the road' price range (013,051) 
and choice by manufacturer (035). 
... Tools 
in the £15-40 price range are all pretty much the same ... 
Interviewees were often unable to recount any other criteria for tool purchase and in 
only one case was the tool performance - non-rusting - referred to as a purchasing 
criteria (018). Interviewees obtained their tools from a specialist supplier or through 
mail order catalogues (018,051). Tool pricing was a concern for many, especially 
when the tools were vulnerable to theft, or had a short life-span (003,061). Some 
interviewees had received training in use and care of their tooling, but rarely since 
initial or apprenticeship training (061). Others felt that they had just picked it up as 
they went along (020,022,035,065) or relied solely on suppliers information (038). 
Instructions were sometimes unread and considered unwieldy (002). 
7.3.3.2 Material qualities 
Materials, the base products used for the build development were identified as 
problematic in ten of the accident studies and of these eight were directly indicated in 
the adverse incident. Findings included a description of variability in the quality of 
materials; in accident 001 it was reported .... 
... 
When the coils of tying wire are heated in the vat (annealing process) 
the ones at the top don't get heated so much - this makes them stiffer 
and more springy ... you cant really tell what its going to be like until 
you start to use it ... 
Shortcomings in the way the material was presented for use was also noted for many 
of the materials identified here. Sharp or abrasive materials were reported (009,065); 
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in accident 009 for example the steel banding is hazardous even after cutting, as the 
sharp ends remain and can cause trips or cuts if it is not properly secured. Cut hazards 
were also reported in the use of ducting, with the hazard enhanced by slipperiness 
from the protective oil coating (034). Weight related issues were indicated in five of 
the accidents (001,005,018,022,033), yet whilst interviewees made occasional 
comments about the failings, there seemed to be generalised acceptance of this type of 
handling within their work tasks and many were unaware of the weight of the 
materials they were handling - if this information was available. 
... There were ten steel angles to 
be unloaded from the forklift truck 
onto the storage point on the floor... with a man at each end we 
expected to take about 20 minutes to do this... 
This report from accident 005 for example belies the fact that each angle was 9m x 
140kg each. Whilst this was an extreme case, the presentation of materials also 
appeared likely to impede good handling practice - perhaps through slipperiness of 
the product (described above) or inadequate contact area for grasp or purchase (001, 
033). 
Interviewees were also concerned about the limited information from manufacturers 
concerning use of the product (002,013,022) and of the possibility of contamination 
of manually handled products by rat urine (001, risk factor for Weil's disease). 
7.3.3.3 Equipment qualities 
Equipment, including machinery or plant brought onto site, were identified as 
problematic in sixteen of the accident studies and in all cases were directly indicated 
in the adverse incident. Failures relating to equipment included adverse effects 
resulting from inadequacies in dimensions for user anthropometrics or at the point of 
user interface. These problems were also confounded by shortcomings in equipment 
maintenance, performance and safety related features. 
A main issue concerning inadequacies in the physical dimensions of the products was 
that user interaction, such as physical or visual access, was hampered. In three cases 
this related to laddered access equipment. For example, in accident 006, it was 
reported that a jump was required to descend the scissor lift, and researcher 
210 
observation of the work equipment showed that there were no distinct handholds on 
this equipment to guide the user in this action. 
... We're taught to come 
down the scissor lift steps backwards, but the 
last step is about 2ft from the ground, so you have to jump the last bit 
Observation showed that the safety cage on top of the scissor lift offered the most 
convenient points to make a grasp (at 2.2m from the ground), yet the fixing bolts at 
`grasp' point were exposed, compromising the only handhold area. With similar 
restrictions, it was also reported during the study of accident 021 that the length of 
ladder attached to the side of the rail wagon inhibited access when working at a depth 
of less than ground level or if any physical rather than just visual access was required 
at the top of the wagon. No further handholds were available. Elsewhere the use of 
split or cut down ladders was also reported (025). 
The final example, commented upon spontaneously in three of the accident studies 
(yet only immediately relevant for accident 050), concerns the small size of the access 
hole between different scaffold levels. The width generally determined by the 
distance across two scaffold boards side by side (500mm); an example measurement 
gave the aperture as 500mm (width) x 950mm (long). With the ladder fixed within 
this, the actual access area in front of the ladder was approximately 750mm. 
In a similar context, problems were also reported concerning the use of scaffold 
towers. Issues concerned the difficulties experienced in achieving a desirable scaffold 
and handrail height for the task requirements - given the fixed heights of the rise 
inserts available (036,062). 
The researcher observed and recorded general comments relating to awkward 
postures, such as over-reaching to gain access (039). Problems were also observed 
with load instability, such as fuel moving freely within the container of a fuel bower 
(038) and the difficulties that were experienced in choosing the correct equipment for 
the task (060) and in usability factors for the manual movement of loads (022,060). 
... I 
had a full trolley of plasterboard and was wheeling it along the 
gangway with help from a foreign labourer. There were communication 
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problems. If the other man could have understood "stop pushing" instantly 
it probably would have helped prevent it - not 100% though. 
This comment from accident 022 for example shows that for the most part the 
accident was blamed upon communication issues, yet researcher observation of the 
plasterboard trolley and accident area indicated that the accident had happened at a 
bend in the route. The plasterboard trolley had rotating wheels at only one end (the 
other end having fixed forward facing wheels) and while it was not known which end 
of the trolley was leading, difficulties in manoeuvring a full load were anticipated. 
Incompatibility of equipment with the build structure was also reported in accident 
036, whereby the depth of the M&E configuration in the ceiling space (ducting and 
services) inhibited handrail erection (and safe working practice) upon the access 
tower. 
Equipment maintenance was recorded in three other accidents and these related 
especially to steel parts (such as scaffold clips, concrete pipe clams and extendable 
steel props) (008,018 and 004). Weathering and concrete were reported as the main 
contaminants and although `regular cleaning and maintenance programmes' were in 
place, problems with rust and working with equipment in poor condition appeared to 
add to the physical efforts required in use and manipulation. In contrast, many 
interviewees spoke positively about the condition of other equipment hired onto or 
provided on site for their use. 
Performance related aspects concerned shortcomings in interaction between parts or 
structures and also in the interface presented to the users. In accident 004 for 
example, in removing the shuttering from the column, it was possible for the operative 
to commence dismantling of the column braces prior to removal of the support props - 
resulting in a destabilised structure. Whilst it is acknowledged that there are other 
temporal and procedural issues within this accident study the loss of stability was not 
visually apparent to those working in the area. Lack of feedback (such as visual, 
auditory or tactile information to the user) concerning safe state of the equipment was 
also relevant in other accidents (019,038). 
Usability issues were also reported in accident 011, where the interviewee reported a 
wide range of lorry types that he might use in his work. There were common features 
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however, such as the crane controls, but the description of the operation of these 
indicated that the operational design contravened population stereotype behaviour 
(pushing the lever down raised the crane and vice versa). It was also reported that 
inbuilt safety features did not accommodate the accident event. 
7.3.3.4 Personal protective equipment PE) 
Whilst not formally within the physical process of the build, issues concerning PPE 
are included here as essential equipment for task execution. Use of (at the very least) 
a safety helmet, high visibility-vest and safety boots was mandatory on all sites 
visited, with supplementary use of protective eyewear, gloves, harnesses and 
respiratory protective equipment (RPE), depending on task types. Adverse comments 
were made about the PPE in twenty-six of the accident studies and were for the most 
part incorporated within four topic areas - poor fit and comfort; inappropriateness for 
task type; poor quality, care or condition; and aspects relating to cost and provision. 
Reports concerning the safety helmet focused upon inadequacies of fit and comfort 
(005,020,024,052,063,064). The complaints concerned lack of lining / foam 
padding, insecurity (due to lack of a chinstrap), poor ventilation (especially in 
summer) and being too small. Interviewees recounted that the helmets were regularly 
dislodged or fell off (005,063), induced headaches (024) and interfered with the work 
upon looking up (023,024). Many interviewees accepted or were resigned to wearing 
a safety helmets, but at times these were described as a necessary evil. However, it 
was also reported that they were not always needed, with interviewees showing 
frustration at the lack of flexibility concerning whether the helmet should be worn 
(022,052,064). 
... 
With the hat you're more likely to hit your head, as you don't account 
for the extra height when walking underneath different structures ... 
As with the safety helmets, there were a number of complaints about comfort and fit 
in the discussion of work gloves (001,005,033), with operatives describing not 
wearing them as they interfered with their ability to operate their tools and the speed 
with which they could undertake their work (052). Operatives reported inadequate 
supplies (necessitating ongoing use of worn out gloves), inadequate durability, and 
lack of a suitable size range or quality for their work tasks (017,018,040,052,062). 
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There were reports that they always got lost with constant putting on and pulling off 
(061,062), whilst others for example reported that `the gloves had been left in the van 
or a bag"; there seemed little incentive to wear them. 
Interviewees discussed the use of fall arrest harnesses in only a small number of 
accident studies (only specified trades require use of this type of PPE), yet among 
those who were in a position to comment, there was a consensus of criticisms about 
the equipment (004,006,017,018,036). These included complaints about comfort 
and fit (especially in use over 30 minutes), concerns about restriction of mobility and 
inadequate supplies (leading to harness hoarding among site operatives). Interviewees 
were also worried that the 2-metre lanyard length was inadequate and that they would 
experience physical damage from the harness itself if they fell. As with the other 
PPE, harness use was seen as a necessary evil, but given the task disruption 
impracticalities of hooking on all the time, all interviewees felt that they should be 
permitted greater discretion on whether to wear the fall arrest equipment. 
Fewer comments were made about the remaining PPE. The main complaints about 
protective eyewear were that goggles steam up and despite the apparent `common 
sense' of wearing this equipment, some interviewees continued to avoid their use, in 
one case due to the added effect of poor lighting on their work (020,034,035,063). 
Only two comments were provided about Respiratory protective equipment (RPE), 
and in each case the equipment used was very different (003,060). Nonetheless the 
problems reported related to fatigue or to task compatibility problems. 
There were random complaints about having to wear the high-visibility vest, mostly 
focused upon the obstruction they created in accessing tools wom on a waist belt (004, 
008,009) and also due to lack of fabric breathability and the discomfort they 
generated in hot weather (004,008,009). 
Lack of an adequate range of PPE, for comfort and for all different environmental 
conditions, was also reported (019,025,037,051). A number of interviewees 
reported receiving no training in the care of their PPE (018,020,024,025,034,052), 
some felt that use and care was `down to the individual' or not necessary as they had 
used it for a very long time. 
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In comparison to the complaints recorded about the PPE itself, further comments were 
generated relating to purchasing and PPE management issues. Many interviewees 
reported having to buy their own protective footwear and in one case another reported 
purchasing his own protective eyewear. 
Reports from the Supervisor / Manager interviews revealed that their perception of 
PPE and its availability was quite different from those in operative grades. They 
perceived full access for all to a range of PPE and that it would even be provided on 
loan to the self-employed (053). Some reported working with glove manufacturers to 
trial new products, or in the case of the new short peaked hat tried them themselves to 
assess the product. These interviewees were concerned about the lack of care shown 
to PPE, with many reports of finding new and expensive PPE treated badly, left lying 
around or improperly cared for, precluding re-use (036). Ordering and choice of PPE 
was in a number of cases an exclusive function of `Head Office' (061) although in 
other cases supervisor / manager interviewees were involved. Only a few had tried 
ordering new styles - their decision mostly led by recommendation or observation of 
use by other construction teams or by selection from a supply catalogue (040,050, 
051,062,063). 
7.3.3.5 Task technique 
Only limited comment can be offered on issues relating to task technique, as it was 
only in a small number of cases that it was still possible to see the accident event task. 
Almost all findings are observations of the researcher - the only hazards relating to 
task technique offered by interviewees related to risk factors of cement bums (033, 
040) or the revision of work techniques when working alone rather than a more usual 
two man team arrangement (050,063). 
Nonetheless, where technique was described or re-enacted there were a number of 
physical interactions where risk factors for musculoskeletal injury were observed. 
These included forceful grips and awkward wrist postures and manipulations (001, 
007), and load handling with a broad span hand grasp (033). Interviewees also 
reported commencing heavy physical work whilst cold and without a warm-up period 
(050). There was a high reliance upon brute force for many of the work activities 
observed. In one reconstruction, an operative demonstrated his technique for using a 
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mitre saw; this involved reaching repeatedly across the body midline to manipulate the 
wood pieces. Alone, the repetition rate of this task was considered insufficient as a 
risk factor for musculoskeletal injury, yet the very nature of the technique did involve 
passing the hand in front of blade and obscuring visual access (002). 
From a broader perspective, communication problems were also observed where there 
was physical distance between a group of co-workers. Examples included liaison of 
concrete pour between different levels (012) or negotiating the desired delivery 
quantity when the exit was at some distance from the flow control source (040). 
7.3.4 Summary of results according to design and task execution factors 
phase . _ý 
Failures concerning Failures concerning Failures 
of generation Project Concept Work Organisation concerning Task 
Design & & Management Execution 
Failure cate o Procurement 
Design & task Development of build Transfer and Provision of 
execution plan. site and design management of build necessary hardware 
- Survey land requirements 
for the work 
- Site plan " Build scheduling 
- Architecture " Detail and design " Procurement of " Tools 
- Detail of the structure 
hardware " Materials 
- Materials " Detail and design " Managing the " Equipment 
- Equipment of the site layout provision of task " Task technique 
- Tools resources " Relating to PPE 
_ PPE 
Table 57. Summary of results according to design and task execution factors 
The results were few when reporting the PCDP and work organisation phases, as only 
a small number of interviewees could provide information with a direct link to these 
developmental and management phases. Nonetheless, clear issues arising from the 
analyses indicated three main areas of concern. 
Firstly, the fluctuations that occur at developmental level (in planning, procurement, 
work scheduling etc. ) had considerable impact on site organisational matters. This 
resulted in those in intermediary positions working in a perpetual state of flux; 
apparently having to effect the build development by reaction to prevailing 
circumstances rather than being able to generate and freely move the work forward 
according to the work programme. (See review and recommendations 9.2.1.1) 
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Related to developmental problems, a second feature concerned shortcomings in 
design of the site layout, with apparent inadequacies in space allocation for both 
planned interactions and to accommodate the fluctuating circumstances of work in 
progress. (See review and recommendations 9.2.1.2) 
A third feature was the apparent lack in designation of responsibilities to manage 
procurement and task resource inadequacies. This was perpetuated once products 
were on site; some temporary works lacked clear design specifications and innovation 
in tooling or working methods was instigated at the discretion of the individual 
undertaking the task at site level. Inadequacies were described in tooling, equipment 
and materials, yet there was still no real criteria for identifying and delineating where 
the responsibilities lay for exploring and managing solutions. (See review and 
recommendations 9.2.1.5). 
`Task based' aspects of the work were strongly represented in this section. This was 
expected, given the volume of semi-structured interviews, with operatives, yet 
appraisal of the findings shows that interviewees only in a limited number of cases 
offered critical review of these task-based failures themselves; for the most part the 
report and appraisal of failures was noted by the researcher during the site visits. 
Across all areas covered - tools, materials, equipment and PPE - there were common 
failings, which were expressed in lack of intuitive design and poor interface for human 
interaction. These failings include poor contact points for ease of grasp, manipulation 
and manoeuvrability. Exposed surfaces were at times inherently harmful and 
appeared to inhibit safe and comfortable use. Some products were often weighty, of 
rudimentary design and awkward dimensions, and required considerable brute force 
for the task circumstances. Tool purchasing criteria, for the self-employed, was 
determined mostly by retail price, with apparently little appraisal of product qualities. 
Whilst incompatibility with PPE was cited as a problem during tool, material and 
equipment use, the very nature of the PPE used and incompatibility for comfortable 
use appeared to be a source of distress for many. 
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7.4 Results according to Planning, Scheduling and Management factors 
Planning, scheduling and management encompassed aspects essential to the process of 
setting up and running the site - making the design and task execution phase possible. 
At the PCDP phase, this concerned issues relating to contracts development and the 
appointment of contractor teams to do the work. At the work organisation and 
management level, this concerned the appointment and management of personnel 
undertaking the work. Finally, at task level this concerned the provision of the area 
where the work was being undertaken and of the surrounding areas serving these work 
areas. 
7.4.1 Planning, Scheduling and Management : PCDP phase failures 
Failure generation f 
Phase 
1 
Project Concept 
Design & 
Procurement 
Planning Scheduling & 
Management 
7.4.1.1 Appointment of sub-contractors 
Time pressure within the site schedule was often reported (001,002,003,009,053) 
and concerns about the financial penalties of project over-run were a burden for those 
in a managerial position (025,061). Sub-contracting of the work was a feature on all 
sites visited and was also the method of obtaining the necessary labour and skill range 
in Construction Management. Sub-contractors were appointed as in-house skills and 
resources were kept to a bare minimum or were unavailable (002,003,004,005,011, 
019,038,052,064,065). Given the fluctuating needs of skill and labour requirements 
in the industry, use of sub-contractor labour was seen as cheaper than retaining 
permanent employees on full pay. 
Where possible, sites often retained a list of tried and tested sub-contractor groups that 
they would invite to tender for work. Nonetheless there were a number of comments 
regretting the loss of a directly employed workforce (001,004,021). Typically these 
general concerns emanated from interviews with principal contractor employees and 
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concerned problems with the performance and supervision of sub-contractors on site 
(004,010). Performance losses were perceived as a loss in speed of `reaction time' 
when something needed to be done (001) and lacking initiative or spontaneous action 
when a need arose (010,025). 
... The sub-contractors are working 
in isolation; they just consider 
themselves rather than the rest of the site ... 
There were also concerns about the lack of control in appointment of contract 
labourers, the appointment of people who were unknown to their supervisor / manager 
and who possibly were involved in double shifting or second jobs outside the industry 
(021). 
The supervisory problems that were reported concerned loss of control with lengthy 
sub-contractor chains (034) and complaints that sub-contractors do not project manage 
or address safety issues well (010,025). In accident 051, for example, the researcher 
identified that liaison through a chain of four different sub-contractors was required in 
order to arrange for a work area to be cleared so that another could start. 
Reports from sub-contractor interviewees, however, provided a different perspective 
on these issues. Whilst there were similar reports of working in `isolation' there were 
supplementary comments concerning lack of consultation and communication from 
the principal contractor (005,011,038,062,064). Complaints related to lack of daily 
meetings with sub-contractor supervisors and increasing over-ride of formal 
communication channels the greater the time spent on site (005). Where liaison did 
occur, it was reported that this was often in isolation for principal contractor workers, 
or other teams on site, and that it was purely 'task' orientated (038,062). 
... It's 
frustrating managing practical matters with the principal 
contractor. You get left to your own devices and the managers wash 
their hands of you ... 
A few sub-contractor interviewees also felt that principal contractor operatives were 
treated more leniently than those of the sub-contractor and that double standards were 
in operation (036,062). 
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7.4.1.2 Defining contractor responsibilities 
Some reports, from both principal contractor and sub-contractor interviewees, related 
to lack of clarity or ownership of responsibilities, especially (although not exclusively) 
in construction management (010,050,062,064). The examples concerned clouded 
responsibilities for issues such as housekeeping, making decisions about site safety 
requirements and allocation of operative tasks (050,061,064). Whilst it was reported 
that construction managers try to encourage contractors to communicate between 
themselves (010), it appeared that (for those concerned) this was at times perceived as 
disregard by management of their responsibilities. Another concern offered by a 
principal contractor employee was that foremen for sub-contractors are working 
foremen - undertaking tasks in addition to their supervisory duties. Normally the 
principal contractor would provide some supervision, and although this does not 
happen with construction management, sub-contractors did not make alternative 
arrangements and this has contributed to supervisory failures (010). 
7.4.1.3 Ownership of proactive safety behaviour 
There appeared to be a lack of clarity and ownership of the responsibility to be 
proactive in safety, and failure to take initiative and put ideas into practice (017,022). 
A small number saw taking action on safety issues as the responsibility of the visiting 
safety adviser (051). Alternative comments identified a perception by sub-contractor 
interviewees of a lack of responsibility among big companies (064), yet a contrasting 
perception from the principal contractor viewpoint was that sub-contractor groups had 
inadequate insight into the thoroughness of safety management in practice (002). 
... If 
it's a cut it's our fault and he gets a pair of gloves, if it's a trip its 
not our fault as others supply the workplace ... 
Where action was taken, the level of intervention varied between different employers. 
For example `regular safety meetings' took place monthly for one employer (004), 
whereas another undertook this four times a year on a Friday afternoon (050). 
Complaints about construction management were prevalent, as the purely 
'management' role was seen as removing the principal contractor from responsibility 
for initiative and action (062,064). In accident 050, for example, the sub-contractor 
group felt that the erection of safety barriers (rather than a board over a hole in the 
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ground) would have been a more appropriate safety measure, yet felt that a decision 
and action such as this was not within the remit of their responsibilities on site. 
7.4.2 Planning, Scheduling and Management: WO& M phase failures 
l 
Failure generation f 
Phase 
-ý 
Work 
Organisation & 
i Management 
Planning Scheduling & 
Management 
7.4.2.1 Labour supply and appointment 
Many Supervisor / manager interviewees reported problems with labour supply, in 
both volume and quality or workers. It was reported that selection sometimes 
depended on who was available rather than being able to make an appointment by 
choice (003,012,020,022,023,037,062); a `lack of strong young men' willing to 
enter the industry was rued (012). A contact list of `good men' was often maintained 
and where possible appointments were made from this (009); poor availability of 
labour appeared especially acute in the larger cities. Interviewees also reported that 
they were required to appoint a designated quota of labour from the `local' population. 
At times they felt that this resulted in men undertaking tasks for which they were 
insufficiently qualified or experienced (003,037). 
Managing absenteeism was also a problem and there were a number of reports where 
trades and operatives would be moved around and have to take on work outside their 
normal area of expertise when necessary (020,022,023,038,039). There were 
complaints that the multi-skilled `modem day' apprentices were lacking in work 
experience and at times were `more of a hindrance than a help' (063). 
7.4.2.2 Determination of competence 
Members of the Major Contractors Group ran all the sites included in the research and 
it was their policy that appointees at trade level should be holders of a CSCS card 
(2.5.6). The company Head Office occasionally made this verification (022,060, 
061), or otherwise it was undertaken on site. Nonetheless, supervisor / manager 
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interviewees, when asked how they determined competence of new appointees on site, 
reported an additional range of practical methods. These included review of where 
they had worked before or obtaining an opinion of them from a previous employer 
(019,036). Alternatively, they reached a decision by talking with them at induction 
(019) or by watching and reviewing the men once they had started work - an 
impression that would often be reached within the first few hours work on site and at 
most up to a week or two trial (017,019,020,033,037,063). A principal contractor 
interviewee indicated that it was the responsibility of the sub-contractor to ensure 
appointment of competent personnel (022). 
7.4.2.3 Identification and surveillance of fitness for work 
Supervisor / manager interviewees were asked to describe arrangements for pre- 
placement health screening. A number of interviewees were unaware of such a 
system (063), although others reported that health requirements were stipulated for 
working in confined spaces (038,062). Otherwise, there appeared not to be any 
formal arrangements, although it was indicated that decision about fitness for work 
would be made by the safety officer, contracts manager or director (040,050,060), or 
would dealt with by whoever provided the site induction (040,050). 
Interviewees reported health surveillance as the provision of an annual medical (036, 
051,061) or access to a discounted gym (037). 
7.4.2.4 Supervision of experienced and inexperienced operatives 
Operative interviewees reported considerable self-reliance when describing 
`supervision' of their work, with many informally managing themselves and their own 
workload (002,007,009,013,018,022,023,061). This appeared to be especially the 
case with the self-employed or of those undertaking a particular task type in the long- 
term (023). Supervision was reported (by both the operatives and managers / 
supervisors alike) as inappropriate for experienced men - many of whom might have 
taken a supervisory role themselves on other sites or under different circumstances 
(002,004,013,052,053). 
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Problems appeared to arise when experienced operatives undertook tasks which were 
`one-offs' and with which they were unfamiliar - such as covering labourers' work 
due to manpower shortages (012,020,021,039,060,061). 
Issues relating to inexperience were also observed by the researcher (although were 
rarely reported as problems by the interviewees themselves) and concerned the young, 
or operatives with only a few weeks or months construction experience. Typically, 
they described worries about not being able to keep up with a fast work pace (005, 
012,040) and appeared reluctant to request assistance or a break when needed (040, 
050). 
In putting together a team of workers, supervisor / manager interviewees aimed to 
avoid disruption of established gangs, where there was often strong cohesion, perhaps 
through family groups working together or a history of longstanding co-working (002, 
005,034,050). Where teams had to be made up they would aim to mix experienced 
with inexperienced employees, although this was not always possible (012,019). 
7.4.2.5 Establishing working hours 
Interviewees in many of the accident studies reported long working hours (001,002, 
003,004,005,011,019,021,022,023,025,033,036,037,050,061,064). The mean 
working hours of each employee group are shown in Table 58. Weekend work was 
undertaken by many interviewees and appeared to be accepted practice - in one case 
seen as a beneficial method to spread the workload over seven days rather than five 
(061). 
Many employees worked in excess of 40 hours / week and working hours, on average, 
were greater among those in a safety / managerial or supervisory roles (005,020,023, 
061,062,064). Whilst safety and managerial staff appeared less likely to undertake 
`overtime', they also described additional working hours as being an inherent part of 
their workload - perhaps undertaking paper work from home at the week-end or, and 
especially the case for managerial staff, feeling the need to be on site whilst their 
operatives were working (064). Few described their additional hours as overtime as 
they felt that such a schedule was inherent to their appointment and salary agreements. 
223 
Interviewees on site (Total n-77 i 
Safety (n-9) Management Supervisory Ganger Trade Labour 
(n-9) nil n-8 n-1 (n-17)* 
Mean designated hours / 48 52 47 47 43 43 
week + ran e 38'%-66 (39 'A-75 39-63 421/3-50 37-50 (37 'A . 69) 
Occasional overtime 
(O/T) + (numbers able to 4 (ns2) 4 (n-1) 14 (n-4) 6 (n-1) 9 (n-2) 15 (n- 5) 
specify weekly overtime 
hours) 
Mean hours of OT / week 17 6 11 12 7 11 
(where specified) 
Mean total hours / week 52 53 50 43 45 46 
0 data missing for two operatives. 
Table 58. Working hours according to job role 
Interviewees in the operative or supervisory grades saw overtime as distinct from 
their formal working hours; in two cases operatives undertook supplementary work 
outside the site. In a number of cases interviewees felt that overtime was pressed 
upon them and something that they could not decline (011,025,040,050,060); 
another also suggested that undertaking overtime was habitual rather than something 
that he really needed to do (013). One interviewee described the ability to undertake 
up to 30hrs overtime per week, before his pay incentive was reduced (021). 
Interviewees also reported the requirement for considerable flexibility in working 
hours, if this was dictated by the process (a concrete pour for example) (011,012, 
040). Flexibility meant that the provision of breaks was not always honoured. 
Lengthy work periods without rest were reported (especially in the afternoon) - 
interviewees both accepted (021) or showed dissatisfaction with this arrangement 
(011,012,021,022, , 023,024,025,033,040). On other occasions, however, 
interviewees were happy to forfeit their break in order to complete work and leave 
earlier at the end of the day (004,012,034,037,064). 
A number of interviewees also reported long travel distances to work, with greatest 
duration (of 1 Y2 hours or more) especially on the return trip (002,004,007,009,020, 
021,022,040,052,053,065). A number of interviewees arose and commenced work 
travel between 04.45 and 06.00, to arrive on site at any time from 06.45. 
Reports also varied when interviewees described their arrangements for sickness and 
holiday pay and these data are reproduced in Table 59 and Table 60. A number of 
respondents reported that where they had taken sick leave, that they had not been paid 
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for this. The greatest number describing this were among the labourer group of 
interviewees; it was reported that this was a disincentive to take rest in the case of 
minor illness (034). Unpaid holiday was also reported by those in both labour and 
trade positions; time taken by these operatives varied considerably. For those who 
received paid holiday, those at labour, trade and ganger man grades took the least time 
off on average, with a number taking little or no time at all (018,033,040,050,053). 
There were reports of taking pay in lieu of holiday (050,052). 
Received sick 
pay 
Did not receive sick 
a 
Received SSP'' 
Safety n-2 2 
Managerial n-3 6 1 
Supervisory n-12 9 2 1 
Ganter n=8 5 3 
Trade n-3 2 1 
Labour n-11 4 6 1 
* Statutory sick pay 
Table 59. Payment for sickness absences 
Received holiday 
pay 
Mean paid duration in 
days (+mnge) 
Unpaid 
Safety n-3 3 25(20-35) 
Managerial n-70 7 22.6 (15-30) 
Su erviso n-12 12 19.75 13-30 
Ganern 5 146-29 
Trade n. 8 S&3 no 19(15-25) 26.7(5-60) 
Labour n-12 6&6no 13(0-22) 21 0-40 
Table 60. Payment for holiday absences 
7.4.2.6 Time pressures upon workload 
Interviewees reported the effects of a tight build schedule on the management of their 
workload. Weekend, late evening or night work was sometimes reported as a method 
to accommodate this (021,061). 
Whilst the formal build schedule was pre-determined, interviewees also reported 
problems with accommodating unscheduled work (040), although at times 
unscheduled work was undertaken spontaneously perhaps because the tasks would be 
required anyway at a later date, because labour shortages were anticipated or `to gain 
time' (002,021,020). 
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Interviewees described a variety of influences that affected the timing of their work 
such as delays to check site conditions prior to safely proceeding with a task (060) or 
delays from the process and access to site (008,009). 
... I had to be quick 
because the concrete was setting and because the 
lorry was blocking the road outside for the delivery ... 
Time pressure from being `rained off was reported (009) and interviewees also 
described time pressures arising from shortages or late deliveries of materials, 
equipment or supplies (009,062). Whilst there was labour shortage through covering 
sick leave (039), other problems generated from the very presence of other operatives 
were also described. These included pressures to complete work and vacate an area 
for access by another trade group, to make materials and equipment available for 
others that needed it (002,004,012,019), the need to clear up or work around the 
debris or unfinished work that others had left (018,025,050) and slowness induced by 
another labourer or trainee (018). 
A competitive element to time pressure was occasionally described and appeared to be 
applied to two aspects of work. Firstly this was reported among individuals 
undertaking priced work and needing to get as much done as possible (005,013,061, 
063). The second element appeared to have more of a leadership element with reports 
of competition between different work teams or from initiation by a Site Manager or 
sub-contractor foreman (001,005,050,063). 
... The 
Charge Hand wants a surge of work first thing in the morning. 
The work's not behind, its just his character ... 
An important element of the issues described in this section was that interviewees 
often did not always perceive the situations and circumstances described above as 
time pressure (002,004,005,007,011,012,039,060,63). There appeared to be a 
generalised acceptance of these circumstances as the norm and that they had to 
accommodate the ever fluctuating circumstances affecting their work programme. 
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7.4.2.7 Monitoring performance and providing motivation 
Some supervisor and manager interviewees described a range of techniques that they 
used to encourage performance and to provide motivation for the operatives. The 
variable methods of liaison were described. Some recounted the need to maintain a 
good relation with the operatives and included discussion, encouragement and asking 
the men about their work (019,022,050,061,063). Others felt that their own manner 
or rushed pace of working would act as a motivator (017,064). 
A range of practical techniques was also described. One principal contractor 
interviewee had adopted a scheme of providing a monthly prize (£100) to the best sub- 
contractor team (judged upon their management procedures, safety performance and 
adherence to method statements and risk assessments). (025). Where poor 
performance or unsafe work was observed sites reported various disciplinary measures 
such as work supervision and warnings prior to dismissal. 
Across sites, motivational methods included financial incentives to make the target 
dates (025,064) `job and knock4' (especially on Fridays and week-end work 004,012, 
020,023,034,037,052) and increased hours or double shifting (025). Fear of 
redundancy was mooted as a motivator in one discussion (051). 
... We 
did job and knock as the site really wanted to get the work done 
Whilst it was reported that extra speed was not wanted (as this would make the work 
unsafe 020,065), it was otherwise indicated that safe practice would be maintained 
because of the supervisor's request for it and by his presence (062,064). Job and 
knock was not seen to compromise safe practice (020) and in one case it was indicated 
that the absence of sick pay was an incentive to work safely (051). 
One interviewee reported getting a `pat on the back' for good work (037). 
4 Term employed in the industry to describe 'job and finish'- the ability to go home as soon as the 
work is finished. 
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7.4.2.8 Pay and remuneration 
Most interviewees received either salaried (for permanent employees) or fixed wage 
payments. Fixed wage payments were most common among interviewees at operative 
level and on-site for a transient period only. Only two operative interviewees received 
priced work payments (004,063), yet it appeared that the pay for a number of 
managers or supervisors from smaller sub-contractors may have been interlinked with 
the fixed price of the work contract and performance bonuses for work completion 
(025,034). When describing payment preferences, interviewees for the most part 
indicated a preference for a fixed wage (009,019,018,020,021,022,033,036,038, 
050,060,061). 
... At 31 
I'm getting too old for priced work now ... 
... There's 
less stress and you don't have to take so many risks to earn more ... 
Some of the interviewees would have preferred priced work, however, because of the 
increased earning capacity that this method brings (004,005,023,040,052) and one 
reported that priced work was more likely at the week-ends (061). 
... It would 
be very hard to get a bonus on this type of site, but I can go 
faster on house building work as it doesn't have to be perfect ... 
Reasons for rejecting priced work included a conflict with safe working practice (002, 
011,013,022,025,036,037,063); those in a safety role especially reported this. The 
competition between teams and a need to reach a production target were also reasons 
for rejecting priced work (020,034,064). 
A small number of alternative payment methods were also described, such as a share 
of the bonus scheme for finishing work quickly or for working through the rain (034, 
052). One interviewee received a loyalty bonus of time off equivalent to 4 weeks 
sickness absence per year (064). 
7.4.2.9 Provision of welfare facilities 
Response was mixed when describing the provision of welfare facilities. Many were 
happy with the facilities, but a number of operative interviewees showed 
dissatisfaction. Most complaints concerned the provision of insufficient numbers and 
location of toilets (022,025,060,061,064), and their dirty and smelly condition (022, 
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024,062,064). Shortcomings in provision of washing facilities were also described, 
including inadequacies in water pressure or the provision of grit soap (005,006,009), 
and a lack of shower facilities (011,025,037,052). Whilst complaints about 
changing room provision were fewer (009,037), there was concern about lack of 
security with reports of lockers broken into (065). 
Complaints about provision for food and drink were few; a single complaint about 
access to fresh drinking water (008). All others concerned the pressures upon use of 
the canteen at break times, with queuing reducing break allowances and lack of space 
resulting in some having to eat in the changing rooms (023,052,039,064). 
7.4.2.10 Documenting accident events 
Further analysis of company accident investigation forms (see 5.2.1.2) was not 
undertaken. However, the baseline documentation provided for many of the accidents 
studied were a mix of company forms (similar to those in 5.2.1.2) used either alone, 
and /or with forms used by the appointing contractor (in the case of a sub-contractor 
employee accident). Some of these were also used in combination with forms defined 
by regulatory requirements. These included the F2508 (for the RIDDOR incidents) 
and, the `accident book' record BI 510 (as required by the Social Security (Claims and 
Payments) Regulations 1979). Aspects to be completed are reproduced in Table 61; 
as with the evaluation of construction industry accident investigation techniques 
(5.2.1.2), these did not embrace the range of search criteria (latent conditions and 
factors affecting performance through the project lifecycle). 
1: 2508 ßl 510 
Name of reporter and company  ý" 
Incident record (time, location)  
Injured person details 
Iniurv details 
Accident / dangerous occurrence kind (predetermined RIDDOR categories) 
Description of what happened 
- detail substance, equipment, precursor events, actions of others & 
describe remedial action 
 
Table 61. Accident record forms to fulfil regulatory requirements 
7.4.2.11 Managing accident investigation 
Where possible, site accident reports were collated with descriptions of accident 
causes provided by interviewees to the researcher. Whilst in most cases the main 
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elements of the accident were documented, there were also anomalies of information. 
At times, accident involved interviewees were unfamiliar with the recorded 
description or their own account of events showed some disparity with the detail 
documented (013,037). Accident records were also used as a forum to document 
complaints or requests for improvement to work circumstances (062). 
... Slipped on 
inside of scaffold, fell and twisted left knee. Mud on 
boots caused slip. Designated footpath was asked for in H&S meeting. 
Item 15 in minutes ... 
In a number of cases, it appeared that the person making the report had become 
involved only after the accident event and did not comprehensively document the 
accident details. The researcher felt that possible reasons for this included lack of 
space on the accident report form or because those involved had been reluctant to 
describe their own or others inappropriate behaviour or technique (008,012,022,036, 
060,061). Whether they had completed the report or not, supervisor / manager 
interviewees were not always aware of the techniques or work circumstances of the 
accident involved interviewee (009,061). 
Interviewees descriptions of accident causes to the researcher for the most part fell 
into three categories. The first category (described both by supervisor / manager and 
accident involved interviewees) was that the accident was often seen as a `pure 
chance' event (009,033,036) and that risks in techniques or work area (002,009) 
were not perceived. A fatalistic approach was observed on a number of occasions; for 
example, interviewees were quite dismissive of the risk of skin damage in the manual 
handling of materials or in working with cement (004,033,053,040) and had an 
expectation of higher risk working conditions in the housing sector (020). 
The second category encompassed attribution of blame; generally this was directed at 
`accident involved' interviewees, although there was one incidence directed at site 
control' (020). Typically the responses encompassed a range of sentiments that 
related to behaviour type failures, such as over-familiarity (002), carelessness (019, 
024) complacency (022), negligence (024), rushing (024), lack of concentration and 
judgement (002,011,022,24) or distraction (013,022,033,037). There was one 
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incidence blamed upon recurrence of an old injury, thought to have been undisclosed 
by the victim at start on site (037). 
Where relevant, some of the areas of blame were provided in the context of poor work 
technique, such as incorrect use of task equipment (011,012,013), working alone 
when two people would have made the task easier (018,061) or incorrect use of PPE 
(040). 
... He probably wasn't watching what 
he was doing; he was in a group 
and probably chatting ... 
The third category of attribution concerned failures related to `task related' aspects, 
such a poor machine design (002), or problems in the handling of materials (002, 
005). Interviewees also expressed concern relating to poor condition of the work area 
(011). 
7.4.2.12 Identification of accident remedial action 
Responses to the accident events varied. Many interviewees reported no action at all 
(017,035). Different reasons were given for lack of action, including the accident 
incorporating accepted hazards and being an unquestioned part of the job (009,033, 
034,050), the job being a one-off or just temporary work (036,060,061), and that any 
intervention would have taken longer to do than the job itself (061). Interviewees also 
reported that remedial action would not be necessary because they were already 
following site rules (004,022,036), or because action was outside their remit and the 
responsibility of the principal contractor (022,051,064). 
Where action was taken, this was applied in a number of different ways. One measure 
was to review and provide or reinforce guidance on work behaviour, such as advising 
people to get extra help when needed (039,050), or to use better and less hazardous 
task techniques (019,023,024). For other accidents, the response was to reiterate the 
need to use PPE (033,039,063,065), to advise improved housekeeping in the work 
area (025,053,062) or to install traffic cones over walkway obstructions (064). 
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Where remedial action was directed towards the generation of new ideas, these 
concerned the development and instigation of more robust procedures (020), and the 
consideration of new or safer equipment designs (012,038). 
7.4.2.13 Providing opportunities for operative consultation and communication 
Operative grade interviewees reported variable opportunities for consultation and 
communication about work organisation and safety related issues. Some were 
involved in a discussion only concerning their own tasks (018), whereas a number of 
other respondents reported being `told' and not being part of any consultation at all 
(010,012,022,050,052,060,061). 
Other interviewees were included in discussions about work organisation, but not 
about safety, (020,025,052,063) or vice versa (024,037,061,063). Whilst one 
interviewee would have like much greater involvement, most interviewees felt that 
they could initiate discussions or make suggestions if they wanted to. Many spoke 
favourably about positive developments in `health and safety' over recent years, yet 
there were also reported incidences of inaction in response to concerns raised about 
inadequacies in the provision of facilities (002), and of the quality and safe use of 
work materials and equipment (001,004,025). Complaints also related to general 
working conditions, in most cases concerning the condition of the site working areas, 
walkways and footpaths, in terms of poor housekeeping and trip hazards from 
protruding structures and uneven or poorly maintained surfaces (002,004,017,025, 
050,051,061,064). 
Interviewees often had positive suggestions or recounted experience in previous work 
(often abroad) of possible solutions to their problems. These related to improvements 
in tooling, equipment or materials design (001,009,018,052), yet none of these ideas 
had been communicated to others. 
... The tying wire comes 
in a 25kg roll here, but in Germany they come 
in small cartons which is much better ... 
... 
When I was working in the Bahamas they used to have proper nips 
for cutting steel banding, but I haven't seen them here ... 
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... The sun 
bounces off the concrete and causes a lot of glare - perhaps 
adding some colour to the mix would reduce this? ... 
7.4.3 Planning, Scheduling and Management : Task phase failures 
A6o. a Te l 
Failure generation 
Planning Scheduling & 
Management 
7.4.3.1 Ground, floor or foot placement areas 
Interviewees reported many situations where the conditions `underfoot' were a 
contributor or risk factor for accidents and these concerned the task and service areas 
(001,017,022,037,051,052,062,063,064). Common problems reported were 
raised structures on the walking surface that created trip hazards - typically the extent 
of the rise was often low enough not to be seen easily, yet significant enough for a trip 
to occur. In accidents 017,037,051 and 064 for example, the trip hazards were 
electrical cables, ply board used as a temporary manhole cover and setting out points - 
These structures were coloured either black, (steel) grey or brown and at most would 
have stood less than 50mm proud of the floor / ground surface. 
... 
If the points had been marked or coloured then I could have seen 
them better, but they are steel discs, which is like a camouflage... 
In other areas, the rise was much higher or more obviously precarious for walking 
over, such as working on or over rebars or upon loose ground or brick rubble (001, 
053). The condition of traffic routes and walkways also received a high number of 
reports of problems (051). 
... 
There is always brick dust, which is a slip hazard, but when block 
work is cut the debris is like roller-balls under your feet ... 
Complaints focused upon partial obstruction of access areas or footpaths, with debris, 
deliveries or traffic cones for example (017,062,064) and of the shared access of 
pedestrian and traffic routes (062). Allied to the concerns about pedestrian access, 
was the impact that the condition of the floor or ground had upon the safe movement 
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or stability of mobile equipment, such as lorries, hoists or scaffold towers (011,050, 
060). Surface hazards such as spilt oil, mud, cement or wetness were also reported 
(022,040,052,062). 
7.4.3.2 Workspace provision 
In addition to the reported problems at ground or foot placement level, there were also 
reports concerning the remainder of the workspace. These included constraints upon 
the space available for movement and manipulation activities (002,003,012,020, 
060) and inadequate work height or inappropriate work surfaces for materials or 
equipment placement (007,039). Associated with space limitations were the presence 
of structures, such as scaffold cross-membering and protruding structures that 
impeded free movement (018,036,050). 
7.4.3.3 Housekeeping 
Poor housekeeping was reported by many interviewees, and they recounted the 
general problems of dust and lack of clearing up by others (002,022,023,024,050, 
051,061). Allocation of responsibility for clearing up was seen variably as something 
they would expect other gangs (who had created the problem) or the Principal 
Contractor to undertake - at worst work gangs were reported to push rubbish to one 
side or delay their work schedule in order to clear up after others (024,051,053,064). 
Alternatively, it was felt that the weekly delivery of an empty skip that ultimately 
prompted a clear up - its predecessor being too full to take any more material long 
before it was exchanged. One interviewee, however, felt that he was less careful 
when the work area was overly tidy. 
7.4.3.4 Environmental conditions 
Whilst many operative interviewees cited poor weather (eg. cold, wet or windy) as 
one of the worst parts of their job (7.6.1.8), they rarely appeared to see this as having 
any direct implication to performance or accident risk factors. Accident involved 
interviewees were asked for opinions on adverse environmental conditions and where 
this was provided interviewees spoke about lighting conditions and dusty working 
conditions. There was one report of distracting glare from sunlight reflecting upon 
concrete (018), but all other reports concerned poor background lighting or 
inadequacy of daylight in terms of availability and task illuminance (002,037,050, 
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051,063,064). Too much dust was reported during general clear-up (008) and by 
interviewees involved in duct work. 
7.4.3.5 Organisation of tasks between different trades or operatives 
Many operatives appeared to organise their own task workload and three main aspects 
were reported to impact upon this task activity. The first of these was the occasional 
need to accommodate unplanned work - perhaps as a consequence of fluctuations 
elsewhere on site such as shortages in labour or resources (002,019). In accident 002, 
for example, a stock of window braces was being made up because extra bricklayers 
had unexpectedly been appointed to site (using the existing supply of cavity closures) 
and because shortage of carpenter labour was anticipated in the next few days. 
The second factor that impacted upon undertaking of tasks was the need to 
accommodate the space requirements of other workers. Some reported that space and 
scheduling provision was adequate for each group, whereas others indicated some 
form of `trade overlap' in the work area (004,005,013,023,024,025,036,051,052, 
053,060). 
... Most 
jobs are fast track programmes and you end up working on top of 
one another ... 
The descriptions provided by interviewees indicated that this was an accepted and 
normal part of their work, yet the impressions of the researcher were that this affected 
ease of access and induced operatives to speed up if others were waiting for them to 
finish or indeed if they wished to gain first access to an area (005,023,024). 
The third aspect that impacted upon undertaking of tasks concerned generosity and a 
desire to help others (and not necessarily within their own gang) when assistance was 
required. This took the form of helping others in their use or movement of equipment 
(012,019,039) and in helping older workers with strenuous activities (034). Not all 
offers were quite so altruistic, however, as there was also a report from a supervisor 
who chose taking `the risk' himself as a measure to avoid having to do any 
`paperwork' (021). 
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7.4.4 Summary of results according to Planning, Scheduling and Management 
factors 
The results in this section were fewest when reporting failures at the PCDP phase, yet 
they echoed the failings of clear specifications and designation of responsibilities, 
which were also apparent at the Design and Task Execution level. 
Phase -Failures concerning Failures concerning Failures 
of generation Project Concept Work Organisation concerning Task 
Design & & Management Execution 
Failure category Procurement 
Planning Defining and Manaaing and co- Provision of suitable 
Scheduling & organising labour ordinating site task conditions 
Management supply nne 
- Project " Ground, floor or 
timeline " Labour foot placement 
- Appointment " Factors affecting appointment areas 
of personnel sub-contractor " Determination of " Workspace 
Scheduling appointment competence provision 
the work " Factors affecting " Identification and " Housekeeping 
distinction of surveillance of " Environmental 
contractor work fitness conditions 
responsibilities " Supervision of " Affecting 
" Ownership of experienced and operative task 
proactive safety inexperienced organisation 
behaviour operatives (trade overlap) 
" Establishing 
working hours 
" Time pressure 
upon workload 
" Monitoring 
performance and 
providing 
motivation 
" Pay and 
remuneration 
" Provision of 
welfare facilities 
" Documenting and 
undertaking 
accident 
investigation and 
determining 
remedial action 
" Providing 
opportunities for 
operative 
consultation and 
communication 
Table 62. Summary of results according to Planning, Scheduling and Management 
factors 
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In the context of Planning, Scheduling and Management (PSM), the discrepancy 
revealed isolation between different contractor groups and little real sense of 
`community' on site. This appeared especially apparent between the principal and 
sub-contractor groups, and appeared to be linked to losses in communication, 
consultation and co-operation that were formerly apparent with greater levels of direct 
labour employment patterns. Allocation of responsibilities and authority among 
contractors on site was unclear, with resulting feelings of exclusion, loss of belonging, 
ownership and goodwill, and of undercurrent frustration with others on site. 
An overwhelming proportion of the findings in this section were related to aspects 
concerning work organisation and management of sites. Firstly, and in spite of formal 
methods for verification of the skills and abilities of new starters to site, an informal 
assessment process appeared to be running in parallel. This may have reflected a lack 
of confidence in the fidelity of the formal scheme or poor change management with its 
introduction. Nonetheless, with underlying restrictions in supply of the desired labour 
and skill range, a two-fold assessment process was apparent and burdensome for those 
in supervisory positions. 
Whilst issues surrounding appointment criteria revealed duplication in formal and 
informal procedures for skills verification, there was a contrasting dearth of 
occupational health assessment (either pre-placement or as part of a health 
surveillance programme) and this was a second area of concern. Where attempts were 
made at pre-placement health assessment, these appeared to be unregulated and were 
undertaken by personnel without the competencies to make informed decisions. A 
few attempts were made at health surveillance, but it was not possible to determine the 
occupational relatedness of these interventions. 
Lack of, or poor, regulation also emerged as the third area of failure in organisation 
and management of task operations. Whilst supervisors reported the need to observe 
and oversee the work of new operatives on site, their oversight rapidly declined once 
new appointees capabilities had been observed and `approved'. Supervision for these 
`approved' operatives appeared almost obsolete and they worked in relative freedom, 
with high decision latitude and autonomy. Whilst this freedom was welcomed at both 
supervisory and operative grades, problems (directly associated with some of the 
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accidents) emerged when new or unusual work was required. It appeared that there 
was quite an unsympathetic and traditional hierarchy for young and inexperienced 
operatives to reach `approved' status; for any operatives, task-based learning appeared 
consequential to time on site or time spent working alongside others. Given the very 
nature of the work, novel circumstances and work conditions were frequent, yet there 
appeared to be little endorsement or presence of a learning culture to promote skills 
development during working time on site. 
Similarly, some at operative grade perceived opportunities for consultation and 
communication, but this was largely informal and there was little sense of ownership, 
respect or response to the system when available. Contrasting with the poor learning 
and consultation culture, the impetus and priority on site was for the most part 
uniquely directed toward build progression. Whilst the fundamental need for work 
progress was not questioned, it appeared that lack of regulation, already attributed to 
skills development, was also apparent in more fundamental aspect of work 
organisation across the industry. 
Temporal issues such as long working hours and overtime culture, which coupled with 
possible financial impediments to full holiday and sick leave, inhibited opportunities 
for rest, relaxation and recovery. Closely related to problems with working time, the 
motivational measures (often related to job and finish type arrangements or provision 
of bonus payments for work acceleration and completion) appeared likely to 
additionally confound opportunities for rest and safety in working methods. 
There was a lack of insight into the possible health and safety impacts of these 
motivational methods. A habitual acceptance or blindness to the nature of adversity in 
the industry was the final area of concern. This was represented not only in working 
time arrangements, but also in the lack of perception of pressures upon working time, 
the lack of perception of the impact of trade overlap in work areas and the lack of 
perception concerning the impact of the condition of welfare, work and transit areas 
upon performance, safety and comfort of personnel. 
Habitual acceptance was also apparent in the management of accident investigation 
and remedial action. There was multiplicity in form completion among principal and 
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sub contractors, and forms provided by regulatory authorities did little to encourage 
deeper or reflective accident investigation. Blame orientated culture and superficial 
site investigation of accident causal factors was common and essentially very little 
was done in remedial action that impacted upon or challenged the status quo. 
7.5 Results by information transfer factors 
Information transfer was largely concerned with determining and communicating 
criteria for safe development of the build. At the PCDP phase, this concerned liaison 
and communication in the pre-site stage of the work, whilst the work organisation and 
management phase concerned the techniques used to assess and communicate the 
details of the work plan, process and safety requirements. Consideration of 
information transfer at task-based level concerned issues relating to the induction and 
training of site personnel. 
7.5.1 Information Transfer factors : PCDP phase failures 
Failure generation 
Phase 
f 
Project Concept 
Design & 
Procurement 
Information Transfer 
S, RA, Induction etc 
7.5.1.1 Pre-contract information 
Interviewees in sub-contractor roles reported problems that arose from late provision 
of design guidelines from the principal contractor (009). Provision of incorrect 
drawings or information from utility services (such as underground supplies) was also 
reported, resulting in the need for further liaison and revision later in the build process 
(009,020,052). The researcher also gained the impression that pre-contract materials 
(including method statements or confirmation of health and safety arrangements) 
were, at times, styled primarily to demonstrate an `intention of good practice' in order 
to curry favour in the competition to gain the work contract. 
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7.5.2 Information Transfer factors : WO &M phase failures 
un 1 W-1 
Failure generation 
-i 
I Organisation & 
Management 
Information Transfer 
(MS, RA, induction etc. 
7.5.2.1 Risk assessments 
There were no risk assessments for many of the accident studies (006,007,008,009, 
012,017,019,018,020,021,023,024,052,036,037,038,040,050,054,061,065). 
Most commonly, this was because the accident activity was seen as a core skill of the 
person undertaking the task (001,002,033,061) or because the accident did not occur 
during a task activity (Table 49). Where risk assessments did exist, the hazards that 
contributed to the accident events were often excluded (002,012,034,039,052,061), 
or control measures were not enforced (035). 
Where possible, the risk assessments were evaluated by the researcher and a range of 
shortcomings were noted. Typically, there was insufficient detail to reflect operative 
practice during the task; generic risk assessments of repeated activities were 
commonplace, but breadth of application seemed to date these quickly and render 
them less well to the unique circumstances of site, task and work conditions (052, 
063). In one circumstance, the risk assessor was directed to identify risks only if 
there was a `significant risk' of injury (034). Additional failures were that alternative 
risks to the accident event had been identified (061) or, often in the case of handling 
or manipulations, human interaction had not been identified (033,039,055). 
Various presentation styles were used and commonly these constituted a 
questionnaire type form inviting tick box responses, a range of prescribed questions 
and answers that could be selected at will by the assessor, or boxed areas for the 
addition of free text responses. Assessment of these revealed problems with style and 
presentation - at times quite complex sentence or language styles (034), scoring 
systems without easily identifiable meaning (005,034) and comments with 
inadequate detail such as "Use the correct PPE" (063). 
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In a number of the accident studies, interviewees (mostly operatives) were unaware of 
the existence of the risk assessments (012,022,033,034,035,052,060,061,063). 
7.5.2.2 Method statements 
There were no method statements for many of the accident studies (006,007,008, 
009,017,018,019,020,021,023,033,034,036,037,038,050,051,061,062) and 
most commonly this was because the accident event did not fall within the process 
description for the section of the build being undertaken (i. e., walking around and 
preparation type activities) (062,064, Table 49). Where the method statements did 
exist, many operative interviewees were unaware of them, or did not recall any 
procedures or instructions for their work (011,012,022,033,034,035,052,060, 
063). 
The method statements were often married with or used alongside a risk assessment. 
Where it was possible to review the content and style of the document, a number of 
recurring adverse features were observed. Firstly, the content of the method 
statements was mainly concerned with the necessary sequence of steps from which to 
develop the process from initial to end stages. Whilst the process was often carefully 
structured, there was at times little or inadequate detail of the tasks that were required, 
skill requirements and the human interaction necessary to achieve the activity (001, 
002,005,024,035,039,040,063). In accident 005, for example, the work sequence 
and lifting equipment required to lift the steel angles up and into the building was 
recorded, yet there was no description of the human interaction that was required to 
load or unload the angles between the different handling equipment. 
It is of course possible that the manual lift in accident 005 was not a planned activity 
and this is the second area of concern; that the method statements are invariably 
prepared well in advance of the time at which they become effective, or are generic 
documents for repeated application to same type situations (009,010). In either case, 
the content describes a best case scenario, yet is isolated to the prevailing 
circumstances at the time of task execution, such as access to an area, or equipment 
and tooling availability etc., at the very least. As such, the document appeared to 
serve well as a tool to develop or schedule a part of the build process, but was 
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invariably redundant or un-applicable at the time of actual application. Nonetheless, 
the documents were used as an audit tool to confirm safe work methods (011,022). 
Method statements varied in length, at times a single sheet (038,040), although a 
number were very long - up to 20 pages and with multiple process steps (44 in one 
case, 039). Reading or reading out the method statement was often used as a training 
medium. In some cases, the language style and sentence construction was complex 
and of a regimented style; this was considered by the researcher to be inappropriate 
for low skill readers or for those with a low span of concentration (001,033,039). 
Preparation of the method statement was generally undertaken by someone in a 
`management' position, such as Contracts Manager (001,009,013,050), Project / 
Construction Manager (002,005,009), Facilities Manager (003), Civil Engineer 
(004), or Site / General Manager (009,011. Often they were developed from existing 
method statements or from generic materials, provided by a safety consultant (039, 
040) or based on a style devised by the site principal contractors. Interviewees on site 
were occasionally consulted or involved in preparation of the method statements, 
although this appeared to be less common with those co-working at operative grades 
(001,022,040) or by sub sub-contractors in the chain. Where interviewees were able 
to comment upon the preparatory process, they reported that the documents were often 
prepared before site work began (022,050) and that there was often inadequate 
information available at the project outset (009,022) or there were time constraints in 
preparation time due to inter-contractor competition for the contract (033). 
7.5.2.3 Ownership of provision of information transfer 
Information transfer also included the provision of toolbox talks, induction and on the 
job task training. Provision and receipt of information transfer among sub-contractor 
groups varied and it was quite difficult to identify the systems in operation. Principal 
contractors seemed to provide toolbox talks at some sites. At other sites, however, 
each of the sub-contractor chains were expected to provide their own specialist 
training or toolbox talks (010,020,050,062), but might occasionally be drawn into 
the arrangements of the next contractor in the contract chain (034). 
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Uptake of training varied among interviewees, both in frequency and range of training 
undertaken. The impression was that principal contractors at some of the larger sites 
accommodated sub-contractor employees, at a cost, into their own CSCS training 
schemes (013,022). The CSCS training schemes were available elsewhere too, but 
often it appeared that the costs were born by individuals (especially those self- 
employed) and that this was prohibitive for some (004,033). 
7.5.3 Information Transfer Factors : Task phase failures 
lP T... 1 
Failure generation 
Information Transfer 
S RA, induction etc. 
7.5.3.1 Styles of training provision 
Paper-based training methods were regularly used as a mode for conveying 
information - these included booklets or leaflets on general health and safety 
information (033), manual handling training techniques (017,050), site inductions, 
toolbox talks (062), and method statements and risk assessments. Where paper-based 
methods were used, it was reported that interviewees would either be given the 
material to read themselves, or that this would be read out to them (often during 
induction). 
Interaction or use of supplementary training media (such as video, pictorial means or 
case histories), seemed infrequent (53) and there were concerns that the training 
messages were lost because of selection of inappropriate interface styles for the target 
audience (025). Interviewees who held supervisory positions, which included training 
provision, commented on the lack of training that they had received to undertake their 
own role - citing needs of their own for training in safety and management, and in the 
provision of toolbox talks and inductions (001,040,052). 
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7.5.3.2 Site induction 
Both positive and negative comments were received about site inductions. Positive 
reports concerned the value of induction to introduce information unique to the site 
and also to inform newcomers about necessary emergency and health and safety 
information (040,052,064). On the other hand, other interviewees reported that site 
inductions offered no value (009,022,023,025,034,037,040,050,051,052), citing 
reasons such as `it's all common sense' (002,036,038), that `they're not attention 
grabbing' (018,038 052) and that `they tell you what you already know' (005,034). 
Others found them a time consuming formality to enter site (006,036), appropriate for 
specialist sites only (061) and complained that they covered issues (such as drug / 
alcohol) that those running the inductions were not qualified to make a judgement 
upon (040). 
Interviewees reported a variety of different styles of induction, ranging from a single 
sheet bullet point list of information through to mixed media including a range of 
video presentation, discussion, pictorial and paper based methods. When describing 
any preferences for presentation style, interviewees both liked (019) and disliked 
(064) the video methods, but were less keen when they had to read information 
themselves (051). In interviewees' experience, inductions varied in length from thirty 
minutes up to two days on some of the larger aeronautical or petro-chemical sites; for 
some, induction was one of their only sources of safety training (034). 
Induction was both perceived (017,061), and not acknowledged (024), as a training 
method. Issues such as Weil's disease, needle-stick injuries, fire and muster points 
were commonly remembered contents (017,018,051), yet others found the induction 
was too long or difficult to take in (017,019). Some reported that the contents were 
not appropriate for their work, such as those undertaking delivery driving or who were 
specialist tradesmen (002,011,018). 
... They're not any value when you've 
had so many -I just need to know 
if site varies from others. They're not really to do with scaffolders work, 
yet they always get the blame and into trouble... 
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7.5.3.3 Toolbox talks 
Many of the operative interviewees received toolbox talks and there was varying 
perception of the value of these. Positive comments were received, although it was 
acknowledged that it was difficult to try to make these stimulating for longstanding 
employees (036). More negative reports concerned inability to remember the topics 
that had been addressed in toolbox talk training (040,062), the use of toolbox talks as 
methods of controlling misdemeanours (such as going home early) or as a reprimand 
of some type of failure or accident (022,036). 
7.5.3.4 On the job learning 
Interviewees also reported that their task skills were developed by less formal (and un- 
assessed) methods, such as practical experience alone (005,020,040,060), or on the 
job learning. 
... I do this 
job six days a week, and you can't get any more trained 
than that ... 
... I haven't 
had any training - it's just something you pick up isn't it 
On the job training was undertaken by many interviewees and was the sole method of 
skills development for those whose work was not a formally recognised trade, such as 
ground working (052), ceiling fixing and duct working (022,024,034) (although it 
was reported that efforts were being made to develop an NVQ system for duct 
workers). Interviewees from these groups felt that their expertise was underestimated 
(022,052) and that they were dependent upon the ability and goodwill of their co- 
workers or supervisors in learning the necessary skills (009,022). 
7.5.3.5 Transferring training into practice 
There was a range of favourable and negative comments surrounding training 
provision and a number of concerns were reported by interviewees and observed by 
the researcher. Many interviewees reported no especial training for undertaking the 
accident event task (009,017,019,020,022,024,034,035,038,040). In some cases 
this was because the accident had occurred during non-task activities, such as 
movement around site, or because they had previously gained their task skills through 
a variety of formal and informal methods. 
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Evaluation of the training related issues by the researcher revealed a number of 
additional issues relevant to construction industry practice and the accident events. 
The first of these relates to different perceptions between those in operative and those 
in supervisory / managerial roles as to what constitutes training. In a number of cases, 
the supervisor / manager reported that training (such as toolbox talks, induction, task 
technique) had been provided to the accident involved personnel, but discussions with 
the supposed recipients often revealed that they did not perceive this (017,020,022, 
040,061). Informal site based instruction or toolbox talks were least likely to be 
perceived as training (065). 
... I've never 
had any safety training ... (later) ... I had a toolbox talk this 
morning `How to walk safely on site' - it was OK ... 
A second feature concerns mistrust or trivialisation of training; with comments 
implying that it is a method to comply with health and safety rules rather than as a 
method of skills transfer (020,038). In accident 005, for example, it was reported that 
the supervisor provided manual handling training to the accident involved 
interviewee, after which they then proceeded with the manual lift in spite of severe 
load and mismatch of team handlers. Some interviewees acknowledged receipt of 
toolbox talks in the three months preceding the semi-structured interview, but were 
unable to remember what these covered (040,062). Alternatively, there were reports 
of working safely when the safety advisor was around, yet instructions to resume 
`normal' practice when they left (023). 
A third feature observed by the researcher was that although some type of training 
may have occurred, this often did not address the initiating activity of the accident. 
These included manual handling (such as pushing and manipulation of equipment) 
(022,038,050) and housekeeping (062). There were mixed reports about too little 
(023) and too much training (012,022) and also some mixed comments indicating 
confusion or uncertainty about defining correct task techniques (004,012,024). 
A final feature concerning all `information transfer' issues was the value interpreted 
from obtaining a `trainees' signature. In many instances, interviewees reported 
`signing for it' after receiving some type of information (001,005,009,025,050,051, 
061,062). Interviewees described this as a foundation upon which to reprimand rule 
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breaking (037) or as a disclaimer of responsibility by those in authority (004,005, 
009). 
7.5.4 Summary of results according to Information Transfer factors 
The results for this section were dispersed across each of the PCDP, Work 
Organisation and Management and task phases with findings in common across all 
levels. 
Phase --*Failures concerning Failures concerning Failures concerning 
of generation Project Concept Work organisation & Task Execution 
Design & Management 
Failure category Procurement 
Determining criteria for Developing means to Communicating 
Information build and personnel assess and define safe instruction and guidance 
transfer requirements practice on safe practice 
- Client " Factors affecting " Risk assessment " Styles of training 
- Off-site contract, design and " Method statement provision 
personnel development of work " Ownership of " Site induction 
- MS schedule training provision " Toolbox talks 
RA " Transferring training 
- TBT into practice 
- Induction " On the job learning 
Table 63. Summary of results according to Information Transfer factors 
There were anomalies in the way that information transfer was interpreted and used. 
At PCDP phase, late provision of information apparently constrained the development 
of risk assessments and method statements, yet at this pre-site stage the documentation 
(essentially developed and used as a competitive tool to gain contractual work) 
preceded the point of application by a time period often of many weeks or months. In 
addition, the level of detail varied among the documentation that was included in the 
research. Even where there was some indication of the task elements necessary to 
effect the process, the delineation of what were inherent core skills of the operative 
and what instruction needed to be detailed was unclear and a source of confusion. 
Risk assessments were more likely to be applicable to task elements of the work 
process, yet invariably accidents did not occur during a task activity - setting-up, 
transit and clearing up the work situation received little coverage in either document, 
yet were heavily represented in the accident incidences. 
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Method statements, often developed from generic materials, were essentially a `best 
case' or even Utopian transcript of anticipated practice during sections of the build 
process. At the time of application, however, they did not necessarily reflect the 
prevailing circumstances at the time of work enactment. Those at task level rarely 
perceived them as working documents, yet their value as an instructional / training 
tool was seen as a fundamental component of safety management. 
Written materials were process orientated and appeared to have insufficient address to 
operator activities that would be required to achieve this. This may reflect 
indiscriminate allocation to `core skills', but the lack of detail describing task 
technique and skill requirements indicated poor insight into the human interaction 
necessary for the work. 
Those in senior roles on site mostly prepared risk assessments and method statements, 
yet they invariably appeared to have little practical involvement in the process tasks. 
As such, it appeared that any learning experience derived from document preparation 
was not applicable at a practical level. Conversely, at site level, those reading the 
documentation had little concept at all of any instruction in task techniques or 
procedures. The subsequent emphasis on signature collection (apparently inferring 
transfer of ownership and responsibility for work practice), appeared to offer little 
value - the direction, value and bureaucracy in using these types of information 
transfer as instructional measures is questioned. 
In the context of practical information transfer through induction, on the job training 
and toolbox talks, ownership and responsibilities for their provision appeared blurred, 
especially for those greatest in distance from the principal contractor in the sub- 
contractor chain. There was little indication of training in training provision for site 
personnel yet reliance upon `on the job learning' for skills development was 
considerable. For those apparently providing practical skills training there was no real 
sense that they perceived this as part of their work role. The style, presentation and 
language used in both practical and written modes of information transfer often 
appeared un-stimulating and inappropriate for a teaching medium. 
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7.6 Results by role, skills, abilities and attitudes 
Throughout the semi-structured interviews various concerns relating to the different 
employee grades were reported. These, with observations of the researcher, relate to 
differences among interviewees' roles, skills and attributes. 
Failure generation 
Phase 
10 
Role, skills, abilities and attitudes 
7.6.1.1 Role clarity of those in safety grades 
Interviewees that held a safety, or health and safety role, had a variety of backgrounds 
and training, ranging from trade to professional positions. A range of different job 
titles was also noted.. When referring to this grade, site personnel used the term 
`safety officer' most commonly, although the jobholders themselves used the term 
`advisor' or `manager' in preference. For those that were not called `manager', one 
was concerned that this lowered his credibility (010). Interviewees had also 
undertaken a wide range of training, ranging from short courses of less than one week 
(such as safety for Supervisor training), courses lasting in the range of 20 days (such 
as NEBOSH Construction & Certificate training) and longer training to NEBOSH 
Diploma and degree levels. These data are reproduced in Table 64. 
Project 
f&S I H&ti Safe$ Site Safety Safety Wet) afetl Co- Safety 
oh title Ianaýei Sgijervisor 
ý4la11a 
er Manager Officer dvisor Adhisor ordinator Adhisor 
Tature of 1-4days afety for TEBOSH NEBOSH 22 Sc EBOSH 'EBOSH EBOSH 
safety 
training 
uperviso 
nurse 
ertifica 
1978 
general + 
onstructio 
days afety 
elated 
ert + 
iploma in 
Part 2 Diploma 
e ee ro ress 
Table 64. Employment and educational training of personnel in a safety role 
The Safety role often appeared to be seen in the context of enforcement, policing or 
wet nursing (001,009). Site personnel offered most comments, but the safety 
interviewees also acknowledged these problems. 
249 
... We were trying to get away without a handrail on the scaffold to save 
some time. We thought it was safe and were happy with it, but the main 
contractor saw us and told us off... We just had to put our hands up to it 
and say we'd done it ... 
The researcher observed incidences of dismissiveness, backchat or dispute with the 
safety adviser (010), and these interviewees at times perceiving themselves as `worst 
enemies until something goes wrong' (036). Those in a safety role had varied 
perceptions of the value of their role. Most gave the impression that they provided a 
valuable and worthwhile contribution, but others indicated that their appointment was 
a second-choice option (away from an professional site position, such as Engineer) 
and something to which they were directed towards by their company rather than 
chose (005,009). 
7.6.1.2 Role clarity of those in supervisory / management grades 
Whilst the breadth of responsibilities for interviewees within supervisory / managerial 
roles was quite wide, there were also a number of concerns particular to this group as 
a whole. One of the main issues that interviewees described concerned conflict, 
which appeared to arise from the responsibilities of their role between subordinates 
and with those in authority. 
... I'm 
in the middle and the buck stops with me ... 
It was reported that principal contractors handed over responsibility for work 
organisation to sub-contractor supervisors (052), yet continued to be in a position to 
offer instruction or direction to their operatives, which undermined or confused the 
arrangements for control (061). Elsewhere, interviewees reported poor liaison in 
establishing arrangements for work planning or organisation - such as identifying 
needs for materials, supplies or PPE (001,061,062,064). This resulted in feelings of 
isolation or feeling distanced from the development and feedback loop. 
The level of responsibility within the supervisor role varied quite considerably among 
interviewees. There were reports of onerous demands to oversee a large number of 
people (up to 20 in one report, 036), yet other supervisory arrangements were more 
informal. Some interviewees did not see themselves as having a supervisory role, or 
saw their position just as an informal arrangement with their employers (020,034, 
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040). Promotion to a supervisory /management role from a skilled operative position 
was not always welcome (062). 
In describing their supervisory style, interviewees at times described the need for quite 
a strict and authoritative approach in order to ensure that the work progressed (009, 
020,052) and that correct PPE was worn (040). 
... I have to stand over and drive them - if you don't then they don't do it ... 
... The lads just don't see the danger and therefore they need to be told 
and kept in line ... 
Demands upon supervisors were confounded by various dissatisfactions, such as the 
need to assess and oversee the performance of new tradesmen (009), the concurrent 
demands of dealing with mobile phone calls - averaging 20-30 per day for one 
interviewee (002) and with long working hours. 
Supervisory / manager interviewees described their responsibilities for `health and 
safety', and any instructions and performance review that they received. Responses 
varied - only one interviewee reported all aspects within his employment contract 
(063) but the arrangements for others were less robust. Some interviewees reported 
no standards or instructions to follow at all (017,019,062), yet felt that health and 
safety responsibilities were part of their role, although not specified (023,040). 
Others also reported nothing unique to their appointment, but felt that any site 
documentation (such as site rules, codes of practice, toolbox talks, scaffold register, 
method statements or risk assessments) were their instructions (025,033,036,037, 
038,050,052,060,062,065). One interviewee had received an instructional folder 
from his safety advisor (061). The nature of any performance review (as in appraisal) 
received varied comments. Some interviewees reported `none' (038,050,052), or 
reported regular liaison with their safety advisors (061), or reactive monitoring 
according to accident occurrences (017,025,062), or audit by the principal contractor 
(065). 
Training among these interviewees in safety related matters varied and, unfortunately, 
many were unable to spontaneously provide details of training history and duration at 
251 
the time of interview. Although data were not fully available, the impression was that, 
of the 24 interviewees who responded, 17 had received some health and safety 
training in the preceding five years, whilst the remaining seven had received none, 
either in that time period, or at all. For those that had undertaken some training, the 
duration was in most cases between one and six days (22 days in one case); some saw 
the First Aid at Work certification as health and safety training. Only two 
interviewees felt that they had received training in human capabilities and 
performance - one through the `experience of life' and the other through previous 
training in the armed forces. 
7.6.1.3 Role clarity of those in operative grades 
At operative level, the main issues concerned problems arising from poor delineation 
of task responsibilities. Task requirements appeared quite varied from site to site and 
the boundaries of labourer/trainee or labourer/semi-skilled/tradesman roles appeared 
flexible. Interviewees resented working interchangeably with less skilled and 
qualified workers (003,023), and the resulting uncertainty affected the definition of 
task responsibilities, of core skill requirements, and the level at which task based 
training or supervision in task execution would be required (002,018,022,024). 
A number of interviewees reported general feelings of dissatisfaction (5.11.4.9). 
Typically these related to the impact upon their work through trying not to 
inconvenience the public (039,051,061) and comparable disparity in the provision of 
safe conditions for themselves and for the public (037). Additional sources of 
dissatisfaction for the interviewees included feelings of doing menial, poorly paid or 
undervalued work (018,023,050,062). 
... There's no thanks or acknowledgement 
from the company Directors. 
You risk your life all day and end up getting told off for smoking or not 
wearing a hard hat. It really knocks the wind out of your sails ... 
There also appeared to be undercurrent of dissatisfaction between different employee 
groups. At times this was interlinked with dissatisfaction with the housekeeping of 
another trade, or was related to poor performance or 
behaviour of others that the 
interviewee felt had induced the accident event (004,011). Interviewees reported that 
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communication beyond their own peer group was limited (037,038) and that there 
was a certain amount of secular behaviour (020). 
... It's the 
brickies versus the chippies and then M&E versus everybody 
else ... 
There were also isolated reports of `them and us' situations between operatives and 
managers (037). In spite of quite a bit of self-management among operative 
interviewees, they generally experienced good rapport with their immediate 
supervisors. Where there were problems these related to mumbled instructions (017) 
and pressures upon work pace and performance. 
Additional friction was apparent in (non-grade dependent) employee groups, 
distinguished by age, language and literacy. Quite varied perceptions of young or 
trainee workers were offered. From one perspective they were seen to be more safety 
aware (022,025), yet it was understood that inexperience, reluctance to complain, 
and the impression of being maligned by older and more experienced workers 
rendered them less likely to effect this knowledge (002,005,017,020,025). 
Issues relating to language and literacy also arose in the accident studies - there were 
reports of communication problems due to non-English speaking co-workers in three 
of the accidents. It was reported that this affected communication of safe working 
practice (008,019,022), yet there was some reluctance to address this as an accident 
causal factor, for fear of being accused of racism. Communication problems through 
poor literacy were also described (and noted by the researcher during data collection, 
012,024), although there were few reports about the disadvantage of this. Where 
relevant, any disadvantage was accommodated by reading out or describing the 
instructional materials. One supervisor /manager interviewee reported using the 
induction process to confirm language and literacy skills (023). 
Although not especially commented upon by interviewees, the researcher noted that a 
number of interviewees described themselves as self-employed, or as self-employed 
but somehow linked to a sub-contractor employer (009,011,065). It was very 
difficult to ascertain their employment pattern, but self-employment appeared to be 
more common among the operative interviewees. Given the difficulties in identifying 
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the nature of appointment, any likely link to their nature of employment could not be 
made. 
Whilst operatives in trade positions had undertaken apprentice or City and Guilds 
trade training, supplementary training for them and others in labour positions was 
focused upon CSCS or `ticket' based training for use of site plant or equipment. 
Many interviewees were unable to spontaneously provide details of training history 
duration at the time of interview. However, of the 31 who were able to provide some 
details it appeared that for ten to 13 of these interviewees, the toolbox talks and 
inductions were their only source of training. 
7.6.1.4 Skills development by trade. apprentice and NVO schemes 
Interviewees reported a variety of baseline trade, apprentice and NVQ training 
schemes, generally undertaken as school leavers and supplemented with subsequent 
experience on the job (001,002,007,011,018,022,023,051,061). The styles and 
duration of these different types of training were quite varied, and appeared to involve 
a mix of college and/or practical based experiences. 
Among the few trainee interviewees, a number of problems were reported. Scaffolder 
training, for example, was described as two to three block release sessions at a training 
centre, with examination after each subsequently permitting a certain level of 
unsupervised work. The formal training was supplemented with ongoing `on the job' 
learning and supervisor assessment. Interviewees in a trainee role expressed concerns 
about the quality of `on the job' learning, in the context of inconsistency of standards 
and lack of enthusiasm among the training providers (017,023). 
... The training 
involves labouring with scaffolding thrown in if they can 
be bothered ... 
A range of titles was given to the various stages of trainee development (from `mate' 
to `improver' for example) and the rationale for determining promotion intervals 
appeared quite flexible, lacking formal time scheduling or criteria for decision making 
of skills achievement (017,024). Employers and the self-employed each reported 
paying for these training schemes. 
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7.6.1.5 Skills development by CSCS training schemes 
Interviewees reported CSCS training schemes between one and five days and typically 
these involved training for use of a particular piece of plant or equipment (e. g., 
scaffold tower, mobile equipment, fork lift truck) or for supplementary safety training 
for their trade or area of responsibility. This scheme, with each training and 
assessment session also referred to as a `ticket', was well established on the sites 
visited and was used as a formal method by which to ascertain competence for 
workers to operate on site. 
Some adverse comments relating to the CSCS scheme were described and primarily 
concerned an over-balance of time on classroom style instruction compared with the 
practical component of a training course. A novice user of a piece of motorised 
mobile equipment might complete and attend a day's training course for example, but 
interviewees expressed concern that the time spent on practical skills training for the 
`ticket' did not provide sufficient experience with which to subsequently use that 
equipment unsupervised on site. 
... The crane co-ordinator course 
I had was not training - it was just 
here's the form, fill it out and sign it ... 
7.6.1.6 Individual capabilities 
Interviewees variously reported both good and bad health. Where there were reports 
of underlying or treated health conditions these related to background musculoskeletal 
injuries (004,013,017,021,022,023,028,029,040,060,63,64), respiratory 
problems (023,053), eye problems (023) and feelings of stress or anxiety (001,025). 
7.6.1.7 Attitudes towards safe practice 
Interviewees reported a wide variety of comments in relation to perceptions of safety 
culture within the industry and these fell within two main themes. Firstly, and 
although there really wasn't any rejection among interviewees of the need to `be safe', 
perception of what constituted safe and advantageous practice varied. 
Some saw the prescription of `safety measures' as detrimental to performance, by 
slowing the job down (060) and reducing earning potential (002,017). There were 
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one-off reports that some special or new measures (such as risk assessments for young 
people or anti-vibration gloves) were `over the top' (052). Others thought that safety 
measures introduced new risks (052, e. g., safety barriers creating trip hazards or 
harnesses hindering safe escape in emergency situations), and that the introduction of 
regulated safety had led to relinquishment of personal responsibility in determining 
safe working behaviour (021,052). 
... People 
lose their wits because of regulated safety ... 
Others felt that some general safety measures were unnecessary. The blanket policies 
on all sites about the wearing of PPE (hard hat and harnesses especially) were 
frequently considered inappropriate to a range of work circumstances (023,018). 
Interviewees inferred that this stipulation undermined their ability to make informed 
decisions (on the conditions of any given work situation) and was also an insulting 
intrusion into their otherwise high risk / high responsibility roles. 
Use or non-use of PPE was reported by operative and supervisor / manager 
interviewees alike as one of the main indicators of safe practice (041); yet there was 
anger among operative interviewees that focus on this was at the expense of 
concentration on less visible but greater hazards (001,062). 
... We're 
forever getting told off by the principal contractor about 
things not done. It's over the top, like complaining about you taking 
your hat off if its in the way - They go on about minor things, but the 
major stuff is all down to money ... 
Overall, comments about the site's safety culture were good, with many reports and 
appreciation of the greater emphasis on safety in the preceding five years. 
Nonetheless, there were a few adverse comments indicating that safe practice was 
overridden by production pressures (025,037) and that, despite what was said in 
induction, `safety' was more for appearances sake than actual implementation (011, 
060). Where interviewees provided positive feedback on safety culture this was at 
times judged against reactive measures, such as the occurrence and response to serious 
accidents (007,063). 
... I couldn't 
fault them - they took me to hospital when the accident 
happened ... 
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7.6.1.8 Attitudes affecting work motivation 
As a conclusion to the semi-structured interviews, participants described the best and 
worst parts of their work. Comments varied both between groups and across the 
participant range. 
At the safety grade, for example, interviewees reported promoting safe work practices 
(002,013), seeing people work in a safe manner (004,010,036) and contribution to 
reduction of major accident rates (005) as the best aspects of their work. Whilst these 
types of comments were unique to this employee group, these interviewees also had 
comments in common with other grades. For example, social interaction with others 
on site was cited as a `best parts of the work' by safety (001) and by the other 
employee grades too. At the supervisory / management level this was described as the 
benefits of working with people (002,003,009,025,020,064), of companionship 
(051) and of being able to pass on their own good work skills (063). At the operative 
level, the best parts of social interaction were seen as socialising, working with 
friends, helping others and having a laugh (005,011,019,062,063,065). 
Variety was also seen as a `best part of the work' by all grades and was interpreted in 
the context of `situation' and work content. In the situational context variety was 
valued in freedom of movement around and across different sites, with the opportunity 
to work in the fresh air and appreciate open space (019,023,024 025,037,050). 
Concerning work content, interviewees welcomed opportunities to deal with new and 
challenging situations (002,005,007 020,025,060,063). More detailed descriptions 
by interviewees showed that opportunities to use mental capacities and a sense of 
accomplishment were also important. At a supervisory / managerial level, 
opportunities for problem solving (038,064), making decisions and being in control 
(019,020,037,063,064) were valued and, especially concerning operative grades 
too, accomplishment of quality work (012,020,022,023,051,053,060) with value to 
the end user was prized. 
For interviewees at the supervisory / managerial grade, work completion according to 
projected target was especially important (002,017,022,023,025,037,040,050, 
052,053,061). Alternatively, among operative interviewees only, working in an 
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environment where they could organise their own work, without pressure or hassle, 
was seen as `best parts of the job' (017,023,024,040). 
A few other `best parts of the work' were mentioned, relating to `rewards' of the work 
- such as being complemented for good work (060), receipt of payment (009,040, 
062), keeping fit (017,065) and work breaks or going home at the end of the day (002, 
004,011,012,018,019,038,052). Other interviewees, and from all grades, gave no 
particular description for the `best parts of their work', but simply reported that they 
mostly enjoyed their work (008,013,024,025,033,034,036,038,040,060,061, 
063,064). 
In contrast, interviewees also described the `worst parts of their work'. Across all 
grades, but especially mentioned by operative interviewees, was poor environmental 
circumstances, such as bad weather - wet, cold, snow and wintry conditions (001,002, 
009,011,018,020,033,036,050,062,065), dirt and dust (008,017,023,024) and 
poor underfoot conditions, such as mud and uneven ground (002,011,038). 
Operatives also described aspects related to work or task types that were the worst 
parts of their job, for instance use of particular types of equipment (063), demolition 
(060) or heavy / labouring work (009,017,022,063). For a few the work was boring 
and mundane (004) and there were safety concerns about being pushed to do work that 
they were not qualified for (020). 
There was greater commonality of responses by those in the safety / supervisory / 
managerial grades, although those in safety grades specifically mentioned the 
occurrence of accidents as the worst parts of their jobs (002,004,036). Problems with 
communication and liaison were frequently mentioned, affecting relations within own 
employer group and with principal and sub-contractor teams (005,013,038,052, 
053,062). Whilst a couple of interviewees cited `being busy' as an advantage of their 
work (002,065), more reported work overload as a `worst part of their work'. This 
was expressed in terms of too much work (025,023,065), pressure to complete work 
(003,006,050,060,063,064,065) and having to work to over-ambitious targets 
(038). 
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Supplementary to these pressures, the safety / supervisory / managerial interviewees 
reported insufficient resource to do their work, such as lack of materials (010,061) 
and of the burden upon them to manage absenteeism (038), or poorly skilled 
operatives (002,020,021,023,025,050,061). Bureaucratic demands, such as 
dealing with dismissals (009,022,064), `paperwork' and burdensome and lengthy 
safety inspections were additionally mentioned by supervisor / manager interviewees 
as the worst part of their work (002,012,037,040). 
Whilst some interviewees reported no worse parts of their work (011,019,040), 
among each interviewee group, travel and working hours were reported. One 
interviewee felt his work hours were too short (053), but there was otherwise 
considerable disdain for long work hours (009,013,025,037), coupled with lengthy 
travel to and from work (002,034,053,061). 
For others, getting up and starting work was the worst part of their work (004,017, 
051,019,052). Several interviewees, across all supervisory, management and 
operative grades reported that they would not enter construction work if they had their 
chance again - computer based office work was seen as the optimum type of work by 
many. 
7.6.1.9 Rehort on rated responses for stress, job satisfaction and social support 
A number of the comments concerning best and worst part of the job were generated 
when people completed the rating scale for stress, job satisfaction and social support. 
The data (mean scores and standard deviation) for the rating scale responses are 
reproduced in Appendix 7 and in the chart in Figure 22. 
Whilst qualitative analysis revealed many different opinions and experiences, the 
rated responses of employee groups (as a common voice) were surprisingly positive. 
The intermediate level (3), signifying neither complete agreement nor disagreement 
was (except for labourers) attributed to `my job causes me worry - the labourer group 
tended to disagree with this statement. 
Other points at level 3 or below were 'I enjoy my work' and `I would recommend my 
job and place of work to a friend'. Supervisor respondents rated work enjoyment at 3, 
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whereas senior managers rated this as `2' (SD 0.69) - suggesting least agreement 
among these respondents. 
Standard deviation had a pattern of being greater among all groups' responses for the 
final four statements, indicating a larger breadth of feeling (around the mean score) for 
these issues 
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7.6.2 Summary of results according to role, skill and attitude factors 
Roles skills and Role 
attitudes " Clarity of role for different interview grades 
Sldlls 
" Skills development by traditional training methods 
" Skills development through the CSCS scheme 
Individual capabilities 
Attitudes 
Attitudes towards safe practice 
Attitudes towards motivational factors of the work 
Table 65. Summary of results according to Role, Skills, Capabilities and Attitude 
factors 
The findings from this section indicated that, apart from the safety advisor position, 
job roles are poorly defined. The safety position appeared to operate under a myriad 
of job titles, yet these did not necessarily seem to carry any bearing upon their 
baseline training. Within such a small sample it was especially worrying to find that 
this role was adopted as an alternative to redundancy. 
For other roles, job content appeared to be very fluid and entirely reactive to 
whatever the requirements of the site of particular work situation required. The j ob 
requirements evolved to fit the circumstances or context of the work. This seemed 
to be accepted as part of the job, often without question by supervisors, yet caused 
discontent among operative groups. 
For supervisors especially, their positions ranged between extremes of demanding 
responsibilities to quite casual arrangements where they did not necessarily perceive 
any especial demands to oversee others. This may reflect the wide range of job 
roles with `supervisory' responsibilities in the sample, but nonetheless supervisor 
role content and responsibilities seemed more `perceived' rather than recorded. Few 
had any form of career pathway, or appraisal to help them develop in their work. 
There were apparently few or no opportunities to learn supervisory skills and they 
seemed to be valued almost exclusively by performance markers, such as timeliness 
of their work, accident rates etc. 
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At operative level, training history seemed very varied. Some were entirely reliant 
upon inductions or toolbox talks as their only training opportunities. Where formal 
skills' training was provided, there was concern about the disproportionate amount 
of time spent on theory, compared with practical skills development (7.6.1.5). Skill 
based learning (tickets) was invariably related to use of a particular piece of tooling 
or equipment - it is not known whether safe practice in set-up, maintenance and 
clearing away (i. e. many of the accident circumstances) was covered. That first-aid 
training was also seen as safety training supports the impressions of fatalism 
associated with many interviewee accounts. 
In contrast to supervisors, operatives were less content with fluidity in their role and 
felt that their skills were not valued or respected as distinct from those without 
comparable skills or experience. There were incidences of considerable discontent 
and operatives seemed to receive little positive feedback on their performance. 
There were aspects from which they derived fulfilment and job satisfaction (doing a 
good job, companionship etc. ), yet these appeared quite opportunistic rather than 
something that was desirable as a management initiative. 
Information from operative interviewees gave two quite different pictures of 
behaviour and management style on site. On the one hand operatives appeared 
secular, with inter-trade rivalries and a rigid hierarchy that does little to 
accommodate special groups (young, non-British, poor literacy). Traditional 
management practices appeared to complement this, with a `boot camp' mentality, 
encouraging petty rivalries between different trades and operating with heavy- 
handed disciplinarian methods. In contrast, others, and this includes representations 
among all roles, revealed disdain for this mindset and had a genuine desire to help 
others and to distance themselves from such antagonism. 
Hand in hand with the traditional approach, many safety management practices also 
appeared dogmatic and inflexible. Non-use of safety equipment or PPE, albeit 
briefly at times, appeared to be perceived as deviant behaviour. Some responded by 
seeing what they could get away with without being caught, whereas many others 
found it oppressive and offensive to be ticked off like naughty schoolboys, in 
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circumstances when they had genuine reasons for such omissions. Objections to 
this style of safety management appeared credible. 
One of the prime conflicts here was that agreement, sympathy for or sense of 
ownership for many site safety interventions was severely lacking. There seemed to 
be a tremendous contrast between perceptions of what safety interventions were 
warranted - between the site based and safety / managerial personnel. Other than 
resigned acceptance by some, many initiatives were seen as a management cop-out 
to doing something that might be more disruptive or expensive. 
There were also many undercurrent health problems among operative interviewees 
and the provision of occupational health services appeared either incompetent or 
negligible. 
7.7 Summary of qualitative site data 
The summary sections for each failure category drew together the range of problems 
that had been identified across the project timeline. There were a number of main 
elements or common themes to the findings. 
The early stages of the planning process were hampered by fluctuating inputs and 
ongoing revisions from designers and the client. This had broad reaching effects 
upon time scheduling and the quality of drawings or detail required later on site. 
Financial restrictions also appeared to be far reaching; affecting purchasing of 
materials, equipment and products used on site and the appointment of sub- 
contractors. 
Co-operation and communication between principal and sub-contractors appeared 
poor. There were also numerous issues concerning the `management and co- 
ordination of site personnel'. Findings suggested that these aspects were poorly 
conceived and appeared not to be `managed' at all; problems appeared to focus 
upon lack of knowledge and an inadequate range of clear guidelines stipulating 
good practice (e. g. health related issues, providing supervision, monitoring 
performance and providing motivation, payment and working hours). Where there 
were specifications these were only cautiously adopted (e. g. in labour appointment 
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and competence determination) and operated in parallel with traditional and 
unregulated practices. 
The training schemes received a mixed perception; much of the practical training 
appeared very casual and lacking in clear boundaries for development. The move 
towards `ticketed' training often ensured that more people were authorised in use of 
particular tooling or equipment, but appeared to offer little in the way of task and 
skills development that fulfilled individual needs. Documentation, compiled for risk 
assessments and method statements, was used as training yet these materials had 
many style and content failings and appeared to offer little in the way of 
`instruction' for operatives. 
The common themes to the findings were that there was `habitual blindness' among 
interviewees; many of the problems were accepted without question and 
intervention. There also appeared to be many instances of lack of clear specification 
or ownership of responsibilities, and this affected all phases from design, through to 
procurement and the roles of individuals. Even where there were specifications, the 
effectiveness of these were hampered by the lack of consideration of human 
interactions, and this affected layout, routes, the condition of the workspace and 
welfare facilities and much of the tooling, equipment and materials used on site. 
Table 56 introduced the categorisation style for the site data findings and this has 
been amended (Table 66) to summarise the areas where failure was identified. 
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Failures concerning Failures concerning Work Failures concerning 
Project Concept Design & Organisation & Management Task Execution 
Procurement 
Development of the site Transfer and management of build Provision of necessary 
and buildingplan and requirements hardware for the work 
d si 
g " Build scheduling " Procurement of hardware " Tools 
oý ö " Detail and design of the " Managing the provision of task " Materials 
structure resources " Equipment 
Äü " Detail and design of the " Task technique 
site layout " Relating to PPE 
Defining and organising Managing and co-ordinating site Provision of suitable 
labour sunnly personnel task conditions 
" Factors affecting sub- " Labour appointment " Ground, floor or foot 
contractor appointment " Determination of competence placement areas 
" Factors affecting " Identification and surveillance " Workspace provision 
distinction of contractor of work fitness " Housekeeping 
responsibilities " Supervision of experienced and " Environmental 
" Ownership of proactive inexperienced-operatives conditions 
safety behaviour " Establishing working hours " Affecting operative 
" Time pressure upon workload task organisation 
" Monitoring performance and (trade overlap) 
providing motivation 
" Pay and remuneration 
" Provision of welfare facilities 
" Documenting and undertaking 
accident investigation and 
determining remedial action 
"ö ° " Providing opportunities for 
91 operative consultation and 
communication 
Determining criteria for Developing means to assess and Communicating 
build and personnel define safe practice instruction and idance 
requirements on safe practice 
Q 
" Factors affecting contract, " Risk assessment " Styles of training 
design and development " Method statement provision 
of work schedule " Ownership of training provision " Site induction 
" Toolbox tallos 
" Transferring training 
into practice 
" On the job learning 
Role 
" Clarity of role for different interview grades 
m 
" Skills development by traditional training methods 
" Skills development through the CSCS scheme p individual abilities 
Attitudes 
0 ý, " Attitudes towards safe practice k Attitudes towards motivational factors of the wor 
as 
Table 66. Summary of qualitative site data findings 
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7.8 Critique of the qualitative site data analysis 
In contrast to the shortcomings identified in analysis of `accident specific' findings 
(6.5), the qualitative data analysis has provided much greater detail to support the 
core findings and how these issues affected different employee groups. Within this 
it has also revealed an impression of the site culture - the nature of interactions, 
intangible or invisible issues, which were not apparent in the more concise analysis. 
The style of cross-referencing the focus group enquiry themes with categories later 
derived from the analysis provided a useful anchor upon which to ensure that all 
aspects of enquiry were explored. It also ensured that the phase of generation in the 
project timeline was fully represented (Table 66). 
The category `Information Transfer' was essentially a means of conveying or 
communicating knowledge between `Design and task execution' and `Planning, 
scheduling and management'. Ideally, representation of these three categories 
would follow the style in Figure 23, where `Information Transfer' is placed 
centrally (rather than following Planning, Scheduling and Management). The 
horizontal arrows represent progressive development for each category, and the 
oblique arrows represent the interaction between categories during the project 
timeline. However, this style of presentation was not adopted because much of the 
planning, Scheduling and Management information needed to be introduced 
beforehand. 
Project Concept Work Task 
Design & Organisation & 
Procurement Management 
Design & task execution 
Information Transfer 
(MS, RA, Induction etc. ) 
Planning Scheduling & 
Management 
Figure 23. Information transfer - the central role 
From a negative perspective, the categories did generate a certain amount of 
replication of information and at times it was difficult to allocate findings to a 
particular category. However, whilst not foolproof, they did permit isolation of 
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issues that arose and ensured that information was looked at from different 
perspectives. Although the analysis process was heavily dependent upon the 
subjective impressions of the researcher, this style of categorisation ensured that 
information relevant to all areas was considered. It was thought that this would 
minimise researcher bias (perhaps by inadvertent selection of information relating 
only to specific areas) and misdirected or inappropriate attribution of cause (3.9.5). 
The multiple data collection methods generally fulfilled their objectives and created 
a wealth of data. However, it was unfortunate that it was not possible to proceed 
with the iterative development of proformas as expected (5.4.5). This meant that, 
although there was inclusion of new enquiry themes (Table 42), the later review or 
removal of unproductive questions was not undertaken. As such, the interviews, at 
times, took longer than anticipated. 
The qualitative analysis has not identified the `frequency of occurrence' that is the 
mainstay of epidemiological style analysis (although `irregular access to data' (6.5) 
suggested that these data were in any case incomplete for this style of analysis). 
These `frequency' data are traditionally important measures used to identify the 
extent of a problem and urgency of preventative measures. This practice is integral 
with the risk assessment process, yet it is important to consider whether these latent 
condition data fall into the `risk' category and require comparable levels or urgency 
of action? Latent conditions are contributory in nature and not necessarily causal 
(Spurgeon and Young, 1980), (3.5.3.2). An alternative perspective is that these data 
reveal to the construction industry the nature of the problems, and that alternative 
means are required in the generation of remedial measures (9.3). 
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8 PHASE THREE - LATENT CONDITION FOLLOW-UP 
Analysis and interpretation of the site data, Phase Two of the research, revealed a 
broad range of factors relevant to accident causation during site-based activities. By 
cross-referencing findings to the project phase of generation it was also possible to 
identify some of the organisational latent factors. These data, however, gave only 
occasional information concerning accident distal factors in the pre-site phase. 
Indeed many of the findings revealed failings outside the construction process itself 
- perhaps in the provision of ancillary services (provision of tools and equipment 
for example), or in related to regulation within the industry. 
Phase Two 
Site based accident 
studies 
Cross-disciplinary 
appraisal 
Establish contacts for Collate and develop 
latent factor ergonomics analysis 
follow- methods 
Phase Three 
Latent condition 
follow- 
Cross-disciplinary 
appraisal and closure 
Figure 24. Phase Three of the research 
Phase Three (Figure 24) of the research concerned the process of cross-disciplinary 
appraisal in identification of latent factors that warranted deeper exploration, 
development of the range of techniques used to acquire data, establishing further 
industry contacts and finally the methods adopted among the research team to 
validate the process. 
8.1 Methodology 
8.1.1 Aims and objectives 
The aim of the latent condition follow-up was to explore issues that had emerged 
from the Phase Two analysis (either to reinforce or refute conclusions reached). It 
also aimed to reveal informational themes that might be more widely applicable, 
and especially across the accidents excluded from this more detailed analysis. In 
order to achieve this, the objectives were to: 
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(a) Canvas opinions from both construction and ergonomics specialists 
concerning their perspectives of the most important factors to be pursued 
(b) Identify information from ergonomics and construction industry resources 
that might be used in the development of data collection techniques 
(c) Explore the latent conditions and range of alternative practices that might 
inform and enrich the data source 
(d) Identify the most effective methods for data representation 
8.1.2 Technique used for accident study latent factor Identification 
8.1.2.1 Review by research team specialists 
Accident summary reports (Appendix 9) were prepared for each of the accident 
studies. These included feedback of responses from interviewees, appraisal of 
procedural information and, where possible, photographs of the accident event work 
area (or current equivalent at the time of the site visit). 
One each of the Construction and Ergonomics specialists on the research team 
appraised the contents of each report. This served two purposes: 
. Construction specialists were able to verify interpretation by the Ergonomist 
researcher of the circumstances and terminology used to describe the accident. 
If relevant detail had been omitted, or if information was unclear, this process 
enabled them to highlight where clarification or supplementary information 
was needed to strengthen the report 
0 Construction and Ergonomics specialists were each able to identify the areas 
that they felt were most pertinent in accident causation. This information was 
later used to direct the accident study follow-up process 
8.1.3 Research boundaries to latent conditions follow-up 
The first thirty accidents (between 001 - 040) were selected for inclusion in the 
process of more detailed analysis. To accommodate the time and manpower 
available to pursue latent factors, each specialist was required to identify just two or 
three aspects that they felt had played an important contribution in the accident 
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event; this practice was agreed amongst the research team. Although the range of 
latent factors adopted for further research was reduced, it nonetheless channelled 
thoughts to consider the main issues. 
8.1.4 Researcher criteria for evaluation of follow-up suggestions 
Whilst specialists aimed to be succinct in their suggestions for follow-up, there were 
times when the range of suggestions (especially when construction and ergonomics 
specialists comments were combined) exceeded the `two or three aspects' that might 
feasibly be explored. In order to select the nature and direction of the further 
exploration, the researcher undertook a process of cross-comparison of the 
suggestions made by each of the specialists. These data are reproduced at the end of 
each accident study report (Appendix 9). In order to identify which aspects to 
pursue, the following criteria were adopted: 
Commonality of opinion 
9 Where each specialist had suggested the same aspect, this was most likely to be 
selected for further exploration 
Anticipated feasibility of successful data collection 
Some suggestions were considered unlikely to be fruitful. Decision upon 
`unlikelihood' was based upon existing knowledge of lack of access to the 
proposed interviewees 
" Where the proposed enquiry and response had already been addressed as fully as 
possible as part of the accident study, the matter was not selected for 
reintroduction to the interviewees 
In some cases specialists' comments were indicative of their knowledge or 
suggestions for best practice under ideal circumstances. Whilst this provided a 
valuable learning resource it did not necessarily identify the follow-up route for 
the actual accident event 
" Other suggestions proposed that interviewees should be asked why they had 
acted incompetently or with lack of insight. Experience from accident study 
interviews showed that such admissions were rare and that interviewee: 
interviewer conflict restricted openness of responses. Where an open enquiry 
could not be anticipated the suggestion was not pursued 
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Some suggestions were of a personal nature (enquiries about the interviewee's 
domestic situation for example, which beyond the bounds of the research 
criteria), or were beyond recommended health and safety guidelines (use of back 
belts in manual handling, for example), or might breach an interviewee's 
confidentiality in discussion with others. Aspects such as these were not 
pursued 
As an example of the latent factors selection process, the summary of the 
specialists' suggestions for accident 025 are reproduced in Table 67. 
Accident 025: An Assistant Surveyor was descending a scaffold ladder and 
cut the back of his leg on sheet metal debris from roofing work 
Construction Specialist Ergonomics Specialist 
1. Housekeeping culture 1. Delegation of responsibilities 
for housekeeping 
2. Sub-contractor viewpoint on 2. Criteria for sub-contractor 
safety culture appointment (quality and 
integrity of workmanship) 
3. Risk assessment by client or 
Architect 
Table 67. Further exploration suggested by project specialists 
In this example, each specialist proposed `housekeeping'; this aspect was selected 
for follow-up, with the expectation that this information would be defined in the site 
policies of the Principal Contractor. A second proposed aspect was discussions with 
the sub-contractors about their perceptions of site safety culture; whilst it was 
known that they had been dismissed from site it was felt that this would also be a 
valuable enquiry and this aspect was selected for follow-up. Finally, risk 
assessment by the client or Architect, as part of the design activity, was identified 
and this aspect was also selected for follow up. 
Criteria for sub-contractor appointment was the final aspect proposed by the 
specialists. `Sub-contractor appointment' had already been discussed during the site 
visit and there was already indication that best efforts had made in appointment of 
competent personnel; this aspect was not pursued further. Whilst it was felt that 
further exploration of sub-contractor appointment would not likely reveal additional 
data for this specific accident study it was noted that that the issues of sub- 
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contractor appointment arose across a number of accident studies. In response to 
generation of specific and common concerns across accident studies, a range of 
follow-up methods was introduced. 
8.1.4.1 Commonality of construction and ergonomist opinions 
The same or similar responses from ergonomics and construction specialist were the 
trigger for selection of the suggested enquiry area to be pursued for further data 
collection. Whilst a different wording or source may have been offered by each 
discipline, there was commonality within suggestions for 24 of the 30 accidents 
(80%) included in this stage of the research. 
8.1.5 Data collection methods 
The need to explore pre-site or extra-site issues was identified at the outset of the 
data collection period, yet it was not clear until actual collection of accident study 
site data where these enquiries should be directed. 
8.1.5.1 Generation of data collection techniques 
During the resource appraisal and technique development phase for Phase Two (5.2, 
5.3), it was apparent that latent factor follow-up would likely be directed towards 
personnel in positions `upstream' in the project lifecycle. A further proforma, also 
incorporating roles and responsibilities laid down in the CDM Regulations (Health 
and Safety Commission 2001b), was developed for use in semi-structured interview 
with senior or off-site construction personnel (Appendix 8). From these resources, 
the client, planning supervisor and designer were anticipated as likely interviewees. 
It was intended that this proforma would be used in combination with Proforma 3 
(as during the site data collection interviews, 5.4.2), although in practice, the 
prepared proforma was used only on a small number of occasions. The proforma 
had been developed for someone directly in the accident event `chain', yet 
participant recruitment problems (8.1.6) meant that it was not appropriate when 
interviewees were outside the accident frame. 
Many follow-up aspects concerned manufacturers or suppliers of machinery, tools 
and equipment; an existing data collection questionnaire for product and equipment 
evaluation was adopted for use in these circumstances (Institute for Occupational 
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Ergonomics 1998b, Appendix 8). For other interviews, questions were developed 
on an ad hoc basis (either prior to or during the interview) - to explore findings 
from accident study data or from `specialists' comments. Interviews were less 
structured than those used during site data collection. A framework of discussion 
themes was generally prepared, but interviewees were encouraged to enlarge upon 
these as the interview evolved. The interviews with least structure were generally 
used for the more generic interviews. 
8.1.6 The range of enquiry routes used in data collection 
Most interviews were held at interviewees' places of work (also one by e-mail/ 
letter and four by telephone) and included one to one interviews and group 
discussions. 
8.1.6.1 Accident specific data collection 
Where there was a direct lead to individuals or specific companies in the follow-up 
factors chosen for each accident, all effort was made to proceed with this nature of 
enquiry. At times, however, this approach was not always possible (primarily 
because contacts did not wish to participate, or because they could not be contacted) 
and alternative `generic' methods of latent factor data collection were sought. 
8.1.6.2 Generic data collection 
The process of exploring latent factors through `generic style assessment' proved a 
valuable resource for the research. `Generic' style exploration was undertaken with 
interviewees who were suitably qualified or experienced to be able to provide an 
informed opinion upon the subject matter, yet were not necessarily connected with 
any specific accident event. This style of latent condition exploration was 
undertaken under the following types of circumstances: 
Where accident studies revealed failures in common across a number of 
accidents 
" Where accident study follow-up indicated that failure might stem from pan- 
industry issues (such as longstanding organisational problems or inappropriate 
guidelines, for example) 
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" Where it was not possible to follow the proposed enquiry routes for each 
accident study, whether through lack of access, or when contacts did not wish to 
participate in the research 
These `generic' interviews were conducted using either of two methods: 
Generic specific data collection 
`Generic specific' interviews were discussions that were directed at a specific area 
of enquiry 
Generic collective data collection 
`Generic collective' interviews were broad based discussions encompassing a range 
of enquiry areas. 
The process of using these approaches is shown in Figure 25. 
IDENTIFICATION 
OF DATA NEEDS 
Accident follow-up Accident specific 
specific 
General enquiries Generic collective 
en 
Figure 25. Process used to collect latent factor information 
Use of published materials relating to enquiry areas were also used (publicity, fact 
sheets, instructions), and were appropriate for either of the generic data collection 
methods. 
8.1.7 Analysis and representation 
Data are presented in three different forms. Firstly the profile of the research sample 
reveals the follow-up areas that were pursued (8.2). The second form is tabular 
presentation of the findings, relevant to the enquiry areas for each accident (as in 6.3). 
The final form is the qualitative analysis of all findings (as in Chapter 7). Accident 
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specific enquiries revealed that the latent conditions were in themselves subject to 
latent conditions, and these data are combined (as in Figure 21) for presentation. 
8.2 Profile of the research sample 
Table 68 represents the nature of the latent factor analyses undertaken (shown in the 
context of the four enquiry areas). Whether data collection was successful or not (or 
not attempted) is also shown. This is also listed with each accident report in 
Appendix 9. 
Design & task 
execution 
Management 
factors 
Design development & choices 
(002,003,005,010,011,017, 
024,033,035,039) 
Ergonomist product evaluation 
(001,007) 
Equipment/ Tool / PPE 
manufacturer (002,003,006, 
008,012,022,033,035,036, 
038) 
Equipment / tool supplier (012, 
036) 
Materials manufacturer (002,034) 
Technical specialists (004,005, 
007,009,011,017,020,021, 
025,036,038,040) 
Product procurement (033,034) 
Housekeeping management (017, 
018) 
Operative supervision (018,019) 
Work scheduling (021) 
Fitness for work (037) 
Communication on site (038) 
005,013) 
Operative training (008,011,012, 
017,033,035) 
Professional training (017) 
Language / cultural issues (022) 
Design development & choices 
(001,004,005,011,022,024, 
025) 
Equipment' Tool manufacturer 
(007,008,019,021) 
Materials manufacturer (009) 
Task technical specialist (001,008, 
024) 
Product procurement (022) 
Co-ordination on/off site (004, 
013,020,022) 
Work incentives (023) 
Housekeeping management (025) 
SC appointment issues (025) 
Documentation issues (010,018, 
019,020,021,023,025) 
Operative training (007,020,021) 
Not altempled 
Multiple personnel (001) 
Design development & 
choices (001,003,010, 
018,024) 
Equipment/ Tool 
manufacturer (002, 
035,038,039) 
Materials manufacturer 
(018) 
Task technical specialist 
(034,038) 
Product procurement 
(003,038) 
Operative management / 
supervision (007,013, 
034,035) 
Identification of working 
hours (011,039) 
Communication on site 
(012,023,035) 
Housekeeping 
006,009,010,038, 
040) 
Documentation issues 
(009,038,039) 
Personal issues (021) 
Skills assessment (023) 
Table 68. Overview of research pursuit for the follow-up proposed by specialists 
8.3 Profile of latent conditions for the accident sample 
Research questions generated from the construction and ergonomics specialists 
suggested areas of enquiry are reproduced in Table 69. As not all interviewees were 
traceable (or responded), the questions have been revised and developed to reflect 
the nearest equivalent given the eventual interview circumstances. 
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Where the interviewee name has been `strask thfough' this indicates that a planned 
interview had been identified as desirable, but had not proved possible. As such, the 
data presented represents what could be achieved under the circumstances. 
8.4 Validation of researcher findings 
Upon completion of data collection, findings were discussed with the ergonomist 
and construction specialist. This was an opportunity for cross-disciplinary 
conference upon the results and for either to suggest any further exploration or 
clarification. It was also an opportunity to dispel bias by the researcher. 
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8.5 Techniques used for results categorisation 
The tabular presentation of latent condition information shown in the last section 
answered the immediate research questions in relation to each accident but, in isolation, 
did not represent the findings in the context of the construction industry. In the same 
way, qualitative analysis of site findings (7) counter-balanced this and a similar style of 
analysis was used to explore the findings and identify the themes and common trends 
relevant to the industry. 
8.5.1 Distinguishing accident direct and generic follow-up 
Over forty follow-up interviews were held and these included a mix of individual or 
group discussions; many were able to provide information concerning more than one 
accident (recorded as generic specific or generic - collective interviews). The interview 
types are reproduced in Table 70, (categorised according to the data collection method 
used) together with abbreviations that are later used in the text. 
Accident - direct Generic -- specific Generic - collective 
Structural Engineer (SE) Temporary Works Designer (G- Senior Site Managers (QS, Site 
Architect (A) TWD) Planner, Contracts Mgr, 
Planning Supervisor (PS) Ergonomist Analysis (self) Project Manager (G-SSM) 
Site Management staff *(- x5) Ductwork Designer (G-DWD) Plant suppliers (G-S) 
Site Safety staff*(- x7) Regulatory bodies (CITB, HSE Architect (G-A) 
Temporary Works Manager specialists) PPE Suppliers G-PPE) 
(TWM) Scissor Lift Manufacturer (SLM) Health and Safety Specialists (G- 
Ductwork Designer (DWD) Plasterboard Trolley supplier H&S) 
Groundwork Contractor* (PTS) Supply catalogues 
Cavity closure manufacturer Harness Designer (HM) 
(CCM) Jockey Wheel Manufacturer 
Extractor fan manufacturer (JV TM) 
(EFM) Concrete pump manufacturer 
Lorry crane manufacturer (LCM) (CPM) 
Scaffold tower manufacturer 
(STM 
comments extracted from site data and reported by accident number) 
Table 70. Profile of resources used in latent factor data collection 
8.5.2 Categorisation of latent conditions 
As a framework upon which to distinguish the findings, the methods of cross- 
referencing the development phase with the failure categories was re-employed. 
Further analysis of the information concerning the information source (accident direct 
or generic) (Table 70) revealed that the information also formed natural groupings 
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within the three development phases; these findings are reproduced in Table 71 and 
show the main information resources for the new categories. 
Information Designers and Managers and Ancillary designers* 
sources Planners Suppliers 
Accident - Architects Planning Supervisor Cavity closure 
direct Site Management staff Site Management staff manufacturer 
(_) (_) Extractor fan 
Site Safety staff Temporary Works manufacturer 
Ductwork Designer (_) Manager Lorry crane 
Groundwork Contractor manufacturer 
Scaffold tower 
manufacturer 
Mitre saw manufacturer 
Generic - Nuclear Installations Scissor Lift 
specific Designer Manufacturer 
Temporary Works Plasterboard Trolley 
Designer Designer /supplier 
Ductwork Designer (_) Jockey Wheel 
Manufacturer 
Concrete pump 
manufacturer 
Harness Designer 
Senior Site Managers & Plant suppliers 
Generic - Planners PPE Suppliers 
collective Architect 
Health and Safety 
Specialists 
I Other 
Ergonomist Analysis, Regulatory bodies (CITB, HSE), Supply catalogues 
0 Ancillary design denotes a common term adopted to encompass the designers of tools, equipment and materials used on site 
Table 71. Distribution of interviewees included in latent factor work 
Supplementary information was also available, `other' and this was used to support or 
explore findings as appropriate. However, whilst it was relatively straightforward to 
categorise findings derived from the industry itself, this was less straightforward for 
information that had been generated outside the construction process. Information from 
suppliers and manufacturers, for example, whilst fundamental to the latent factor 
investigation, was a new resource to the research, revealing fresh information without 
an initiating prompt from construction related resources. 
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Development phased Project concept Work Task 
"I Design & Organisation & 
Failure categories Procurement Management 
Design & execution Development of Transfer of Provision of 
build plan and management and hardware and 
design build requirements materials 
Planning Scheduling 
& Management Defining and organising contractors 
Factors affecting personnel management and task conditions 
Information Transfer Determining design requirements 
(MS, RA, induction 
etc. ) Assessing and defining safe practice 
Role, skills, abilities Role and skills development 
and attitudes 
Shortcomings to optimum role execution 
Table 72. Categorisation of latent conditions 
As a means to draw together and distinguish these new findings, the section headings 
were revised (Table 72). In contrast to the site data results, where many of the findings 
cross-referenced to `Planning, scheduling and management' issues (and had no real 
route for further pursuit), findings here related primarily to the `Design and task 
execution' category. This is reflected in the refashioning of the table. 
8.5.3 Presentation style 
At the beginning of each section the main points from site data qualitative analysis are 
reproduced in order to put the findings in context. Information source abbreviations 
(Table 70) are inserted into the text and denote relevant issues to their basis and reveal 
where conflict or contrasts arise. Some findings derive from second interviews with 
site based personnel and these are reported by accident number. As in Phase Two 
analysis (7.2.3), the volume of these annotations are not intended to represent strength 
of feeling, merely the range and commonality of experiences among respondents. 
8.6 Development of build plan and design 
Failure generation f 
Phase 
0 
Project Concept 
Design & 
Procurement 
Design & execution 
_1 
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8.6.1 Build scheduling 
Findings from site data collection 
" Revisions to the project timeline adversely affected build 
scheduling 
8.6.1.1 Factors affecting the development of project timelines 
Determining a build schedule 
Individual's knowledge and skills gained through previous experience appeared to be 
the primary resource for determining the build schedule and project timeline (021, G- 
SSM). Additional resources to supplement this included access to a book of 
`Estimators Basic Data' (work study of construction operations) or use of computerised 
packages capable of calculating rates of construction operations (G-SSM). Whilst it 
was reported that work-study data eventually becomes learnt, any cross reference to this 
basic data eventually becomes obsolete, the computer package appeared to offer a 
broader range of advantages. For example, providing the client with cost estimates, 
facilitating calculation of task organisation and space allowances and assisting 
workload management where late or missing information occurred. 
Build scheduling required a range of different allowances - time for architects and 
designers to prepare and deliver, time for materials such as plaster and concrete to cure, 
time to go through the sub-contractor tender and appointment process, time for 
inclement weather, time for closure and holidays and time to accommodate quiet 
periods (in residential areas for example). 
Whatever the methods used in preparation of the build schedule, the arrangements and 
provision of any flexibility appeared vulnerable to the nature of relations with the client 
(021, G-A, G-SSM). 
It appeared difficult for principal contractors to justify actual time requirements to the 
client. Clients traditionally stated their time requirements and there appeared to be an 
inevitable episode of bartering between the Principal Contractor and client in order to 
agree a build completion date. Interviewees felt that clients were poorly advised and 
that later repercussions of a tight time schedule might result in the taking of short-cuts 
by sub-contractors (G-SSW. 
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Build schedules were also revised because of sub-contractor tenders. If sub-contractor 
tender times varied from those originally scheduled, then re-evaluation of would be 
required. Interviewees felt that a quicker tender was generally provided where work 
was offered on a packaged or priced basis. (G-SSM). It was also reported that there are 
problems when the work programme gets out of line, as others working nearby may not 
be protected from hazards to which exposure was not expected (G-H&S). 
Issues surrounding project timeline revision 
The accommodation of late requests from clients (either to develop or revise their work) 
appeared relatively common for the architect interviewees (001,002). For the most part 
this was sporadic, yet appeared to induce intermittent and considerable time pressure. 
Information derived from the `generic architect' discussions revealed that `architect 
instructions' (Als) were for `assumptions that haven't come to pass' (e. g.: a change in 
the lift supplier leading to shaft and motor room changes) and that otherwise their 
avoidance was preferable for project success. There were concerns too that this later 
information is missed out of the risk assessment process. The Generic Architect 
perspective was that AI requests more commonly derive from contractors, who use this 
method to increase time and financial allowances (G-A). However information from 
generic senior site manager interviewees completely contrasted with this; they reported 
that extension claims and design revisions derive from client requests 99% of the time! 
8.6.2 Detail and design of the structure 
Findings from site data collection 
" Lack of clear specification of design responsibilities 
Lack of fine detail in design 
" Acceptance or blindness to longstanding design problems 
Reports and analysis of information from interviewees reinforced findings from site 
data collection concerning lack of specification of responsibilities and fine detail in 
design. 
8.6.2.1 Designers' perspective 
Designers assumed a role of providing initial tender drawings or performance 
specification (G-DWD, 001,004,005), yet the fine detail or prescription of technical 
solutions for these was attributed to the principal contractor or (more likely) the sub- 
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contractor chain. Designers were wary of providing excessively prescriptive measures, 
as building tolerances are too great and any more careful measurements would incur 
additional time and costs (G-DW). 
8.6.2.2 Contractors' perspective 
From the sub-contractor perspective, design ownership was seen as the domain of 
whoever had appointed them to undertake the work (005). Sub-contractors developed 
and undertook the portion of work that they had been contracted to undertake, yet at 
times had little knowledge about the context of application or interaction with other 
contractors. In accident 003 for example, where the fan was seen as a causal factor in 
the dangerous occurrence, the extract fan manufacturers were not involved in ducting 
and fire protection choices - these aspects were reported to be entirely within the remit 
of their employing contractor. 
8.6.2.3 Use of proprietary Droducts 
Designer involvement also appeared reduced where there was standard use of 
proprietary products (002,005). In accident 005, for example, the use of a proprietary 
cladding system appeared to have inferred the undertaking of a common activity and 
one in which the Planning Supervisor would not normally be involved (PS). 
Information about the unusually heavy angle weights appeared masked within the 
apparent `standard' nature of the activity. 
Alternative designs could have produced the angle in smaller sections, or the angle: 
cladding design could have been revised to avoid handling at height (G-CS, PS). These 
alternatives, however, would have introduced additional costs through the introduction 
of extra handling time or in the development and purchase of more complex fittings 
(005, G-CS). Design processes appeared to have had input from multiple personnel in 
accident 005 and safety measures appeared to have been directed at accommodating 
rather than challenging any design inappropriateness. 
8.6.2.4 Lack of design 
problems with unclear ownership, boundaries of responsibility and poor liaison 
appeared to carry over from structural to temporary works design too. Many of these 
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issues relate to design for task compatibility of tools, equipment and materials used and 
are discussed later (8.8.1). 
There commonly appeared to be lack of design or ad hoc arrangements for temporary 
structure design. In accident 010 for example, it was confirmed that the use of ply 
board as a hole covering had never been designed (010). Any decisions that might 
relate to the board diameter / density / loading capacities in any given situation would 
be determined by the carpenter. 
... there is no culture of calculating ply requirements; the technical 
ability is not on site ... 
Even where there had been ply board failure, remedial action perpetuated the exclusion 
of formal calculations or determination of board qualities (010). Ply board re-use was 
reported both as rare (G-TWD) and common practice (010) indicating very different 
experiences or perceptions for those with on- and off-site design responsibilities. 
8.6.2.5 Drivers to lead innovation 
It was proposed that there are a few lead architects who pioneer new practice or 
innovation; clients seek these qualities for landmark designs. Later, the novel practices 
often infiltrate into standard building practice within a few years (G-A). In spite of this, 
information in 8.6.2.1 and 8.6.2.2 revealed that choices for design alternative were 
often transferred or distributed among a number of different personnel in the build 
development and construction process. Responsibilities appeared blurred or diluted and 
opportunities for using products for more advantageous human interaction appeared to 
have been lost. Specialist advice has revealed that a number of design alternatives 
might have been appropriate for some of the accident scenarios. There was a strong 
preference for the introduction of more pre-fabricated materials on to site (G-CS), 
which was seen to improve quality and `handlability' within controlled conditions (G- 
A). For example: - 
- Use of pre-fabricated welded mesh carpets instead of individual tying of steel 
rebars (001) 
- Use of alternative design and steel angles weights (005) 
- Use of or pre-finished M&E structures (035) 
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The need for contractor involvement in off-site fabrication was acknowledged, in order 
to ensure continuity in knowledge of set-up, work phasing and planning etc. (G-A). 
Interviewees reported that costs were a significant influence upon the innovation 
choices made. It is not known what data are available to cross-tabulate costs of design 
innovation (such as time to devise, manufacture, integrate with build and schedule and 
train personnel) with those of more traditional methods. 
8.6.3 Site layout 
Findings from site data collection 
" Inadequate space and traffic route provision 
" Poor quality utility services drawings 
Site layout related failures were commonly reported, yet few of the `specific' follow-up 
interviews were successful in providing any general insight into the design and 
management issues involved. However, information was available concerning utilities 
supplies. 
8.6.3.1 Provision of utility supplies 
Problems were identified with the selection of appropriate locations to secure power 
cables (due to the nature of the work or temporary structures) (017). Even at the point 
of bringing services onto site, poor or inaccurate records from the Utilities services 
caused confused access and uncertainty (020). The Principal Contractor was described 
as responsible for the layout of temporary or portable services, with advice being 
sought from a Temporary Works Designer if an appropriately qualified person was not 
available on site. Positioning (to avoid snagging / damage of overhead cables or re- 
routing once interior walls have built) was one of the major problems - coupled with 
cabling straying into traffic routes and not being correctly repositioned or maintained in 
the desired position if movement had been necessary (G-SSM). 
8.6.3.2 Barriers to efficient supply set-up 
Both Generic Architect and Generic Senior Site Management interviewees recounted 
problems relating to liaison with Utility service providers and how client reluctance to 
establish an early contract can inhibit project progress. Utility service providers 
appeared unable to provide accurate drawings (especially water) and were unwilling to 
release information without full payment upfront. At times this entailed the 
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supplementary appointment of a labourer (and additional costs therein) to undertake a 
ground assessment and dig trial holes to assess ground conditions. 
Architects and Principal contractors, not holding the service contracts, were unable to 
exert any influence other than to try and persuade the client to take action. This had a 
significant later impact upon preparedness for work and any subsequent time pressures. 
Generic Senior Site Management interviewees also felt that Utility services retained a 
`Statutory Authority' mentality and did not behave as sub-contractors. 
8.6.3.3 Space for welfare facilities 
It was reported that some clients lack understanding of their responsibilities to provide 
space for personnel and welfare (G-H&S). There appeared to be some conflict 
concerning the provision of welfare facilities. Architects have to maximise clients 
profits, yet responsibility for provision of cabins etc., was attributed to the Principal 
Contractor. Within this, the Quantity Surveyor was also required to organise welfare 
facilities according to the sub-contractor tender submissions (G-A) and anticipated 
work schedules. 
8.6.4 Contractual influences 
Findings from site data collection 
a None - New theme generated via latent factor data analysis 
Interviewees had varied preferences for the different contract types commonly used. 
Findings are reported per information source, but at times appeared somewhat 
contradictory. 
8.6.4.1 Partnered projects 
Architect interviewees (002, G-A) both showed a preference for `partnered' projects 
(Architects and contractors act as mutual contract holders), as it appeared to enhance an 
equal sense of ownership and performance on the project. 
8.6.4.2 Perceptions of Design and Build contracts 
Architect interviewees had different preferences for `Design and Build' (although it was 
acknowledged that all contract types have good and bad points, G-A). For one, `Design 
and Build' enhanced opportunities for the Architect & contractor to work together from 
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an early stage. This led to improved buildability and teamwork and avoided the 
contractor developing a lot of `un-drawn design' upon their own initiative (002). The 
alternative viewpoint was that whilst such early liaison was desirable, this was only 
possible when the client was prepared to pay for this early collaboration (G-A). The 
Generic Architect interview revealed that the downside of `Design and Build' was that 
Architect novation (meaning allocation without any negotiation) to the contractor 
resulted in `dumbing down' of the design and stifled innovation. It was felt that 
minimising design by contractor led `valued engineering', resulted in safety 
compromises (such as provision of harness hooks rather than full edge protection). 
The training specialist felt that Architect driven projects were advantageous, and that 
`Design and Build' was less preferable as site decisions were less skilled, informed and 
experienced. The Generic Temporary Works Designer supported this view, in that 
`Design and Build' inhibits early Architectural input to solutions. From the perspective 
of senior site management interviewees, however, `Design and Build' provided an exact 
specification with fewer variations. For them there was some control over the Architect 
and an opportunity to make the design practical or buildable. Invariably they acted 
informally as construction consultants to Architects and the client supports this input 
(G-SSM, G-A). The downside for them was that the risks in this style of management 
resulted in them having to assume responsibility for the design. 
8.6.4.3 Perceptions of Construction Management contracts 
The Generic Architect interviewee preferred Construction Management, as quality was 
enhanced with detailed performance requirements and drawings. Their work had to 
provide sufficient flexibility for contractors to input, to take ownership of the design 
and to determine how the design should be built. Disadvantages were that Construction 
Management forced the Architects to design in 'packages'. Designing in 'packages' 
was disliked - as it necessitated Architects to contract technical construction advice and 
resulted in lost control over the design risk assessment (G-A). Working in 'Packages' 
were also seen as a problem by the senior site management interviewees, as it 
encouraged sub-contractors to take on and struggle with work in which they might be 
inexperienced. There was also a regional perspective here - with a dearth of skills in 
some areas exacerbating the problems. There appeared to be no formal definition to 
identify the difference between a sub and packaging contractor (G-SSM). 
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8.6.4.4 Clients' perspective upon contract types 
The Generic Architect interviewee felt that, from the clients' perspective, cost certainty 
was reduced with Construction Management. Alternatively, with design and build 
contracts, Architects have greater input into the design, which facilitates contractor 
costing and price certainty for the client. The greatest control would be obtained 
through a fixed price lump sum payment but this was felt to be disadvantageous, as the 
Architect would undertake considerably more work without the contractor on board (G- 
A). 
8.6.4.5 Contractual essentials and barriers 
Irrespective of contract types, interviewees felt that there was greatest advantage in 
close working relationships between designers and contractors - from the earliest stage 
possible. The impact of the client was seen as fundamental to later successes down 
stream. 
Client failings were perceived as inability to pre-plan and listen to the contractor's 
advice, inability to make up their minds, inability to provide an Architect with sufficient 
time to complete their work before the contractor starts, disinterest in health and safety 
and ridiculous pressure to conform to ever tighter timescales (G-A, G-SSM). It was 
acknowledged that clients business' change and that this could affect their build 
requirements. There were reports too (from a business perspective) that designers felt 
pressured to tell client that they were coping, but that intervention from the HSE 
Enforcement Officers had a positive effect upon client: Architect: contractor liaisons 
(G-SSM, G-A). There were reports of considerable time pressures too for designers, as 
they also experienced tight timescales during client liaisons (001,002). 
`Compliance with the CDM Regulations' appeared to be the most commonly cited 
reference by interviewees. Only Architect interviewees spontaneously offered any 
critical appraisal of the legislation - indicating that its usabilty and guidance from the 
HSE was inadequate (002), and that contractors used it as a beating stick to constrain 
their work (G-A). Increased HSE presence and intervention on sites was urged (002, 
G-SSM), perhaps with a more informative and facilitative approach (G-A). There was 
also a call for acknowledgement and advice from the HSE on the influence of contract 
procurement on design and health and safety (G-A). 
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8.7 Transfer and management of build requirements 
Failure generation 
Phase 
10 
Work 
Organisation & 
Management 
Design & execution 
8.7.1 Procurement of hardware 
Findings from site data collection 
" Cost restrictions resulted in insufficient quantities, materials or 
equipment 
8.7.1.1 Ownership of procurement decisions 
Architects appeared to expect that contractors would request design revisions, such as 
the introduction of cheaper or simpler build measures (002, G-A). Whilst designers 
appeared happy to consider alternatives (and revision to cut costs was also instigated by 
clients), they did not perceive hardware procurement as part of their role or within their 
control (001). From the Senior Site Manager perspective however, their own input was 
less if designers had made a specification perhaps for aesthetic or creative element of 
the work. 
8.7.2 Influences upon selection and purchasing criteria 
Findings from site data collection 
" Purchasing criteria were vague and dominated by financial 
considerations 
Analysis of interviewees' reports indicated that, although product alternatives are 
available, some purchasers bought indiscriminately and were not trained to select and 
buy for user interaction or work application (G-PPE, G-PS); this appeared to affect all 
products used for task execution - `hardware' items such as tools, equipment and 
materials and also PPE purchase too. 
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8.7.2.1 Financial considerations 
Principal Contractors specified certain suppliers (for quality and delivery certainty), yet 
sub-contractors reportedly made their own price agreement and service arrangements 
(G-SSM). From the site perspective, problems centred on acquiring materials at the 
right time and their subsequent storage. This was less problematic with hired 
equipment such as plant, but problems were reported with manufacturers expecting 
storage either with the sub-contractor or on site even as soon as goods were ready and 
even prior to items being required. Items stored on site were vulnerable to damage. 
Payment would be required upon delivery, causing contractual problems if there had 
been programme revision and the build was behind schedule (G-SSM). 
From the manufacturer's perspective, the influence of customer purchasing and a 
routine desire to obtain the cheapest products (sometimes contravening manufacturers 
or suppliers advice) was seen as the greatest influence on the quality (affecting comfort 
and task application) of products used in the industry (LCM, JWM, STM, HM). These 
purchasing arrangements meant that purchasers wanted multi-functional products 
(MSM), or alternatively, rarely bought anything but the bare minimum, missing out on 
opportunities for better quality or innovative designs (HM, JWM, PPE-S, HM). 
Alternative designs were also available as a result of research and development 
commissioned by the military or emergency services. Learning from these examples 
was not transferred to commercial market and manufacturer interviewees felt that the 
customer led culture inhibited any such progress. Examples of improvements included 
harness development for female users and an innovative single action / all terrain 
jockey wheel (HM, PPE-S, JWM). 
Incidences of non-use of available products were observed during the site data 
collection period. For example, it was clear from literature search that rebar tying guns 
and alternative (safer) craft knife designs are available. However, these alternatives 
were not observed during site visits - methods of introducing and trialing tools 
traditionally purchased by the self-employed are unknown. Impact at an organisational 
level was also apparent. In accident 003 for example, spark arrestor filters had been 
made up in-house to protect the extractor fan during the decommissioning activities, yet 
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it was apparent that a range of filter products were already available from the 
manufacturers (EFM). Whilst it cannot be ascertained that cost was the determinant of 
the development of the product on site, the possible influence of this and dissemination 
of information about product ranges may have influenced the choices made. 
For larger equipment, manually operated components (as opposed to those fully 
automated) reduced purchase costs, yet may also have contributed to poor usability. In 
the case of the lorry crane for example, manufacturers revealed that upon servicing 
vehicles, it was not uncommon to discover manual outriggers jammed in their stowed 
position and clearly unused (LCM). Similar histories for hydraulic equipment are 
unknown, yet the researcher anticipated considerable physical burden and possible 
disincentive to use manually operated equipment that had deteriorated into this 
condition. 
However, comments from site-based interviewees suggested that purchasing strategies 
did exist - with examples where service providers were required to provide products in 
a style to improve handling (033), strength and protected / minimised sharp edges (G- 
SSM). They reported that lengthy development and manufacturing times caused 
problems, especially where bespoke products were required for specific work activities 
(G-H&S). 
8.7.2.2 Marketing strategies 
Product manufacturers varied in approach to marketing. The more rudimentary or 
traditional product designs appeared to have received least innovation. Concrete 
adhesion to steel appeared to be a perennial problem yet there were no reports of 
research into lower adhesion products. Indeed there was commercial advantage in 
replacement, rather than repair of damaged products (CPM). 
An alternative perspective was in marketing enhanced safety features of a product. In 
accident 002, for example, site personnel felt that mitre saw replacement with a similar 
product containing a disc brake was superior. Whilst acquisition of a newer generation 
product may well have achieved this (and the researcher did not undertake a detailed 
comparison of either product), it was not evident that the new disc stopping was 
necessarily superior to its predecessor. Latent condition data collection revealed that all 
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circulating blades must stop within a 10 second period (whether by brake / disc design 
/other means) and that many stopped within a3 second period in any case (MSM). 
Whilst it was reported that new products brought onto site should be subjected to risk 
assessment, the process to `avoid or reduce risk' did not appear to easily translate into 
optimising use or performance (see also 9.2.1.18). There were also reports of 
reluctance among site foremen to change, apportioning a certain amount of rejection of 
new innovations to them (G-H&S). 
8.7.2.3 Boundaries of hardware sunnly 
It was suggested that sub-contractor purchasers have little detailed knowledge of the 
product range available (G-H&S). Interviewees described their PPE purchases with 
`compliance' being a leading factor in purchase choices (036, G-SSM). Nonetheless 
whatever purchasing problems existed it was reported that sites do try to keep a full 
range of PPE stock and sizes on site, but problems in providing adequate storage and 
security affected the quality of what was purchased (G-SSM). 
Interviewees described problems with product deliveries (G-SSM). These concerned 
delivery issues - with loss of control as a result of deferral of responsibility to sub- 
contractors and also due to restricted delivery times if in a residential area. 
Manufacturing processes, with a desire to make all like items together, were also 
reported to have a negative affect on product availability. 
Manufacturers also felt that supply was influenced by hire and supply companies, 
reporting that they were often unwilling to stock anything other than the most 
commonly used parts (STM). 
Additionally, there were intermittent reports by manufacturers that some hire 
companies replaced damaged parts with a lower specification than the original product 
(1WM). Whilst it was not possible to verify this, a suggested reason was that repair and 
replacement of damaged parts was a source of revenue for Hire companies - for them 
an apparent disincentive to supply the industry with quality parts or products (STM). 
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8.7.2.4 Mixing brand products and components 
Manufacturers provided mixed responses concerning the compatibility of their products 
with those of competitors. Responses ranged from little compatibility among PPE 
components (PPE-S), to an acceptance of interchange of detachable parts (harness 
lanyard and scaffold tubes for example (HM, STM) or where parts were subject to 
routine deterioration (saw blades for example, MSM). 
Compatibility was seen as quite possible with other products, concrete parts for 
example (CPM), yet the manufacturer emphasised that this would not account for 
different qualities of parts offered by other manufacturers. In other cases, compatibility 
was inconsistent. In one case, the scaffold tower manufacturer reported deliberate 
development of their tubing to the same diameter of scaffold pipes - in order to permit 
interaction between the different products (STM). An alternative viewpoint was that 
commercial aspects limit interchangeability of scaffolding, ensuring consistent purchase 
and use of a manufacturer's product at any one time (G-TWD). 
8.8 Provision of Hardware and materials 
Failure generation f 
Phase 
-' 
Task 
Design & execution 
Analysis of site data revealed that there were many common problems among the range 
of tools, equipment, materials and PPE. This commonality is also apparent in latent 
condition data analysis and, in the light of this, findings in common are reviewed 
according to the term `product'. 
8.8.1 Compatibility for task purposes 
Findings from site data collection 
" Poor compatibility for task purposes 
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8.8.1.1 Product qualities 
Acquisition of products of an appropriate quality was reportedly subject to influence by 
the import of cheap, poorly specified and low quality products from Asia (HM, JWM). 
One of the issues apparently influencing this was where no standards or specifications 
existed for some parts. For example, it was reported that imported jockey wheels often 
bent easily and were not dimensionally true. The lack of specified standards or criteria 
meant that when these items were used as sub-components of a larger product (for 
which a standard was defined) the fidelity and overall quality was compromised. 
Products without standards were subject to alternative influences however. From a 
design perspective, it was reported that harness buckle quality was unspecified in EU 
standards, yet there was some inference of this in related guidance which specified that 
that the buckle should not shear the webbing (HD). Lack of specification was also 
relevant in the use of raw materials on site. With ply board for example (and in spite of 
different perceptions of re-use, 8.6.2.4) there were indications that quality deteriorates 
over a period of months and that off-cuts or pieces of variable quality and strength were 
chosen for covering holes. 
Manufacturers described a variety of measures to ensure durability and reliability of 
their products. Parts warranty was reported in some cases (MSM, LCM), and orders for 
replacement or repair were also used as measures to identify quality issues (CPM, 
STM). 
8.8.1.2 Tool: Product compatibility 
Temporary works typically involved the erection and dismantling of structures during 
the process of the build. Whilst there appeared to have been some innovation in user 
friendly fasteners for newly developed products such as cavity closure frames and 
scaffold towers (CCM, STM), the more traditional products, such as ductwork, scaffold 
and steel props / braces did not appear to have benefited from comparative design 
innovation. 
An example of the impact of this can be seen in accident 004, with the discovery that 
dismantling of the column entailed two ascents (G-TWD). The first involved wedge 
removal and the second spanner use to undo the braces. It was commented that had the 
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operative used the formal dismantling procedure the operative would have tied the 
props with rope upon wedge release to keep the structure secure - but that in practice it 
was `faster to do it all at once'. Researcher observation during the site visit had already 
identified that brace removal would probably automatically disengage the steel props 
without any intervention from the operative; the design and interaction of the different 
parts did not promote safe working practice. A natural desire to use the quickest or 
most convenient dismantling process - perhaps too the most logical method - resulted 
in an unstable structure and a work hazard. 
It was also suggested that similar issues might also apply to scaffolding use (G-TWD). 
Whilst there is a range of proprietary systems, typical dismantling might also entail two 
ascents - the first to undo and remove scaffold clips and the second to undo and remove 
scaffold tie nuts. Whilst it is not known what Scaffolder dismantling preferences are, it 
appeared that this double ascent process was governed largely by the use of different 
tool types to operate the scaffold clip and tie nuts. Scaffolder interviewees had already 
revealed that they avoid changing tools whilst working at height (for balance and for 
fear of dropping them). The lack of interchangeability of tools for related product use 
and, possibly the physical burden of carrying a range of tool types, were considered by 
the researcher to increase the risks of time spent working and manipulating products at 
height. 
8.8.1.3 Structure: Product compatibility 
Structure: product incompatibility issues occurred in use of scaffold towers in areas of 
restricted headroom from interior ceiling structures (036). Manufacturers reported that 
minimum available height increments of scaffold frames were S00mm (STM). It is not 
known whether these minimum sizes were available on site, yet it is clear that optimum 
working platform height with the handrail had not been possible. Further exploration 
with the manufacturer revealed that there had been previous problems of this nature. In 
one case the company had been able to pioneer a solution (with support from an HSE 
Inspector), but the final design fell outside the formal handrail requirements (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2001). The company were willing to promote such solutions, but felt 
that endorsement or support from the HSE would be essential in such an endeavour. 
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A second incompatibility occurred with the use of the plasterboard trolley. It was 
reported that this item could be driven from either end, and that swivel wheels at one 
end only offered greater control (G-PTM/S). Demonstration revealed that any 
manipulation was possible in an open plan area, yet where manoeuvring was restricted 
to a narrower area (such as a scaffold gangway with direction changes) it was 
considered by the researcher that ease of manipulation would be greatly reduced - not 
withstanding the added burden of weight when fully loaded. 
8.8.1.4 Environment: Product compatibility 
There was a little general guidance on environmental factors relevant to products used. 
Equipment that might be vulnerable in windy conditions was variably provided either 
with (STM) or without (MLM) guidance on how to judge the severity of wind. Ground 
conditions were also discussed for use of the lorry crane. It was reported that there was 
no indication by the manufacturer of what might constitute suitable ground conditions 
(although this should be addressed in operator training). Appropriate counteractive 
measures included the use of outrigger `slippers' (purchased as an optional extra), 
observation and knowledge of the ground condition; brick blocks were not thought 
suitable for outrigger support, but steel or wood (including railway sleepers) were 
considered appropriate (LCM). 
8.8.1.5 PPE: Task compatibilities 
It was felt that PPE was compromised by poor care and maintenance, with inadequate 
arrangements for cleaning and storage of PPE products and little insight into how 
products might degrade or deteriorate from exposure to various contaminants (PPE-S, 
JiM). There were concerns too that PPE is not designed or properly issued (G-H&SS). 
Accident study examples include the inappropriateness of harness use whilst working at 
less than 4m from the ground (036), dexterity problems with poorly fitting gloves (034) 
and reduced comfort and ventilation problems during use of multi-purpose goggles 
(035). These problems tie in with findings from site data collection (7.3.3.4) and also 
expand upon the range of problems identified in the selection and purchasing among the 
range of products used on sites. 
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8.8.2 Compatibility for human interaction 
Findings from site data collection 
" Products had poor compatibility for human interaction 
More detailed analysis and exploration of the way that tools, equipment or materials are 
used on site revealed that compatibility for human interaction was often poor. Findings 
reflect many of the failures already observed during site data collection. 
8.8.2.1 Product: User specification 
Manufacturer interviewees generally described few criteria for users of their products; 
where this was specified it related to user skill base (MSM, LCM), strength, and 
personal and anthropometric characteristics. 
Some manufacturers indicated that users should be able bodied (MSM, STM, MLM, 
CPM). Others gave more information, indicating that they developed their products for 
mixed sex and/or mixed handed use (MSM, HM), whereas others felt that design was 
more likely oriented towards male users for some products (CPM, MLM), as in the case 
of rescue breathing apparatus (PPE-S). Alternatively others designed especially for 
female users, as in the case of harness design (HM) and in the designation of a 
handbrake operational force less than 60kg for jockey wheel products used more 
commonly by women (JWM). 
Manufacturer interviewees derived from varied areas of responsibility and this may 
reflect the detail that they were able to provide; some were unsure, felt that user 
characteristics was the domain of their parent company (MLM, JWM) or that it was not 
possible to design for physical dimensions (CPM). Nonetheless, only the PPE supplier 
and mitre saw manufacturer were able to consider their products in the context of 
anthropometry, indicating that this was incorporated within the research and 
development process. The PPE supplier reported that products are selected for the 
average person in the UK; with approximately 90% of UK product users were in the M- 
L size range, with the remainder as S or XL. There were also concerns that products 
imported from overseas (such as the USA) were designed for their ethnicity and 
different body shape, but were not always appropriate for the UK market (PPE-S). 
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8.8.2.2 Product: Handhold design 
Compatibility for manual interaction appeared limited in some cases; product designs 
were often basic and lacked many qualities that might enhance operation or 
performance. Basic hand tools, such as nips (001) and craft knives (007) are used 
universally throughout the industry yet, between them, ergonomics analysis revealed a 
range of undesirable features. Sample observations included poor grasp surfaces 
(exposed metal, inadequate purchase points) and, in the case of nips, excessive 
dimensions for handhold and manipulation. For both tools, task techniques included 
the repetitive and demanding application of forces and, in the case of nips, excessive 
forearm rotation to the extreme of joint ranges. These aspects were all felt to be risk 
factors for musculoskeletal injury. 
Poor grasp surfaces also featured in some equipment designs, with handhold areas of 
exposed metal (004,006,022,038) and, where handhold areas had been provided, 
dimensions were inappropriate for power grasp. With the jockey wheel handle, for 
example the handles were exposed steel and of a diameter of only 12 -16mm; it was 
reported that handles for caravan use have a rubber surface, but that this is seen as an 
`extra' in industrial use customers and will not pay for this (JWM). High force 
application was noted in the closure of concrete clips, yet a manufacturer was unable to 
indicate whether the forces had been measured or that any research had been 
undertaken in facilitating use for operative interaction (G-CPM). 
8.8.2.3 Product: Movement and manipulation 
Interaction, exertion and ease of manipulation appeared overlooked in use of larger 
items too. Examples of these relate to the use of manual outriggers and the issues 
already described in relation to the physical burden of interacting with poorly 
maintained products. 
A second example concerned unwieldy design of the plasterboard trolley. The 
researcher considered that plasterboard trolley use on constricted passageways might be 
difficult, given the fixed forward facing wheels at one end (8.8.1.3). A confounding 
problem was the lack of recognition that the weight of transported plasterboards might 
have. Manufacturers guidance was `not to overload the trolley' yet an example trolley 
had a 400kg capacity. Plaster boards were not marked with their weight (mean 25Kg 
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each) and it was felt that, fully laden and given site reports of the conditions of floor 
areas, trolley movement would be considerably more difficult. There were also reports 
that plasterboard trolleys might be made-up by contractors on site and, given the 
examples seen, there was little evidence to reveal design features to enhance user 
interactions. 
Lack of knowledge concerning the weight of product materials had also been issues in 
accident 005 (handling 140kg steel angles) and accident 060 (dismantling steel 
ducting); from which there were issues concerning the nature of procedures and risk 
assessment (7.5.2) and determining contractor competency (7.4.1.1). 
Interaction with products used in temporary works structures were also noted as areas 
of concern by the researcher. Restricted aperture size between level change on 
scaffolding and scaffold towers was noted on a number of site visits, and was directly 
relevant in accident 050 (IP injured carrying tools bucket on his back up a ladder). 
Interviewees confirmed that aperture width would generally be determined by the width 
of two scaffold boards (225mm x 2) (G-TWD, STM). In the case of the scaffold tower, 
this dimension was attributed to a `EU standard' (specific details unknown), but in the 
case of scaffold erection this was at the discretion of the scaffolder. Interviewees were 
not aware of any research or particular direction for this size choice, but felt that the 
comparatively small aperture dimensions between level changes offered a certain 
amount of fall protection. 
8.8.2.4 Product: Interface for perceptual characteristics 
Accident data analysis indicated that there were some instances of inadequate visual, 
auditory or tactile cues to indicate whether the equipment was safely set up or not. 
These issues were apparent in accident 004 and, with accident 019 as a similar example, 
latent condition data collection revealed that accident avoidance would have been 
achieved by the following of procedures and method statement (TWM). Whilst the 
approaches and shortcomings of remedial action have already been evaluated 
(7.4.2.12), the nature of the cantilever fixing methods and apparent vulnerability of the 
design for inappropriate operative actions and for a commonly required situation is 
noted. 
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Manufacturers described measures inherent in their designs to provide `positive 
feedback' during system set-up, with examples of auditory clicks for clamps, handles or 
triggers (MSM, CPM, STM), or changes in balance or resistance for winches or 
operational triggers (MSM, MLM). Others described such features as absent on basic 
grade equipment, but as an optional extra for higher grade products (LCM, JWM). The 
researcher considered that opportunities for annotating products with item weights or 
safe working loads were missed. Manufacturers reported that such detail could be 
painted on / moulded in (CPM), but for others the interchangeability of parts were a 
primary reason for avoiding this (MLM). There were no examples where design had 
been developed for simple visual inspection of structural integrity. 
Latent factor analysis also revealed instances where poor design may have 
compromised usability, in the context of psychological processes involved in their use. 
The first of these concerned the extractor fan (003) whereby `reset' for the alarm mute 
was a manual operation. The researcher considered that there was inherent system 
vulnerability in lack of accommodation for human failings (such as forgetfulness). 
An alternative situation, but related to routine operation, concerned the contravention of 
population stereotype in lorry crane control direction (ie: control lever depression raised 
the crane and vice versa). Further exploration revealed that this had been introduced 
approximately 15 years earlier (in response to a fatality whereby an operative fell onto 
the controls and was crushed as he inadvertently instigating its downward movement) 
(LCM, crane specialist). Interviewees felt that this was a response generated from 
within the industry, possibly with guidance from the HSE, but was unlikely to have 
included any ergonomics advice. Current crane designs incorporate a variety of safety 
features, such as interlock devices and force fields (to stop the crane coming towards 
the operator). It is not known whether the incident could recur under current design 
conditions, or what design alternatives might be feasible to enhance crane safety and 
facilitate operability. 
The final example of poor compatibility for psychological processes concerned harness 
use, which reportedly could be put on `upside down and inside out'. In spite of the 
recommended 20-minute training, it appeared to the researcher a distinct possibility that 
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this would happen at some stage, if achievable within the tolerance of the equipment. 
Impact on comfort or product efficiency though such misuse is unknown. 
8.8.2.5 Product: Hazard exposure 
Exposure to sharp edges or abrasive surfaces appeared commonplace and the risks 
through interaction seemed little challenged by industry. Craft knife blade changing 
entailed handling of very sharp edges, as did working with cut ductwork (or its swarf) 
(034,035) and steel banding (009). 
The work materials generated similar hazards. With ductwork for example, it was 
reported that there are no tool alternatives to reduce swarf production and that, even 
when goggles are worn, (if they are ventilated) dust gets though the holes or swarf 
drops from the hair into the eyes when they are removed. Alternative ductwork 
products, such as glass fibre, or other synthetic products are available, yet sheet metal 
was reported to account for 99.9% of UK ductwork (G-DWD). In a related example, it 
was revealed that solutions to reduce risks of cuts and abrasions associated with steel 
banding (in securing palletised products) involved its replacement with nylon banding 
(to a strength capacity, up to 800kg) (G-CPM). This innovation was generated through 
a manufacturers own in-house risk assessment (CPM); the rationale for product choices 
and dissemination of information about alternative products in industry is unknown. 
Design for chemical hazards appeared fundamental in PPE design (PPE-S), yet was not 
raised as an issue by other manufacturers. Some manufacturers did not identify any 
occupational hazards (CCM, STM), although some did report desirable behaviour such 
as avoiding electric cable or working on manhole covers (LCM). Deterioration through 
environmental contamination was mentioned; such as the possibility of harness 
webbing degradation, and heat exposure during hot works (HM). Two interviewees 
identified noise exposure. In the case of the mobile lift, however, it was felt that 
introduction of a silent racket winch might actually be associated with a greater risk of 
crush hazards. 
8.8.2.6 Product: Maintenance 
Product maintenance requirements varied according to the nature of the constituent 
materials and likely hazard exposure. Maintenance was not required for some products 
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(CCM), or alternatively, where the manufacturer did not specify a maintenance 
schedule, they indicated that users should follow legislatory guidelines for maintenance 
(MLM)" 
Some manufacturers appeared keen to facilitate product usability by minimising 
maintenance requirements. Measures to achieve this included the provision of fixed 
price service and maintenance contracts for customers (LCM). Alternatively, although 
there was no maintenance schedule for the mitre saw (wood splinters were not seen as 
an especial problem), some internal parts were intentionally accessible (for blade 
changing etc. ), yet full access to other inner mechanisms was deliberately restricted by 
compatibility only with non standard tooling (MSM). 
Maintenance of less sophisticated products generally required more traditional cleaning 
methods. for example, it was reported that goggles should be cared for with warm 
soapy water and anti-mist wipes, but that there was general poor maintenance of PPE 
on site (PPE-S). There were varied reports on how concrete pipe equipment should be 
maintained. From a site perspective, the guidance was a weekly wash and scrub with 
water - using a hammer if necessary to break off resistant cement (TWM), whereas hire 
company guidance was to clean with water and chip off with a needle gun (G-PS). 
Visual inspection and lubrication were recommended for steel/ metal parts (TWM, 
TWD, STM). 
8.8.3 Manufacturer design developments 
Findings from site data collection 
" None - New theme generated via latent factor data analysis 
In spite of the many product shortcomings that were identified, manufacturers (to a 
varying degree) were involved in product improvements. From product and user trials 
and in response to customer feedback, manufacturers described a range of features that 
they had enhanced to improve usability and safety of their products and strength and 
integrity of materials (STM). Examples included variation in the design of load bearing 
shafts (JWM) redesign where parts might be omitted (STM), improved cable strengths 
(MLM) and greater use of simpler fixing methods. 
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Simpler fixing methods, such as push fit parts, spring loaded clips and reduced loading 
mechanisms between product parts had been devised. These were thought to reduce the 
volume of product parts and were seen as more straightforward and preferable because 
they minimised skill requirements for use (STM, CCM). These measures also reduced 
product weights; weight reduction and adaptation of dimensions or methods for 
improved handling were desirable features for other manufacturers too (CPM, PTS/M, 
MLM). 
Design innovation to improve safety characteristics was also an important part of 
product development, including features such as safety interlocks to avoid unsafe use 
(LCM), and greater use of safety brakes (MLM, MSM). Some features, such as 
outrigger `slippers' to distribute load, or harness waistcoats to facilitate correct donning 
mode were optional extras, and were reported to be vulnerable to customer purchasing 
criteria (LCM, HM, JWM). 
Some features such as safety information labels or safety clips required identification 
by the user, yet there was concern among manufacturers that these features passed 
unseen or unused (MLM, CPM). For example, safety clips / pins for added security of 
concrete clips / pins had been developed; yet there were reports that these were rarely 
used (CPM, G-PS). Given the problems already observed with concrete adhesion and 
maintenance schedules for this type of equipment it does not seem surprising that the 
clips are not used. Measures for innovation, trial and development of the safety clips / 
pin are unknown. 
Manufacturer interviewees also expressed concern about the extent of safety innovation 
that should be introduced into their products - given the possibility of refashioning or 
over-ride that might be undertaken by slowed or frustrated users and negative safety 
impact therein. Manufacturers also used a variety of training or informational materials 
to guide product users (8.10.2.3). 
8.8.4 External factors influencing design 
Findings from site data collection 
. None - New theme generated via latent factor data analysis 
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8.8.4.1 Design ownership issues 
Manufacturer interviewees indicated that there were at times a number of manufacturers 
responsible for significant portions of their final product. The lorry crane manufacturer, 
for example, revealed three separate manufacturers (for the vehicle, bodywork and 
crane) in creation of the final product; additionally, there was a further option whereby 
customers chose to buy and mount the crane themselves (LCM). Whilst it was clear 
that there were appropriate routes of consultation and communication for this process, 
the researcher felt that, as a general issue, final ownership of products created in this 
way might be challenged, or unclear. 
This was the case in accident 038, where the site did not contact the bowser 
manufacturer about its jockey wheel failure, as this was not perceived as a fault with 
their product. 
Another related aspect was the extent to which product designers specify use of their 
products. For example, the cavity closure manufacturer had originally intended to 
supply their product to site as a flat pack with the brace inbuilt (accident 002). 
However, ideas for supply of the completed product were withdrawn (to avoid potential 
for production faults and wastage) and responsibility for making up and choice of 
bracing method and material was transferred to the customer (CCM). Manufacturers 
were unaware that their products were being made up on site (rather than in a factory) 
and design ownership appeared blurred. 
A final aspect concerned areas where opportunities for innovation might fall outside the 
usual remit of manufacturers' knowledge (e. g. qualities of nylon banding to replace 
steel banding, accident 009). Some manufacturer interviewees indicated that (with 
varying frequency) they employed external consultants, (MSM, LCM, CPM, STM, 
PPE-S), but it was not apparent that there was any leadership on these oblique type 
issues. 
8.8.4.2 Overseas influences 
Incidences of poor product quality and poor accommodation of UK user physical 
characteristics by overseas (generally US /European) manufacturers have already been 
discussed. In addition to this, there were concerns that, where alternative design 
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features (such as specific safety interlocks on lorry cranes or improved guarding or 
switches) were required, manufacturers internationally left management of this to UK 
suppliers (Crane specialist, CPM). At times, a number of manufacturer interviewees 
had little knowledge of the nature of design innovation measures that had been 
undertaken or were in development overseas (CPM, MLM). Additionally, the 
researcher perceived a certain degree of isolation from overseas parent companies (even 
from those in Europe), given their use of alternative materials, operational techniques or 
product choices (CPM, JWM). Nonetheless, there was some indication that the IlK 
might benefit from evaluating the use of design alternatives used elsewhere. 
8.8.4.3 Standards and specifications 
Manufacturers and designers described a range of different resources that were 
employed in the determination of standards or specifications of their products. These 
included EN / TVV (German derivative) standards (MSM, CPM); trade standards 
(CCM, G-DWD) and/or general compliance under European Directives in the form of 
UK Regulations (PPE-S, MLM). A bespoke industrial standard was used in the nuclear 
industry. Although it was reported that the extractor fan was outside some of the static 
requirements for equipment in nuclear installations (EFM), any implications of this are 
unknown and were not explored by the researcher. In the case of the jockey wheel 
there was no standard, although it was reported that the German National Directive had 
been adopted elsewhere in Europe and Road Traffic Act 1981 compliance would apply 
in the UK. 
Interviewees indicated some shortcomings in standards. One suggested that those 
preparing the standards were remote from, and lacked understanding of, the practical 
uses of products on site (MSM). There were also indications that some standards 
provided only a bare minimum criteria (such as a 100kg 'dummy' for harness drop 
testing) - the manufacturer in this case chose to undertake a wider range of independent 
testing with alternative dummy weights and dimensions (HM). Although not yet 
instigated, there were also concerns about the proposed implementation of mandatory 
use of lorry crane outriggers; worries concerned a mismatched `idealistic' intent with a 
range of task circumstances whereby load, space and traffic conditions (for example) 
might impede facility of use (LCM). 
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8.8.5 Operative task technique 
Findings from site data collection 
" There was high reliance upon brute force 
" Optimum performance was inhibited by interaction with 
products and physical distances on site 
Through customer liaison, manufacturers gained a perspective of the types of failures or 
incorrect use (deliberate or inadvertent) that occurred with their products. Typically, 
manufacturers felt that their advice was contravened in a number of different ways: 
Taking shortcuts 
- non-use of brick ties with cavity closure frames (CCM) 
- non-deployment of outriggers with lorry cranes (LCM) 
- non-use of (metal-ended) end hoses for concrete pour (CPM) 
- omission of guards, boards, wheels on scaffold tower (STM) 
Use of incorrect fittings 
- incorrect use of nails to secure cavity closure frames (CCM) 
Use product incorrectly 
- safety hats on back to front (PPE-S) 
- respiratory protection masks incorrectly secured (PPE-S) 
- harnesses worn upside down and back to front (HM) 
- overloaded or unbalanced mobile lifts (MLM) 
A range of technical specialists were consulted during latent factor data collection and 
their appraisal of accident data revealed that accident involved personnel had, at times, 
employed incorrect or inadvisable task techniques (G-TS, G-TWD, G-DWD, SM, 
H&SS). Specialist practitioners felt that there had been inappropriate tool selection for 
a number of the accidents (007,009,018,020,024). Failures included non-selection of 
bespoke tooling (004,009); In accident 004, for example, it was reported that steel 
props are rarely used at a 450 angle and that there are few alternative proprietary 
systems for such an application. Nonetheless, site data revealed that alternatives do 
exist but availability may have been linked to supply issues. A second issue concerned 
non-selection of appropriately powered tooling. Failure in tool choices concerned 
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appropriateness for task hazards, be it to avoid undesirable operational forces of 
manipulations (007,024) or tool: environment incompatibility (020). 
Specialists also reported that improved task technique could have reduced accident 
risks. Desire for time efficiency was reported as a possible influence upon task 
technique. Speed (and sharpness) of ductwork drilling was considered a factor in swarf 
generation (G-DWD) (035), as was the choice of nails rather than countersunk screws 
as the speediest of shutter fixing methods (G-TWD) (018). 
Adoption of incorrect working methods was also reported. The background to these 
incorrect choices at accident-involved level is not known, yet `experts' opinions 
identified failures from their knowledge of product qualities (010,020), or product: user 
interaction (019,022). These findings are closely allied with risk assessment failures 
(such as testing methods to assess residual gas supply, 020), but also indicate a lack of 
understanding in procedure development (G-TWD, 010) and misplaced reliance upon 
procedural efficacy (G-TS, 019). 
8.8.6 Summary of latent conditions according to design and task execution 
factors 
Latent factor data explored and elaborated upon much of the information obtained 
within the site data phase `Design and task execution' and also introduced additional 
factors (shown in bold, Table 73) that supported the analysis as a whole. Given the 
volume of information these are summarised according to work phase. 
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Failures concerning 
Project Concept Design 
& Procurement 
Failures concerning 
Work Organisation & 
Management 
Failures concerning 
Task 
Develgl2ment of build Transfer of management Hardware and execution 
plan and design and build requirements of the wk 
" Build scheduling and " Procurement of " Compatibility for 
timeline development hardware task purposes 
" Detail and design of " Factors affecting " Compatibility for 
the structure selection and human Interaction 
" Detail and design of purchasing criteria " Factors affecting 
the site layout manufacturers 
" Contractual types design development 
and preferences " Task technique 
Table 73. Summary of site latent conditions: Design and task execution 
8.8.6.1 Development of build plan and design 
Data relating to the developmental phase explored the background to the uncertainty 
experienced at site level as a result of build schedule revisions. Build scheduling 
appeared to be impacted by change or uncertainly from all directions - from alternative 
Sub-contractor timelines from those anticipated and as a result of client intervention. 
Bartering between the client and principal contractor appeared to be the main 
determinant of the agreed timeline. Whilst appraisal of materials used to develop build 
scheduling was not undertaken the bartering process appeared to over-ride or at least 
undermine the credibility of the calculations and skills involved in formulating a 
comprehensive programme. Data did not reveal the source of clients' advice in 
determining an adjusted build schedule. 
Data revealed that there were quite different perceptions of the roles and responsibilities 
of architects and senior personnel within principal contractor (PC) groups. Architects 
were perceived as providers of the design concept, their responsibilities incorporating 
specification of performance and integrity of the build. Contractual influences 
determined the exact dynamics of their interaction and delineation of responsibilities, 
but the principal contractors (within their responsibilities of build management) were 
also afforded responsibilities for ascertaining fine detail and temporary works design 
for the build. 
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The distinction of responsibilities between the two groups appeared blurred and was 
often spread among a number of people (appearing to dilute rather than strengthen 
ownership for the design) or, when attributed to core skills, was not designed at all. 
This resulted in a loss of opportunities to integrate innovative practice for improved 
user and process performance. It appeared that the determination of this fine detail, or 
development of technical solutions, was perceived as less important or significant in 
input than the design as a whole. At times the PC responsibilities seemed quite casual 
arrangements, and there was an element of mothering vs. free spirited prodigy 
relationship between the two parties ("Architects wear a leather thong and carry a 
whip"! ). The design fidelity of PC inputs received variable comments. Whilst their 
input was seen as essential the PC led design activities were openly afforded less 
esteem or credibility - more so a necessity to effect the build process and design 
objectives. The formalities of liaison, especially Architect Instructions, were very 
differently perceived among interviewees. They appeared especially burdensome for 
the PCs, in terms of time for liaison and integration of instructions. 
The subtle dynamics between the designer and principal contractor groups found a 
common cause in mutual dissatisfaction and concerns about disruptive client influences 
on projects. Perspective was not gained from the project client, yet interviewees 
showed varied preferences for different contract types. Interviewee accounts appeared 
somewhat mixed, yet there was a clear preference for early and continuous 
collaboration between all parties. Acknowledgement and guidance from the HSE was 
also called for concerning the influence that contractual arrangements had on health and 
safety. 
8.8.6.2 Transfer of management and build requirements 
The latent factor data generated a considerable amount of material concerning the 
different range of products used in the industry and different perspectives on their 
development, procurement and use. Unfortunately interviewee groups were not large, 
but a number of issues of note emerged. 
Detailed evaluation and observation of product design, use and performance reinforced 
site data collection findings - that design inadequacies inhibited interaction (for both 
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physical and psychological processing) and had a resultant undesirable impact upon 
usability and performance. There appeared to be three main influencers that impacted 
upon this outcome - those with procurement responsibilities, manufacturing 
responsibilities and also a number of independent external influencers. All aspects 
appeared to be undermined by themes in common; communication inadequacies and 
inadequate (or inconsistent) knowledge dissemination. These findings are summarised 
in Figure 26. 
External Influences 
Supplier purchasing criteria 
Standards and specifications 
Overseas products and design 
Manufacturer 
PC /SC procurement Communication Some application ignorance 
Order and delivery problems =:: > and knowledge 
1 Unclear user specification 
Some purchasing ignorance gemination Unequal product development 
failures Blindness and blame 
Product design Inadequacies 
and Inconsistencies 
Inhibiting interaction, usability 
and iDerformance 
Figure 26. Constraints impacting on product development, purchase and use 
procurement issues essentially concerned activity undertaken at site level, either by the 
principal or sub-contractor. For those with a purchasing role their problems concerned 
timeliness of manufacturing, delivery and storage of products. A perspective on these 
issues was not obtained from manufacturers or suppliers. They did, however, express 
concerns that lack of knowledge and understanding resulted in indiscriminate 
purchasing and poorly considered use or task compatibility by those on site. 
8.8.6.3 Hardware and execution of the work 
Manufacturers gave varied responses and it was apparent that the drive and input into 
product improvement differed considerably among the sample group. Some appeared 
to have quite robust arrangements into product development, whereas for others 
(especially those making simpler products) deterioration and re-purchase were income 
generators and incentive for development was diminished. Development appeared 
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hindered by an apparent lack of knowledge of how products are used on site. Whilst 
some of the company's had sales representatives responsible for site liaison, overall this 
did not seem adequate to gain information about use, interaction and to become 
involved in problem management. 
In combination with shortcomings in knowledge of application there was an impression 
too of failure to consider user specification in design. To a certain extent this may have 
reflected information available to the interviewee at the time of discussion, but 
nevertheless reporrts of design for human interaction (physiological and psychological 
processing) and for `a range of users' were few. Where such action had been taken this 
was commonly directed at weight reduction and improved handlability. 
It was not possible to gain information from all manufacturers in the accident studies, 
but product evaluations and some comments indicated habitual acceptance and an 
apparent lack of regard to simple hazards. It was expected that the risks of cuts or 
abrasions, for example, would be controlled by the use of PPE. Where safety 
interventions had been implemented these were not always used on site. User trial of 
the products was very variable. There wasn't often any real sense of methods or 
strategy to use the trials as an opportunity to evaluate products in the context of user 
interaction, complimentary to evaluation of product qualities. Some safety related 
solutions had been generated but these did not always seem well communicated or were 
not considered in the light of usability or the nature of application observed on site. 
Manufacturers and specialist practitioners often saw adaptations or shortcuts with 
products as a user fault and rarely as an opportunity to explore product design and 
development. Indeed, misuse appeared to be a disincentive for manufacturers to 
explore and develop the products. 
Manufacturer interviewees were not asked directly, but it was apparent during later 
analysis that many of the machinery shortfalls directly contravened the mandatory 
health and safety requirements of Annex 1 of the Machinery Directive (Great Britain 
parliament 1992). Examples relevant to the failures or shortcomings observed include 
details for user-centred design, risk reduction, PPE compatibility, logical design or 
controls etc., yet this did not seem to have been 
identified by manufacturers or industry 
alike. 
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Whilst manufacturer innovations varied, they also had to operate within the confines of 
their business environment and standards and specifications. Standards and 
specifications were at times seen as rather dogmatic or idealist and there were some 
suggestions that those involved in their development were somewhat remote from 
practice. A dominant theme among all interviewees was of the overwhelming impact 
of customer purchasing power and how this limited the range and quality of products 
made available in the industry. Purchasers included site personnel, suppliers and other 
manufacturers. Manufacturers wanted to promote a number of innovative products yet 
were constrained by purchasing power and lack of direction or desire to introduce new 
products into the industry. 
The impact of poor quality imports was a concern for interviewees, especially when 
integrated with their own products. For those with overseas parent companies there 
was an impression of the UK operating somewhat in isolation to the company whole. 
The parent manufacturer did not always accommodate UK design and user 
requirements. If any adaptation was required in order to fulfil UK criteria there were 
instances where features had to be added on to the completed product post-production. 
From an alternative perspective, however, it was felt that some overseas uses or 
innovations might be advantageous to the UK market, yet limitations in customer 
purchasing disabled their introduction. 
8.9 Planning Scheduling & Management 
Failure generation 
Phase l 
-ý 
f 
Project Concept Work j Task 
Design & Organisation &i 
Procurement Management 
Planning Scheduling & 
Management 
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8.9.1 Recruiting and organising contractors 
Findings from site data collection 
" Lengthy sub-contractor chains led to loss of control and 
ownership 
" Principal contractors experienced variable sub-contractor 
performance 
" Sub-contractors experienced isolation from the principal 
contractor 
" Responsibilities were poorly defined 
8.9.1.1 Contractor appointment criteria 
Interviewees reported that they regularly appointed those that have worked for them 
before (G-SSM, G-A). The advantages being knowledge of previous skills and 
experience and an ability to transfer learning and information previously gained. 
For senior site managers the decision on whether to make a sub-contractor appointment 
was judged against a mix of criteria, with the project manager and client making the 
final appointment decisions. Essential qualities included price, ability to perform, 
`safety' history (often accident records and RAMS control strategies), quality and 
reputation from previous site (G-SSM). It was agreed that subjectivity was required in 
order to consider the tender in the context of labour requirements and skill supply etc. 
and the pressure upon those tendering to promise more than they could deliver (G- 
SSM). 
8.9.1.2 Barriers to sub-contractor appointment 
The constraints affecting senior site managers in their choices were pressures from 
clients. Clients were reported to require at least four tenders, yet contractors were 
frequently unable to amass the volume of sub-contractors who might feasibly be able to 
undertake the work. Clients were reported to consistently choose the lowest tender, 
with the expectation that the principal contractor would thus manage the safety of these 
appointees (7.4.1.3). Clients were reported to have no involvement with the subsequent 
appointment of sub-contractor chains. 
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Liaison problems and lack of continuity was reported from two perspectives - firstly in 
the development of a working relationship with a SC `front person' ... who 
"evaporated" once the project was secured (G-SSM) - and secondly the lack of control 
and at times poor quality or understanding by those in the sub-sub-contractor chain - 
especially for those outside the specialist skills bracket (G-A). 
8.9.2 Factors affecting personnel management and task conditions 
Findings from site data collection (where relevant to latent 
factor data) 
" Informal competence assessment ran in parallel with formal 
methods 
" Lack of competent health assessment 
" Little acknowledgement of the impact of long work hours and 
absence cover 
"A range of concerns about inadequacies with supervision 
" Frequent use of financial incentives 
" Work area conditions reflected poor housekeeping 
The majority of information relating to management and co-ordination of site personnel 
was collected during Phase Two of the research. Interviewees from the latent factor 
data collection phase offered supplementary data, which although not as expansive, 
enlarges upon earlier findings. 
8.9.2.1 Skills and health related appointment criteria 
Few interviewees within the latent factor data collection phase were able to comment 
upon appointment criteria of individuals. Data indicated that competence assessments 
were focused upon `ticket' checks, but essentially capabilities were judged by 
knowledge of previous task experience and reputation of the sub-contractor firm (005). 
There appeared to be little or no intervention to identify fitness for work, except where 
medical clearance was specified for certain work types (in confined spaces for 
example). An isolated incident of `screening' for pre-placement ill health and graded 
return to work was reported, yet this well intended individual initiative appeared to be 
without the support of protocol or a competent practitioner (037). 
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8.9.2.2 General work organisation 
One initiative, the development of a `smart-card' system to monitor working hours, in 
the rail industry was reported, but little is known about the system, and degrees to 
which it will accommodate working and driving periods of employees (021). 
Other accident follow-up discussions revealed that where workload and sickness 
absence cover had earlier been implicated in the accident study, there had been no 
remedial action to address these factors (039). Likewise, no allowances were made to 
accommodate sickness absence during planning and scheduling (G-SSM). 
In discussing staffing levels, interviewees expressed especial concern about the 
inadequacy of supervision, especially among sub-contractors and where there were 
working supervisors (G-H&S). A range of different incentives (such as free breakfasts, 
prizes for good performance or good ideas), were employed to raise performance, 
motivation and the profile of health and safety. The importance of providing good 
welfare facilities was also acknowledged (G-H&S). 
8.9.2.3 Housekeeping 
Problems with housekeeping were reported in many of the accident studies and issues 
arising from latent factor data analysis revealed a number of factors that might have 
inhibited good management. Whilst standards existed, it was reported that actual effect 
would be whatever was accepted by those in seniority (G-H&S). Specification of 
clearing up frequencies was reported, yet this did not appear to infer any ongoing 
responsibility for maintaining steady state. With cable management for example, there 
was operative instruction for daily checking of leads and plugs, yet this did not extend 
to position management (to prevent trip hazards). Cable positioning became 
increasingly difficult as walls and doorways were erected (G-SSM), yet instruction on 
management and trip prevention was felt to be inherent within general housekeeping 
duties (017). 
8.9.3 Summary of latent conditions according to Planning Scheduling and 
Management factors 
Findings related to Planning Scheduling and Management were few at this stage of data 
collection and reflect completeness of the findings and analysis generated from site data 
analysis. 
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Failures concerning Failures concerning Failures 
Project Concept Work Organisation concerning Task 
Design & & Management 
Procurement 
Planning Recruiting and organising contractors 
Scheduling & " Factors concerning contractor appointment 
Management 
Factors affecting personnel management and task conditions 
" Factors concerning skill and health in appointment 
" General work organisation issues 
" Housekeeping 
There was much reiteration of earlier information - for example, reinforcing the 
combined `ticket': subjective assessment competence determination, the lack of 
intervention or misguided efforts in health screening and surveillance, managers 
tolerance determining housekeeping standards, and supervision inadequacies especially 
among sub contractor groups. Data revealed that there were some inroads to monitor 
working hours, but, this was only directed at rail work. Where cover of absent or 
unavailable operatives was pursued there appeared to have been little consideration of 
workload in accident causation. A resigned acceptance of working under these types of 
conditions was typical, combined with little apparent action into managing the resultant 
problems. 
Issues surrounding contractor appointment were explored and, as with determining 
competency of individuals, the principal contractor had to employ a certain level of 
subjectivity in tender appraisal. The tendering process appeared to generate rapport 
with sub-contractors and generate ambitious promises that could not always be 
followed through in practice. 
The tendering process also appeared to be adversely influenced by clients. A blanket 
requirement for a minimum number of tenders was felt to be unnecessarily ritualistic, 
especially in areas of specialist or skills shortage work. The process enforced the 
principal contractor to seek tenders from sub-contractors who were possibly unsuitable. 
Client's reportedly over-rode principal contractors misgivings and routinely expected 
appointment of the cheapest sub-contractor. It was felt that clients lack understanding 
of possible safety outcomes of cost cutting, and had an unrealistic expectation that the 
principal contractor would manage the safety issues on site. 
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8.10 Information transfer 
l 
Failure generation f 
Phase 
-ý 
Project Concept Work Task 
Design & Organisation & 
Procurement Management 
Information Transfer 
MS, RA, induction etc. 
8.10.1 Communication of design requirements 
Findings from site data collection 
" Principal contractors were late in providing sub-contractors 
with design guidelines 
" Drawings from utility services was often incorrect 
" Pre-contract health and safety documentation seemed to be 
biased towards tender acquisition rather than practice 
8.10.1.1 Designer: Site liaison 
Designers described the possibility of liaison conflicts during the development phase, 
especially if their work overlapped with others (e. g. architects), or if they were having 
to juggle conflicting client or tenant requirements (G-A). 
Both designer and senior site manager interviewees expressed a desire for mutual 
involvement with the design from a very early stage (G-A, G-SSM). For designers this 
was an opportunity to liase over methods of installation and task techniques etc, and 
was perceived to have a positive effect on quality assurance and health and safety. 
From the senior site manager perspective this enabled them to influence the designer to 
use simpler, quicker or more buildable methods from the outset. 
Whilst there were complimentary goals the outcome of this liaison was differently 
perceived. From the designers' perspective necessary perhaps only if there was a 
particularly difficult work aspect (034) or if they felt that they had reached the 
boundaries of their responsibilities (001,004,005,024). Site visits traditionally were 
not undertaken by the original designer (unless essential or called for), although 
designer representatives might later be based on larger sites (G-A). 
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Site based interviewees gave an alternative perspective, describing a need for perpetual 
queries with designers and reaffirmation or revision of design because of inadequate or 
anomalous information at the outset, and late provision of information during the build 
schedule (G-SSM). 
Designers were required to provide information for the health and safety file, including 
information relating to any `residual risk' in the design. One instance, where a 
construction activity was considered a `core skill', the provision of residual risk 
information was not thought appropriate (001). It is not known whether this was a 
widespread activity, but at times designers also appeared unaware of the nature of 
operatives' interaction in their use of products or in the building techniques used (002, 
035). Opportunities to promote safer practice and performance were missed or were 
seen as the responsibility of the Contractor and outside the Designers role (001,024). 
The use of or introduction of `new style' materials and designs was discussed and 
disparity between manufacturers anticipated uses or application of their products and 
actual use on site was noted. In accidents 002 and 039, for example, the cavity closure 
window frames and slewing ring were being fabricated or used in an entirely different 
context to that intended by the designers. 
8.10.1.2 Manufacturer: Customer liaison 
Manufacturers varied in the extent of liaison they had with customers. Arrangements 
varied from informal contacts to frequent and routine consultation with sites. The 
extent of liaison appeared influenced by the directness of contact with end users and 
this was absent, or least, in cases where intermediaries handled a manufacturers product 
as a component of a main product for the final customer (EFM, JWM). 
Manufacturer interviewees were not always sure of the nature of product and user trial 
undertaken by their parent company (MLM), but descriptions otherwise reflected a 
range of different methods and levels of intervention used for evaluation. These 
included product reliability trials (LCM, MLM), simple trials with one or more 
potential end users (CCM, CPM, PPE-S), or multiple methods incorporating usability, 
hazard review and failure analysis (MSM). 
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Alternative methods of evaluation included demonstration to customers (STM, LCM) 
and evaluation of customer's in-house appraisal (EFM), feedback or complaints (HM, 
CPM). Whilst little of the follow-up data search addressed this from the perspective of 
the customer or end user, there were indications that consultation was not always 
undertaken or perceived and would have been welcomed (021). Some manufacturers 
who had access to end-users reported development of questionnaires (not evaluated by 
the researcher) to facilitate the end user appraisal process (MSM, PPE-S, CPM). 
Alternatively, lack of access to end-users was also associated with a lack of formal 
assessment methods (JWM). 
8.10.1.3 Dissemination of accident related information 
Interviewees generally had very little knowledge of construction industry accidents, 
except where there was some form of catastrophic failure (001,002, G-A). There was a 
universal desire among all interviewees for access to a greater range of accident related 
information and dissemination of subsequent learning and knowledge gained. Whilst 
the HSE was proposed as one body to set up a database, it was also suggested that trade 
bodies and the Major Contractors Group might also be able to do more (G-A, G-H&S). 
Manufacturers were dependant on customer liaisons to learn about product failure or 
accidents involving their products. There were concerns that, through misuse or 
adaptation, customers were damaging the products themselves (JWM, HM, EFM). 
Nonetheless many monitored product failures via customer liaison concerning damage, 
repair or warranty issues, and requests for spare parts (CPM, MSM, LCM, STM, 
MLM). Manufacturers knowledge about accidents was generally obtained through 
claims from insurers, where there was litigious action as a result of a reportable 
accident (CPM, MSM, STM, PPE-S), or if the company had been approached to 
provide expert witness advice in court cases (LCM, JWM, HM). Some manufacturers 
had no little or no knowledge of accidents with their products (038, JWM, CCM), or 
were concerned that they were over-exaggerated by the HSE (STM). 
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8.10.2 Assessing and defining safe practice 
Findings from site data collection 
" Documentation had many content and presentation 
inadequacies 
" Documentation was often idealistic and incompatible with the 
work situation at the time of application 
" Those involved with task execution had little involvement 
with documentation preparation 
" Documentation was used as a training medium, but not 
perceived as such by the recipients 
" Formal training was often `ticket' orientated 
" There was high dependence upon on-the-job learning, yet 
training provision was random and ill perceived 
8.10.2.1 Risk assessments and method statements 
Some designers acted as Planning Supervisors in the pre-contract stage (which included 
developing baseline risk assessments), and upon appointment of the principal contractor 
these were subsequently transferred. There were indications that preparation of this 
type of material for the Health and Safety file was an onerous task (001) and that the 
materials were at only a preliminary stage at the point of transfer. Designer's general 
guidelines for assessment of residual risk are unknown, but one example that was seen 
offered only a hazard checklist approach - in the absence of risk assessment guidelines 
or control measures (003). 
Little further information was gained during latent condition data collection on the 
nature of site protocol to identify the need for development of risk assessment and 
method statements. In accident 020, for example, it was suggested that materials 
should have been developed if there had been 2100 gas supplies to work on, but it is 
not known how such criteria is determined. Interviewees considered that generic 
documentation was appropriate in many cases, as was verbal instruction and attribution 
of responsibility to the operative's core skills (021, G"SSM). 
A lack of resources was variably considered to inhibit the usefulness of materials; poor 
dissemination of learning from accidents was thought to inhibit the upgrading of 
method statements (010). 
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Additionally there appeared to be little insight into the range of failures (identified by 
the researcher) within the documentation and subsequent value that might be gained 
from them. The researcher gained a general impression of blanket faith in the efficacy 
of the materials and the systems in place to appraise them - by virtue of their existence. 
Even during latent condition interview, interviewees remained steadfast in their faith of 
the value of the documentation and the systems in which they operate. Where the 
documentation had existed it appeared to serve as a tool to absolve `management' from 
responsibility, to endorse their sense of integrity in proactive planning and provision of 
task conditions, and transfer blame to accident involved personnel (002,013,018,033). 
8.10.2.2 Training related issues 
The provision of training was considered important by all interviewees. A variety of 
methods (used either alone or in combination) were proposed, such as formal 
instruction (CPM, LCM, STM), demonstration (HM), videos, use of site based 
documentation, or materials from product manufacturers (G-H&S, 012,033). 
The methods chosen varied; manufacturers invariably provided paper-based materials, 
although had little or no control over the nature of their use (012). Interactive methods 
were more prevalent where there was direct access to site personnel, yet it appeared that 
provision of documentation such as risk assessments, method statements and supplier's 
information was felt to be a reasonable interpretation of `training' (033). Where 
training needs arose that were beyond what was routinely provided, responsibility for 
identification and provision of additional instruction was apportioned to the foreman or 
supervisor (033). 
Barriers to the provision of training were attributed to time pressures, from the general 
workload or as a consequence of using 'just in time' production methods (038, G- 
H&S). Whilst the CITB bursaries and raised profile of training were welcomed (G- 
H&S), there appeared to be little flexibility within the criteria to obtain funding. 
Training duration and the formal instruction: practical experience mix was specified; 
one manufacturer interviewee described being unable to `stretch out' their training to 
fill the specified time period for the release of bursary funding (STM). This meant that 
their training was not endorsed with a `ticket' and also suggested that more generally 
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(and however well intentioned) a desire to fulfil the CITB criteria might have 
disproportionate priority over desired training methods. 
Manufacturers felt that instruction or training was either essential (LCM, CPM, STM) 
or unnecessary. Instances where it was considered inappropriate related to the product 
being a sub-component of a larger part resulting in manufacturers lack of knowledge 
about how the product would subsequently be applied (JWM). Similarly this was 
considered the case when hire companies were the main customer bases, indicating that 
it would not be possible to control the training that they subsequently provided (LCM). 
Trainer's receipt of training skills was discussed (LCM), although it was not possible to 
obtain comprehensive details about their content, duration and frequency. In the case of 
hirers of concrete pump equipment, it was reported that drivers received a one day 
training course (including safety awareness and concrete pump use) - This would then 
render them responsible for provision of a safety manual, task training, plus supervised 
practice for the first few hours on site (if necessary). The researcher felt that although 
site practice could be supervised for the first few hours, this did not infer that any 
guidance would be provided in equipment clean up and dismantling upon work 
completion. Whilst it cannot be assumed that these aspects were relevant for accident 
011, the potential for failure is apparent. 
8.10.2.3 Provision of product information 
Suppliers and hirers all offered some form of product associated leaflet, booklet or 
catalogue, ranging from single prompt sheets to large folders incorporating combined 
documents comprising a few hundred pages. 
Even where instruction was not required product brochures were generally supplied 
nonetheless (CCM, JWM). Documentation was derived from a number of sources - 
either developed in house or (for the larger companies) developed by technical agencies 
(MSM, MLM). A number of manufacturers were concerned that, with intermediaries in 
the supply chain, that documentation was not distributed or taken advantage of on site 
(CPM, LCM, STM). 
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Varied routes were used to inform end users about the products. Larger contractors 
reported dissemination of in-house company advice or free product trial (G-SSM), but it 
is not known how widespread this practice is. Product manufacturers included in the 
research invariably spoke of a team of sales representatives or Engineers who advised 
end users on product choice and purchase, selection for task appropriateness and 
provision of training in use of their products (CCM, LCM, STM, MLM). In many 
cases they were able to liase with site users, yet equally their end users were 
intermediaries such as trade suppliers, retail outlets or other manufacturers (LCM). In 
these cases they had no apparent control or influence over purchase choices or the 
guidance that ultimately was made to individual end users. The plant supplier indicated 
that they often dealt with repeat customers, who had little need for the provision of 
information about products. Where appropriate however they expected to offered 
telephone advice and a site visit (if necessary) to identify the most appropriate hire 
choice. 
Product information was also provided by use of the flyers or catalogues. Although 
little information was obtained in relation to the use and dissemination of product flyers 
for the range of site hardware, it was clear (from site and latent condition data 
collection) that there was high dependence upon use of product catalogues for the 
purchase of PPE. 
8.10.2.4 PPE related issues 
The researcher noted two issues of concern, which were thought likely to have 
impacted upon the accessibility of optimum PPE products: - 
The first of these concerned the methods used to identify market needs and the 
subsequent impact upon the catalogue sales range. This information was not obtained, 
but it was known that the catalogue did not include the full product range (PPE-S). 
Whilst it was acknowledged that it was impractical to include the entire product range 
in the catalogue, the methods for liaison and subsequent selection of desirable 
inclusions are unknown. An example of where an excluded product might have offered 
a positive impact on site, was a clip for holding gloves on the belt. This would seem a 
likely catalogue inclusion (assuming design appropriateness for the task and user), 
given the liaison with site personnel about product needs and the numerous reports of 
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lost, damaged or mislaid gloves - yet the clip was not catalogued; rationale for 
accommodating these types of viewpoints is unknown. 
The second area of concern related to the lack of catalogue information on choosing 
products for user fit. This did not appear especially relevant for items sold according to 
retail sizing (such as shoes and garments), yet the researcher thought this especially 
relevant in glove purchasing (anticipating little comparative knowledge of hand sizing). 
Guidance on selection for appropriate hazards appeared strong, yet gloves were either 
sized or allocated for `male' or `female' use - there was no catalogued information 
concerning selection for a range of users and the benefits of appropriate fit. In accident 
033, for example, alternative glove styles were not chosen `because they wouldn't 
protect from crush injuries'; whilst this might be the case, the advantages in purchasing 
a range of different glove sizes appeared overlooked - as were the positive effects to 
dexterity and use compliance that might be gained through improved fit. 
8.10.3 Summary of latent conditions according to Information Transfer factors 
The principal contractor and designers unanimously welcomed early liaison at the 
project outset. For designers this enabled positive contribution towards quality 
assurance and health and safety issues, whereas for the Principal contractor 
involvement enabled assurance of simpler, quicker or more buildable methods. 
Failures concerning Failures concerning Failures 
Project Concept Work Organisation concerning Task 
Design & & Management 
Procurement 
Information Communication of design requirements 
transfer " Liaison between designers, manufacturers and contractors 
" Factors concerning the assessment, definition and communication 
of safe practice 
Designers, in addition to their creative duties during the developmental phase, described 
pressures affecting their work. These 
included the preparation of risk assessments and 
multiple-liaison requirements - generated through client or tenant relationships and co- 
operation with other designers on the project. Designers generally appeared to assume 
an off-site role (although a designer representative may take up site residence on a large 
build), perceiving site liaison as necessary where there were work difficulties. From the 
site perspective however a continuous need for 
designer liaisons (because of 
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inconsistencies or late design deliveries), gave an impression of burden for site 
personnel having to perpetually hound designers for their information needs. 
The term `ancillary design' was employed as a common term to accommodate product 
manufacturers and suppliers and, whilst their perspective differed from those of 
designers responsible for the build process, there were findings in common. Data 
revealed incidences where products were used in a different way to that intended by the 
designer. Designers and ancillary designers were at times unaware of interaction with 
their products or of building techniques used. Although the designers' did not 
incorporate knowledge of task technique within their roles, attribution of this to core 
skill or principal contractor responsibility appeared to induce a chasm of understanding 
and missed opportunities for positive intervention in design and promotion of safe 
performance. 
Mainly Engineers or sales representatives were responsible for manufacturers customer 
liaison. Whilst it was known that their role entailed the provision of guidance on 
product purchases, it was not possible to gauge whether they also dealt with appraisal of 
product failures or problems. In general, manufacturers intervention varied 
considerably; contact with end users was least where the manufacturer dealt with 
intermediaries, such as other manufacturers or where their customers were retailers. 
Product catalogues were used by many on site, especially for PPE purchases. Whilst 
analysis did not include a broad spectrum of documentation, the initial enquiry 
indicated that further detail concerning choices for catalogue content and conveying 
information on glove fit would be welcome. 
`User trial' during product development took various guises, ranging from product 
reliability testing, to product demonstration, to small-scale user trails and also more 
detailed multiple methods. Some companies had developed in-house user appraisal 
systems, yet these were few. All companies (and for some these were the main 
methods) relied on reactive feedback to gain an impression of product performance - 
such as evaluation of complaints, damage, warranty or repeat orders etc. 
There was a general feeling among manufacturers that customers' adaptations and 
misuse were behind many of the product related accidents. They relied upon a range of 
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alternative (and reactive) methods to learn about accidents involving their products - 
such as insurance claims, litigious action, or related cases where they were called to act 
as expert witnesses. Manufacturers and designers were concerned about the lack of 
resources to access information and learning outcome concerning non `headline' 
construction accidents. Consequently they felt that because of this they were unable to 
revise or develop their work accordingly. 
Findings from accident investigations were also felt to be important for improvement 
and development of documentation, such as risk assessments and method statements. 
Little beyond related findings of site data analysis were obtained. Information was 
scant, yet sufficient to highlight concern about the quality of designers' resources for 
undertaking risk assessments. 
Latent condition data collection did not clarify the types of situations where 
documentation should be prepared for site work, its level of detail or alternatively when 
verbal instruction or attribution to core skills might be more appropriate. Nonetheless 
the very existence of documentation induced great faith in the robustness of safety 
arrangements and operatives were seen to be at fault where accidents had occurred 
when such procedures had been in place. 
As with site data collection, the provision of risk assessment and method statement 
documentation, and materials from manufacturers or suppliers, continued to be seen as 
a `training medium'. Manufacturers had no control over site dissemination of the 
materials, but were concerned that the information was not used. Manufacturers 
materials varied - some were lengthy and unwieldy, whereas others had developed 
shorter, pictorial guides for end users. 
There was concern about time pressure from production exerting a negative affect on 
training provision. Full details of training content were not obtained, but indirectly it 
appeared that there might be conflict in preferred training content (customer funded) 
and a desire to fulfil the CITB training criteria (and hence eligibility for their training 
bursaries). The foreman or supervisor was relied upon to address skill development 
where there were no formal training methods. 
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8.11 Role, skills, abilities and attitudes 
Failure generation 
Phase 
Design & execution 
Role, skills, abilities and attitudes 
8.11.1 Role and skills development 
Findings from site data collection 
" Many job roles and responsibilities are poorly defined 
" There were limited opportunities for task and skills 
development 
8.11.1.1 Safety advisers: roles and skill development 
Generic interview health and safety professionals described a varied range of personnel 
working in health and safety roles, with skills derived from both trade and professional 
roles. Practitioners obtained their safety based training, typically through a number of 
different methods, through NEBOSH (general or construction certificate or diploma 
level training), through Trade Union safety representative training (20 days), and 
through degree level training. Practical skills training was obtained by work across a 
number of different sites. 
Whilst their responsibilities varied according to their skills and experience, it was 
expected that Safety Manager status would be equivalent to that of a Project Manager. 
Site Managers support was seen as essential for Safety Adviser's motivation in their 
work. Nonetheless, there was reluctance to integrate the safety role with the site team, 
in order to ensure that any problems could be dealt with independently and that site 
personnel were not relieved of personal responsibility to address health and safety 
issues within their own work. 
8.11.1.2 Architects and designers: roles and skill development 
Interviewees indicated little or inconsistent formal skills development in health and 
safety issues and none had received any training in human capabilities and 
performance. 
341 
Whilst they had access to safety inductions, these were not always felt to be appropriate 
and, where professional training was specified (to obtain Chartership status, for 
example), safety related training was directed towards self-preservation rather than the 
impact of professional skills. Whilst there were expressions of interest (and instances 
of considerable study relating to safety related knowledge acquisition), such education 
for the most part appeared to be the consequence of personal preference and self. 
directed study (PS). Barriers to knowledge development were attributed to a number of 
factors, including: 
Working in professional isolation 
Emphasis on computer-based work (associated with diminishing site based 
experience) 
Unbalanced focus upon build quality rather than build process itself 
Inadequate and late address to `CDM' issues during the architects University training 
was also described; it was deemed inappropriate that design health and safety should be 
attributed as a contract law issue, rather than something that should be inherent 
throughout the entire educational period (G-A). Nevertheless, it was pointed out that 
health and safety issues are just one of many conflicting pressures for architects to 
accommodate. It was felt that Architects are easy targets for blame when accidents 
occurred, yet in reality they may not have made a final design decision or were one of a 
group who had been responsible (G-A). 
It was not possible to obtain training details about the manufacturer designer skills 
range, but a number of disciplines were reported to influence the development process - 
Engineers (MSM, CCM, LCM, CPM, STM, PPE-S, MLM), technical specialists (HM, 
MSM, CCM, PPE-S) and sales and marketing personnel (MSM, STM). 
8.11.1.3 Senior site management : roles and skill development 
A range of different roles were incorporated into this interviewee group and it was not 
possible to obtain specific information about each professional group. Nonetheless the 
impression gained from this small group was of a variety of skills development routes. 
Interviewees described a mix of trade and site experience and higher or graduate level 
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education. For them, the emphasis was on essential understanding of the construction 
processes, sound technical knowledge and common sense in order to be effective. 
8.11.2 Shortcomings affecting optimum role execution 
Findings from site data collection 
" There was high dependence upon core skills ability 
" The supervisory role was extremely flexible and had to 
accommodate a broad range of responsibilities 
8.11.2.1 Supervisors / managers 
Larger companies were reported to have a range of in-house training schemes to 
provide line managers with safety training. Smaller firms, however, often had no 
access to comparable knowledge or health and safety advisers, and in these instances 
they would rely upon the foreman or site manager to undertake risk assessments and 
implement appropriate risk reduction measures (033, G-H&S). Problems attributed to 
this management style concerned lack of appropriate knowledge (G-H&S) and the 
impact of different tolerance levels and standard accepted by those `at the coal face' (G- 
SSM). 
8.11.2.2 Operatives 
Latent condition data from those with direct site responsibilities revealed that, where 
formal procedures had been absent for the accident event, the skills of task execution 
were attributed to contractor and operative core skills (004,013,018). Even where 
operatives were without formal training it was expected that compliance with task 
execution instructions from those in charge should address this (008). It was pointed 
out that where the sub-contractor tender had stated that competent operatives would be 
provided, then it should not be unreasonable to expect this. Inflated views of own 
capabilities were thought to contribute towards ambitious pledges (018,035). 
The problem of skills shortage was acknowledged, as were the issues relating to 
language and literacy abilities (019). Whilst the current stance is that these should be 
managed as any other risk issue, `social inclusion' issues were reported to be under 
review within the HSE and guidance would subsequently be provided to HSE 
Inspectors. 
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8.11.2.3 Designers 
Interviewees with a design role identified reliance upon, and respect, for operative core 
skills. From a positive viewpoint they deemed it inappropriate for designers to impose 
a particular practice upon site-based personnel, given their superior knowledge and 
practical experience (G-DWD). The alternative perspective was that designers and 
manufacturers admitted to limited knowledge of practical build issues or actual task 
techniques (002, G-TWD, G-A). Control measures were perceived as the remit of site 
personnel (SE), with the expectation of PPE use often cited as one of the most likely 
control methods where risks remained (CCM). The researcher felt that this created 
barriers to designers understanding of their professional ability to avoid accident 
recurrence. 
8.11.3 Summary of latent conditions according to Role, Skills, Abilities and 
Attitudes 
Detailed information about training and skills development was obtained from only a 
small number of interviewees with active accident involvement. This lent a somewhat 
anecdotal bias to the findings, but where possible this was supported by comments from 
generic-collective interviewees. 
Failures concerning Failures concerning Failures 
Project Concept Work Organisation concerning Task 
Design & & Management 
Procurement 
Role, skills, Role and skills development 
abilities and " Factors enhancing and constraining role development and execution 
attitudes 
Information relating to skills development varied for the professional groups included. 
For safety personnel and senior site managers the learning path was accommodated 
within a number of training schemes, varying from certificate courses through to 
diploma and degree level training. Some form of site position, either trade or office 
role, was often a precursor to such professional development and, for all, the value of 
site based learning and skills gained through experience on different sites was 
paramount. 
Comparable detail of skills development for manufacturer designers was not obtained. 
Information relating to construction designers indicated that although their education 
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was University based, knowledge development of their professional impact upon health 
and safety appeared to depend upon self-directed study. There were instances where 
designers and ancillary designers had limited knowledge of build issues or task 
techniques. They gave the impression that risk control at task level was a site issue and 
beyond influence of their professional role. 
As with site data analysis, skills shortage and sub-contractor operative capabilities were 
areas of concern. A level of expectation of core skill ability was common among the 
latent condition interviewees and, where this was lacking, the impression was that 
compliance with task instructions should accommodate those untrained. An absence of 
formal procedures meant that responsibilities for risk assessment and control fell to site 
managers or foremen, but there were concerns too about the negative influence from 
their lack of knowledge and different tolerance levels. 
8.12 Summary of latent condition data 
The summary sections for each failure category drew together the range of problems 
that had been identified across the project timeline. As with the qualitative site data 
analysis, there were a number of main elements and common themes to the findings. 
The findings both reinforced and extended understanding gained from the earlier site 
based data collection phase. 
The fluidity in build scheduling and planning (impacted by accommodating multiple 
inputs from clients, designers and other contractors) was additionally hampered by lack 
of formal or respected criteria for devising timelines. Indeed, not only planning and 
scheduling work, but also the design activities undertaken by the principle contractor, 
appeared to be perceived quite casually and with little apparent respect. Responses 
from site based personnel and those such as designers based off site indicated many 
areas where roles were not distinguished or were poorly understood. The different 
contractual arrangements also appeared to have some impact in generating uncertainty 
or confusion between site and off-site personnel. 
The influence of poor role clarity and understanding of others roles appeared 
widespread and this had repercussions in defining `ownership' of work, designation of 
responsibilities and lost opportunities in the generation of improvements or solutions. 
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The lack of knowledge of others roles also meant that those in senior (especially off- 
site) positions had only variable perceptions of site needs, activities and core skills, 
upon which to develop or direct the work. 
Lack of knowledge or understanding was also apparent in `hardware' purchasing and in 
product development by manufacturers. The lack of knowledge concerned poor 
understanding of practical application for task purposes and poor understanding of the 
need to trial and specify products for human interaction and usability. This lack of 
knowledge was also apparent in purchasing products for site needs; the financial 
restrictions upon purchasing appeared to restrict the introduction of innovative or more 
user-centred products (where available) into the industry. 
Site data analysis revealed many problems with `habitual blindness' to longstanding 
problems and this was the case too among the manufacturer interviewees, when faced 
with misuse or revision of their products by site users. Opportunities for the generation 
of improvements or solutions to products used on site were often lost and it was noted 
that (where relevant) some of the equipment failings directly contravened the 
requirements of the Machinery Directive. 
The development of a knowledge base was also hampered by inadequacies in 
communication or access to information of common interest to all parties. For 
example, the lack of any information about accident histories ensured that learning 
opportunities from previous events were, for the most part, lost. 
An interesting perspective of the analysis concerned the latent conditions that impacted 
the manufacturers themselves. Standards and specifications appeared to be remote and 
did not always enhance practice. Where UK companies were part of an international 
branch the UK companies, at times, appeared to be working and adapting products in 
isolation. Opportunities to integrate innovative or alternative practice used elsewhere 
were lost and this appeared to derive from purchasing criteria and rigid adherence to 
traditional UK practice. 
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Table 66 summarised the findings for the Phase two analysis and this has been amended 
(Table 74) to amalgamate summaries from both the Phase two and Phase Three data 
findings. 
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8.12.1 Transferability of information 
Latent condition data collection incorporated analysis of only 30 of the 40 accidents 
included in the research. Suggestions for pursuit of further information for these 
accidents are reproduced below in Table 75. 
Suggested follow-up areas Addressed Excluded 
Design & task Site planning (53,64)  
execution Good practice for setting-out points (64)  
Temporary works design (50)  
Design and use of manholes (51)  
Tooling qualities (52,63)  
Equipment manufacturer (60)  
PPE suppliers (61,63)  
Task techniques (61,63)  
Brick transport methods (65)  
Planning Housekeeping issues (51,53,62)  
Scheduling & PPE provision (50,65)  
Management Task warm up arrangements (50)  
Work organisation (52)  
Safety culture affects from corporate stability  
(62) 
Information Procedures and documentation issues (50,52,  
transfer 60,61) 
Training issues (50,60)  
Table 75. Follow-up suggestions for the final ten accidents 
Alongside, a comparison has been recorded indicating whether or not the enquiry type 
was addressed or excluded during the latent condition follow-up investigations. For the 
most part (81%) the issues were pursued, and this was the case especially where the 
enquiry was of a generic or non-specific nature. When the suggested follow-up was 
unique to the particular accident in question the issue was less likely to be addressed. 
8.13 Critique of the latent condition data analysis 
In contrast to the findings generated in the site data qualitative analysis, where findings 
were widespread across all categories (but concentrated upon management and co- 
ordination of site personnel), the latent condition findings were very much centred within 
the `design and task execution' category. New information from the range of different 
interviewees also gave a perspective of the latent conditions within which they operated 
too. 
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New categories of information were generated within `design and task execution' (shown 
in bold, Table 74), and for all existing categories new information was also generated. 
This was least for Planning, Scheduling and Management, Information Transfer and Role 
Skills Abilities and Attitude phases, where the information generally reiterated and 
reinforced earlier findings. 
Arrangement or allocation of findings, according to the four failure categories, was less 
straightforward than in Phase Two of the research. An alternative style would have been 
to present findings according to their information sources (Table 71 `designers and 
planners', `managers and suppliers' and `ancillary designers'). However, this was not 
adopted, as presentation by role would not have permitted the (albeit somewhat awkward 
at times) cross-comparison of interviewee findings and different perspectives on similar 
themes. In addition, it was also felt that continued use of the failure categories would 
ensure that information relevant to all areas was considered and that this would minimise 
the potential for bias and inappropriate attribution of cause arising from researcher 
subjectivity (as for Phase Two, 7.8). 
It had been anticipated that there would be greater interviewee representation from senior 
management, off-site personnel and clients. Recruitment difficulties meant that this was 
not possible for some of the desired follow-up areas (Table 68), yet the aspects that were 
pursued were nonetheless a genuine reflection of factors considered important by the 
construction and ergonomics specialists within the research team. 
The data collection proforma (Appendix 8) that had been prepared in advance was of 
limited value. It was unwittingly quite a narrow interpretation of the range of latent 
conditions and job roles actually identified by specialists and subsequently selected for 
further exploration. Additionally, the proforma had been developed for someone directly 
in the accident event `chain', rendering the proforma appropriate when interviewees were 
outside the accident frame. That latent condition 
follow-up would be directed so 
regularly at ancillary designers had not been anticipated, yet adoption of the existing 
product and evaluation proforma (Appendix 8) proved successful. That interviewees 
were not directly asked about their responsibilities 
(where relevant) under the Machinery 
Directive was unfortunate and would certainly be a valuable inclusion for any similar 
type of enquiry in the future. 
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Where accident specific interviews were not possible, the adoption of the `generic' 
interviews meant that it was possible to gain opinions from personnel groups in a 
comparable role. Whilst these interviews were initially seen as a compromise option, it 
quickly became apparent that the absence of personal involvement was very much a 
positive feature. Interviewees discussed the accident scenario, or aspects that were 
relevant to the accident and the work circumstances, freely and without the need to 
defend any of their actions. As the discussions were not confined to any one particular 
accident, it also meant that interviewees were able draw upon relevant issues that 
affected their efficiency at work and which might not otherwise have arisen, had there 
been a more structured interview. This did not over-ride the value of information from 
`accident specific' interviewees, but redefined the relative merits of each interview style. 
In general, the data collection methods for this phase were more open and unstructured 
than for Phase Two of the research. This served the data collection purpose well, but 
meant that there was much less personal background information, as obtained by 
proforma 3 (Appendix 6). As with the site data qualitative analysis, pursuit of 
`frequency of occurrence' has not been the driver for this analysis (7.8), more so an 
exploration of the range of issues that emerged. 
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9 APPRAISAL, REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This style of research is the first of its type in the construction industry, yet earlier 
construction research has revealed some of the same failure types (2.5.1) as those 
reported in this thesis. Previous recommendations have proposed a variety of practical 
interventions, and more general measures incorporating safety management and safety 
culture principles. New legislation has been developed and the industry is pioneering 
initiatives for quality and improvements. That accidents continue to occur in spite of 
these interventions suggests that accident causation is poorly understood, that failure 
types have not been adequately identified and that solution management has not been 
appropriately devised or directed. 
To explore these issues `appraisal, review and recommendations' is first divided into two 
sections (Figure 27), prior to drawing together the main issues for future work and 
conclusions. 
Review and 
recommendations 
Research 
perspective 
& Industry 
Appraisal of 
methodology 
Contribution to 
The way forward 
Conclusions 
Figure 27. 
Applied 
perspective 
Content of review and recommendations 
Appraisal of 
construction 
initiatives 
Firstly, there is a review from the research perspective. This includes the main points 
from the summaries and critiques compiled during the research programme and 
appraisals of the methodology. 
" Secondly, there is a review from an applied perspective. This includes summaries 
from the main findings from the Phase Two and Phase Three data interpretation, and 
proposes recommendations that industry might consider or adopt as improvement 
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measures. It also explores the findings in the context of interventions adopted by the 
construction industry 
9.1 The research perspective 
A summary was provided at the end of each chapter and a critique was undertaken 
following each stage of analysis and interpretation of findings. The main points from 
each are reproduced in 9.1.1.1 - 9.1.1.4 below. The research methodology has also been 
appraised using two further methods. Firstly, by application of the style of critical 
analysis used to evaluate the construction accident models, and secondly, by reappraisal 
of the construction accident models according to the criteria used for the systems 
approach and to classify data. 
9.1.1 Summary and critique of the research programme 
The aim of the research was to explore the nature of accident causation in the 
construction industry. The research programme incorporated, first, literature review and 
then three phases of data collection within the construction industry. This ensured that 
the methodology integrated reflective practice (the research based findings) with field 
data of current construction industry operations. The literature review and data collection 
phases served, each in succession, to inform development and direction of the subsequent 
phases of the research. 
9.1.1.1 Literature review 
"A range of inter-disciplinary understandings and contributions to accident causation knowledge 
was revealed. The progress of development of accident research was explored through 
evaluation of accident causation models. Approaches have developed from disparate fragmented 
attribution of accident causes, through understanding of their multi-factorial nature and finally 
systems approach to accident causation 
" Desirable features of the systems approach were isolated and, against these criteria, construction 
accident models were evaluated for their use in the research. None fulfilled the criteria 
identified for the systems approach, but advantageous features were isolated for later inclusion 
during Phase Two methods development 
" There appeared to be disparity between the engineering and behavioural / psychological 
approaches to accident modelling. Engineering approaches faltered in their interpretation of 
systems theory; these failures concerned poor understanding of human performance, the use of 
leading terminology and a blame style approach 
Construction models exhibited many of the engineering approach failures 
" Different disciplines appeared to have advanced 
in their contribution to accident causation 
understanding at different rates 
" Engineering and, more recently, behavioural / psychological approaches have dominated 
knowledge development. Nevertheless, an ergonomics approach was necessary to generate a 
framework for the systems approach 
355 
9.1.1.2 Phase One 
Summary 
" This concerned information search from construction industry participants - gaining their 
perceptions of accident causation and the nature of failure. 
" It entailed seven focus groups with different construction disciplines. Using an ergonomics 
framework, discussion criteria for the research were devised from construction accident 
reference material. These addressed the nature of 'Work Organisation and Management', 'Task 
factors' and 'Individual factors'. An additional theme was also introduced, 'Project Concept, 
Design and Procurement', to accommodate the developmental and design phases of a build 
project. 
" Findings from the focus group discussions provided a rich data source and were fundamental in 
devising the data collection techniques for Phase Two of the research. 
Critique 
" The participants of two groups were poorly representative of their discipline, which may have 
influenced the depth of range of data obtained 
" Focus groups are vulnerable to the effects of group acquiescence and the introduction of bias 
from the opinions of dominant participants. 
" Validation from further construction participants both confirmed and expanded upon the 
findings. This suggested that findings were not necessarily representative of the industry as a 
whole, more so of a range of employees with the relevant experience and knowledge. 
9.1.1.3 Phase Two 
" This concerned site based study of 40 construction accidents. A sampling strategy, devised to 
ensure appropriate representation of build and construction accident types, formed part of a 
detailed process of methodological development prior to data collection 
" Literature review of the accident investigation process had identified a range of data collection 
and representation techniques, but also indicated that the integrity of an investigation could be 
undermined by inadequacies in content, style and interpretation. Solutions to interpretation 
failures included cross-disciplinary appraisal, and triangulation of findings by the use of multiple 
data collection methods. These themes were integrated into the research methodology 
" To ensure adequate content and style, the methodological development process included 
assimilation of information from construction and ergonomics resources in the development of 
data collection techniques. Focus group findings were also included, but to generate a more 
succinct and construction specific categorisation, a new framework classification was devised - 
'Design and Task Execution', `Planning, Scheduling and Management', 'Information transfer' 
and `Role, Skills, Abilities and Attitudes' 
" Literature review had revealed a range of 
data representation methods, but none were considered 
appropriate. As an alternative, two styles of data analysis, interpretation and representation were 
generated. The first entailed isolation of active factors and latent factors 'objectively' 
considered relevant to the accident; the second entailed qualitative analysis of all accident study 
findings. Qualitative analysis was represented using the cross-referenced framework 
classifications that were developed pre and post focus group analysis. 
" Construction and ergonomics specialists evaluated accident studies; their findings were used to 
verify interpretations and inform Phase Three of the research 
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" Analysis and evaluation of the strategy for Chapter 5, `Development of the 
methodology for the accident studies', follows in 9.1.2.1 
Isolation of factors `objectively' related to the accident provided succinct and comprehensive 
data, but the shortcomings of this technique included the potential for researcher bias, confined 
representation of latent conditions, problems with categorisation and underplay of irregular 
access to data (6.5) 
Qualitative data analysis redressed many of the constraints introduced by the objective analysis, 
but shortcomings of the technique involved information duplication, researcher subjectivity and 
the management of interviews, at times, longer than anticipated. 
9.1.1.4 Phase Three 
Summary 
" This concerned exploration of selected latent conditions that had been identified from 30 of the 
accident studies 
" Reviews from the research team specialists were used in determining the nature of follow-up and 
a strategy including both accident specific and generic interviews was devised. Data collection 
methods were devised from the construction, ergonomics and focus group resources and 
supplementary techniques, for use with interviewees in extra-organisational roles, were adopted 
" Findings were validated by discussion with construction and ergonomics specialists and were 
analysed, interpreted and represented using the qualitative analysis style from Phase two 
Critique 
" Representation of findings, using the same strategy as for site data, was less straightforward than 
before. However, it continued to permit cross-comparison of findings on similar themes from 
disparate sources 
" There was little value in the pre-prepared data collection proformas. The use of alternative and 
less structured measures yielded important data but meant that a profile of participants was not 
obtained 
" Generic interviews, initially a compromise, provided information of alternative but equally 
valuable merit for the research 
9.1.2 Appraisal of the research methodology 
The literature review evaluated the progressive development of the knowledge base 
concerning accident causation and isolated key features in modelling the systems 
approach (3.7). It also explored the nature of accident investigation and how common 
shortcomings might be avoided (3.8 & 3.9). The main points of each approach were 
summarised (Table 25) and, against both criteria, construction models were evaluated 
and their strengths isolated (3.11). In the light of the findings the table was revised, to 
represent the main features from all three areas of contribution (Table 32). 
In order to appraise the research methodology a process, comparable to the evaluation of 
the construction accident models (reproduced below and based upon Table 32) was 
adopted, whereby strengths and weaknesses were isolated. 
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Systems Accident Construction Ke) points 
approach insesti ation model Strengths 
IDENTIFY EXPLORE 
Managerial, representation of 
organisational and  " EXPLORE project concept 
extra- the range of and extra- 
organisational influences and organisational 
AVOID over 
influences conditions factors concentration  
IDENTIFY latent that impact on individual 
conditions human EXPLORE The 
fallibilities 
independent of the  performance dynamic states 
accident sequence and variables 
AVOID the 
" EXPLORE contributing to  many 
forms 
 of `blame' 
IDENTIFY types compatibility each accident 
rather than tokens 
 
of barrier / sequence AVOID 
IDENTIFY the 
influence of 
control 
interventions EXPLORE 
' 
 
states for user & 
? examples of centrism 
upon subsequent 
 
process construction V 
performance and specific 
`token' 
adaptations events 
Explore using multiple methods and cross-disciplinary analysis 
9.1.2.1 Methodology evaluation 
The strengths of the methodology adopted in this research are that the criteria isolated 
from all three areas of contribution appear to have been met. In the context of 
investigation, multiple methods were adopted, not only in the use of different but 
complimentary techniques (interview, observation etc. ), but also in the canvassing of 
opinions from different personnel on the same themes. This provided the opportunities 
for triangulation of results (Denzin 1970, Dekker 2002). There was cross-disciplinary 
intervention, firstly in devising a construction specific vernacular into the data collection 
methods (as proposed by Johnson 1996), and secondly in appraisal of findings from each 
data collection phase (as proposed by Svedung and Rasmussen 2002). 
In the context of the systems approach, identification of the managerial. organisational 
and extra-organisational influences was achieved through data collection from managers, 
supervisors, and safety personnel during site visits, extending to senior site managers, 
designers, other off-site personnel, suppliers and ancillary designers, during latent 
condition follow-up. The representation of the project concept and extra-organisational 
factors in the construction models (Whittington et al. 1992, Suraji et al. 2001, Goh and 
Chua 2002) served in preparing for and identifying the range of issues to be addressed. 
358 
Latent conditions. independent of the accident sequence were identified and explored; 
this fulfils the criteria identified by (Reason 1995). The accident study methods, through 
use of the proformas (for semi-structured interviews) and assessment of documentation 
and tasks, ensured not only that antecedent events to the accident were explored, but also 
that the nature of the work and circumstances under normal conditions were assessed. 
The need to identify actions of decision makers under `normal conditions' was identified 
by (Svedung and Rasmussen 2002). 
The nature of latent conditions was initially distinguished through categorisation of 
disparate examples of `types' and `tokens' (Table 15, Redmill and Rajan 1997, Reason 
1997, Health and Safety Executive 1999d, Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002), by using an 
ergonomics framework (based on Grey et al. 1987, Sanders and McCormick 1992, 
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health 1989, Institute for Occupational Ergonomics 
1998a). The use of an ergonomics approach at each phase created commonality, avoided 
classification by `token' examples, and ensured that interacting factors that affect human 
performance (rather than purely `constructo-centric' issues) were identified. 
Ergonomics classifications were used again in development of the focus group discussion 
themes (Health and Safety Executive 1997b, Health and Safety Executive 1999d), and in 
later interpretations of each data collection phase. Based upon focus group findings a 
revised framework classification (5.3.1) was devised to represent the construction 
snecific `token' events. The pre and post focus group classifications were used together 
in analysis for Phases Two and Three. This cross-comparison enabled identification of 
construction specific findings and interacting factors that affect performance, in the 
context of the time-line of a construction operation. This ensured that the dynamic states 
from the project concept and design, through to task execution were represented. 
Whilst `active factors' (Reason 1990b, Mathews et al. 2000), describing `front-line' 
failures, were identified, they were evaluated in the context of what might have induced 
`human failure' (Health and Safety Executive 1999d) rather than apportioning blame to 
individuals. The human failures included a range of error types and violations (6.4.1) 
which, when evaluated in the context of aspects of the work that might have induced 
them (Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994, Health and Safety Executive 1999d, 
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Mathews et al. 2000, Shappell and Wiegmann 1997, Table 17), often indicated the source 
as latent conditions. 
There was intermediate success with the exploration of `barrier and control 
interventions for the user and process'. For the most part this was successful, especially 
when the area of enquiry was a latent condition (e. g. nature of the risk assessment or 
planning the access of different trades to a work area). However, the belated or lack of 
access to an accident area meant that it was not always possible to gain a perspective of 
the accident event in the context of the control measures that had been in operation at the 
time. 
9.1.2.2 Supplementary critique issues 
Table 32 highlighted the necessary criteria for fulfilment of a construction centred 
systems approach and the use of data collection methods that would aid in the avoidance 
of bias and inappropriate attribution of cause. These describe the process or `technical' 
aspect of the research, but little of the `human centred' researcher influences. 
Researcher subjectivity in results interpretation has already been identified within the 
critiques of qualitative analyses for the data collection phases (7.8 & 8.13). In addition to 
this is the researcher's evolution of knowledge and understanding of construction issues, 
during the 18-month data collection period for Phases Two and Three. 
Little construction experience at the project outset may have had both positive and 
negative impacts. From a positive perspective the initial inexperience would have 
rendered the problems associated with causal attribution and bias unlikely. Examples 
that could have been avoided include `scripting' (Woodcock 1995), professional 
preconceptions concerning the accident event and players (DeJoy 1994), or focus upon 
decoy phenomena (Department of Health 2000, Rasmussen 1990). Early stages of the 
construction `learning curve' required the researcher to probe and explore issues that 
might otherwise have been overlooked by those with more experience, yet these simple 
enquiries regularly generated useful insights and understanding that formed an essential 
part of the analysis. 
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A more negative perspective of this is that information from early accident studies could 
have been missed, that might otherwise have been identified had a study been undertaken 
at a later stage. That construction specialists evaluated accident study findings was a 
mitigating factor. Additionally, the use of proformas during data collection also 
redressed such imbalance; their iterative development also permitted inclusion of 
supplementary enquiry themes as these became apparent (5.4.5). 
9.1.2.3 Secondary appraisal of construction accident models 
In appraisal of methods for use in the research, construction accident models were 
criticised for their lack of independent investigation of latent conditions, use of leading 
terminology and for adoption of a constructo-centric approach (Table 31). However, 
strengths were identified and, in order to accommodate these, the ergonomics methods 
used for the systems approach were revised. Cross-reference between the framework 
classifications of each (generated pre and post focus groups) was employed for 
qualitative data analysis (Table 56 & Table 72). A combined version of these tables 
summarised the findings for site data and latent conditions together (Table 74). 
Terminology and technique varied between construction accident models, yet each 
identified areas of the construction process where failures occur. Tentative evaluations 
of the contents of the construction accident models have been undertaken in relation to 
the systems methodology that was devised. Causal factors identified in the construction 
accident models have been cross-referenced to the findings of the site and latent 
condition follow-up analyses (using an abridged version of Table 74). 
Comparisons have been undertaken only very cautiously, as the style and language was 
quite different in some of the original sources. Detail also varied, according to the nature 
of the source materials used (i. e.: contract research report, journal papers and conference 
proceedings). Nevertheless, the comparison has enabled reinforcement of some of the 
assumptions made during the literature review - that the construction accident models 
did not embrace the systems approach. These results are shown in Table 76. 
The comparisons represented in Table 76 are, for the most part concentrated in the areas 
of `provision of suitable task conditions' and 'role skills, abilities and attitudes'. This 
was expected, given the emphases upon 'unsafe acts and unsafe conditions' typical of the 
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engineering approaches adopted by those modelling construction accidents (3.13). It was 
predominately the models of Suraji et al. (2001) and Whittington et al. (1992) which 
served in development of the focus group discussion themes and this is reflected here, in 
both spread (across all categories) and volume of factors that are compatible with the 
range used in the systems approach. Aspects identified by Goh and Chua (2002), 
although less plentiful in the source material, are also distributed widely. 
Notable omissions from this cross-comparison are the absence of any reference at all to 
some of the findings identified in `provision of necessary hardware for the work' and 
`managing and co-ordinating site personnel'. Construction accident models were 
criticised for their lack of consideration of factors that affect human performance (Hinze 
1996, Abdelhamid and Everett 2000, Suraji et al. 2001, Goh and Chua 2002). The 
absence of any reference to `product: human compatibility' and of many of the aspects 
identified in `managing and co-ordinating site personnel' reinforces this earlier 
observation. Expectance that use of safety management systems would accommodate 
and address these (often longstanding) problems in the construction industry has already 
been questioned in the literature review (3.11.5.1 and 5.9); again, this shortcoming 
appears to be reinforced here. 
Some of the models gave good representation of organisational and extra-organisational 
factors (Whittington et al. 1992, Suraji et al. 2001). Some aspects that they identified 
were not addressed in the latent factor follow-up (such as `environmental legislation', 
Suraji et al. 2001) and further work would be required to explore the relevancy of these 
issues. None of the construction accident models, however, suggested the influences of 
manufacturers and others in an ancillary design role (i. e. there were no cross-references 
to these aspects in `provision of necessary hardware for the work') and this is a new 
finding from the research. 
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9.2 The applied perspective 
The data analysis and interpretation for each phase generated a huge amount of 
information and this section presents the findings in the context of their relevance for 
industry. This is presented in two sections. The first section summarises the main 
themes and proposes recommendations for industry, whereas the second section 
appraises the findings in the context of construction industry initiatives. 
9.2.1 Review and recommendations - proposals for industry 
The scope of this section is to review the nature of failures in construction and where 
needs lie, rather than generate pragmatic solutions to the myriad of problems that were 
identified. These are introduced mainly according to the framework categories 
generated as a result of the focus groups. These have been adapted slightly to avoid 
duplication and facilitate presentation. 
9.2.1.1 Design and task execution: Build scheduling 
The range of skills required to devise a build schedule and project timeline had little 
credibility, were treated informally and appeared to be decided by bartering between the 
client and principal contractor when trying to reach a final agreement. 
From a managerial and organisational perspective (3.6.4 and 3.6.5) build scheduling 
also appeared to contradict the socio-technical systems approach, as it offered little 
`optimisation' for users and had considerable impact upon time pressure (9.2.1.13) later 
during the build process. There is some analogy with the degree of `coupling' in 
manufacturing production systems; build scheduling appeared to be a complex process 
and to be planned according to some of the tightly `coupled' principles (Perrow 1999). 
Tight coupling often failed and a reactive, looser system, ensued. The scheduling 
appeared to become progressively `looser' with each sub-contractor in the chain and as 
time from project initiation increased. 
The industry is also trying to adopt some `just in time' (JTT) efficiency measures 
(8.10.2.2) yet worked reactively (according to prevailing circumstances). This 
appeared to completely contrast the JIT philosophy (Myazaki 1992, Jackson and Martin 
1996). 
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Recommendation 
9 Methods to devise and agree build scheduling and a project timeline need to be 
formalised and carry greater respect among co-disciplines 
" Any variations to the formal agreement need to be justifiable. Competency 
requirements are necessary for anyone involved in re-scheduling. The instigator 
must also retain some responsibility of ownership over the impact that their revised 
calculations might have 
" Scheduling according to rigid work study arrangements would appear inappropriate. 
A more loosely coupled build scheduling is required from the outset, to enable 
accommodation of delays and factors affecting sequence variability (Perrow 1999) 
" Principles from the manufacturing sector may help in devising methods to decouple 
tasks, perhaps by the introduction of buffer zones (Konz 1992), alternative 
sequences, inbuilt time allowances etc. (Perrow 1999) 
" Whether lean manufacturing techniques (such as JIT) can be inbuilt into this `looser 
system' is unknown. Cross-disciplinary intervention (Svenson et al, 1999,3.9.5.4), 
with construction and manufacturing systems expertise, may herald solution 
generation 
9.2.1.2 Design and task execution: Design ownership and liaison issues 
Lack of, or dispersed, design ownership was common; it was very difficult to gauge 
areas of responsibility. The culture of casual or non-recognition of design (when 
undertaken by principal contractors (PC), when left to operatives or when using 
proprietary products) trivialised the inputs of those without architect responsibility, and 
also ensured that there was no `learning' or `reporting' culture (Reason 1997, Table 20). 
Radically different perceptions between the architect and PC about architect 
instructions, site attendance, residual risk etc. suggested further safety culture 
communication failures . 
Recommendation 
9 Non-Architect design would benefit from a strategy to formalise competency 
requirements, responsibility and ownership of interventions 
The industry needs to take measures to raise the profile of, and acknowledge the 
importance of all the non-Architect designers 
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9 Measures to improve communication between off site and senior site personnel are 
required 
9.2.1.3 Design and task execution: Contractual influences 
Different disciplines had varied preferences for different types of contract. Styles 
appeared to offer a variety of benefits and drawbacks, and this had later impact upon 
sub-contractors appointment and time scheduling too. There were frequent requests for 
more guidance from the HSE concerning the health and safety ramifications of the 
varied contract styles. 
Recommendation 
9 There is a need for improved consultation and authoritative guidance on the nature 
and impact of contract type and client intervention 
" The industry and HSE need to improve communication channels so that needs such 
as these can be identified and managed 
9.2.1.4 Design and task execution: Site layout and information requirements 
Drawings of utility service layouts were inadequate. Site layout development appeared 
vulnerable to lack of consideration, or compromise in provision of process / user 
interaction space and facility needs. Problems appeared to result from lack of 
synchronicity with changes in build scheduling and resulted in much wastage (labour / 
resources etc. ) later in the schedule. HSE guidance (Health and Safety Executive 2001) 
and construction information sheets define traffic route needs, but do not seem to 
address the much wider range of issues generated during the interviews. A range of 
welfare measures is described, but these do not cross-reference to provision for 
numbers of people on site (7.4.2.9). 
Recommendation 
9 There is a need to formalise the range of aspects to be considered during the process 
of defining requirements for site layout. 
" Development of the site layout should cross-reference to any ongoing changes in 
build scheduling, so that there is synchronised evolution of each 
" Improved liaison with utility service providers is advisable to generate acceptable 
solutions to the drawing and service inadequacies 
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" More detailed guidelines specifying workspace dimensions and conditions for both 
process and human interaction are required 
" Welfare requirements need to be defined according to numbers accessing them. If 
specifications for general workplace welfare facilities apply to the construction 
sector (Health and Safety Executive 1992), (e. g. numbers of toilets according to 
numbers on site), then this should be detailed in the industry guidance 
9.2.1.5 Design and task execution: Product procurement and supply 
Cost cutting, lack of synchronicity with the build schedule, blurred ownership of 
specification and varied purchasing arrangements between PC and sub-contractors (SC) 
resulted in hardware supply inadequacies. Middle management grades were able to 
operate only reactively to these circumstances - decision-making had not been de- 
centralised (Reason 1997, Table 20), suggesting a safety culture failing. 
There was little apparent hire or purchasing strategy to ensure that products with user 
centred design were targeted for site use; the self-employed received little or no 
guidance at all. Innovative products, with better user-centred design were sometimes 
available, but the customer led culture appeared to ensure that only basic quality and 
range products were made available. 
Recommendation 
" Aspects relating to quality and range of products provided by suppliers need further 
exploration 
9 Middle management personnel need greater authority and autonomy over the 
ordering, scheduling and purchasing of products 
9 The procedures for identifying product specification and purchasing need to be 
much clearer 
To enhance purchasing and determination of safe working practice the industry 
need skills, and guidance about how to evaluate usability and safety features in 
product purchasing 
" Usability evaluation information also needs to be disseminated to retail outlets, 
suppliers and manufacturers 
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9.2.1.6 Design and task execution: Product design. compatibilities and user 
specification 
Many products lacked intuitive design and had poor interface for human interaction and 
performance. Materials integrity and reliability (3.6.3.1) was sometimes poor. 
Common hazards were often overlooked and were `scripted' into every day activities 
(Woodcock 1995). The nature of product development by manufacturers was 
inconsistent - often poorly compatible for their construction industry work 
circumstances or for use with other products, and not developed or trialed in a user- 
centred manner. This was often worst for the less technical / expensive products - 
although this did not necessarily mean that they were used least on site. 
Manufacturers were only variably able to specify a user profile for their products and at 
times had only limited understanding of their product use in practice or that design 
failures may initiate misuse. That `standards and specifications' were accrued poor 
status suggests a lack of consultation and communication in their development and that 
safety cultural issues (Health and Safety Executive 1997b) extend into the extra- 
organisational context. 
Many of the machinery shortfalls directly contravene the mandatory health and safety 
requirements of Annex 1 of the Machinery Directive (Great Britain Parliament 1992) 
(such as details for user-centred design, risk reduction, PPE compatibility, logical 
design or controls etc. ). Non-machinery' items had similar failures, but comparable 
guidelines were not found. 
Recommendation 
" There is need for widespread education and guidance on the employment and 
application of ergonomics principles to the industry, manufacturers and suppliers 
The construction industry needs to explore attitudes that contribute to scripted 
behaviour and devise and adopt remedial measures 
Industry information, guidance and liaison networks need to be developed and 
extended to manufacturers 
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" Manufacturers need to explore measures to integrate ergonomics into the 
development of their designs (e. g. Norris and Wilson 1997) and measures used for 
instruction 
" The reasons for failure to identify and follow mandatory legislatory guidance for 
product safety and design needs to be explored 
" Solutions to manage the regulation: manufacturer: supplier: industry failures must 
be applicable for all products used in the industry 
9.2.1.7 Design and task execution: Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Findings indicate that PPE was often uncomfortable, poorly cared for and that the range 
available for personnel was limited. There was much misunderstanding about range, fit 
and user-centred design and (as above) user specification was poorly defined. 
The mandatory use of PPE appears to contrast with recommendations that it should be 
the last line of defence in control of hazards (2.5.4). Nevertheless, it is required where 
risk remains. Contrasting perceptions between senior and site personnel, on what those 
risks are, suggest a lack of consultation and communication on this issue (Health and 
Safety Executive 1996). The discontent may also reflect failure concerning 
psychosocial issues (3.6.4.1) and protest at lack of individual control and autonomy 
among those at site level (9.2.1.20). 
Recommendation 
" Manufacturers, suppliers and site need to improve their communication of what is 
really needed on site 
9 The PPE purchasing strategy needs review. Better quality products are required; 
purchasers and suppliers need greater knowledge about usability issues and the 
impact of restricted budgeting on quality and usability 
" Provision of storage facilities, improved guidance for care and maintenance and 
definition of responsibilities is required for PPE 
" Requirements for mandatory use of PPE need to be reviewed. This must include 
workforce consultation and representation in solution generation 
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" The culture of acknowledging and managing worker discontent needs to be 
reviewed. Opportunities for consultation and communication need to be enhanced 
and welcomed (Health and Safety Executive 1996) 
9.2.1.8 Planning. scheduling and management: Sub-contractor appointment and 
identi 
Inadequate quantity and quality of communication between principal contractors and 
sub-contractors fuelled feelings of frustration with each other in appointment and 
practice. Sub-contractors were compartmentalised, often isolated and responsibilities 
and ownership of safety decisions and safety training were blurred. These issues 
indicate safety culture failings (Health and Safety Executive 1997b, Table 20). 
Recommendation 
" The industry needs guidance / examples on good communication style. 
Communication channels need to be nurtured and sustained 
" Current arrangements for appointment and liaison need to be evaluated. Distinction 
of responsibilities between contractors is necessary. They also need empowerment 
to challenge and enhance a denigrated role 
9.2.1.9 Planning. scheduling and management: Labour appointment and determination 
of competence 
The industry is hampered by skill and labour shortages. Designated competence 
assessment methods (CSCS) appear to run in parallel with informal `gut reaction' 
evaluations. The CSCS scheme, as yet, is still in early days of introduction, but 
responses do suggest a lack of faith in its credibility (and see 9.2.1.19). 
Recommendation 
9 The CITB (2.5.6) should verify the robustness of their standards for accreditation. 
Measures used in accrediting individuals to the CSCS standard require greater 
publicity to try to foster support 
9.2.1.10 Planning, scheduling and management: Health status and fitness for work 
This is not competently managed and is a longstanding problem in the construction 
industry. HSE have commissioned research into the feasibility of developing a 
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National Occupational Health Scheme for the Construction Industry (Amey Vectra Ltd 
2001). This has widespread support and work is ongoing in this area. 
9.2.1.11 Planning, scheduling and management: Operative supervision 
Perspectives of appropriate management style varied between management and 
operative grades - this appeared to be concurrent with the degree of `coupling' (9.2.1.1) 
in operation. Tight coupling and a top down management style defined the need for 
greater supervision, operative control and definition of `rule based behaviours' 
(Rasmussen 1982, Table 17), yet `loose coupling' at operational level, with high 
decision latitude (knowledge based behaviour), was necessary to deal with the dynamic 
and complex circumstances of the work. A desire for high control over and definition 
of practice is inappropriate (9.2.1.1). These issues suggest failures of an informed 
safety culture in relation to `flexibility and learning' (Reason 1997, Table 20) and lack 
of insight into work design and organisational theories. 
Recommendation 
" The disparity of practice through the phases of management to operational hierarchy 
needs to be addressed. 
. The industry should not try to constrain or control the flexible and dynamic work 
undertaken at operational level 
is The industry should seek advice from industrial sectors where organisations have 
experience of developing and facilitating dynamic group work or teams working 
autonomously 
9.2.1.12 Planning. scheduling and management: Working hours, pay and remuneration 
The industry is not an excluded sector within the Working Time Regulations 
(Department of Trade and Industry 1998a), yet a long hours culture (especially in more 
senior grades), and flexibility in the taking of breaks was the norm. Supplementary 
hours were encouraged (evening and week-end work). Few were on priced work, yet 
there were a myriad of financial incentives (such as `Job and knock' or bonus schemes) 
to `encourage' work pace. Possible detriment to performance from extended work 
hours or time pressure was not acknowledged. 
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Recommendation 
" The industry needs to define boundaries of good practice with regard to working 
hours, breaks, overtime and holidays 
" Manipulation of working arrangements as a motivator / incentive is not acceptable 
" Alternative means of work organisation and means to generate work fulfilment and 
motivation, such as those described in 9.2.1.11, should be explored 
9.2.1.13 Planning. scheduling and management: Time pressures, trade overlap. 
performance and motivation 
Build schedules with inadequate arrangements to accommodate `adversity' were the 
root of many aspects concerning time pressure and trade overlap in a work area. 
Various incentives were used to motivate personnel, with little apparent insight into the 
limiting mitigation that `free choice' will have over poor task workload and interface 
(Center for Chemical Process Safety 1994). Management by competition between 
teams may have a number of sources - desire for first access to access a common work 
area, misplaced understanding of motivation .. or a sweepstake! 
Recommendation 
" Competition for access to a work area is a build scheduling problem (see 9.2.1.1) 
" Alternative strategies for managing and generating better conditions for work teams 
are required (9.2.1.11) 
9.2.1.14 Planning. scheduling and management: Welfare facilities 
The provision of and condition of washing and changing facilities were often deemed 
inadequate (see 9.2.1.2). 
Recommendation 
" Arrangements for managing the condition of welfare facilities need to be reviewed 
9.2.1.15 Planning. scheduling and management: Accident investigation 
Only infrequently did accident records provide information beyond immediate active 
causal factors. Accident investigation is a poor method to gain information about latent 
conditions. `Active' causal factor information suffered inaccuracies; records did not 
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always tally with the `accident involved' person's recollection of the event and were 
vulnerable to selectivity in the information that was presented. These issues typify the 
problems of hindsight bias described by Woodcock (1995), DeJoy (1994) and Barnett 
(1987) in 3.9.4.4. 
Documentation often offered only limited space to provide detail. Neither did it 
encourage more detailed exploration of latent conditions (3.9.4.1). Forms that fulfil 
regulatory requirements appear to endorse only superficial exploration (7.4.2.10), with 
categorisation by type of harmful energy transfer (e. g. `struck by', `fall' etc. ). That 
accident records were used as a forum to register complaints indicates safety culture 
failures in communication (Health and Safety Executive 1997b). 
It was only in a small number of cases that latent conditions were identified as accident 
causal factors. Otherwise, perception and attribution of cause typified the dated blame 
style approach (3.2.2, Heinrich and Granniss 1959). The varied `unsafe acts' in the 
accident reports seem to have served as `decoy phenomena' (Department of Health 
2000, Rasmussen 1990), detracting attention from the range of other possible causal 
factors and certainly the majority of latent conditions. 
Hindsight bias by those responsible for remedial action was common and the view that 
many accidents were pure chance rare events ensured that intervention with any great 
impact was avoided. The lack of remedial action for many events illustrated the degree 
to which adversity had become `scripted' into and accepted as part of daily activities 
(Woodcock 1995,3.9.5.3). Lack of remedial action is also associated with lack of 
ownership for safety decisions (9.2.1.8) and blind faith in site control measures 
(3.6.3.3). 
There was no circulation and publication of the learning experienced from managing 
previous accident causation - suggesting further safety culture failures 
Recommendation 
" Alternative measures for accident investigation are required. This draws upon 
information described in (9.2.2.3) and possible solutions are proposed in (9.5) 
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" The need for measures to disseminate learning from accidents was proposed by 
Whittington et al. (1992), and this issue continues to remain outstanding 
" Learning dissemination and communication must accommodate those providing 
supply and ancillary services to the industry and those with design and planning 
responsibilities 
9.2.1.16 Planning, scheduling and management: Consultation and communication 
Consultation and communication opportunities were available for those in operative 
grades, but there was little sense that they perceived that any real value would be 
acquired from their contributions. Information flow throughout an organisation is a 
fundamental principle of safety culture (Health and Safety Executive 1997b) and this 
suggests that communication channels are inadequately managed. 
Recommendation 
" The industry needs greater understanding of the value of consultation and 
communication 
" The industry needs to fulfil its legislatory requirement for consultation and 
communication (Health and Safety Executive 1996) 
9.2.1.17 Planning. scheduling and management: Provision of suitable task conditions 
Pedestrian routes, workspace, housekeeping, and environmental conditions were often 
inadequate and a source of distress to accident involved personnel. Conditions were 
variable among the sites visited. Whilst rarely identified with as accident causal factors 
within the industry, the lack of importance with which these conditions are attributed 
suggests that these conditions have become `scripted' (Woodcock 1995,3.9.5.3) as 
normal and are overlooked. 
Recommendation 
The industry needs guidance and demonstration on what `acceptable and good 
conditions' mean. 
The industry needs to explore, publicise and embrace solutions (beyond procedures 
or behaviour change) on how to deal with adverse conditions 
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9.2.1.18 Information transfer: Assessing and defining safe practice 
Risk assessments and method statements were a bureaucratic burden, seemingly with 
very little impact at operational level yet useful for demonstrating intent to work with 
`good practice'. Risk assessment was entirely directed towards identification, 
elimination and control of hazards, the failure of which would create `active failures', 
leading to harm, and damage or productivity losses. Hazard control incorporated few 
latent conditions and, where included was heavily orientated towards local physical 
conditions only; there appeared to be no strategy for assessment and management of 
factors that affect performance. 
The risk assessment and method statement documentation was entirely focused upon 
the construction process, `constructocentric' (3.11.1.1), and hence many of the accident 
event activities (set-up, walking about) were not addressed. There was no apparent 
criterion for document preparation and style. That they existed was often a rationale for 
lack of post accident remedial action and their use typified the `defences in depth' 
failures (Rasmussen 1997, Wagenaar 1990) described in 3.6.3.3. 
Recommendation 
" Determination of the circumstances where these documents are appropriate requires 
a clean sheet, cross-disciplinary and participatory approach 
" Alternative measures are required to assess factors that affect performance - latent 
conditions, independently of the risk assessment process (see 9.4.1) 
" Alternative approaches, styles and methods of generating materials must be 
considered 
" Guidance will be required on the style and usability of whatever materials are 
finally chosen 
" Training and education will be required for those with responsibilities for whatever 
measures are finally chosen - these must address user centred needs 
9.2.1.19 Information transfer: Instruction, guidance on safe practice and skills 
development 
Much of the various documentation used for `assessing and defining safe practice' was 
inappropriate for instruction and training; they served more so as control measures for 
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site (Stanton and Baber 1996, Dekker 2002) and offered little in terms of user 
centeredness. On the job training appeared to lack structure, learning objectives or 
competent trainers, yet was the foundation learning source for many. 
`Training' had ritualistic qualities, and appeared to be tied in with realising finances 
from the CITB bursary scheme. Training generally focused on the use of different 
pieces of equipment, and the application of this knowledge in the context of the works 
process was not clear or apparent in review of training for the accident activity. The 
skills of experienced personnel, in dealing with novel situations, appeared to lack a 
training strategy. That many site personnel rued the imbalance of theoretical: practical 
skills' training suggests lack of evaluation of training needs effectiveness too. At worst, 
toolbox talks were used as disciplinary measures - behavioural control - which is 
inappropriate and gives a poor image of the value of training in the industry. Many of 
the training and procedural problems summarised by Reason (1997), Sanders and 
McCormick (1992) Center for Chemical Process Safety (1994) and Rasmussen (1997) 
in Table 19, epitomise the research findings. 
Recommendation 
" The CITB need to review whether the bursary scheme invites misappropriation of 
'fi g. 
" Training needs much greater transferability to works processes. Fresh training 
needs analysis is required (a clean sheet, cross-disciplinary and participatory 
approach), giving priority to the development of user centred materials and methods 
- for personnel of all levels of experience 
" On the job learning also needs revision. As a formal training method it needs a 
structured approach with proper learning objectives and acknowledgement and 
development of the `training providers'. 
. Methods should be developed to evaluate efficiency of all training methods 
"A network of consultation and communication, accessible by all personnel, is 
required, to canvas training opinions and needs requirements, to facilitate early, 
directed and user centred interventions 
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9.2.1.20 Roles. skills. abilities and attitudes 
Job titles have subtly different meanings between different sites. Many roles are poorly 
defined and poorly understood throughout the hierarchy of the industry - especially 
between those on and off site. There is, nonetheless, tremendous reliance upon 
euphemistic `core skills'. 
A high degree of flexibility is expected from those at site level. This receives resigned 
acceptance by supervisory staff; their role is highly reactive to circumstances, yet the 
problem solving, variety and authority this provides appears to offer them some element 
of job satisfaction. On the other hand, flexibility is sometimes deplored by trade and 
operative grades, for whom ownership and recognition for the quality of their work is 
almost entirely dependent upon the job satisfaction they perceive upon work 
completion. From a psychosocial perspective (3.6.4.1), their work is low status, 
inconsistently managed, undervalued and not `jointly optimised' from a socio-technical 
system (Warr 1987) perspective. There appears to be no application or recognition of 
job characteristics or job design theories (Carayon and Lim 1999) and `work to rule' 
and fierce defence of any tangible sense of autonomy and authority appears to be an 
understandable response. It is possible too that this may have some impact upon 
perception of site safety interventions (9.2.1.7). 
Recommendation 
9 Measures to learn about the skill range and practices of construction industry 
professionals and trades are required 
" The industry needs to investigate different styles of job design and look to 
alternative styles of work organisation, that might abate the negative aspects of the 
traditional management style (ties in with 9.2.1.11) 
" The industry needs to understand the benefits of alternative organisational styles, 
learn from the experiences of other industries and undertake interventions as a 
cross-disciplinary and participatory intervention 
. There is an urgent need for greater understanding of psychosocial issues, human 
capabilities and performance throughout the construction industry 
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9.2.1.21 Summary of proposals for industry 
There were three recurring themes in `appraisal, review and recommendations - 
proposals for industry'. Firstly, there were numerous incidences of poor consultation, 
communication and co-operation throughout the organisational and extra-organisational 
hierarchy, suggesting safety culture failures. There is tremendous potential for 
improvement through the application of ergonomics principles - reflecting a need for 
guidance, education and greater dissemination of this learning. Product manufacturers 
and suppliers for the construction industry need to be brought into the information and 
communication circle. 
Secondly, organisational failures appear to arise from a strange dichotomy of practice. 
Planned at organisational levels with tight coupling and a high level of 
proceduralisation, rules and control - but contrasted with a need for flexibility and 
autonomy at site level. The numerous cases of `defences in depth' and behavioural 
control suggest little insight or understanding of the benefits of alternative job and work 
design strategies. 
The third theme accommodated the many cases of `scripted' behaviour (also described 
as habitual blindness) where issues such as planning problems, role clarity problems, 
design problems, training problems etc. are just not seen by those within the industry, 
suppliers or manufacturers. There were many recommendations for a clean sheet, 
participatory approach in solution generation and many instances where guidance and 
example from other industries would be appropriate. 
9.2.2 Overview of construction industry initiatives 
The construction industry historically has a strong desire to improve performance and is 
in the process of a number of new initiatives (2.5). These are overviewed in the light of 
the research findings, to explore whether accident causation has been suitably addressed 
9.2.2.1 `Rethinking Construction' initiatives 
`Drivers for change' (Figure 2), such as 'leadership', `commitment', `quality' and 
`commitment to people' all appear to accommodate many of the issues that have been 
identified in the research findings. That respect for people is isolated and that target 
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areas to accommodate a `diverse workforce, site welfare, health, safety, lifelong 
learning and off-site welfare' (Respect for People Working Group 2000), is promising. 
However, overview of the demonstration project initiatives (Table 6), and key 
performance indicators for both (including Table 7) give only limited impression of 
socio-technical approaches. Some benefit to personnel should arise through partnering 
and supply chain integration (i. e., from improved communication and co-operation), but 
it is not known to what extent are these user-centred in designs? The focus of `Respect 
for people' initiatives is upon improving workplace conditions and personal 
development, but there is no suggestion of work organisational or job design changes, 
which appear to be the source of many of the latent conditions. A `Hawthorne effect' 
may see some positive changes, but whether this is sustainable (3.6.3.3) remains to be 
seen. 
9.2.2.2 General initiatives to improve health and safety 
The ten-point strategy of the `Revitalising Health and Safety' initiatives (2.5.3) appears 
to offer many opportunities to take positive remedial action for many of the failure 
types observed. The targets are general, however, and need to be seen in the context of 
legislatory and construction specific initiatives that might facilitate their 
implementation. 
9.2.2.3 General le sgi latory initiatives 
The legislatory initiatives champion the risk assessment and risk management approach 
to prevent hazards and control risk (2.5.4). However, evaluation of this process 
(9.2.1.18) identified that latent conditions were not comprehensively addressed in risk 
assessment - or only so if they had the potential to become `active' factors in accident 
causation. Strategies used in Safety Management Systems were deemed inappropriate 
for construction accident modelling (3.11.5.1) or as a framework for analysis and 
representation of the results (5.9), and comparison with the risk assessment process 
appears to reinforce this. Learning from earlier accident causation research has not 
been disseminated into assessment (comparable to risk assessment) of latent conditions. 
This would require assessment of factors that affect performance -'performance 
assessment' - comparable to the risk assessment process. 
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`Revitalising Health and Safety' has arisen as a 25-year review of the Health and Safcty 
at Work Act, 1974, (HASAWA) (Great Britain Parliament 1974) and this would seem 
to be a prime opportunity to reconsider the approaches of the HSE. As a topical 
example to the research and legislatory review, Section 6(1)(a) states: 
"It shall be the duty of any person who designs, manufactures, imports or 
supplies any article for use at work to ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, that the article is so designed and constructed as to be safe and 
without risk to health when properly used" 
Understanding of latent conditions and factors that affect performance suggest that `safe 
and without risk to health' is not enough. That HASAWA, in isolation, would not bring 
about significant change to health and safety is not a new concept (Stubbs, 1992), but it 
is suggested that the anticipated benefits of the EC Framework and daughter Directives 
(2.5.4) are also limited in their influence upon accident prevention. The regulatory 
guidance and risk assessment process offer some redress but, given the research 
findings, seem to have had limited impact upon the full range of latent conditions 
outside the immediate health, safety, hazard and risk reduction arena. 
9.2.2.4 Construction industry le isgi latorv initiatives 
Overview of the distribution of findings from the research (Table 74) has helped in 
evaluation of the efficacy of the Construction, Design and Management Regulations 
(CDM), 1994 and Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996 (2.5.4). 
Despite the `strategic approach to health and safety in project design, procurement, 
planning, preparation and execution', (Allan 2000), failures are apparent across all 
areas. That so many of the research findings concerned (1) poor liaison between 
contractors, manufacturers and suppliers and (2) work organisational issues, suggests 
that emphasis on the construction process alone is inappropriate. 
A `constructocentric' approach (lack of socio-technical principles) was heavily 
criticised in evaluation of construction accident models (3.11), and this problem appears 
to be replicated in the construction industry legislation. CDM, by identifying design 
and planning appears to address what would be considered `root causes' in the 
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construction accident causation. In doing so it appears to give only scant attention to 
the social needs - management of people rather than the process. 
9.3 Contribution to knowledge and directions for future work 
This is the first type of research of its kind, undertaking detailed investigation of a 
range of construction accidents in order to identify causal factors. Previous 
construction accident research, by epidemiological style analyses or use of secondary 
data sources, has revealed a wealth of information but also identified that any 
shortcomings or bias in the data source are reflected in the quality of interpretations 
made (Suraji et al. 2001, Whittington et al. 1992). 
Through systematic analysis of accident causation and construction accident modelling, 
key features of a systems approach for use in construction accident investigation were 
identified. -Techniques were developed to acquire, analyse and represent details of 
active and latent factors. Findings were widespread; whilst often duplicating those 
from previous research, they also revealed that many of the unrecognised problems 
hailed from a lack of consideration of factors that affect human performance. Findings 
also revealed that manufacturers of construction products, although not previously 
acknowledged as construction accident extra-organisational latent conditions, are 
significant players in accident trajectories. 
The data collection, analysis and representation techniques are as yet only in early 
stages of development. Nevertheless they provided baseline methods that served in the 
transfer of accident causation models into accident investigation techniques (Benner 
1985). These would be enhanced by further development, the use of cross-disciplinary 
input, and iterative development to enhance the content and style. Future work might 
also incorporate the generation of alternative methods of data collection and analysis, in 
order to explore repeatability of the subjective impressions made by the researcher. 
It was not possible to include the desired sample of housing and engineering 
construction accidents in this research. The profile of the research sample (6.1) also 
suggested that many accidents occurred in transit (rather than at task) and that there 
were time of day peaks. It is expected that the sample of 100 accidents might 
counterbalance under-representation of the two construction work areas and, with a 
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larger source of data, enable the creation of a more extensive profile to strengthen the 
research findings. 
9.4 The way forward 
Beyond the future work directly associated with the research methodology (above) , 
two areas were particularly isolated as routes for future research and intervention. 
9.4.1 Integrating the accident investigation, risk and performance assessment 
processes 
Findings from the literature review suggested many types of shortcomings in the 
process of accident investigation (3.9.5). To a certain extent these were apparent in 
evaluation of accident study accident records - at times incomplete data or a forum to 
blame or complain. Accident investigation did not appear to be a particularly efficient 
way to identify causal factors, especially latent conditions (9.2.1.15). Risk assessment 
appeared to address little more than `active' factors in accident causation (9.2.1.18) and 
`performance assessment' was identified as a necessary means to comprehensively 
identify latent conditions for accident prevention. 
Figure 28, reproduces the model of organisational accident causation (Reason 1995) 
and, beneath it, compares the current and proposed assessment process. The risk 
assessment process concerns the control of hazards and is thus focused close to the 
point of `defences'. The `branches' generated from the risk assessment are there to 
illustrate that the hazards for a particular activity occur in the person /team, workplace 
and (less commonly) organisational issues. As the purpose of the risk assessment is to 
ensure that hazards are controlled, the branches represent following the traditional 
routes of risk assessment, in the prevention of unsafe acts (such as the provision of 
training) and unsafe conditions (such as environmental parameters etc. ) that aid in 
mitigation of the risk. 
The problem with this system is that, for many of the accidents, risk had not been 
identified and even where it had, isolation of aspects that could induce hazards did not 
adequately address the broad range of latent conditions in accident causation - 
especially where there was no task association. To address this, the proposed additional 
system to assess factors that might affect performance - `performance assessment' 
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would provide comprehensive baseline data of latent conditions. Following the active 
and latent failure pathway in accident investigation would then enable access to a much 
wider source of information than is provided through the risk assessment process. 
Further research is required to explore the integration of accident investigation, 
performance and risk assessment information. 
Person` 
Organisation Workplace Outcome 
team 
Management Error and 
decisions and violation Errors and f A id t [patlwoy organisational producing vio ations 
cc en 
processes conditions 
Latent failure pathway (Reason 
1995) 
Risk assessment pathway 
Risk and performance assessment pathway 
Figure 28. Current and proposed assessments to prevent accident causation 
In representing dynamic accident data, Svedung and Rasmussen 2002, proposed tracing 
back the accident sequence to those at higher levels whose decisions, under `normal 
conditions', had influenced outcome (3.9.3.2). These principles could also be applied 
to the `performance assessment' as this would define the standards adopted for `normal 
conditions' within an organisation. Consequently, this would entail a need to set 
standards for `performance assessment' and ensure that competent personnel undertake 
assessment and evaluation. These are, in any case, baseline proposals of the research 
appraisal, review and recommendations (9.2.1). Many `performance standards' could 
be extrapolated from existing CE /British Standard and HSE guidance or codes of 
practice - whether these would fulfil all aspects identified and be presented in an 
appropriate style should be the subject of further research. 
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9.4.2 Construction accident modelling 
Appraisal of the construction accident models revealed numerous failures (3.11), 
essentially focused upon `constructocentrism', poor categorisation and over-emphasis 
upon blame and unsafe acts. This appraisal was made possible by the evaluation of a 
much wider pool of pan-industry accident causation findings from which to cross- 
compare (3.5). This chapter, `appraisal, review and recommendations', has revealed 
many instances where the construction industry had become insular and needed to look 
outside its own boundaries and capitalise upon learning experiences from elsewhere. 
Consideration of these points suggests that a model specifically for the construction 
industry is not appropriate - whilst the construction process is unique, accident 
causation is concerned with identification of active and latent factors - and these are 
mainstream issues affecting all employment types. The need to model these to the life 
cycle and dynamic interaction of processes has already been identified (Rasmussen 
1997) and fits into to existing accident modelling. 
To ensure that the construction industry has future access to general information on 
accident causation it needs to remain in the arena of `organisational accidents' and any 
future developments. Reason's (1995) model of organisational accident causation has 
been relevant for the research, but extra-organisational issues (described in free-text by 
Reason 1995, were misleadingly under-represented. Reason's model has been 
annotated to redress this (Figure 29). 
Extra- 
organisation 
Organisation Workplace 
Person/ 
team 
Outcome 
Regulators, Management Error and 
Manufacturers ! 
-decisions 
and . violation 
Errors and id 
and suppliers organisational producing violations 
Acc ent 
wä processes conditions 
II 
Latent failure pathway 
Figure 29. Revised model of accident causation 
The challenge to the industry now is to generate comprehensive techniques, to ensure 
adequate address in the construction context, of active and latent failure pathways. The 
broad range of issues proposed in this thesis, such as the integrated accident 
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investigation, performance and risk assessment described in (9.4.1) and proposed 
development of the methodology (9.3) need to be drawn together for a more succinct 
assessment. These aspects would be need to be the subject of future work. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Findings show that accident causation in the construction industry is multi-factorial. As 
might be expected, there were many localised aspects such as the work tasks, work 
methods and physical conditions implicated in the accidents studied. Previous research 
has traced construction accident causation, using `root cause' analysis, through to lack 
of `health and safety' in design and planning, and these issues too continued to emerge 
during the accident studies included in this research. 
However, that many of the findings revisit old ground from earlier research - issues 
such as design and organisation of site, equipment and PPE, supervision and training 
etc., suggests failure in previous remedial measures and initiatives. The wide scope of 
the analysis in this research, collecting data not only from site, but also about issues 
concerning the early project lifecycle or influences from extra-organisational factors, 
offered new perspectives on these old problems. 
Exploration of the accident latent conditions revealed that an tinder-estimated and 
unexplored problem affecting the construction industry was the isolation of 
manufacturers and suppliers from the learning and information loop, which resulted in 
products with poor compatibility for user and task needs. 
Within the industry, the main problems were the lack of a socio-technical approach, the 
organisational culture and the style of safety management systems. Safety management 
was found to be heavily focused upon risk assessment and hazard reduction measures; 
as such, the range of latent conditions were not comprehensively explored and only 
construction centred, `constructocentric' failures were identified. The style of safety 
management complemented the traditional organisational culture -a rule based, highly 
proceduralised approach, with multiple and burdensome interventions to control both 
process and individuals. This completely contrasted needs and working methods at 
operational levels, where high decision latitude and autonomy was required to 
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accommodate the perpetual flux and unique circumstances that typified much of the 
working day. 
There were incidences of considerable effort by the construction industry in trying to 
follow HSE legislatory and regulatory guidance, yet this appeared to have played a 
hand in some of the problems experienced. Risk assessment is the foundation stone of 
health and safety management, yet appears to identify mainly `active' factors that 
(when control fails) become hazards and hence risk factors for injury. In contrast, 
latent conditions in accident causation are a complex amalgamation of antecedent 
events and conditions. Degradation or impact upon performance may be more subtle 
than an `active' event yet, unless latent conditions have the potential for an `overt' 
association with the risk or hazard in accident occurrence, they appear to be given little 
attention. Safety management systems may be barking up the right accident `tree' ... 
but only at the leaves! 
Appraisal of the accident investigation process identified numerous problems and 
concluded that in its current state, this technique is not the most efficient way to explore 
accidents and especially latent conditions. Alternative methods, such as `performance 
assessment', are required. Much of this information will be available within HSE 
`guidance' or `codes of practice', but further work will be necessary to adapt the style 
to inter-link with `active' data collection methods and to ensure that the range of 
information is comprehensive. 
The industry can help itself by benchmarking with industries that have moved away 
from the traditional organisational and safety management approaches. Instead of ever 
tighter controls it needs to embrace the flexibility and skills of those at the operational 
level and devise and engender different organisational methods to accommodate and 
nurture this. This, in any case, would be sympathetic with the current industry 
improvement initiatives. The additional challenge would be to devise changes that are 
compatible with management and contracting methods; the ultimate solution may well 
entail concomitant development of each to ensure compatibility. 
A final cautionary note is that, despite its enormity, the industry appears quite insular. 
It is entrenched in the concepts of control and behavioural safety and quite possibly any 
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moves away from this may be a complete anathema to some; any intervention will need 
careful management, leadership, participatory processes and cross-disciplinary 
development. 
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